d7gdg
-
Upload
bkaaljdaelv -
Category
Documents
-
view
221 -
download
0
Transcript of d7gdg
![Page 1: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 1/29
Behavioral Finance Definitions
Behavioral Finance, a study of investor market behavior that
derives from psychological principles of decision making, to
explain why people buy or sell the stocks they do.
The linkage of behavioral cognitive psychology, which studies
human decision making, and financial market economics.
Behavioral Finance focuses upon how investors interpret and act on
information to make informed investment decisions. Investors do
not always behave in a rational, predictable and an unbiased
manner indicated by the uantitative models. Behavioral finance places an emphasis upon investor behavior leading to various
market anomalies.
![Page 2: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 2/29
Behavioral Finance !romise
Behavioral Finance promises to make economic models better at explaining
systematic "non#idiosyncratic$ investor decisions, taking into consideration
their emotions and cognitive errors and how these influence decision making.
Behavioral Finance is not a branch of standard finance% it is its replacement,
offering a better model of humanity.
&reate a long term advantage by understanding the role of investor psychology
'uman flaws pointed out by the analysis of investor psychology are consistent
and predictable, and that they offer investment opportunities.
![Page 3: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 3/29
!recursors to Behavioral Finance
(alue investors proposed that markets over reacted to negative news.
Ben)amin *raham and David Dodd in their classic book, +ecurity nalysis,
asserted that over reaction was the basis for a value investing style.
David Dreman in -/0 argued that stocks with low !12 ratios were undervalued,coining the phrase overreaction hypothesis to explain why investors tend to be
pessimistic about low !12 stocks.
Tversky and Daniel 3ahneman published two articles in -/4 in +cience. They
showed heuristic driven errors, and in -/ in 2conometrica, they focused on
representativeness heuristic and frame dependence.
![Page 4: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 4/29
Two Important +tudies
5 re euity valuation errors are systematic and therefore predictable6 7 2fficient markets view8 prices follow a random walk, though prices fluctuate to extremes, they
are brought back "regression to the mean$ to euilibrium in time.
7 Behavioral finance view8 prices are pushed by investors to unsustainable levels in bothdirections. Investor optimists are disappointed and pessimists are surprised. +tock prices are
future estimates, a forecast of what investors expect tomorrow9s price to be, rather than anestimate of the present value of future payments streams.
7 2arly studies focused on relative strength strategies that buy past winners and sell past losers
5 :erner De Bondt and ;ichard Thaler -0< 7 Investor =verreaction 'ypothesis opposes 2fficient >arkets 'ypothesis
7 ;e)ection of ;egression to the >ean which says prices operating in the context of extremehighs and lows balance each other
5 +hefrin and +tatman -0< 7 Disposition 2ffect suggests investors relate to past winners differently "they keep winners in
their portfolio$ than past losers "they sell past losers$
7 =dean applied the Disposition 2ffect in vivo context
![Page 5: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 5/29
:erner De Bondt and ;ichard Thaler -0< study
De Bondt and Thaler extended Dreman9s reasoning to predict a new anomaly.
They refer to representativeness, that investors become overly optimistic about
recent winners and overly pessimistic about recent losers.
5 They applied Tversky and 3ahneman9s representativeness to market pricing
7 =verweight salient information such as recent news
7 ?nderweight salient data about long term averages
5 Investors overreact to both bad news and good news.
![Page 6: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 6/29
De Bondt and Thaler +tudy
;obert +hiller proposed prices show excess volatility.
That is, dividends do not vary enough to rationally )ustify observed aggregate
price movements
In spite of dividends, investors seem to attach disproportionate importance toshort run economic developments.
Two 'ypotheses8 2ach a violation of weak form market efficiency.
-. 2xtreme movements in stock prices will be followed by subseuent price
movements in the opposite direction.
@. The more extreme the initial price movement, the greater will be the
subseuent ad)ustment.
![Page 7: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 7/29
De Bondt and Thaler -0< study "cont$
=verreaction leads past losers to become under priced and past winners to become
overpriced.
De Bondt and Thaler propose a strategy of buying recent losers and selling recentwinners. Investors become too pessimistic about past losers and overly
optimistic about past winners.
![Page 8: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 8/29
De Bondt and Thaler -0< study "cont$
De Bondt and Thaler studied two portfolios of A< stocks
=ne consisting of past extreme winners over the prior three years
=ne consisting of past extreme losers over the prior three years
!ast losers subseuently outperformed winners over the next four years.!ast losers were up -. percent relative to the market in general.
!ast winners were down five percent relative to the market in general.
difference of @4. percent between the two portfolios.
+tudy suggests that investors cause market prices to deviate from fundamentalvalues creating inefficient markets8 due to representativeness heuristic
markets9 treatment of past winners and losers is not efficient.
![Page 9: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 9/29
De Bondt and Thaler study
=ther Findings8
-. The overreaction effect is asymmetric8 it is much larger for losers than
winners.
@. >ost of the excess returns are realiCed in anuary. "-.E of the @4.E$A. The overreaction phenomenon mostly occurs during the second and third
year of the test period. "By the end of the first year the difference in the two
portfolios is a mere <.4E$
![Page 10: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 10/29
&ritics of De Bondt and Thaler -0< study
;eversion to the mean explanation offered by >alkeil consistent with efficient
markets hypothesis
suCsanna Fluck, ;ichard Guandt, and >alkeil study
+imulated an investment strategy of buying stocks which had poor recent twoor three year performance.
They found8 in the -0Hs, -Hs, those stocks did en)oy improved returns in
the next period of time, but they recovered only to the average stock market
performance.
It was a statistical pattern of return reversal, but to appropriate levels "they did
not overshoot levels$.
Fama and French% and !oterba and +ummers studies8
![Page 11: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 11/29
>ore &ritics
Two alternative 'ypotheses8 to overreaction.
-. ;isk &hange 'ypothesis8 overreaction is rational response to risk changes"short term earnings outlook changes$ as measured by Betas
@. Firm siCe8 past loser portfolio made up of small firms
Disturbing factors-. +easonal pattern of returns "anuary turn of the yearJ effect$
@. The characteristics of the firms in the portfolios "+mall siCe$
A. &o#relation is asymmetric
De Bondt and Thaler9s response
The data do not support either of these explanations. It is emotional shifts inmood of investorsKbiased expectations of the future, not rational shifts ineconomic conditions
see also, -H paper8 Do +ecurity nalysts =verreact6 yes
![Page 12: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 12/29
But what about6
egadeesh demonstrated shorter term reversals8 one week or one month
though these results are transaction intenseJ
*rinblatt and Titman -0, -- relative strength strategies8 they showed a
tendency to buy stocks that have increased in price over the previous uarter,
based on past relative strength
![Page 13: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 13/29
Integrating results
&ontrarian strategies work with
-. (ery short periods "one week, one month$
@. (ery long periods "A to < years$
*rowth "relative strength strategies$ work with three to -@ months
egadeesh and Titman "-A$ studied period -<#0 found8
three to -@ months earned average of .<E "six months earned -@E$
then reversals, -@#@4 months lost 4.<E
for earnings announcements8
past winners earned positive returns for the first seven months
past losers earned positive returns for -A month period assessment
![Page 14: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 14/29
Dreman9s research
5 +ample of -<HH largest stocks, each over a billion in capitaliCation
5 Develop a portfolio of stocks with low !12 ratio
5 !ortfolio established in -/H
5 By -/ portfolio grew from L-H,HHH to LH,HHH while the market benchmark was
LA@,HHH.
&ontrarian portfolios did better in down markets
During down uarters over the years, market averaged down /.<E% &ontrarian portfolio
down 4E
Dreman emphasiCed the importance of reinforcing events and event triggersJ creating
perceptual change
5 !ositive +urprises are very favorable for unpopular stocks "not so for popular stocks$
5 Megative +urprises are very conseuential for popular stocks "not so for unpopular
stocks$
![Page 15: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 15/29
:hat it means6
&onsistent with positive feedback tradersJ hypothesis on market price
>arket under reacts to information about the short term prospects of firms but
overreacts to information about their long term prospects
This is plausible given that the nature of the information available abouta firm9s short term prospects, such as earnings forecasts, is different form the
nature of the more ambiguous information that is used by investors to assess a
firm9s longer term prospects
David Dreman8 &ontrarian strategies do better than the market over time
Importance of earnings surprises on popular and unpopular stocks
reveals a market sentiment is significant
![Page 16: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 16/29
+pecific over and under market reactions
>arkets over react to I!=s
>arkets under react to8 earnings announcements, dividend announcements, open
market share repurchases, brokerage recommendations
Investors systematically under weight "conservative$8 abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information,
while they over weight "representativeness heuristic$
salient, anecdotal, and extreme information
![Page 17: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 17/29
2xplanations1Theories for ?nder and =ver reaction
3ent Daniel, David 'irshleifer and vanidhar +ubrahmanyam
Investor =verconfidence and biased self attributionJ
(ariations in investor confidence which is an over estimation of ability to
value stocks and predict future prices arising from biased self attributionwhich is confirming information in the public arena encourages but
disconfirming information does not discourage, "blames others$ leads to
market over and under reaction to information$
![Page 18: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 18/29
Daniel, 'irshleifer and +ubrahmanyan "cont$
5 +hifts in investors9 confidence cause
7 Megative long lag auto correlations "&ontrarian strategies$
7 2xcess volatility relative to fundamentals "variance$
7 !redictability about future prices
5 +hifts in investors9 self attribution cause
7 +hort lag autocorrelation "momentum strategies$
7 +hort run earnings drift in the direction of earnings surprise
7 bnormal stock performance in the opposite direction of long term earnings
changes. "Megative correlation between future returns and long term past stock
market performance$
![Page 19: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 19/29
Daniel, 'irshleifer and +ubrahmanyan "cont$
Theory is based on investor overconfidence, and on changes in confidence
resulting from biased self attribution of investment outcomes
5 Investors will overreact to private information signals creates momentum in
price "either absent public information to support price, or assuming public
information confirm private signals, orN.
5 Investors will under react to public information signals "avoids correction in
stock price until it goes to extreme$
?nlike noise trader approach, this theory posits that investors misinterpret genuine
new private information.
![Page 20: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 20/29
2xplanations1Theories "cont$
Barberis, +hlieifer and (ishny -0
Oearning model explanation
ctual earnings follow a random walk, but individual s believe that
earnings follow either a steady growth trend, or else
earnings are mean reverting.
;epresentativeness heuristic "finds patterns in data too readily, tends to over react to
information$ and conservatism "clings to prior beliefs, under reacts to information$.
Interaction of representativeness heuristic and conservatism8 explains short term under
reaction and long term over reaction
Investor9s reaction to current information condition on past information. Investor tends
to under react to information that is preceded by a small uantity of similar information
and to over react to information that is preceded by a large uantity of similar
information.
![Page 21: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 21/29
2xplanations1Theories "cont$
'ong and +tein -/
?nder and =ver reactions arise from the interaction of momentum traders and
news watchers
>omentum traders make partial use of the information continued in recent price
trends, and ignore fundamental news
Fundamental traders rationally use fundamental news but ignore prices.
![Page 22: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 22/29
2xplanations1Theories "cont$
Bloomfiled, Oibby and Melson
Traders in experimental markets undervalue the information of others
!eople with evidence that is favorable but unrealiCable tend to overreact toinformation, whereas people with evidence that is somewhat favorable but
reliable under react
![Page 23: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 23/29
=ptimism, =verconfidence, and =dean9s ;esearch
!eople are overly optimistic
5 !eople believe that they are less likely to get hit by a bus or be robbed than
their neighbors
!eople are overconfident in their own abilities
5 Driving skills and social skills are better
5 Mew business owners believe their business has a /HE chance of success, but
only AHE succeed
5 'elps soldiers cope with war
=verconfidence and the stock market
5 =verconfidence can lead to substantial losses when investors overestimate their
ability to identify the next >icrosoft or maCon
5 +ecurities that investors purchase under perform those they sell
![Page 24: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 24/29
BenartCi, 3ahneman and Thaler survey on
=verconfidence
+urvey of >orningstar -H<A subscribers
5 04E male, average age is 4<, annual in come LA,HHH
5 verage allocation to stocks is /E
5 =ptimism uestion8 7 Thinking about financial decisions, do you spend more time thinking about the
potential return or the possible loss6
7 :hat do you think is the likelihood of stocks outperforming bonds in the long run6
5 =verconfidence and =ptimism decided by
7 nswer to the uestion about likelihood of stocks outperforming bonds
7 sset allocation of retirement contributions of stocks vs. bonds
![Page 25: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 25/29
=dean9s study of overconfidence in the marketplace
:hat happens in financial markets when people are overconfident6
5 Trading volume increases8 overconfidence generates trading. Those who trade
more freuently fare worse than those who trade less
5 =verconfident traders hold under#diversified portfolios% riskier portfolios
though they have the same degree of risk aversion
5 =verconfident insiders improve price uality% overconfident noise traders
worsen it
5 >en are more overconfident than women% men trade more freuently "4<E
more$ than women, men earn less returns than women "one percent less$.
5 +ingle men and single women the results are larger "/E more trading, -.4E
less$
![Page 26: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 26/29
Trading Behavior and ;eturns
Individual investors who hold common stock directly pay a tremendous
performance penalty for active trading
5 =dean study trading can be haCardous to your wealthJ
7 +tudied ,4< households from -- to -
7 >ost freuent traders earn --.4E "turn over /<E of portfolio$
7 verage household earned -.4E
7 >arket benchmark was -/.E
5 =dean study on =n line traders
7 +tudied -H/ traders on line, compared with -H/ telephone traders
7 =n line traders experienced strong performance prior to going on line
7 fter on line, less profitable, lagging the market by three points
7 2xplained by overconfidence, self attribution bias, illusion of knowledge, and
illusion of control
![Page 27: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 27/29
=verconfidence and the Disposition 2ffect
Investors weight recent observations too heavily "representativeness heuristic$
Investors under weight prior information
Investors commit the gambler9s fallacy8 expecting recent events "downturns in
stock prices$ to reverse
Disposition effect8 Investors hold on to losers in their portfolio "because they can9t
be wrong$, and sell winners.
Investors )udge their decision on the basis of the returns realiCed not paper money
returns, then holding losers will avoid confronting their true abilities.
Investors won9t learn from mistakes, continue as overconfident.
=dean9s research confirms Disposition 2ffect
=dean looks at trading decisions of investors at discount brokerage
+tocks traders buy under perform those that they sell
![Page 28: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 28/29
Oevel of =ver#confidence changes dynamically
Depending upon the success of failure, level of overconfidence changes
5 trader is not overconfident when he begins to trade
5 =verconfidence increase over his first several trading periods early in his
career
7 These overconfident traders survive the threat of arbitrage, that is, they are not the
poorest traders
7 Initial success increases overconfidence
5 =verconfidence declines thereafter
![Page 29: d7gdg](https://reader033.fdocuments.mx/reader033/viewer/2022051008/5695d04c1a28ab9b0291e0f9/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
7/23/2019 d7gdg
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/d7gdg 29/29
'omework ssignment8 Disposition 2ffect and De
Bondt and Thaler9s study
'omework assignment8 'ow do you suare the Disposition 2ffect with the !rice
;eversals Oiterature "see De Bondt and Thaler -0< study$6