Colo Vol. 5

353
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Transcript of Colo Vol. 5

 
This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project
to make the world’s books discoverable online.
It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject
to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books
are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that’s often difficult to discover.
Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book’s long journey from the
publisher to a library and finally to you.
Usage guidelines
Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to
prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.
We also ask that you:
+  Make non-commercial use of the files  We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for
personal, non-commercial purposes.
+  Refrain from automated querying  Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google’s system: If you are conducting research on machine
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
+  Maintain attribution  The Google “watermark” you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
+  Keep it legal  Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other
countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can’t offer guidance on whether any specific use of 
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book’s appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.
About Google Book Search
Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers
discover the world’s books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web
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Carlisle v. Cooper............. 299 Culverv.ThirdN.B'kofChica
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Carpenterv. Williamson....... 8
Castello v. St. LouisCircuitCourt374 Dayv. Hall... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
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--------------------------61,63 Delafieldv.State. . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
Charlesv.Davis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 | Delaware&H.CanalCo.v.The
Charlesv.Eshleman..... . . . . . 114 Penn.Coal ...............292
Chasev. bury. . . . . . . . . . . 470 Den. Fen.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...357
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Cheeseboroughv. Millard. . . . . . 101 | &M.'R.Co.v.Wan
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March,A.D.1880,thesamebeingoneofthedaysofth regular
anesteem be ofthisbar,hasbeencalledtodepartthis life,
‘ ShallnotteJudgeofall the_earthdoright?
waseminentlyfi tedbyhis great ability, noble character, and
variedexperience,torender invaluable assistancein buildingup
our State institutionsuponthebroadfoundations ofjusticeand
virtuesoftheirhusbandandfather. Tothemhis deathwasthe
theirwidowhoodandorphanagetheyhaveour sincere sympathy.
oneofthelastsadritesto eprtedbrother;butifthe dread
tionsonthedeathofHon.JohnQ.R. King,totheSupremCourt
ofJ. J.Tatmanfor murder,inApril,1866,atPaducah,Ky. Gov.
Kingwas at that time in the meridia ofsuccess asa om
inentlawyerandcitizen. Hehadalargeandlucrativepractice;
throughout SouthwesternKentucky;hewaspopular and om
cameacquaintedwithGov. Kingin thespring 65 when I
wenttoPaducah,Ky.,withmyregimentandtookcommandof
ty the summer of 1865, it becamemydutyto
restorethesupremacyofthecivil lawover art law whichhad
existedduringthewar. Duringthis timeGov.Kingwa om
th war,heappearedastheadvocateofboththeseclasses,be
nottoexcitethosepassions. omthe time I co nce the
practiceoflawin Paducah,in the winter o 165-6,anduntil I
went toMontanaasAssociateJusticein 1869,I knewGov.King
rankofjuryadvocates,andhis reputationwas co-extensivewith
reputationasaprominent lawyer andcitizen in Kentuky be
causeI havefelt that sincehisresidence in this Statehe
bornesohighareputation forability, andhas notsucceededso
encethatexistsbetweenthequalitiesandacquirementswhichin
anddistinction an and politician and
thoserequiredtowinthecovetedprizeinthis parto thecountry
retainedasthe advocates intheimportant. trials totakeplace at
the Withus t sditferent. Here,Ithink,abrillianthust
ings peech,intead at actingclients,wouldcausedistrustofa
olddayswhenthe advocatesatnisiprimgavethepolitics
tothepeople,aswellasthe lawtothecourtsandjuries,arefast
theadvocatewhohasbeenrearedandpracticedinthatschool till
ingwhenhegoesto suchnew,different, and, to him, untried
fi lds,andenters the listswiththose tothemannerschooledand
reared. Andtwouldb surprisingif forsometimehedidoccupy
meritsdeserved. Idonotsaythisindisparagementofthereallegal
 
whetherhewouldmovehere,I drovehimaround thecity. He
reersince. Ishall not atteptan analysisofhis character and
abilities. no Kingwasanexcellent citizen, akindand
good-heartedneighbor. Hewasamostdevoted, indulgent,gon
expressthelosssustainedbyhis untimelydeath.
maynotbechallenged. Thathisworkwaswellandnoblydone,
thereisnotonlyabundantbutuniversaltestimony. Mya.cqua'mt
greetingsthat thehearttohim. Thestrongestimpression
lighto esun. Hislife wasanillustrationthattheteachingsof
Esq.,havingbeenappointed for that purpose,presented to the
courtthe following preambleandresolutions which
Providenceour andbrother, UG P. ACOBSON,
hasbeentakenfromamongusto i theinnumerablethrongin
while our hisloss, desiretoperpetuate the brnceof
hismanyvirtuesandgivevoicetoourregrets,anddohereby
fession,and omthefamilyandsocial circle of whichhe wasi .
lovedandrespected is ne,thepoignanceof whichtime
tohisworth,we,hisassociatesand kers, bear testi
hismilitarycareer,inthepeaceful,yetperplexing and oft-times
laboriousandsearchingprofessionalone,or inthequiet by-paths
ofsocialandfamilylife,hewseverfo walki asbecamethe
bywhomhewaslovedandrespected,soth hiscountryacknowl
brass, andbyentrustinghimwithstationsofdutyand honor, his
asbeengivenustoenlargeandcultivate our faculties, to dis
iplineandennobleouror togaintheesteemand approba
i'0d, bis life workhadbeenwell and faithfully done; forwe
nowandcheerfullybearwitnessthat he wasable in intellect,
onestinpurposeandaction,purein heartandeverconscientious,
privilegesbestowedbyourinstitutions,andhas thewis
omuponourshores.
mustfeelatsuchaloss, yetas a. furt ertr buteofaffectiontoour
brother,andasanexpressionofour respect andesteem for his
much-lovedandrespectedwidowand hisreveredmther,weex
huband,kin the ofa whohas
barinall theyhavesaidofth deceased.
stoodandhabituallyrecognizedinthiscourt that dutyof recip
nytothewitnessyoubeartohis highcharacter as amem
inanopengrave. Thewhyandthewhereforewedonot know,
his life beenspared, eatersu essdoubtlessawaitedhis talents
of noordinary andof noordinary training; still he
livedlongenoughtogathertherichest harvestthat life ds
poned thanthat the earnest,conscientious,laborious
inthe approbationandesteemof his brethren of thebar. No
ecognition perhaps,wouldhavebeendearertothedeceasedthan
I will notseek toaddtoth tri te to his character which
havebeensowellandjustlyspokenbythosewhobestknew,an
canrenderthe professionupon thisoccasion,aswella th kind
esttributeIcanpaytohis or is todrec yourattentionto
his lifeandcharacter,andthis indorsementofthembyhis breth
The resolutions will bespread uponthe records. Mr. Justice
Beckwasintimatewiththedeceased,andwill respondfurtherto
the resolutions.
tributejust paidto the morof our deceasedbrotherbythe
ChiefJustice,aswellasintheeloquent ti ials thebar, I
woulddoviolence tomyownfeelings,if Isufferedthe occasion
His om as lla his heart wasever open toreceive his
friends,andhistreatmentofthemwasalwtysprincely.
Hewas.manofmuchintellectualpower,andwaspossessedof
societyoneof itsmostuseful citizens, whiletheloss sustainedby
the om circle isbeyondmypowertoexpress. Thesadevent
hascastagloomovertheentirecommunity,widespreadanddeep,
butthereisonetrueandcontidingspiritmorenearlycrushedby
bitteranguish,shehasfelt theforceofthesentiment:
i
orni of life to beherprotectorandpartner in lil'e’ s journey,
actedwellhispartunderall circumstances,andleft anameun
tarnishedbyany evil nameatthementionofwhichshe
whoareknownbyexcellent virtuesandnobledeeds;theywho
theirfellowmen.
keeperoftherecordso th urtinwhichthejudgmentorde
transcriptoftherecord,dulycertifiedtobefullandcomplete,has
beenfiled, ormaybehereafter filed, in the office of the clerk of
thiscourt,beforethe ssu c ofawrit oferror, it shall notbe
necessary,exceptin acasewhereasupersedeasmaybeallowed,
script, sofiled withthe clerk of this court,shall be takenand
consideredtobeadue urofsaidwrit error. Whenawrit
ontheclerkofthe feri t,heshall returnuponsaidwrit
Adefendantuponwhomprocesshas notbeenservedmayenter
proceedin thesamemannerasif dulyserved thprocess.
scriptoftherecordonwhichthe pplictio ismadebecomplete,
andcertifiedbytheclerkofthecourtbelow th assignment
theclerkshall indorseuponsa the followingwords: “ A
transcript ofth re rdin this cause havingbeen filed inmy
officewithan indorsedthereonth th of orheei
bemadea supersedeas accordin to law, thiswrit oferror is
thereforemadea supersedeas and shall operate accordingly,
whichindorsementshall besignedbythe clerk ofthis court.
RULEVI. Wheneverexecutionorother final processshallbe
writoferror operatingasasupersedeas,such rit error may
beservedupontheofficer in whosehandssuchexecutionmaybe,
andthereuponall proceedings undersuchexecutionshallbedis
continued,andsuchofficershallreturn thesameinto thecourt
cutionwhat,if anything,hehathdone in obediencetothecom
tion acopyofsuchwritoferrorand the indorsementsthereon,
orandtheindorsementsthereon.
fact, the original powerofattorneyshall befiled withthe bondin
 
NS OFTHERECORD.
theprocess,withth returnthereto,thepleadingsoftheparties,
all ordersofthe court, the billofexceptions,theappeal bondin
casesappealed.
This rule shall notextend toappealsor writs of error in chan
cry criminalcases.
courtanymatter insertedinthe transcript contrarytothefore
may,bypraecipe, tetotheclerkwhatofthefilesofthecause
beinsufficient, it shall beperfectedathis cost;andifunneces
sarily voluminousthecostoftheunnecessarypartsshall betaxed
fth charge reerre toshall be quotedtotidem verbis in the
specifications. -
our
 
error, thecausemaybeheardexparte,orthejudgmentordecree
maybe,in thediscretionofthecourt,reversedwithoutahearing.
theSup Courtshall preparea printedabstract th record
ineachcase,in whichthey shall set forththetitle f ecause,
withthedateofthefiling ofall papersin thecourtbelow,anda
uponfor thereversalofthejudgmentor ecree the clerkofthe
courtbelowshallalsonum eachfolioofonehundred in
thetranscriptoftherecord,andappellantsandplaintiffs in error
ofthis court,for theuseoftheappelleeordefendantsin errorand
days foreth causeisheard.
RULEXVI.Thedefendant'scounselshall bepermitted,if he
isnotsatisfiedwiththeabstractor abridgmentofthe reordby
theplaintiff'scounsel,tofurnisheachofthejusticesof this court
the ppositepartymayfile theabstractandpreparethecausefor
the causeheardat thesameterm, or the court maydismiss the
appealor ritoferror.
ofth recrdto whichreference is made in the assignmentof er
theappealorwritoferrormaybedismissed.
authoritiesto be s in the argument,andsix copies thereof
shall be fi l d i theclerk of this court atleast threedaysbe
forethecause isheard; one fth opiesmay ithdr by
thecounsel forappelleeordefendantinerror,andtheothersshall
andtheopposingpartiesonorbeforethedaynext precedingthe
ofthepartiesastheyappear in thetitle ofthe cases, aswell as
thebookandpage,shall begiven.
relatingto briefs will notbeheard.
gumentsin writingit shall not be necessaryto fi le briefs, butif
counselfor eitherpartyshall desireto address th rt orally,
the opposing counsel shall fi lehis brif srequiredbytherule.
MOTIONS.
assignerrors,orto fi lebriefs,abstracts,andthelike,shall be in
writing,and at least twenty-four hours tic o the time at
whichthesamewill beheard,shall begivento teoppositeparty.
transcriptofthejudgment,the er th pp l,th bond
and theapproval thereof,andthereupontheappeal shall bedis
missedwithcosts. .
drawthetranscriptoftherecordforthepurpose ofmakingab
stracts,upongivingreceiptstheref totheclerk;anduponsuch
withdrawalmayretainthesameforeightdays, more.
abstract of the record hemaywithdrawthe transcript upon
givingthelikereceipts ndretainthesamefortheliketime.
filedsettingforththatthe tterspresetedbythe recordwere
tweentheparties;andthat the opinion of this court is not
soughtwithanyotherdesignthantoadjudicate andsettle the
in thecause,if thesameshall havebeenfiled in termtime,or if
such pi ha beenfiled invacation,th thnth first five
daysofthenextsucceedingterm. Counselmayaccompanysuch
courtis filed in vacationor within fifteen daysoftheadjourn
mentof thecourt, a petition for rehearingis presentedto either
 
stayeduntil thenexttermofthecourt.
taxa rinter feeatthe rate of45cents foreachonehundred
of pyofsuch abstract, against the unsuccessful
partynotfurnishingsuch abstracts, as costs, toberecoveredby
thesuccessfulpartyfumishingthesame.
entitledtoreceivethefeesallowedbylawforal copiesofrecords
assignedtothejudicial district in whichsuchrecordmaybeshall
havepowertoorderanddirect that suchtranscript bemadeand
hisadmissiontothebarofsuchState r erritory hewasaciti
and al ccpaion,andthathe will nc thepracticeof
lawtherei withinthree nt omthedatethereof;andthe
tering the nameofsuchpartyuponthe recordand s g
license,shallbetendollars.
LIBRARY.
pagein pamphletform. Allbriefsofcounsel shall beprintedin
thesameform,andsixcpies eachofsuchbriefsandabstracts
mentaltranscript depositedwith the of thiscourt
for the ispetio th ppsiteparty. If, uponhearing the
motion, leave is granted, the additional or supplemental tran
scriptmaybe ledandconsideredinconnectionwiththeoriginal
anytimeuponordersignedbyeither twoof the justicesof the
court,and ledintheo c oftheclerkatleast fi tee daysprior
tothedayappointedfortheassemblingof thecourt. Theclerk,
o receiptofsuchorder,shallforthwithenterthesameat length
specialterm.
shall, withinthirtydaysafterthe canvass bythe Stateboardof
canvassers incaseof the District orSup Judge,andwithin
twentydaysafterthecanvassbythe boar ofcanvassers
whichthepersonwhoseelectionto t o c ofCountyJudgeis
tobecontestedresides;whichstatementor shallsetforth:
ingparty,thatthecausesst rt aretrue, asheverilybelieves.
the ount Clerkto safelyke dpreserveall suchstatements
intheirrespectiveoffices.
ntofcontest,thecontcstor,if thecontestis tobefurtherpros
ecuted,orsomeonein his behalf,or in behalfofthe personfor
whose th ntest ismade,shall fi le inthe o c of the
clerkofthiscourtapetition setting forththe fi igofthestate
ntofcontest,andth parti lar und therefor,whichpeti
tionshallbe riedbytheoathofsomecredible person. Upon
monsdirected tothe ri' of e count wheredefendantre
sides,underthesealthereof,whichsummonsshallbear teste in the
ofthecounty,whichsummonsshallbeservedin the samemanner
namedtherein,andanswerthe complaintof theplaintitfinthat
thatdueservicehasbeenhad,defaultmaybeenteed andinthat
shallanswerthepetition,whichanswershallbeunderoath. The
statementofanynewmatter in theanswer,inavoidanceorcon
pleadingsin th eandformtheissues.
RULELIV Whenthe case is t ssu the court shall hear
anddeterminethesameinasu arwa without th terve
tionofa jury. Thecourtshall havethepower tosend for per
sonsandpapers,butunlessotherwiseorderednowitness shallbe
areformed,mayhavethedepositiontakenofanywitnessin this
anyjusticeof thepeaceornotarypublicin thisState,upongiv
andplaceofexamination. Atsuchexaminationeitherpartymay
propoundsuchinterrogatories,direct,crossandre-direct, asmay
readtothewitnessandcorrectedbyhiminanyparticulardesired;
fi edbythe judgeorofficer takingthedepositio enclosedin an
envelopeorwrapper,sealedanddirectedtotheclerkofthiscourt;
orofanyinterrogatoryshallbemadeatthehearing,unlessthe
sofarasapplicable.
enteredatlengthupontherecord. Thecourt shall havepower
judgments.
tion asprescribedbylawfor like dutiesandservicesin cases in
thedistrict Court.
lawfullymadetosome ther rt inthe fi rst instance,the peri
tionshall,in additiontothenecessarymatterrequisite bythe
andnot omsuchother thesu ienc orinsufficiencyof
suchcicumstances so e frthin thatbehalf willbedetermined
bythecourtinawardingor refusing e licatin. ln case
anycourt,justice,orother r, or anyboardorother tribu
nal,inthedischargeof d e of a publiccharacter,be namedin
theapplicti asrespondent,thepetition shall also disclose the
nameornamesoftherealpartyor parties,if any, in interest, or
whoseinterestwouldbedirectlyalfectedbytheproceedings,and
dnr for anysuchwrit, toserve or cause tobe served uponsuch
partyorpartiesininterestatruecopyofthepetition andof the
ceedings,andto uceand lein theotlice o the l r ofthis
court thelikeevidenceofsuchservice.
its discretion, thejudgmentfth courtbelow.
of tbe
trial. thecourt willnot the evidencewithaviewtodetermine
whethert is sufficienttosupportthejudgment. Butanyerroroflawinad
mittingor excludingevidence,maybe reviewedonappeal omthejudg
m--nt,ifmadepart ftherecordbybill Ofexepti rstatementonappeal.
cts faith.
5. Ifinsuchcasethedefendantcanshowthathehadprobblecusefor
ordinaryprudenceandcautiontobelieve,orentertainanhonestandstrong
bytheactsandclcclarutionsofthe party,or itmaybeinferredbythejury
instigatingtheindictmentisproperlyadmissiblein evidence. Theintentof
notesthetestimonyofawitnesstakenatthetrialoftheindictment,andwho
timonywascompetent.
Brown,theappellant,awritofattachmentuponastockofdry
Elliott. InAprilofthefollowingyear Brown's suit ripened
intoaju en he aspecial execution,andatthe
request ofBrown,Willoughbyremovedthegoodsto the auction
co nce WilloughbyinformedClark,theauctioneer,that
hedesiredtoselectcertain articles omthestockforhimself
understandingthathewasto accountfor thegoodsselected at
sale. BeinginformedbyClarkthathewascontent,Willoughby
sale. Thegoodssoselected weredividedintothree parcels;
Br wasdissatisfiedwithhsconduct inthematter,andhe
himselfandwife, atpublicsale,whichwasdone,andthepro
ceedsaccountedforandpaidto Brown.
InSeptember,1875, thegrandjuryofArapahoecountyre
Willonghbyforthelarceny,asbailee,ofthegoodssoldandde
loughbyappearedandgavebail,andatthefollowingJanuary
Thereuponthiscausewasco nce andresultedinaver
reversethat judgmentBr prosecutedthisappeal.
deemedunnecessarytomakeafurtherstatement,excepttoset
outtheinstructionsgiven,whichwereasfollows:
Brown,guiltyinthisaction,theplaintiffmustprovebyapre
ponderanccoftestimony
dictedandacquittedofthe crimeoflarceny,sothatall you
instituted,didhedoit maliciously3
+
instituted,did itwithout reasonableorprobable cause?
3d. Unlessyoubelievefromtheevidence thatBr did
fendant.
epithetsorexpressionsofhatredorill-will towardWilloughby
against the defendant,Brown;andmalicemaybe
Br instituted,or caused saidprosecutiontobeinstituted,
andmust beprovedbytheeviene. It isnotto beinferred
omthefactsoftheacquittalofthe saidWilloiigliby,nor is
thatmay veb shownbytheevidencetohaveexistedon
Brow mayhavebeentowardWilloughby;still, ifhehadrea
prosecuting.
he efen t,Brown,actedwithout probablecausethat'Wil
didinstitute avisethe prosecutionoftheplaintiff, forthe
tute advisedtheprosecutionmaliciously. .
evidenceofmalicesufficient to supportthis action.
pression“ with reasonableorprobablecause, ismeantthe
wasguiltyofthecrimeimputed tohimin the saidindict
plaintiff wasacquittedbythejurythattried himunder the
noproofin his efense tha theplaintiff boreagoodcharac
terprior to themakingofthatcharge,andthat hisreputa
plaintiff took thegoodsmentionedinthe tmet,openly
saiddefendant;thatthe plaintiff tookthegoodswhilehewas
findi ofthe en enthecourt instructs youthat
therewasawant ofreasonableor probablecause,andyour
verdictmustbefor theplaintiff, providedyoufurtherbelieve
fromtheev ene,thatBr maliciouslyprosecutedWil
co nce of the prosecution against Willoughby, he,
Willoughby, ld h goodsmentionedintheindictment as
sheriff, under legal process in favor of defendant, Brown,
against Mines& and before
 
hebelievedsuch information to betrue,andacted on such
belief,andsopr sected hb thenBrownhadproba
levieduponbyWilloughby,as sheriff, byvirtueoftheexecu
whenhemadesaid levyandtook possessionof saidgoods,
thesame,hewouldbeguiltyof larceny. Andf youbelieve
goodsofsaidHobsonet al.whenthelevywasmade,andhe
same,andwithouttheirbeingsoldatpublicsale,andth sai
thatsuchconversion_wasdoneinsuchamannerasto au
steal the thensuchfacts, if provcn,will amounttoa
probablecauseforco nci prosecutionofsaidWilloughby
warrantyouin fi thedefendantnotguilty,sofaras the
 
of thesaid_defendant, nr C.Br thatthe saidexecu
tionwaslevieduponthe saidgoodsofMines&Elliot; that
tionofthesaidMines&Elliot goods,andthat the said de
fendant, nr C.Brown,knewthesefacts, thenthecourtin
amag byreasonof such prosecution,andthat suchprose
cutionterminatedin favorofthesaid plaintiff, then
believe omthe evidence, that thesaiddefendantwas,onor
aboutthe fi ft dayof une A.D.1875, that the
saidplaintiffhadstolenlarge quantitiesofgood entioed;
saidindictment,onthe18thdayof September, 1875,
theretofore received espectin the said stealingwasfalse or
unreliable, then the said defendant cannot relyuponsuch
prior information, to showthat hehadreasonableor prob
ablecauseforprosecutingthesaidplaintiff.
thesoleandexclusivejudgesofthecredibilityofthewitnesses;
witnessesinthiscasehavewillfullyswornfalselyuponama
thedefendantguilty,theymay ndandassess thedamagesot
pellant.
dayofOctober,A.D.1877. C
Nappealwastakenfromtheorderofth rt denying
sixtydaysafterthe lower courtmadethe order. Code,Sec.
338.
ntthe courtmayreviewanyintermediateorderinvolving
Asdefendant failedto prosecutean.appeal omtheorder
examinethe evidence withthe viewtodeterminewhetherit
California,108;Rycrcg v.Rycrq/3,42California,444;Reed
California,483;Deputyv. Staplqford,19California,305.
Carpenterv. lVz'lliams0n, 25California, 167.
 
thewantofthelmowledgeofthe emistezzce ofsuehfactsand
tiffwasguiltyofthecrimeimputedto himinthesa
ment, etc.
separateanddistinct crime,andtheju elseweretold sub
stantiallythatif Brow prosecutedorinstigatedthe prosecu
probablecauseas to such count, he is guilty ot' malicious
prosecution.
countteless injurious,andthereforeconstituteavalidcause
isnotconceivedthat if thechargesmadeare thesame,all re
lating to thesametransaction,themaindifferencebeingin
theallegationofownershipofth property adifferencetobe
actuallyexist, andthattheprosecutorhaveknowledgeoftheir
prosecution. Theessential ound of this action. without
whichit canneverbemaintained,is wantqf_p/-ububle cause.
this po th chargewaserroneous,theverdictought not to
stand. Wehinktheinstructionis entirelytoobroad.
Actualknowledgethatthecrime ttedis notnec
facts andcircumstancesuponwhichhepredicates his belief.
that hehadprobablecausefor his conduct- thatis, that from
suchinformationaswouldinduce easo bleandprudent
prosecution,heis not liable, whatevermayhavebeen hisown
personal malice for setting it onfoot. v. lllason,
31 ont198.  
prosecutoraswouldleadamanofordinarycautionandpru
Cush. 239.
basis,andthisis sufficienttodefeatthepresentaction. Wil
InHarpluzm t al. v. W/zitney,77 Ill. thi question
wasveryfullyconsidered. Thejuryinthatcasehadbeenin
knowledgesufficient to inducethebeliefin themindofacau
committed,mustbe permittedtoappearanddirectthe atten
foundedin fa beingheldli lefo maliciousprosecution,
andofbeingmulctedin uinousdamages. Thecriminallaw
formanttoput it inexecution. Therewouldbelittle of effi
ciency xe tio o muchof our criminallaw,as n
stance,thelawsforthesuppressionofgambling,theunlawful
matteroftheirenforcement,whohadactualcognizanceofthe
infractionofthelaw.
alone. Ifinanygivencase, whereapartysuedfor malicious
prosecution,defendsbyoffering evidenceto showthat a
ofprobable cause, contained in theinstructionunder con
siderationmightbe appropriatelygiven,it is erroneous in a
caselikethepresent,wherethedefendantattempts tojustfy
hisactionuponadifferentground. Thatelsewhereinthein
o dependupontheactual state th case,butupon
thestateofthecaseasit layin the mindof the prosecutor,
doesnotenableustosaythatthejurywasnot misled bythe
lawallows presuptio ofmalice,as it doesin anaction of
slander. Actualmalicemaybeprovedbytheactsanddeclara
tionsoftheparty;oritmaybeinferred bythejuryfromthe
\\'illl'ully false. Levy v. Braunan,39 California,489;[fum
plz-/-ies v. Parker,52Me.507.
\Vheretheevidenceshowsthataccusedwas ho inocen
U/'0/:ker,24 Pick.S7;3PhillipsEv. 572. Whatever tends
to showevil intentmalusanimusonpartoftheprosecutorin
theindictment. Atthetimeofthetrial intheactionforina
criminalcase,wasputuponthe standinthecivilcause,and
his notes. Itis objectedthat the rt rr din
allowingth tobe e. The bjectio s,“ hattheplain
ti ’ mighthave taken thedeposition of Clark or produced
him. Theobjectionis notwelltaken. Forthepurpose of
Slltn. tag wantof probablecause, nnisowasascompetent
totestify asClark,andindeedif Clarkhadbeenin the court
roomit is liiglily probablethathis orastotheevidence
givenatthe trial wouldnothavebeenso accurate astheo
cial reportofit. Goorlrichv. 21Conn.4-42; Bacon
v.Twneet al. 4Cush.238; 1 Hilliard Torts,p. 460.
The avi in attachment,the writ,judgment,indemnity
bond,thespecial executionand thereturnthereof, the suit
ofBrownv.Minesf: Elliott, wereproperlyadmittedin evi
 
touchingthe questionof probable cause,showsthatBrow
Inviewof this fact, it is sc celypossble that the jury
couldhaveunderstoodthe rtbytsinstruction;totell them
theruleandinholdin theerroneous instructioncorrectedby
Justice in his opinion. es em unaided. For this
reasonIconcurthatthejudgmento th courtbelowmustbe
asasequenceofstatutorycondition.
properpersonuponwhomserviceshouldbehadtobringthecorporation in
immaterial,wherethereceiver is operatingaportionofthe railwaywithin
courtoutofwhichthegarnishee processissued,it is notinc bent the
lattercourttoaskleave ftheformerbefor ssui suchprocess.
Phelan, for the sumof $525.03. The pla ti' procured
garuisheeprocesstobeissuedandserveduponVillardandGree
andorderedthat they as receivers, applythatamounttoward
thesatisfaction o h judgmentin favor of the plaintiff.
AfterwardVillardand reeley pperedin the districtcourt,
and the vacationof the referee s report upon the
ground stated in theopinion;the tio ened there
port ed andVillardandGreeleyappealedto this court.
 
which ec estha all judicial power shall bevested in cer
tain designated courts, it is competent for the legislative
assembly to authorize clerksofte district courts to enter
judgmentsin vacationin thecasesprovidedinsection150 of
wouldbesufficient to setatrest thequestionwithus. Suffice
it to saythatthetheoryuponwhichjudgments in such cases
arefounded,isthatthejudgmentisthesentencewhichthelaw
Judgments,Sec. 129. Andthe judgment,though in fact
enteredbytheclerk, is , in theconsiderationofthelaw,what
tiono thecourt itself. Wells v. Moron,10Wis.473. The
objection raised to the affidavit of Haynes for the order of
ganishment is too merely technical to weighagainst the
validityofthecourt'sorder andthesubsequent proceedings
pany. Thewords (or railroad), usedas theyare in paren
thesis,maybe rejected suplsae,sincetheir userenders
tain thaniftheyliad beenomitted.
follows:
and_O.L.Greeley,receivers Kansas c Railway(or
railroad)company,onthetwentieth dayofJuly,A D 1878.
vicemadeuponotherandsubordinate oflicers, oruponagents
tions, incasethe propertyandbusinessofsuchcorporation is
of cersofthe corporation. Theagents, in carrying onthe
businessthereafter,beco his agents;andsuchagents stand
the receiver wasappointed,andfor a purpose affectingthe
receiverhimselfassuch,orthedispositionofthepropertyin
casebeforeus, we edtoregardthereturnoftheoi
controvertedbythegarnisheesthemselves.
Anotherpointmadebyappellantsagainsttheregularityof
beingnon-residentsoftheState,cannotbeheldasgarnishees.
 
ees in their o icial or representative capacity, ere a
portionoftherailwaywasoperatedbysuch receivers within
po appellants, is that th below authority
toproceedagainst therec vers sgarnishees,Without leave
fi rtgrantedthereforbythecourt appointingsuchreceivers.
benotwithoutforce, weresuchproceedings instituted within
StateofKansas,it wasnot incumbentuponthecourtbelow
ColumbianIns.Co.14Allen,353;Folgarv.ColumlaianIna.
leavemayproperlybesought,thefailuretoaskorobtainsuch
defensetoanotherwise legal actiononthe trial.Knnayv.
in supportofthedoctrinethat receivers arenotamenableto
thosecasesresteitheruponthe statutorylawoftheStateex
emptingreceivers omsuchprocess,ColombianBookCo.
effectofthejudgmentwouldbeto disturb thepossessionot'
thereceiverbytheappointingcourt,anwhersuchproperty
thecourtunderwhoseorderitwasheldbythereceiver;Ty
loret al. v. Gllliqn. ct al. '23 Texas,598;Fieldat cl. v.Jonas
2
ston,24Ill. 354.
thatthesumduethejudgmentdebtor, withwhichthereceiv
erswere chargedasgarnishees,wasduehimasmonthlypay
whomitwouldhave been forthegarnisheeprocess,
ized to carryonthe busiess the railway,anddefraythe
currentexpensestherefor.  
court belowerredindenyingthemotion te receivers,and
A I 777ctl.'
avaluableconsiderationmoving omthe promiseemaylnaintainanaction
appellants.
for appellee. .
twopercent.per ont until paid,payableonor beforeOc
tober 10th,to the plaintiff ororder;that defendants never
paidsaidsumof one orany'part thereof eitherwhenthe
same became e, at anytimesince then, and plainti
prays udgmentfor$139.45,withinterestattwopercent.per
nt omSeptember17th,1877,andforcostsofsuit.
complaintthedefendantsexecutedanddelivered to theplain
fredMoisonexecutedanddeliveredhispromissorynotetothe
therebyforvalue receivedpromised topayto the efe ts,
as such partners sixtydays after said July13,1877,the
sumof$1,100,togetherwith interest onsaidsum omsaid
month. Second,thatonthesaid ate tosecurethepayment
ants,atrustdeeduponcertainpremisessituateinthetownof
Silverton,SanJuancounty,StateofColorado,thenownedby
ques the plaintiffconveyedthe said premises tohim,and
oneEmileCharest,andthereuponthe plaintiffin considera
described,whensaidnotebyitstermsfell due,thesaidamount
in cash. Fourth,thattheamountdueuponsaidnotebythe
whichsaidsumandinterestthedefendantsclaimasaset-off
plaintiff, uponthecauseofactionse forth thecomplaint
thepromisesclaimed to havebeenmadebyplaintiff, consti
tute no ground or set-off. Third, plaintiff
is not liable upon the pro se ed in the answer.
Fourth,theanswerset up ofdefense.
to payhisowndebtin aparticularmanner. It anorigi
nal undertaking, and not within th t Frauds.
Browneon Stat. Frauds,Sec. 165,166. Athrdparty fo
whosebenefitasimple contract has beenentered intofor a
valuableconsideration,movingfrom thepromisee,maymain
tainanactionin hisownname,ormaypleaditbywayofset
Thejudgmentofthecourtbelowis reversed,andcausere
monlawandmustbestrictlyconstrued. Tobevalid nst thirdper
ntagainstone H. M.Behymer,andunder th ri the
sheriff seizedacertain lotofpersonalproperty. Mrs.Chand
theissueontheinterplea,shesoughtto establish herright to
mortgages. It was objected that the tarypu before
whomthemortgageswereacknowledged,hadfailed tomakea
mortgageas against the rightsandinterestsofthird persons?
Thechattel mortgageact, uponcom iancewithwhichthe
mortgagormayretain possession ofthe personaltymortgaged,
is in derogationofthecommonlaw,andtherefore tobestrict
ionoftheactcanbeneglected. It isnecessary,first,thatthe
dumthereof,inwhichheshall setoutthenames mort
gagorand tgaee, descriptionofthepropertymortgaged,
mortgage,it was,astosuchcreditor,a vali thoughall the
requirementsofthestatutehadbeencompliedwith.
obtainanyinterest inanypersonal propertywhichis mort
hasnot beenrecorded,andwith tua tic of such,mort
gage,shall be eeedtohaveboughtorobtainedsuchinter
wassomeevidence tendingtoshowthat th ppelats had
noticeofthemortgages. Uponnoreasonableconstructionof
the instrument,it is clear that it must still beexecuted,ac
knowledged,anda orndumthereof takenbythecertify
or or umachattelmortgageis valid asbetweenthe
parties, but it hasno effect uponthe rights ofthirdparties
actingin faith, and thereis nowantof faithon
thepart ofacreditor inlevyinguponhis bto property,
includedinachattel tgagewhichthelawdeclaresvoidas
 
 
admittingthemortgagestobereadinevidence,without the
out in th statement onappeal,weare not ve formd
whethertherewasastipulation thereinallowingthe mortga
gor to retain possession of th property nor whether aside
omthe orndum theacknowledgmentwasproperly
arylimitinsuits, toenforcelienclaims,is tobemeasuredbytheamountin
sentedagainstthesameproperty.
Wh noone l imexceed $2,000.00 in ount anynum fcl s
maybeadjudicatedinthesameproceeding.
is togivethemechanic,la rer rmaterialman,alienfro_mthedateofthe
3. Undertheprovisionsofsectionnineofthescheduleoftheconstitution,
thecountycourts,crat bytheconstitution,wereimmediatelyuponthe
property,maybesoldwiththemineforthe purpose ofenforcingalienun
derthestatute. Powder,steelandcandlesfumishedfortheus ofthemine,
heldtobeclearlyWithin themeaningofthe statute,adforwhichulion
hisinterest. ~
andinthemannerprovidedfr salesonexecutionissuingoutofanycourt
petition stated substantially thatonthe firstdayofAugust,
1876,andthenceuntil the15thdayofDecemberofthesame
thatStrongemployedthepetitionerto docertainworkin de
tioner betweenthe firstandfourteenthofSeptember,1876;
performedlaboruponsaidlodeuntilthe14thdayofDecember,
thepropertyt theKeystoneMiningCompany;andthatthe
filing his petition,onthe22nddayofJanuary,1877. Thaton
ofthedefendantsnotbeingserved,publication washad. Ap
fendants,exceptStr whowasdefaultedJune21, 1877,and
thecominginofthemaster'sreport, onthe25thdayofJune,
uponthepremisesinquestion. It wasalsoordered thatthe
reverse this decree, the KeystoneMining omny
awritofrror. -
andNoFTH,for defendantsinerror.
STONE,J. Theaggregateamountoftheseveralsumsfound
thousanddollars,andit is assignedfor error, that, under the
constitutional limitationofthejurisdictionofcountycourts
ofthe lien claimants are several in their nature, andin the
oftheir enforcement. Eachfiles hisseparatestatement
a th statuterequires. Eachpresentshisseparatepetitionto
toeachclaimant,andsolongasnooneclaimexceedstwo
sented is , in its nature,aseveral and distinct action, but in
orderto avoidamultiplicityof writs, sales and costs,andto
preventpreferencesamonglien claimantsarisingfrompriority
ofdecrees, salesandpayments,thestatutehasprvied
beheardanddetermined in nominallyoneproceeding,adju
whichwasevidentlyintendedto bethemostequitableandthe
creditor, andto direct theapplicationoftheproceedsofsales,
 
 
theamountfounddue to each, if not su en to payall of
their claims. Itmaybe,andperhaps is , the better practice
to empanelajurytopass po an ndtheamountdueeach
claimant, as though t/Lay were separateproceedings. But
wheretherearebut fewparties,andthe claimsare notcom
casetothesamejury.' Buta naldecree,orderingasaleof
th la ats is ascertained. Thentheir several rights
shouldbedeclaredin thedecree, andthepropertysold, ifpay
sumsduetotheseveralclaimants.
was forthe legislaturetoprovidethatanynumbe
$2,000 in unt maybeadjudicatedinoneproceedingwith
this view,wethink the extentof thejurisdictionofcounty
rts, totheirpecuniarylimitinthese cases, is tobemeas
uredbytheamountinvolvedineachclaim severally,andnot
the aggregate of all the la presented st th same
property. Therecordshowsthat the property, previous to
December15th,1876,wasownedbyoneStrongandothers,by
andfurnish the materials forwhichthe liens were claimed.
Thatsuchworkwascontinuedupto thesaid 15thdayofDe
yst ining any,towhomitwasconveyedby
claimantswere fi ledwiththecountyclerk in themannerpro
videdbystatuteinthefollowingmonth,January,1877. Upon
valid decree couldberenderedagainst the yst Mining
 
requiredbystatute. Thisconstructioncannotbegivento our
statute. Theidenticalpointhasbeenpassed pobythiscourt
that thelegal effectofthelatter clauseofsection 7, oftheact
2,whichec esth “ alllienshereinp'rovidedforshll
ofthe ter fu shed andals toall mortgagesanden
cumbrnce unrecordedat the time suchworkor laborwas
gommenced,or the fi rs of' suchmaterialswerefurnished, etc.,
is to vethemechanic,laborer teri ma alien omthe
te o teco nce ofthelabor or th furnishingof
materials. Thesameconstructionandlegaleffect isgivento
withoutjurisdictionexceptsuchasgiven bytheconstitution
untiltheactsoftheGeneralAssemblyoftheStateinrelation
are that “ h terms ‘ pro tecourt, or ‘ pro te judge,
whenever occurring in the statutes of Colorado Territory,
shall, after theadoptionofthis constitution, be heldtoapply
to thecounty court or countyjudge,and all laws specially
applicable to theprobatecourt in any county shall be con
 
thesamecountyuntil repealed. Underthis provision,upon
therebywereimmediatelyclothedwithall thepowersthereto
materialsfurnishedinthemineandfor theworkingof the
rials forandbuildingahouseorshopcontiguoustothemine,
miningsuperintendent. Thehousewasownedbythe
sufficient towarrantthedecreeastothemrespectively.
It is objected that the decree as to ttcer claim is
erroneous,becausethearticles furnishedbyhimwerenot of
the tercomprehendedbythelienlaw,specifying “ tim
berorothermaterialstobeusedinoraboutthe mine. The
clearlywithinthemeaningofthestatuteas anythingwecan
madebypublication,inacordacewi thestatuteproviding
tonotice is , that the decree providedfor a sale in lessthan
ninetydays.
record. Thatthesalewasmadeinaccodanc withthestatute
 
discretion,andtheSup Courtheldthat, in theabsenceof
courtbelowis affirmed.
usbe inthecourtbelow.
summonsissuingoutofthecounty court in said actionby
deliveringto eacho defendantsthereinatruecopy,etc.
files.
Deficienciesin th recrdcannot besuppliedbyexparteaffi
davits. defendantin errordesiresto havethesheriff
Adamset al. 25Ind.457,citedbythedefendantinerror,does
plaintiffclaimedtheproceeds;held,thatdefendantwasnotliablein assumpsit
validity, andthatsuchholderistheowner,andentitled to recover the full
amountagainstall prior parties.
3. Bythel w erc t abanker hasa nral lien on all securities
depositedwithhimbyacustomer,for hisgeneralbal ce, lessthereis a
contract, express riplied inconsistent withsuch lien, andofthis the
courtwilltakejudicialnotice.
mustsustainithimselfratherthanthe ther oentparty.
Erroro unt CourtofArapahoeCounty.
*
below),onthe10thdayofJanuary,1877,drewhissightdraft
sametothesaid Corningto collect and placeto thecredit of
the plaintiff s account at thebank thesaidCorning,at
Boulder. Corningimmediately transmittedthedraft bylet
noprotest.
No.2385, orood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$100.00
countofGeorgeC.Corning,Boulder,Colorado.
Co indebted to the defendant in thesumof$10,
975'.,for balanceofoverdrafts.
telegraphfromits saidNeworcorrespondentthat thelat
thatasCorning hadfailed,Wymanclaimed theproceedsof
London. Onthe15thofMarch,plaintiff, throughhisattor
neys,notified thedefendantbyletter thatheclaimedthepro
ee thedraft,anddemandedpayentthereof. Theexact
dateofthefailureofCorning is venin
cashierof the Boulderbank(whichwasownedbyCorning),
positaries for eachother in respect to fundscollected for nd
remittedbyandto each,accodin to the su courseofbank
ing business. Thechecks of each bankwere paidbythe
other, andtransactions embracin collections, checksandre
tt es daily occurrenceweredebitedandcreditedonthe
himat th te fth draft in question,was graduallyre
duced,sothatatthetime creditedwiththeproceeds
had co reduced to $5,111',whileonthe 29thof the
same theamounthadincreasedto$8,225'.
countstorecovertheamountofthedraft. Trial washadto
costs. Plaintiffbringstherecordto thiscourtfor review,and
assigns for error, thefindingandjudgmentofthecourtbelow
 
omtheequitiesoftheplaintiff. -
same,becomesabonafi er,unaffectedbypriorequities,
unlessit beshownthathehadnoticethereof,isafundamental
principleofcommercia law.
TheindorsementofCorningaspayee,wassufficient totrans
andvestin it thecompleteownership. Thepossessionofthe
faciethatitwasacquiredingood faith for full value, in the
usual courseofbusiness,before maturity,andwithout notice
circumstancesimpeaching its validity; andthatsuch
amountagainstall priorparties. 1DanielsonNegotiableIn
struments,Sec. 812. Andalthoughtheburdenofproofmay
oneseeking to pea of the elementsofvalidity or
rightsofth lderwhichsuchpossessionimplies. Ibid.
ceivingthe draft in e s rs o businessfrom the
payee,whowaslargelyindebtedto thebank,andwhoendorsed
proceedsto beapplied in extinguishmentprotato his in
debtedness to defendant. True, the defendant was notified
thatplaintiffwastheequitableownerofthedraft, beforethe
wasunavaiin againsttherightacquiredbydefendant
transfer is irrevocablewithouttheholder'sconsent. Here,
titlepassedfromtheplaintiff,andbecamevestedin thedefend
greatweightofauthority,thattheendorseeofanegotiable
andentitled to protection as such. Allairev. Hartshorne, 1
Zabriskie,665;Atkinsonv. Brooks,26Vt.569;BankofRe
public v. Carrington, 5 R. I. 515; Brush v. Scribner, 11
Conn. 388;Manningv. McClure,36 Ill. 490;Smithv.Ty
son,16Peters,1.
curitiesdepositedwithhimbyacustomer,for his generalbal
thatshowanimpliedcontractinconsistentwithsuchlien,and
nett, 3Manning,G.&. 530.
t e draft in question wasreceived underspecial circumstances,
suchaswouldtake itoutofthe ruleoflew cat
tropolisv. TheNewEnglandBank,1Howard,23 real
EnglandBankdelivered to theBankofthe nw
wealth transmitted the sameto the Bankofthe Metropolis,
 
wealth,whichfailedwhilethefundswereinthehandsofthe
mustbesustained, eitherbytheplainti 'ordefendantin error,
oundfor maintainingthat thereisanysuperior equity n
thesideoftheNewEnglandBank. It contributed togive
to thecorporation,whichwasproved insolvent,credit with
itshandstobesent. toWashingtonfo llecti indorsedin
sucha ora tomakethempm';nafaoiethepropertyof the
itweretherealowner. TheBankof the Metropolis,onthe
contrary,is innodegreeresponsibleforthe en which
placed on en hasoccasionedthelossinquestion,itwould
Thecasecomingupagain to theSup Court,thesame
should ve engiventhejury,says: “ Butifthejuryfound
th the ea mentionedinthetestimony,theBankof
astheownerofthe egtiblepaperwhichit transmitted for
course ea betweenthem,balances werefrom time to
timesuffered remainin hands of the nw
Bank,to be the proceedsofsuch egtiblepaper,
 
36 OFCOLORADO.
Wymanv. ColoradoNat.Bank.
then the plaintiff in error is entitled to retain st th
defendanti errorfor thebalanceofaccountdue omthe
nw Bank. Samecase, 6Howard,662.
Thecorrectnessofthis rule isaffirmedinSweeney. Easter,
1Wallace,166,andthesamedoctrineis held case of
Appeals),380. Wehinktherulesthuslaiddownpply th
inallowingbalancesto remainin the hands of theBoulder
to bemet of negotiable paper,
amongotherremittances,whichtheevidenceshowswasfrom
debtor,arisingoutoftheforbearanceofthecreditor in suffer
supra;BankoftheRepublicv. Carringtonet al.supra,p.552.
large balancewas allowed to remain beyondtheperiodical
monthlysettlements tatem ts ofaccount rendered,and
wheresuchbalancewasallononeside. In this, as in all
other like cases, thereisahardshipin theloss,letit fall upon
eithertheplaintiff th defendant,but it is anelementary
ruleth wheneveroneoftwopartiesmustsufferbytheactof
party. Thecourtbelowevidentlyfoundthatthefacts in this
bonafideholder ofnegotiablepaper for value andwithout
notice, to dischagethedefendant oftheequitiesbe
judgment.
Judgmentaffirmed.
happened.
causeallegedthat thecomplaintdidnot state facts sufficient
toconstituteacauseofaction, in thatit failed “ tostate the
dateofthenotesuedupon, andbecausethecomplaintwas
ur inthiscase,is that“ it fails tostate thedateo
notesuedupon. Theallegationo th timewhenacontract
andmaybenecessaryto showapresentrightofaction.
pleadingthat factsshouldbestatedwithcertainty; andunder
* * * “ Theecanbenodefinite description ofanyevent
shownwhenth tr was made,th plea wouldbe
demurrable,asnotshowingaliability. ***Therulesin
regardto time,asenforcedincommonlawandCodepleading,
hencewefind unningthroughthepleadingandaccompanying
every allegation, the ‘ on, &c., and “ at, &c., or te ‘ hen
and there. Thisformalityis nolonger respected, and the
timeshouldbegivenorberepeatedonlyasnecessaryto aclear
objectionfor uncertaintyisraisedbydemurrer. S c. 51.
Thecourtbelowproperlysusta edthedemurrer,andthe
judgmentis affirmed. -
allegeorprovetheuse. ,
pleader,i_n draftinghisdeclaration,hasfollowedapprovedcom
other,it is unnecessary toallegethe use, or, if alleged,it is
unnecessary to prove it. Patton v.Ooanat al. 3Col. 265;
v. utte eld 1Col. 380.
II. Nopreviousdemandwasnecessaryto imposeonthe
defendantsthe bligtio topay,nortorenderthemliableon
The ur shouldhavebeenoverruled.
Thejudgmentofthecourtbelowis reversed, andthecause
THECENTRALANDGnonenrownRoanCo.V.Tun
PEOPLEEXREL.TAYLOR. .
purpose ofremedyingtheusurpationormisuseofa franchise
oldactionissnpercededbycivil action. Intenns,chapterseventy-threeofthe
RevisedStatutesauthorizingproceedingsby warranlo,is repealedbysec
thedefendantshowbywhatauthorityitexercisesafranchise,aswasanciently
distantlessthantenmiles omeachother.
reasonable.
forfeitureofacharter, andit is generally itsdutytodosowhenthe fr
tionofitsprovisionsisnotwillful.
ofCivil Procedure,the district attorneyofthe first judicial
district, in thename fthepeople,upontherelation ofFrank
M.Taylor,filed a civil complaint,andcaused asummonsto
issue to he efen tsinsubstantial pl an thepro
visionsoftheCode.
systemofprocedurein civil actionsin thecourtsofjustice of
theState
embracedinanyactwhichshallnotb expressedinthetitle,
expressed.
 
provisionis notmandatory,andthatalawpassedinviolation
315,Mr.Justice Field, speakingforthecourt,says: “ The
statute,but as th provii is merelydirectory,it n ly
operateuponthe conscienceof the lawmaker. Itcreates
dutyofimperfectobligation,fortheinfractionofwhichthere
St. 180, construingtesame provision, the urt uses this
language: “ Thisprovisionbeingintended to operateupon
mustbeheldtobedirectoryonly. It relatestobills,andnot
thevalidityofeverylawdependuponthejudgment very
containedmorethanonesubject,orwhetherthisonesubject
practical en ts ldarise such inquiries. Weare
thereforeofthe opinion that in general theonlysafeguard
a sttheviolationoftheserulesofthehouses, is theirregard
The ed rd in the section of our constitution are
quitesi t,andapparentlyemployedfor thepurposeof
visionbythe courtsof CaliforniaandOhio. - Perhapsthere
muchofanyact as is notdirectlygermanetothesubjectex
pressed in the title, is without force ; that the provi o
insteadofbeingonlyaruleoftheGeneralAssemblytoregu
its trueconstruction,it followsthatif aproceedinginstituted
corporatefranchise,orapuli ebeinits naturesubstan
sededbyacivil action. Intermschapterseventythree the
Revised Statutes, authorizingproceedings byinformationin
obediencetotheuniversallyrecognizedrulethatasovereignty
General Assembly,whether byinformation in the natureof
guo'wa'rra.nt0, or bythe en rit guowarranto,orby
Culnplftlflt under the od inacivil action,the objects tobe
attained are identical,andthe proceeding is, insubstance,
civil, instituted for the eterm ti puelycivil rights.
HighEx.Leg.Re Sec.591; A'ingv. Francis,2TermR,
mercialBank,etc. v. TheStateofJllississippi, 4 Smedes&
Marshall, 504 ThePeoplev. Utiea Insurance O0. 15
Johns. 386 ; ThePeoplev. 00070,8N.Y.70 ; State ea: rel.
Pagev. Smith,48Vt. 282.
Wetherefore concud thattheproceedingunderthe
wasproperlyinstituted. Thecomplaint allegesthattheCen
acttoamendanacttoenableroad,ditch,manufacturingand
thtth saidcommissioner did, inOctober, 864 presri
suchrates,andthesaidcompanyhaveeversincecollected tolls
Marchlast past(A.D. 1878),thesaidcompanyerectedatoll
lessthantenmiles thesaidtoll gateatFallRivertothe
thereatas aforesaid haveneverbeenprescribedbythecounty
commissioner of, oranytribunaltransactingcountybusiness
company,forthespa atleastthreemonthslast past,have
GeorgetownandFallRiveraforesaid,andintermediatepoints,
rights,privilegesandfranchises; 2nd.Thatthesaidcorpora
suchotherandfurtherreliefinthepremises as thecasemay
questionismadeinthiscourtwhetherthecomplain setsout
thefacts constitutingtheusurpationorcauseofactionwithin
tureofaquowarranvto,wouldnotbesu entundertheCode.
tion isperhapsdefectively set out, asthecaseis notnowbe
 
Bythepleadingsandevidence,thequestionis squarelypre
sentedwhetheratoll-roadcompanyorganized undertheIn
mayestablish andcollect tolls at two gates, distant less than
tenmilesfromeachother. Thesectionunderwhichthecom
panywasincorporatedprovidesthat “ saidcompanyshallhave
ve ten iles road,andtocollecttollsthereatattherates
prescribedbythecount_ycommissioner th trib trans
eachofsuch gates. TheevidenceshowsthattheFallRiver
tosaidboardthatsaidcorporationdesiretoerecttoll gateson
establishtheratesof toll at anysuchtoll gateorgates: Now
therefore,we,the saidboardofcountycomssiones,incon
authorityvestedinusbylaw theactaforesaid,doorder,
chargesatanysuchtoll gatesshallbeasfollows, etc.
Itis needlesstosaythat theboardofcountycommissioner
 
compliedwith,if t\vo ormoregatesbeerected thn sp
oftenmiles, providedthatthewholenum of teserected
shouldbeclose together. Whentheinterpretationofa . char
mostfavorableto th peple,providedit beequallyreasonable.
this case, pertinentlyremarksuponthepointunderconsidera
law 64 eitherbyextendingorcurtailingits powers,fran
defendant. It is arguedbycounsel forthe defendant that
th did not fi xthe distancebetween gates,but only re
strictedthenumberof gatesinrespecttotheentirelength
wouldentitle thecompanytotwogatesfortwentymiles,leav
thisbethe proper constructionof thestatute,then thetwo
gatesuponthe twentymiles roa maybelocated within
onemile,orevenashorterdistanceofeachother. Theconse
andintersectingroads. Underthe rulecontendedforbyde
passi veraboutone-halfoftheroad,asuponthosepassing
 
maytherebetwogates,wherethelentho the road ismore
thantenandless thantwentymiles, th iftheentirelength
oftheroadis nottenmilestherecan benogate. Whatwe
do decide is\that wherever there are twogates or more.
thedistancebetweenthemmustbe not less than ten miles.
Thecourtfoundthatthedefendantwasguiltyofunlawfully
gate, collecting tolls thereatwithoutauthorityoflaw;
dutyto dosowheretheinfractionofits provisionsis notwill
thecourtinexcludingthedefendantonly omtherightand
think, aproperjud en it will be rm
ired.
cause fatallydefectivein form,anewwritmaybeawarded orderofthe
 
plaint, fi ledinthiscourt inthisaction duly veried. together withinterest
andthecostsofthissuit. Held,asu ientcopliace iththesectionre
vacation.
thatthesumsoughttoberecovered doesnt excedtwothousanddollars.
572,Gen.Laws,1877).
Mr.A.B.PATTONproae.
Sworn-2. J. It is assigned for error, rst: that thesecond
summonswasissuedmorethanthirtydays afterthe fi l gof
the pl t. Sec. 30ofthe providesthatatanytime
withinone after the fi lin of thecomplaint theplain
tiffmayhaveasummonsissued. This clearly refers to the
summonsrstissuedinthecase. The makesnoprovis
ionforanaliassummons. pr CourtofCalifornia,
nssnotknowntoourlaw,andinfact,underoursys
ec noreturn(lay,andwhenit hasoncebeenissued, it
upon the fi rst. It is basedupon the complaintalone. It
any importance were to beattached to the dictum above
 
th ri is sufficient in thefirst instance, er it iscapa
bleofperformingtheoffice for whichit wasissued. Indeed,
in the verycase from whichwequotetheabove,it became
necessaryto issue anewsummons,for thereasonthatthefirst
writis fatally defective, orhasbeenissuedwithoutauthority,
or foranyother reasonit isincapableofeffectuatingitspur
performingits office, it ismanifestthatanotherwritis neces
| sary. Ifthen,under Coe,thiscontingencyshoul happen
| summons,itwouldb amostimpotentconclusionto holdthat
statutory provision, to awardan alias or newwrit. Andin
the caseofDupuyv. Shear,supra,thecourtfurtheron,per
secondsummonsto issue, it mustbebecausebyfilingthecom
controlof thecourt,whichthecourt,byvirtueof itsgeneral
andas incident to this power itwasauthorizedto directpro
cess to issue for thepurpose qu jurisdiction ofthe
yerson. ***Concedingthisauthority to exist, theexercise
ofthepower rests in thesoundlegal discretion f court.
This concusio isundoubtedlysound. Inthe casebefore
us, thefirstsummonswasquashedbecauseofitsbeingfatally
record. Thisproceedingwasregularandproper.
Thesecondgroundoferroris theoverrulingofthemotion
writwassubstanti thesamea to thefirst.
Code, is asfollows: “ esaidaction is brought to recover
ofthedefendantsheei thesumofsevenhundred
tiff's complaint,filedinthiscourtinthis action,dulyverified,
pr thisamodel,eitherin formorsubstance,of
practice, i mayberegardedasasufficient compliance
warrantareversal ejudgmentuponthatgroundalone.
Theerror assigned as to the defective return ofthe sheriff is
curedbythe showing amended
ntwasrenderedinvacation.
authoritytherebyconferred,therewasnoerrorin therendition
that plaintiff belowdidnotcomplywith therequirementof
averment in hiscomplaint,seemstobewithoutfoundationin
plaint sets out pro ss note for the sumof$336 £ ,to
recover which,with interest, the suit is brought;andthe
fourthparagraphis aspecial avermentthat thejudgment
Tinscase will befo reportedinvolumefour,Colorado
S'row:,Justice,wasinadvertentlyomittedbythe reporter,in
ties bearsinternalevidenceof vi beendrawnupwithout
rise todisputeandconsequentlitigation.
theplaintiff anddefendant were tenants in commonofthe
cropsincontroversy,althoughitwasnotthecrop themselves,
betweenthem.
thepossessionofthecropswhenmatured,for thepurposeof
vestedbysomesubsequentchangeofthe contract,hewasen
ordertochangethe ofawritten contract,by
lf th defen nt, thre isnodisputeasto thefacts
inthe case. Theexacttimewh anleft theplaceis not
stated,butsinceitwasafterthegrasshoppershadravagedthe
 
if anything,left for Mo to erthe contract, until
thecropwasreadyto sell. Bethisasitmay,Hedgesassented
to performany contract, which byitsterms
hewasboundto perform,itwaswaivedbyHedgesin assent
hadatthattime;theprospec wasgloomy;therewassomehay,
hadadvanced. Heaidthathewoulddothebestthathecould,
outofwhatshouldbeleft; thathehadnowahouseto live in,
haveno rentto pay,andthat hecouldhaulwood
toRosita.
thecrops that wereleft, so thatMorganshouldget hismoney
out of them. What did this mean? Obviously, that
Hedges,whounderthe contractwastodotheworkofculti
and harvestingof the crops, th Mo himselfcould
gethis money them. Nowlet usseewhatinterpreta
tion the partiesthemselvesputuponthis “ fi ti ofthe
agreement. Morganfurther testifies: “ thecornand
goandsell the crops, as I considered this a rt myduty
underthe contract. Mr. Platt sent four corn, with
 
(Morgan)gavemeauthorityashi agenttotakecontrolofthe
Actingunder tho ty Itookcontrol th property,and
thedefendantmadenoobjectionat . Isetfourloads
rightofpossessionandsaleofthecrops. IfMo hadin
havedrawn omthe evidence in the case is that Mo n's
rightofpossessiontothepropertywasneverdivested. 1take
the oundthatuponthewrittencontractandthesubsequent
unwarrantedandunsupportedbyanyevidence whatever, or
owncost,advance$675in the purchaseofimplementsand
 
faceofawrittencontract,unalteredbyexpresswords,andup
fromthrowingintothescalesofjustice: Platttestifies: “ De
awayeightloads. Theloadsweighedaboutonetoneach,and
noattempttocontradic thisevidence,andthereforestandsas
havingaddeddishonestyandfalsehoodtowrong. Aquestion
intheargumentsofcounsel,Ideemofsufficient importance
takenbytheofficer uponsuingoutthewrit, anddeliveredto
responsive tosuch allegation, the plea shouldbe that the de
fendant didnotdetain thegoods,&c. 1 Chitty's Pl. Tit.
Replevin.
tended that thereundertheburden pro wasuponthede
fendant. Wehinkthisisnottherule. Itseemswellsettled
showsthepleao pro rtyin defendantto beinthe su and
correctformatcommonlaw,andis in effect a special orformal
traverse, averring,bywayofinducement,propertyin defend
gationofownershipin th propert Thequestion raisedby
suchplea, isnotwhether thepropertyis in thedefendant,but
whether the right of property, and the right to immediate
possessionatthetimewhen,&c., wasin theplaintiff; andthe
onusisthereforeuponhimto showsuchrightofpossession.
ingacontinuance,orfromanordersettingasideaverdict.
continuancefromanorder setting asidetheverdict,andfrom
cause;henceit pretendedthat anappeal will lie
underthefirst divisionofSec.338oftheCode,whichrelates
 
ionofsaid section. Bu thereis noauthorityfoundtherefor
takinganappeal fromeitheranorderdenying
whentheappeal is taken the fi naljudgment;butinthe
absenceofa nal judgment,an intheabsenceof anappeal
ableorder, themotionto dismisstheappealmust beallowed.
appellantwasa pracic physic That isin was
betweentwothousandandthreethousanddollars perannum.
time waspossessedof ys,goods andchattelsandreal
appelleehadhadthecareandsupportofthetwochildren(aged
in thesumof fourteenhundred dollars,as follows: “
hundred dollars within thirty days, four hundreddollars
withinfour nts,fourhundreddollarswithineight nts,
defendant paytwohundreddollars to the plainti s solictor,
 
divorcewasprematurelybrought. Thebill allegesdesertion,
oundforthe divorcesought. It isadmittedthatappellant
aboutthe3rdofMay,1876,andthat thebill fordivorcewas
bythetestimony,thatinthe ofMarch,1876,appellant,
roomofhiswife,an fr that time tothe dateof his a
leavingthehouseinMay,whenever heremainedat thehouse
ma imonia intercourse, companionship or co uni
withhiswife,whatev
partytodeserttheother. 1BishoponMarriageandDivorce,
defendantceasedto sleep in thesamehousewithcomplainant
th therefrethedesertiondid bei untilMay,1876,and
pl bill. Thisis thechiefquestion for usto deter
mine. Wethink the construction claimed for the term
“ bitati entirelytoonarrow. Matrimonialcohabita
 
house,mightbesaidtobecohabitingpromiscuously.
Inconnectionwiththetextwhichwehavequotedfrom,su
immaterialwhetherthe distance towhichthe parties
the rite allcasesis th ten toabandon.
Theintentof thedefendanttodeserthiswifeinthiscaseis
sleepuponthepremisesof thedomicie,andwecanconceive
leavingthekitchenlounge.
In lllagrath v. Magratk, 103 Mass. 579, it is said that
 Ther isnomoreimportantrightofthewifethanthatwhich
toperform all the chiefdutiesandobligations on_ l _ 1 i _ s part,
whichareimposedbythemarriage contract,anddistinguish
think,inviewofall the evideilbe,thattheamountofalimony
in equity, hasntthedignityofalike verdict in anactionatlaw. It isad
visory only. It isthe dutyofthe court in suchcasetosift theentireevi
dence,andtofoundits decreethereon,asmaybe rr ntedbyll thefacts
elicited.
CR IT bill. Thecaseis sufficientlystated in theopinion.
Messrs. ORRIsBLAKE, R. H. HITELEYandGRANVILLE
BERKLEY,for plaintiffs in error.
tried byajury.
considered. Besidesaverydifferentconsideratio governsin
achancerycausefromthatwhichcontrolsinanaction at law.
casebythecourt,hasnotthedignityofalike verdictinalaw
 
- n i l
 
tion. * * * * Ifanissuebedirected,the verdictofthe
Hes notonlyatlibertytodisregard it, but it is his dutyto
decidethe cause accordin tothe dictates ofhisownjudg
ment,andtheconvictionsofhisownconscience. Garrettv.
ell conscienceis not ti withit, must holly
nnheeded. Noerror canbe assignedupontheorder ofthe
court,either granting refusi anissue. Thetrial byjury
insuchcaseis not matterofright.
Therecord,whichis veryimperfect,seemstoshowthat at
thatdidnottestify foreth jury,andthedecree is presum
ablybasedbothupontheevidencesubmittedtothejuryaswell
thatthesame ld e read e re th courtonthe fi nl
hearing,withthesameeffect as thoughithadbeentakenbe
ofthis order,the testimonywastakendownandpreserved.
courttosift the entireeviden addued,bothatthe trialof
thespecialissues and at the fi nal hearing,andto found its
decreethereon,asmaybewarrantedbyall thefactselicited.
In so confused a state is the record that it is i
tosaythatit presentsall theevidencetaken.
 
 
notice to begiven re th sale, the appointment of the
receiverwhowasauthorizedbythedecreeinthemakingof
thesale,andconveyingthepropertytoperformtheordinary
costsinthiscour
I'eversed.
THEPEOPLEExREL.ATT'Y RAL.
2. An ti fortheusurpationofanofficeor franchiseis acivil action
underthe ofthisState,andmustbegovernedbytherulesapplicable
thereto;mustbeinstitutedbyfiling acomplaintandissuingasummons,and
whenrequiredtodosobytheGovernoror eneralAssebly.
Code,seti 260.)
cisebyanyotherofficer isforbiddenbyimplication.
tureofaquo to po therelation oftheAttorney-gen
eralinbehalfof the State stthe Atchison,Topeka&
SantaFe railroad, for the alleged usurpation ofa corporate
franchise.
Someofthequestionsmadearedisposedofbythedecision
thatwhatevertheformofthe action prescribedbytheGeneral
Assemblyto remedy theusurpationormisuseofacorporate
beobtainedareidentical, andtheproceeding is in substance
civil, instituted for thedeterminationofpurely civil rights;
(2), thatchapter25oftheCode,concernin “ cti sfor the
usurpationofanoffice orfranchise, is freefro constitu
bjectio arisingfromsection20, article 5, ofthecon
stitution;(3), that underthe theproceedingto remedy
theusurpationormisuseofafranchise, is bycivil complaint
law.
Aleadingtermofall reform,istheabolitionofcommon
lawformsofactions,andtheestablishmentofasingle, simple
betweenactionsat lawandsuits in equity, andthe distinct
 
 
andthereshallbeinthisStatebut fo ofcivil actionfor
action,andwhichshall be prosecutedanddefended as pre
scribedinthisact.
actionsandtherulesbywhichthesutliciencyofthepleadings
havingrepealed_bythesameact, chapter 73 of the revised
statutes,authorizingproceedingsbyinformationinthenature
cumulativeremedy,buttoreplacethecommonlawproceeding
of all otherremedies. 2PotteronCorp. Sec.665;Palmerv.
Fleg/, 36,SuperiorCort p.(N. .)14. Anactionforthe
supatio an f eorfranchise,therefore,is acivil action
underthe ofthis State,andmustbegovernedbythe
,thefactsconstitutingthecauseofactionin na andcon
 
eretofore sull adoptedwhentheproceedingwasbyinfo:-~
informationintheease TeCentralandGeorgetownRoad
om v.TtePeople,citedsupra,thecourtsays : “
does not state the countyinwhichthe complaint is fi led or
thatit is fi ledat all; nordoesitsu ientl statethecauseand
generalnatureoftheaction,asis contemplatedbytheCode.
1,103provides: “ Attorney-general shall attendinper
sonattheseatofgovernmentduin the sessionof theGen
civil andcriminal,inwhichtheStateshall be rtyorinter
ested.
Statecasesinstitutedorpendingin theSup Courtofthe
intendedtoincludeStatecases pendingin inferior courts.
 
ney-general toappearinStatecasespendingininferiorcourts
request,either th GovernororGeneral emly our
viewtheproceedingshouldhavebeeninstituted,if at all, by
stance,or uponthe complaint ofanyprivate party. With
this view,boththeprovisionsofthegenerallawsandthe
“ ' Thereshall beelected, bythequli electorsofeachjudi
severalcounties ofhis district in all indictments, suits and
proceedingswhichmaybependingin the district court, in
anycountywithinhisdistrict, whereintheState people
etc.
dutyo edistrict attorney tobringtheactionwheneverhe
usurped,intrudedinto, orunlawfully ld rexercisedbyany
person,orwhenheis directedto dosobythe Governor,and
action thecomplaint privateparty,suchaction
Potter'sDwarrisonStat. 72,270. Statev. Hastings,10Wis.
anddismisstheinformationwasthereforewell taken,andthe
Englishlanguage,andto understandit whenspoken, doesnot necessarily
disqualifythemfromserving as jurors,underthe statutesof Colorado.
Errorto District CourtofLasAnimasCounty.
derstandtheEnglishlanguage.
or cause; the challenge was overruled byt e court,andthe
5
jurorsuponthetrial.
Othererrorsareassigned,butbystipulationofcounselte
theEnglish anguage,andto understand it whenspoken,ne
cessarilya disqualifying The questionis not without
ty
Section161ofthe provides that either partymaychal
lengeperemptorily,orforcause,limiting challenges
whichchallengesforcausemaybe taken. It is unnecessary
toadverttothemfurtherthantosaythatinabilitytospeakor
takenasexcludingdisqualifyin causesnotenumerated,other
The expreasioeznius est ewclusioalteriua is notof
versa ppli ti in the structi statutes. The
legislativeintentionis to be taken tothe necessity
ofth tter, andaccordingto that whichis consonantto
reasonandsounddiscretion. BroomsLeg.Max.664.*
ferredto thesecondhead. It is adefect ofeducation, but
onlyin arelative andlimitedsense. Knowledgeofalanguag
ll antofit arguesnothingrespectingmentalculture;infact,
evidenceofthewitnesses,theargumentsofcounsel,andthe
matteroffact, is asconspicuousl adisqualifyin circumstance
asthoghhe erdeaf,unlessthecourtmayaidhiminte
qu tio is removable; if not, it is completeand absolute.
It is true thereis noexpressauthorityofstatute todo so,
butthereis ageneralpowerconferredbySec.402ofthe
courts oforiginal jurisdictionhaveinherentpowertomake
theland. Gannonetal. v. Frit 79Pa.303.
Itmustbe borne inmindthat the territoryembracedin
quiteanumbe ofthe ties n e southernpart ofthe
State, andamongthemthe countyinwhichthis litigation
originated,formerlybelongedto theRepublicof co that
inhabitantsthereofwerelargely, if notexclusively,aSpanish
speakingpeople. Ofthisfactwetakejudicialnotice. These
peopleareinall respectscitizens, andtheassociationofalien
dismissed. Underlike circumstances itwasprovidedbystat
utein the StateofCalifornia,thatajurorshouldhave sui
thecourtwerehad;butcertaincountieswhere largeportion
governments,legislation touching the strti the
law,haspr eeded tho anyexpressreference to, orrecog
nitionofthefactthatin thecountiesmentioned,its adminis
largelydependentupon,aMexicancitizenship. Intheearly
now exlusiveruleth is contendedfor,if itdidnotde
feattheadministrationo th lawinthesecounties,wouldde
volvethe burthensofjurydutyupona verylimitednum
supm,orinthe inherentpowersofthe rts originalju
risdictionwhichtheyhadestablished for the administration
asjurorswhileinthejurybox. Further than thiswedonot
inthisbehalf.
ties ofconsultation,discussionandagreement,it doesnotap
andspoketheSpanishaswellastheEnglish anguage; if so,
jurybox.
speakingonly. Respecting th rorsinacountywherethe
Englishspeakingclass is so limited, andtheSpanishspeaking
class 1 ' s so largely in excess, such apresumption would be
without foundationin fact, andinadmissible. Withoutthis
presumption it does not tivelyappearthatthe rors
namedweredis aliedforthedutiesofthe urroom.We
belimitedtocasesof strictest necessity.
proceedingsmustbe in theEnglish anguage,andthecaseof
ingsmustbein English. Thefallacy oftheargumentonthis
ere exclusiverule. Thedeclarationofthe (Sec.405)
State r foreajudicial of cer, shall be in theEnglishlan
guage. * * * * Thisis substantiallythestatuteofIV,
Steh sPlead.Appendix24. Priortothattimethe record
hadbeenframed tin andthestatutehadforits objectthe
shown,defended,answered,debatedandjudgedin theEnglish
tongue,butbeenteredandenrolledinLatin. 3Black.Com.
aftertheConquest. Thisappearstobetheonlystatuteonthe
commoulaw,neednotbediscussed. Undoubtedlylawsareto
Thepeopleof this State, as of the UnitedStates, areanEng
lishspeakingpeople,andinthesilenceofthestatutealljudi
follow,however,that theywouldbe exclusivelyso.
Non-Englishspeakingprisoners areputupontheir trial, and
knownand manifest tothembythe same instrumentality.
Theproposition,therefore,thatall judicialproceedingsmust
fth courtalso disappears. WhileundertheCodetheymust
ceivethattheir translation into Spanishforthe use andin
structionofa urorunderstandingthat languagealone,would
nowisebedefeated.
tionsto theinterpositionofinterpretersin judicialproceedings;
Suchpersons re disqualified,butwheneverit ispracti
cableto secureafull panelofEnglishspeakingjurors, awise
against the conclusion arrived at in this opinion. The first
authoritywehavebeenunableto obtain. Withthereasoning
foundationsuponwhichtheconclusions in that caseappears
firmedwithcosts.
Affirmed.
V.
receivedinduecourseoftrade,mustbeprotected.
fideholder, in anactionbytheassineeagainstthedrawer;thedefendant
burdenofproofofbadfaith rests withhimwhoassails the title onthat
und
complaint,allegesthatonthe24thdayofAugust,A.D.1878,
plaintiff, is the fu owner nd erthereof;that
hesamewaspresentedto said bank for payment,and that
paymentthereofwas refused.
Kastor)wouldcollectacertainexecution st partnership
thatall contracts, promises,agreements,conveyances,securi
ties and notesmade,given,granted,executed,drawnoren
deviceorgameofchance,or bybettingonthesideor hands
andplaceofsuchplay,toanypersonorpersonssogamingor
consideration,within themeaningofthis section, is utterly
void.
Theprotectionwhichthe lawextends to aninnocentholder,
tiable paper,is ofnoavail whenthe statute intermsor by
unavoidable pl tio ha pronouncedtheinstrumentabso
lutelyvoid. Stricken with nullityat its birth,it canthere
after gain vitality.
heldunderlikecircumstances,whenthestatute eclaressuch
ties, or thosewhoarechargeable withor havehadnoticeof
the sier tio
v. TheFarmers Bankof N.C’ . 7 N10.191;Baileyv.
Taber,5Mass. 285;TeCityqfAurora. v. West,22Ind. 88.
Isthewagerinquestionwithintheprohibitionofthestat
void in_ the handsof every holder. Horse-racing has been
 
used. Thewordgamingisheldto extend tophysicalcon
vices.
“ weretheOlympicandNemeangamesamongthe
Greeks,andApollinianandCapitolinegamesamongtheRo
cock et al. 4Mo.536; Boyntonv. Curle,4Mo.599.
Butawagerastowhetheranexecutioncanbecollected,we
byanygaming.
“ Tosuppressgambling bl houses, extended in
termsto all negotioblepaperwhere the considerationwasfor
wononanywager; buttheRevisedStatutesof1868
certainly shouldnotbeextendedto casesnotfairly withinits
weareclearly f eopinionthat thecheckwasvoid. Even
atcommonlawawageragainst soundpolicywasnotrecover
a pecuniaryinterest whichmight influence himto interfere
withthedueadministatio ofjustice, byseeking to defeat
th proes ofcourt. Toholdthatsuchawager is valid, is to
encourageunwarrantedintermeddlingwiththemandatesof
handsofaLonadeholder,forvaluereceived induecourse
oftrade,mustbeprotected. Bythecurrentofdecisions,and
egtiablepaper,wherethe sier tio arises fromawager
ing contract,will not bedeclared voidinthe handsofbona
fi depu sers, esssoenactedbystatute: Ilaig/itv. Joice,
2Cal.64. Noris thisdoctrinethoughttobevariant omthe
havebeenprotectedin thehandsofa lepurchaser,was
suedonwasnotnegotiable.
statute, thedefendantneednot to haveallegedthattheplain
handssoever itmighthavepassedit wasequally void. But
thischeckoriginatingatransaction not within the interdict
ofthestatute,is, inthehandsofabone depurchaser,unaf
bebysuchholdercollected.
thatheis nota deholder. U/new v. Riche,10Adol.&
El.411;DanielsonNeg.Instruments, Sec. 770. Andthe
16Peters,1; &B elo Lead. Cas.onBillsofEx.
&Prom.Notes,p. 186etseq.and239et eeg.,' DanielsonNg
reversedandthecauseremanded,for further proceedingsnot
ormorecannotbeenteredwithoutdisposingofthe se to all.
Thefactsarestatedin theopinion.
Mr. BUTLER,fordefendantinerror.
Charles H.Morgan,GuyM.Hulett andCharles R. Bissell.
Summonswasdulyservedupon Bissell, PostandHulett,and
Aule to pleadwas also takenagainsttheother defendants
served,viz.: PostandHulett. PostandHulettfailed to plead
in obedience to the rule, whereuponjudgmentbynildicit
asbythecourtenteredagainstPostonly.'Post,asattorney,
enteed
 
entryrecrd th actiontaken: “ daycomestheplaintiff,
com not, buthereinwhollymakesdefault;anditappearing
Theverdictwas for the plaintiff,anddamagesassessed at
$3, ,whichwaslargelyin excesso h damages laid in
the declaration. Thejudgmentof the court, basedupon the
verdict,wasin favorofthe plaintiffandagainstthedefend
couldbepronouncedas tooneor morewithoutdisposingof
couldassessdamagesagainst the other defaulting parties,and
thusajoint judgmentcouldhavebeenrenderedagainstall.
Faulkv. Kellums,54Ill. 191; Kimball c Wardv. Tanner,
63 Ill. 519: Dowv. Rattle, 12 Ill. 373; Streeter et al. v.
MarshallS.M.Co. et al.4Col.539.
Hulett,judgmentbynil dicit should have been taken against
both, ndnotagainstoneonly.
mightberemitted in this court,andajudgmententered for
theproperamou