Post on 11-Mar-2020
AN EXAMINATION OF INDONESIAN
PRISON OFFICERS’ EXPERIENCES ON
DERADICALISATION: TOWARDS BETTER
PRACTICE
I Gede Widhiana Suarda
Bachelor of Law (Udayana University, Bali)
Master of Law (Diponegoro University, Central Java)
Principal Supervisor: Professor Reece Walters
Associate Supervisor: Associate Professor Mark Lauchs
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
School of Justice, Faculty of Law
Queensland University of Technology
2018
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice i
Keywords
Challenges, Collaboration, Counterterrorism, Corrections, Deradicalisation,
Disengagement, Experiences, Extremist, Directorate General of Corrections (DGC),
Implementer, Indonesian Prison Officers, Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation
Program, Jihadist, National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Partnership, Prison,
Prison-based Deradicalisation Program, Radicalisation, Reform, Rehabilitation, Role
of Indonesian Prison Officers on Terrorist Rehabilitation, Special Prison for
Convicted Terrorist, Strategy, Terrorism, Terrorist Convicts, Terrorist Inmates,
Terrorist Prisoners, Terrorist Rehabilitation.
ii An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Abstract
In dealing with convicted terrorists throughout prisons, prison-based deradicalisation
programs have been instituted by many states. Generally, the programs have two objectives:
preventing radicalisation in the prisons, and reducing violent behaviour of the convicted
terrorists. For the implementation of such programs, terrorist inmates are the participants,
while one arm of the implementers is the prison officers.
Following this issue, many studies around terrorist inmates and deradicalisation
programs have been conducted. In the Indonesian context, although an emerging body of
literature is available that focuses on terrorist inmates and deradicalisation programs, less
attention has been paid to the Indonesian prison officers who are implementing the program
at the coalface. This study addresses this research gap, and focuses on the experiences of
Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.
To achieve these goals, focus group discussions with Indonesian prison officers were
conducted in three Indonesian prisons, namely Cipinang, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, and
Surabaya Prisons. To analyse the data, a thematic qualitative analysis was employed. The
study also applied legal research to formulate strategies to improve the role of Indonesian
prison officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs.
The findings demonstrate five challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers
implementing such programs: terrorist inmates’ personalities, the readiness of Indonesian
prison officers, the sustainability of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program,
institutional infrastructure problems, and unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.
Further, the study specifically considered the establishment of a special prison for convicted
terrorists in Indonesia. Although various advantages, disadvantages, and policy
recommendations related to the establishment of this prison were identified, there was
absolute agreement among the prison officers for this initiative. An evaluation of the needs
of Indonesian prison officers in implementing terrorist rehabilitation programs found that
appropriate training and good partnerships are essential. Moreover, the thesis presents policy
recommendations and identifies regulation reform to improve Indonesian prison officers’
role in terrorist rehabilitation. These findings extend the body of knowledge on prison-based
deradicalisation programs from the perspective of prison officers.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice iii
Table of Contents
Keywords .................................................................................................................................. i
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... iii
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ vii
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ viii
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. ix
Statement of Original Authorship ........................................................................................... xi
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ xii
Introduction ...................................................................................... 1
1.1 Contextual Background ..................................................................................................3
1.2 Research Questions .........................................................................................................6
1.3 Objectives of the Research .............................................................................................7
1.4 Significance of the Research ..........................................................................................7
1.5 Conceptual Frameworks .................................................................................................8
1.6 Terrorist Prisoners: A Working Definition ...................................................................11
1.7 Publications ..................................................................................................................14
1.8 Thesis Structure and Chapter Outline ...........................................................................14
Literature Review ........................................................................... 17
2.1 Terrorism in Indonesia: Incidents, Networks, and Future Threats ...............................17
2.2 Terrorist Inmates in Indonesian Prisons: Facts and Figures .........................................21
2.3 The Nature of Indonesia’s De-radicalisation Program for Terrorist Prisoners .............25
2.4 Reported Outcomes of Indonesia’s Deradicalisation Program for Terrorist Inmates ...30
2.5 Limitations in the Current Literature ............................................................................34
2.6 Summary and Implications ...........................................................................................43
Research Design .............................................................................. 45
3.1 Overview of the Research Design and Methodology ...................................................45
3.1.1 The Methodology and Research Questions ........................................................46
3.1.2 Qualitative Social Research Methodology: Empirical Legal Research ..............47
3.1.3 Legal Research: Policy and Law Reform Research ...........................................48
3.2 Research Site ................................................................................................................49
3.3 Participants and Their Recruitment ..............................................................................51
iv An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
3.4 Data and Legal Materials ............................................................................................. 53
3.5 Data Collection Methods ............................................................................................. 55
3.5.1 Primary Data ...................................................................................................... 55
3.5.2 Secondary Data .................................................................................................. 58
3.6 Legal and Non-Legal Materials Collection Methods ................................................... 58
3.6.1 Primary Legal Materials .................................................................................... 59
3.6.2 Secondary Legal Materials ................................................................................ 59
3.6.3 Non-Legal Materials .......................................................................................... 60
3.7 Data Analysis ............................................................................................................... 60
3.7.1 Familiarisation with the Data ............................................................................. 61
3.7.2 Generating Initial Codes .................................................................................... 61
3.7.3 Searching for Themes ........................................................................................ 62
3.7.4 Reviewing Themes ............................................................................................ 62
3.7.5 Defining and Naming Themes ........................................................................... 63
3.7.6 Producing the Report ......................................................................................... 63
3.8 Ethical Considerations ................................................................................................. 64
3.9 Scope and Limitations .................................................................................................. 66
3.9.1 Scope .................................................................................................................. 66
3.9.2 Limitations ......................................................................................................... 66
Legal Frameworks .......................................................................... 69
4.1 Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law .................................................................................. 70
4.1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 70
4.1.2 The Substance of Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law ........................................... 72
4.1.3 The Crime of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Law.................................... 75
4.2 Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Financing Law ................................................................. 82
4.2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 82
4.2.2 The Nature of the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law ............................................. 83
4.2.3 The Crime of Terrorism Financing under the Anti-Terrorism Financing
Law .................................................................................................................... 86
4.3 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 88
The Challenges of Terrorist Deradicalisation: Indonesian Prison
Officers’ Experiences ....................................................................... 93
5.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 94
5.2 Terrorist Inmates’ Personalities ................................................................................... 94
5.2.1 Terrorist Inmates’ Beliefs .................................................................................. 95
5.2.2 Terrorist Inmates’ Behaviour ........................................................................... 100
5.2.3 Non-Cooperative Terrorist Inmates: A Greater Challenge .............................. 104
5.3 The Readiness of Indonesian Prison Officers ............................................................ 109
5.3.1 Internal Factors (Individual Aspects)............................................................... 110
5.3.2 External Factors (Collegial Aspects) ............................................................... 113
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice v
5.4 Program Sustainability................................................................................................116
5.4.1 An Incidental Program .....................................................................................117
5.4.2 A Partial Program .............................................................................................122
5.5 Institutional Infrastructure Problems ..........................................................................126
5.5.1 Overcapacity .....................................................................................................127
5.5.2 Obscurity of Segregation Practices ..................................................................130
5.6 Unavailability of Collaborative Mechanisms .............................................................133
5.6.1 Lack of Cooperation and Coordination between the BNPT and the DGC .......134
5.6.2 Unorganised Partnerships .................................................................................137
5.7 Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................140
The Perspective of Indonesian Prison Officers on the
Establishment of a Special Prison for Terrorist Inmates in
Indonesia ......................................................................................... 143
6.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................144
6.2 The Establishment of a Special Prison for Terrorist Prisoners:
An Absolute Agreement .............................................................................................144
6.2.1 Terrorist Inmates: General Prison versus Special Prison .................................144
6.2.2 An Absolute Agreement ...................................................................................149
6.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of a Special Prison for Terrorist Inmates .................152
6.3.1 Advantages .......................................................................................................152
6.3.2 Disadvantages ...................................................................................................154
6.4 Policy Issues Related to a Special Prison for Terrorist Inmates .................................157
6.4.1 Type of Inmate: Non-cooperative Terrorist Inmates ........................................159
6.4.2 Decision Maker for the Distribution .................................................................161
6.4.3 Timing of Distribution to the Special Prison ....................................................163
6.4.4 Strengthening Partnerships ...............................................................................165
6.4.5 Availability of Data on the Background of Convicted Terrorists.....................168
6.5 Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................170
Improving the Role of Indonesian Prison Officers in Terrorist
Rehabilitation: A Strategy for the Future ................................... 173
7.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................174
7.2 The Role of Indonesian Prison Officers in terrorist Rehabilitation ............................175
7.3 The Needs of Indonesian Prison Officers on Terrorist Rehabilitation........................176
7.3.1 A Direct Need: Training ...................................................................................177
7.3.2 An Indirect Need: Good Partnerships ...............................................................182
7.4 A Correlation between the Findings on the Challenges and
the Findings on the Needs ...........................................................................................187
7.5 Strategies for the Future ..............................................................................................190
7.5.1 Strategy One: Policy Recommendations ..........................................................190
7.5.2 Strategy Two: Regulation Reform ....................................................................192
7.6 Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................196
vi An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Conclusions and Recommendations............................................ 199
8.1 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 200
8.1.1 The Challenges of Deradicalisation: Indonesian Prison Officers’
Experiences ...................................................................................................... 201
8.1.2 The Perspectives of Indonesian Prison Officers on the Establishment of a
Special Prison .................................................................................................. 205
8.1.3 Improving the Role of Indonesian Prison Officers in Deradicalisation ........... 206
8.2 Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 208
8.2.1 Practical Recommendations for the Government of Indonesia ....................... 209
8.2.2 Suggestions for Further Research .................................................................... 211
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 213
Appendices .............................................................................................................. 235
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice vii
List of Figures
Figure 1.1 The Relationship between Rehabilitation, Deradicalisation, and
Disengagement in the Context of Terrorist Inmates .................................... 10
Figure 1.2 The Relationship of Counterterrorism and Counter-radicalisation
Initiatives with the Concepts of Disengagement, Deradicalisation, and
Rehabilitation ............................................................................................... 11
Figure 2.1 The Number of Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesia (2011 - 2017) ............... 22
Figure 2.2 Overall Assessment of Prison-based Deradicalisation Program for
Terrorist Prisoners in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Yemen and Western
Europe .......................................................................................................... 33
Figure 2.3 Grouping of the Existing Research on Indonesia’s Prison-based
Deradicalisation Program............................................................................. 38
Figure 2.4 The Process of the Deradicalisation Program for Terrorist Prisoners
in the Context of Indonesian Correctional Services .................................... 41
Figure 2.5 Including Prison Officers’ Perspectives in the Research Topic of
Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program ................................... 42
Figure 3.1 The Research Sites .................................................................................... 50
Figure 3.2 The Ten Indonesian Prisons with the Largest Number of Terrorist
Prisoners ....................................................................................................... 51
Figure 4.1 Connection between Acts of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism
Law (ATL) and Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program ......... 91
Figure 4.2 Connection between Acts of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism
Financing Law (ATFL) and Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation
Program ........................................................................................................ 92
Figure 5.1 Classification of Terrorist Inmates in Indonesia: Terminology
Comparison between the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan
Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]) and Prison Officers ..... 107
Figure 5.2 Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program: Prison Officers’
Perspectives................................................................................................ 121
Figure 6.1 Findings on the Future Policy Issues of a Special Prison for Terrorist
Inmates ....................................................................................................... 158
viii An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
List of Tables
Table 2.1 The Distribution of Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesian Prisons and
Detention Centres ......................................................................................... 23
Table 2.2 The Number of Prisoners Convicted under Special Criminal Acts by
August 2015 ................................................................................................. 25
Table 2.3 Presman and Flockton Review of the Differences between Violent
Extremists and Non-Ideologically Motivated Offenders ............................. 26
Table 2.4 List of Recidivist Terrorists ....................................................................... 31
Table 3.1 Research Questions and the Associated Methodologies ............................ 47
Table 3.2 The Correlation between Research Questions, Data, and Materials .......... 54
Table 3.3 Details of Focus Group Discussions .......................................................... 57
Table 6.1 Comparison of the Distribution of Terrorist Inmates (Adapted from
Newman’s Findings) .................................................................................. 148
Table 7.1 Correlation between the Challenges and the Need of Indonesian
Prison Officers Regarding Terrorist Rehabilitation ................................... 189
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice ix
List of Abbreviations
AMLL Anti-Money Laundering Law
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
ATFL Anti-Terrorism Financing Law
ATL Anti-Terrorism Law
BNPT Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter
Terrorism Agency)
CIL Correctional Institution Law
CMT Conflict Management Training
Densus Detasemen Khusus (Special Detachment)
Ditjenpas Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan Republik Indonesia (Directorate
General of Corrections)
DGC Directorate General of Corrections
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representative)
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FGD Focus Group Discussion
ICG International Crisis Group
INP Indonesian National Police
IPA Indonesian Prison Authority
IPAC Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict
JAT Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication
Commission)
KUHP Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Pidana (Indonesian Penal Code)
KUHAP Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (Indonesian Law of
Criminal Procedure)
LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute)
LST Life Skills Training
MMDJ Metro Manila District Jail
MoRA Ministry of Religious Affairs
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
x An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia Ulema Council)
NBP New Bilibid Prison
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia)
NSW New South Wales
OHCHR The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights
Perpu Peraturan Pemerintah Penganti Undang-undang (Government
Regulation in Lieu of Law)
PP Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation)
PRAC Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare
R & N Risk and Need
RUTAN Rumah Tahanan (Detention Centre)
RQ Research Questions
SFCG Search for Common Ground
SOPs Standart Operating Procedures
SPS Singapore Prison Service
TPM Tim Pembela Muslim (Muslim Defender Team)
UK The United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US The United States
VERA Violent Extremist Risk Assessment
YPP Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation)
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice xi
Statement of Original Authorship
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet
requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the
best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously
published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Signature : QUT Verified Signature
Date : 14 April 2018
xii An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Acknowledgements
First, I wish to express my gratitude to my principal supervisor Professor
Reece Walters, who encouraged, guided, and challenged me in conducting the
research and in the writing process. His companionship was very remarkable. He
made me feel that I could do what was required. I also wish to thank my previous
associate supervisor, Professor Geoff Dean, and my recent associate supervisor,
Associate Professor Mark Lauchs, who have both supported and encouraged me to
complete my research. They always gave me the moral support and confidence to
progress towards each milestone in my PhD journey.
My sincere thanks also go to the Ministry of Research and Higher Education of
the Republic of Indonesia, the sponsor of my PhD. I thank the Government of
Indonesia for entrusting me with the public money. Special thanks to the Faculty of
Law at the University of Jember, where I have worked for over twelve years, for
supporting me to undertake a PhD degree at QUT. I also would like to thank QUT
for awarding me financial assistance in the last semester of my PhD at QUT.
I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the Director General of Corrections
of the Republic of Indonesia, I Wayan K Dusak, for support and for giving formal
permission to conduct fieldwork in three Indonesian prisons. I also thank Mr Harun,
a senior official in the Directorate General of Corrections of the Republic of
Indonesia, for his encouragement in conducting research within the Indonesian
correctional institutions. In addition, I am very grateful for the help and cooperation
from the friendly prison officers when I was conducting my fieldwork. To all the
prison officers who participated in this study, I thank you for agreeing to be part of
the study.
To my wife, Ni Putu Widita Cahya Dewi Suarda, I appreciate all the love,
sacrifice, and companionship you gave me throughout my PhD studies. To my
sweeties, I Gede Sadhu Anant Suarda and Ni Kadek Divya Ozy Suarda, who gave
me unconditional love and adorable smiles, thank you for making me relax after hard
working days. To my parents and my parents-in-law, thank you for always praying
for me and for supporting me in the completion of my PhD. Unfortunately, my
father-in-law passed away in 2016 after a sudden illness. May you rest in peace. I
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice xiii
have also been lucky to have my younger brother and my brother-in-law, who always
supported my study.
I would like to thank Dr Leigh Findlay, an accredited editor with the Institute
of Professional Editors (IPEd), who provided editing and proofreading services in
accordance with the Australian Standards for Editing Practice and the university-
endorsed guidelines for editing research theses.
To my friends, Tien Hoang Le, Hope Johnson, Elizabeth Rowe, Huong Van
Nguyen, Evan Hamman, Surendran Subramaniam, Hamzah, Walakada Sumanadasa,
Alice Witt, Rosalie Gillett, Janani Ganapathi, Yafet, and my other PhD colleagues in
G-Block, I wish to thank you all for the friendship and all the fun we have had over
the past four years. You are awesome!
Finally, yet importantly, I must thank the Senior Research Services Officers in
the QUT Faculty of Law – Leana Sanders, Myra, and Catherine Mackenzie – who
gave me much information and advice on administrative matters during my PhD
studies.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 1
Introduction
The concept of terrorist rehabilitation starts from the belief that one is not
born a terrorist. A person will go through a process of indoctrination before
he is ready to commit violence. During the indoctrination process, one is led
to be believe that violence and acts of aggression in the name of religion are
permissible. The ideology that is imbibed in his mind needs to be extricated
through a process known as rehabilitation. This is especially important when
extreme ideology is deeply rooted in the mind of the detainees [Introduction
in the book entitled Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-
terrorism]. (Gunaratna & Ali, 2015, p. xv)
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on 11 September 2001, terrorism related activities have occurred in many
parts of the world, resulting in various national and transnational counterterrorism
initiatives (Ramraj, Hor, & Roach, 2005). The number of convicted terrorists is
reportedly increasing and is estimated to be around 100,000 worldwide. The Middle
East, Central Asia and South East Asia report the greatest numbers with large
increases in Western Europe (Eckard, 2014; Kruglanski, Gelfand, & Gunaratna,
2010). This research specifically focuses on counterterrorism policies in Indonesia.
Similar to global trends, the number of convicted terrorists in Indonesia is
significant. According to the Indonesian National Police (INP) discussion paper
entitled Law Enforcement in Indonesia there were 695 terrorist suspects arrested and
519 convicted and imprisoned between 2002 and 20111 (Mabes Polri, 2011). A
report published by Search for Common Ground (SFCG), a non-governmental
organization with a mission to transform the way the world deals with conflict,
identified that Indonesian prisons were holding more than 800 terrorist prisoners
between 2003 and 2013 under the management of Indonesia’s Directorate General of
Corrections (SFCG, 2013, p. 3).
1 This thesis will shed more recent light on the number of convicted and sentenced terrorist offenders
in Indonesia, and on their progress in the prison system.
2 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Many states have instituted deradicalisation programs to deal with convicted
terrorists detained in prisons. The actions of states in response to terrorism involves
not only “hard-line” approaches such as military retaliation (Silke, 2003), but also
“soft” approaches. Implementing deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists is
an example of an adopted soft approach (Fink & El-Said, 2011; Schmid, 2013).
States have developed their own approaches to persuading terrorist inmates to stop
engaging in violent activities (QIASS, 2010; Veldhuis & Kessels, 2013).
As the opening quotation attest, rehabilitation has been an approach adopted by
the Indonesian authorities. Generally, the programs have two objectives: preventing
radicalisation in the prison and reducing violent behaviour of the convicted terrorists
(Eckard, 2014, p. 1). As a consequence, prison-based deradicalisation is implemented
by prison officers; hence their experiences in implementing programs play a vital
role in achieving deradicalisation objectives. In addition to an understanding of the
characteristics of terrorist prisoners and the programs themselves, an understanding
of prison officers’ perspectives is needed.
In the Indonesian context, although a considerable amount of research, policy
and political debate have focused on terrorist prisoners (Hassan, 2007; Jones C. R.,
2014; Osman, 2014; Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono, 2013) and deradicalisation programs
(Bakti, 2014; Eckard, 2014; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Istiqomah, 2012;
Johnston, 2009), less attention has been paid to the Indonesian prison officers who
are implementing the program at the coalface. Therefore, the prison officers’
perspectives and the implementation contexts should be assessed in more detail. An
examination of this aspect of prison-based deradicalisation programs seeks to explore
uncharted terrain that may prove invaluable for future policy and practice.
The goal of this thesis is to examine Indonesian prison officers’ experiences in
implementing deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners. The challenges that
Indonesian prison officers face and their views on the establishment of a special
prison for convicted terrorists were investigated. To fully understand and appreciate
the difficulties and complexities confronting Indonesian prison officers, detailed
qualitative methodologies with focus group were deployed.
Focus group discussions (FGD) were conducted in three Indonesian prisons,
namely Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison, Cipinang Prison, and Surabaya Prison.
These prisons were selected because they hold a considerable number of convicted
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 3
terrorists. The participants were Indonesian prison officers who had been working for
a minimum of two years for the Indonesian prison service and had the task and
responsibility for rehabilitating and/or supervising terrorist prisoners.
This chapter outlines the contextual background of the research (Section 1.1),
the research questions (Section 1.2), the objectives (Section 1.3) and the significance
of the research (Section 1.4). Section 1.5 describes the conceptual frameworks for the
research and Section 1.6 provides a working definition for terminology surrounding
terrorist prisoners. Section 1.7 lists the articles from the work presented in this thesis.
Finally, Section 1.8 provides an outline of the remaining chapters of the thesis.
1.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
Terrorist attacks are a significant threat to global security. Ongoing acts of
terrorism in Indonesia indicate that the country is vulnerable to this serious crime.
Incidents have occurred in Aceh, Bali, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Sumatra. The first Bali
bombing on 12 October 2002 marked a pivotal moment for the development of a
criminal justice initiative in Indonesia. The INP subsequently implemented a range
of measures to improve detection of, prevention, and enforcement against terrorism
(ICG, 2007; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Priatmodjo, 2010).
As a result of these proactive policing initiatives, the number of convicted
terrorists in Indonesian prisons has increased. Of considerable concern are the cases
of recidivism regarding terrorist acts. In a seminar entitled ‘From Radicalisation to
Terrorist’, Petrus Reinhard Golose argued that many of the convicted terrorists’
repeated acts of terrorism were involved in radicalising other inmates while
imprisoned (Berita Satu, 2012).
However, it remains unclear how and why this recidivism and radicalisation
happens in Indonesian prisons. For example, it is not known whether former
prisoners who commit terrorism acts after release were radicalised in prison or were
acting on established beliefs. Furthermore, it is unclear what supervisory prison
models are in place to prevent repeat offending. Such questions raise policy and
practical issues for the Indonesian authorities: the specific programs and personal
development models to implement in prisons; the ideology or theory that informs the
best practice of these models; and how the Indonesian Prison Authority (IPA)
evaluates or assesses the success of a model.
4 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Although the Indonesian Government has launched a deradicalisation program,
questions and criticisms have been raised. For example, the International Crisis
Group (ICG) recommended that the Indonesian Government accelerate efforts to put
in place a system under the Corrections Directorate for identifying and monitoring
high-risk detainees, both while in detention and after their release (ICG, 2012, p. ii).
The ICG also recommended improving supervision through upgrading the analytical
capacity of correction staff (ICG, 2012, p. ii). These recommendations indicate that
both the current system and the capacity of officers who are in charge of
rehabilitating terrorist prisoners need improvement.
When convicted terrorists Taufik bin Abdul Halim (hereafter referred to as
Dani) and Edi Setiono (hereafter Abas) were sent to prison, their incarceration
marked the first time that an Indonesian prison attempted the rehabilitation of
terrorist prisoners. Dani and Abas had been found guilty by the Central Jakarta
District Court as the perpetrators of the Plaza Atrium bombing in August 2001. They
were jailed in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, and lived in the same cell and block with
other “ordinary” prisoners (Andrie, 2011).
Indonesia subsequently introduced the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2002, and many
criminals have since been convicted as terrorists. Consequently, the number of
terrorist inmates has increased sharply. Andrie (2011, p. 6) accurately argues that this
was a period when Indonesian prisons faced difficulties in dealing with terrorist
prisoners. Moreover, while behind bars, some became “passive” actors in subsequent
terror acts. For example, Imam Samudra, a terrorist convicted after the first Bali
bombing, was found to be a passive actor in the second Bali bombing.
Communication between Noordin M. Top – the intellectual leader behind the attacks
– and Imam Samudra occurred when Samudra was imprisoned in Kerobokan Prison.
These issues faced by Indonesian prisons require investigation.
Following the increasing number of convicted terrorists entering Indonesian
prisons, some prison directors began implementing specifically targeted
deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates. Although Indonesian authorities and
journalists have frequently reported the success of such programs, their effectiveness
has been questioned (Nurezki, 2013). The case of Abdullah Sonata is an example of
the failure of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program to deradicalise terrorist prisoners.
After his release in 2009, he was involved in a terror attack; one of the targets was
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 5
the former Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Istiqomah, 2012, p.
267). There are also other cases of convicted terrorists returning to their group after
release and being involved in further terror attacks. To cope with this problem, the
Indonesian Government has now established a special prison for terrorist prisoners in
Bogor, West Java.
To explore the effectiveness of deradicalisation programs for convicted
terrorists in the Indonesian context, this study advances the hypothesis that
deradicalisation programs will be effective if supported by well-trained prison
officers who implement the program. Moreover, this study argues that prison officers
play a vital role in rehabilitating terrorist prisoners. Nurezki (2013, p. 74) stated that
Indonesian prison officers are “the main implementers” of deradicalisation programs
behind bars, rather than other officers from other agencies. Therefore, understanding,
uncovering and evaluating prison officers’ experiences are essential because the
findings can be used to develop strategies to improve the role of Indonesian prison
officers in supporting rehabilitation programs for convicted terrorists. Prison
officers’ challenges in implementing the program and their perspectives on the
establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners were examined.
Research focused on the topic of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation
program have been widely reported in the literature (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007;
Istiqomah, 2012; Johnston, 2009; Neumann, 2010; Nurezki, 2013). Empirical
qualitative studies that focus on convicted terrorists in Indonesian prisons are also
available (Andrie, 2011; Osman, 2014; Sukabdi, 2015; Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono,
2013). However, empirical qualitative studies on Indonesian prison officers’
experiences and perspectives related to the implementation of the program and policy
are lacking. Also lacking are studies that examine the prison-based deradicalisation
program from prison officers’ point of view. Further, the challenges that the officers
face and their views on the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorist
are often ignored.
Although several studies (ICG, 2007; Istiqomah, 2012; SFCG, 2013) report
interviews with Indonesian prison officers, the focus is not the prison officers’
experience of and perspectives about the deradicalisation program and policy. The
studies mainly concern how Indonesian prisons have managed terrorist prisoners and
the “external” factors affecting Indonesian prison officers in managing convicted
6 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
terrorists. To produce further insight into this phenomenon, the focus of this study
was how officers experience the challenges of implementing the program, and their
views on the establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners in Indonesia.
Hence, this study examined the “internal” factors relevant to the management of
convicted terrorists by Indonesian prison officers.
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to address the above issues, this study was guided by three research
questions. First, what are the challenges for Indonesian prison officers in
implementing deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists? Indonesia has no
national policy specifically focused on prison-based deradicalisation programs.
Policies are designed locally by the prison directors based on their capability and
experience and are tailored to context-specific programs. Thus, uncovering the
challenges for the prison officers in implementing deradicalisation programs for
terrorist prisoners is worthwhile. The findings extend the body of literature on
prison-based deradicalisation programs to encompass prison officers’ points of view.
Second, what are Indonesian prison officers’ views on the establishment of a
special prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia? There are no studies addressing
Indonesian prison officers’ perspectives in this context. Again, the findings extend
the body of literature on prison-based deradicalisation programs to encompass prison
officers’ points of view. Moreover, the Indonesian government has now established a
special prison for convicted terrorists in Sentul, Bogor, in West Java. As mentioned
in the previous section, an understanding of prison officers’ views is imperative for
formulating future policy regarding the existence of special prisons for terrorist
inmates in the Indonesian correctional system.
Third, what strategies can be used to improve the role of Indonesian prison
officers in implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs? Previous empirical
data, analyses and discussions were used simultaneously to examine this question. In
addition, data from primary and secondary legal materials and from non-legal
materials was also be used. These collected data were integrated and analysed to
identify the strategies that can be used to improve the role of Indonesian prison
officers in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 7
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
This research examines the experiences and perspectives of Indonesian prison
officers regarding prison-based deradicalisation programs and policy concerning
such programs in the Indonesian context. In line with the research questions, the
objectives of this study were specifically:
1. To investigate Indonesian prison officers’ challenges in implementing
prison-based deradicalisation programs.
2. To analyse Indonesian prison officers’ views related to the establishment of
a special prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia.
3. To examine and assess strategies to improve the role of Indonesian prison
officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH
This research makes a novel contribution to counterterrorism studies and to
criminal justice policy and practice by investigating and examining Indonesian
prison officers’ experiences of implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.
More specifically, the study extends the body of knowledge around prison-based
deradicalisation programs in the Indonesian context. Indonesian prison officers’
perspectives regarding deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates were
thoroughly investigated. From my review, the focus of the previous studies is the
program and the inmates. In contrast, there is a lack of qualitative studies that focus
on prison officers’ experiences in implementing programs. The programs were
assessed but the end-users of the program were not. Therefore, the results of this
study advance the discussion of prison-based deradicalisation program from the
viewpoint of Indonesian prison officers’ experiences and may contribute to future
policies and reforms.
Moreover, discourses surrounding the establishment of specialist prisons for
terrorist inmates arise among both academics and policy makers. The pros and cons
of this issue are commonly debated in Indonesia. However, the perspectives of prison
officers, as previously mentioned, are not available in the existing literature,
including whether they agree or disagree with this proposal. The findings on prison
officers’ perspectives on the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists
8 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
will contribute to the fields of criminology, criminal justice studies, and correctional
science.
In addition, this study will contribute practically to the Indonesian authorities.
By revealing and exploring prison officers’ challenges in implementing
deradicalisation programs, implementation weaknesses and challenges can be
identified and reviewed. These findings are valuable resources in order to investigate
strategies to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs, and to prevent of the spread of
radical beliefs from terrorist inmates to prison officers.
1.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
Indonesian scholars, including government authorities, have stated that
rehabilitation is “one aspect of deradicalisation process” (Idris & Taufiqurrohman,
2015, p. 72). According to Bakti (2014, p. 189), prison-based deradicalisation
programs in Indonesia include several processes or stages: identification,
rehabilitation, re-education, resocialisation, monitoring, and evaluation.
Conceptually, this indicates that rehabilitation is viewed from a “micro”
perspective. Rehabilitation is used for a specific type of offender and is applied to a
specific program. It is seen as a treatment for special populations (Burkhead, 2007;
Cropsey, Wexler, Taxman, & Young, 2007). A practical example includes the
treatment programs for sex offenders (Mullins, 2010, p. 176). On the other hand, a
“macro” perspective of rehabilitation means that the concept of rehabilitation is not
just intended to refer to a specific type of offender. It implies a broader scope related
to the effort for the treatment of all types of offenders. Therefore, a macro
perspective of rehabilitation views rehabilitation as a “major goal of the correctional
system”, as concluded by Cullen and Gilbert (2013, p. 155). In studies by other
criminologists (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013; Cullen, Skovron, Scott, & Burton, 1990;
Cullen, Lutze, Link, & Wolfe, 1989; Gendreau, 1996), a macro perspective of
rehabilitation has also been adopted. Rehabilitation is viewed as a core of
correctional goal, regardless of the type of the crime that have been committed by the
offenders.
From this view point, a macro perspective of rehabilitation is deployed in this
research. Furthermore, by deploying this perspective, the linkage between the
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 9
terminology of rehabilitation and deradicalisation is determined. From a macro
perspective of rehabilitation, deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists in
Indonesia are viewed as part of rehabilitation program for all prison populations
currently administered by the Indonesian prison authorities. Therefore, rehabilitation
is broader than deradicalisation.
However, the terms “terrorist rehabilitation” and “terrorist deradicalisation” are
used interchangeably in this research because, as explained by Fink and El-Said
(2011, p. 3), “the programs aim for a combination of deradicalization and
rehabilitation, and their target objective is to reduce the risk of violent activity”. In
the existing studies, these terms are also often used interchangeably (QIASS, 2010;
Ranstorp, 2009; Schmid, 2013; Veldhuis & Kessels, 2013).
In addition to rehabilitation and deradicalisation, “disengagement” is another
concept in the literature surrounding the management of convicted terrorists. Then
the question is how to situate the concept of disengagement in this framework. Some
scholars have argued that the processes of deradicalisation and disengagement from
terrorism should be distinguished (Horgan, 2008; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The
main reason behind this analysis is ambiguity in the outcomes of deradicalisation
initiatives. For example, Horgan (2008, p. 8) concluded that “there is no evidence to
suggest that disengagement from terrorism may result in deradicalisation”. On the
other hand, a different perspective is proposed by Kruglanski et al. (2011, p. 136),
who argue that disengagement is “a crucial element of deradicalisation”. These
authors defined deradicalisation as “a change in people’s attitudes and beliefs
entailed in the terrorism-justifying ideology” (Kruglanski, Gelfand, & Gunaratna,
2011, p. 136). In this sense, the distinction between deradicalisation and
disengagement has not been rigidly applied and is open to fluid interpretation.
For the purpose of this research, I applied a conceptual framework in which
disengagement is a part of deradicalisation, as conceptualised by Kruglanski et al
(2011). Furthermore, both disengagement and deradicalisation are part of a
rehabilitation program for terrorist inmates, as illustrated in the Figure 1.1. In other
words, rehabilitation is broader than either deradicalisation or disengagement.
10 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Figure 1.1 The Relationship between Rehabilitation, Deradicalisation, and Disengagement in the
Context of Terrorist Inmates
In addition to the concepts discussed above, it is essential to acknowledge that
there are further discourses related to the study of terrorism. The most relevant to this
study are the concepts of counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism. For the
purposes of this study, the differentiation between counter-radicalisation and
counterterrorism follows that of El-Said (2015), who concluded that the key point of
differentiation between these two approaches is based on the target. Counter-
radicalisation policies target wider communities, including youth and women, while
counterterrorism targets terrorists (El-Said, 2015, p. 10). From this perspective, the
concepts of disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation of terrorist inmates
are part of counterterrorism initiatives. According to Iqbal (2015), disengagement,
deradicalisation, and rehabilitation are important parts of counterterrorism narratives
and accompanying policies. Furthermore, regarding the relationships among
disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation in the context of terrorist inmates
as shown in Figure 1.1, counterterrorism could be presented by a “fourth” ring
outside rehabilitation. A fifth outer ring would represent counter-radicalisation
initiatives, because their focus is not exclusively terrorists but also communities, as
can be seen in Figure 1.2.
Disengagement
Deradicalisation
Rehabilitation
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 11
Figure 1.2 The Relationship of Counterterrorism and Counter-radicalisation Initiatives with the
Concepts of Disengagement, Deradicalisation, and Rehabilitation
1.6 TERRORIST PRISONERS: A WORKING DEFINITION
The terminology of “terrorist prisoners” should be clarified for the purpose of
this study. A clear working definition of terrorist prisoners is important in order to
differentiate this study from other studies within the research on terrorism. Who are
terrorist prisoners and why they are labelled as such should be identified. Moreover,
as the topic of this study is a part of the research on terrorism, the debate about how
to define terrorism should also be discussed.
A significant, widespread, and disparate effort to define or redefine terrorism
occurred in most countries after the “9/11” attack (Young, 2006, p. 70). Some
countries such as The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) amended their
penal code or enacted special terrorism laws and formally defined terrorism in their
legal system. For example, in June 2004, through the Act of 24, the Dutch Criminal
Code and some other laws connected with terrorist crimes (e.g. Crimes of Terrorism
Act) were amended by the Dutch Government (UNODC, 2014), while the UK
Government enacted the Terrorism Act 2000 (The UK, 2000).
Other countries in Europe have also defined terrorism within their national
legislation, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland,
Disengagement
Deradicalisation
Rehabilitation
Counterterrorism
Counter-radicalisation
12 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (European Commission Sixth Framework Programme
Project, 2008). The United States of America (USA), India, New Zealand, Australia
and Canada have also tried to define terrorism through their anti-terrorism laws
(Roach, 2007; Young, 2006). In Indonesia, terrorism has been stated and limited in
anti-terrorism law since 2002. In Australia, the first national anti-terrorism laws was
also enacted in 2002; a definition of terrorist act was inserted into the Criminal Code
Act 1995 (Lynch, McGarrity, & Williams, 2015, p. 15; Schloenhardt, 2011, p. 400).
The efforts of these countries to state a definition of terrorism in their legal
system is crucial because this definition is then applied in determining “whether a
violent incident is an act of terrorism” (Martin, 2014, p. 7). Regardless of the
definitional debate, it is important for countries to have a legal definition of terrorism
acts, because terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, including in Europe, Asia, and
Africa. In the case of bombing attacks, for example, anti-terrorism laws can be used
to prosecute and convict both those who conduct the attacks and those who work
“behind the scene”.
However, the ongoing debate about the definition of terrorism should be noted.
This issue has been recognised by many scholars in the field (Aly, 2011, p. 4; Lutz &
Lutz, 2011, pp. 1-2; Martin, 2014, p. 41; Richards, 2014), and Ganor (2002, p. 287)
stated that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. In his publication
in 2014, Gottlieb (2014, p. 1) asserted that agreement among experts will never be
reached on the definition of terrorism. Moreover, Mahan and Griset (2013, p. 3)
concluded that a personal perspective is included in establishing a precise definition
of terrorism, and thus a general agreement on the definition will not likely be
achieved. Thus, a universal definition of terrorism remains an ongoing debate.
Although Schmid also acknowledged a definitional problem for terrorism, he
argues that efforts should be made to achieve a “good enough” definition of terrorism
(Schmid, 2011, p. 4). In order to achieve a good enough definition of terrorism,
Easson and Schmid (2011) compiled more than 250 academic, governmental, and
intergovernmental definitions of terrorism. Based on this compilation, Schmid then
proposed a revised “academic consensus definition of terrorism” (ACDT) for his
work with Jongman in 1983 and 1988 (Schmid, 2011, pp. 86-87).
Equally perplexing as finding a common and global definition for terrorism is
the struggle to define a terrorist. These terms (terrorism and terrorist), can generally
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 13
be differentiated as an act and an actor: terrorism is the act and a terrorist is the actor.
As a result, those who commit terrorism acts could be defined as terrorists. But, as
has been established, the problem is the lack of a universal definition of terrorism.
Establishing a definition for terrorist prisoners seems more easily accepted by
the international community since there is no definitional debate about the term
“prisoners”, either in the academic arena or on a practical level. At the international
level, for example, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners is
widely accepted as universal guidance for the countries on the treatment of prisoners
and the management of institutions (Clifford, et al., 1972; Skoler, 1975; OHCHR).
The definition of prisoner can be found easily in general dictionaries such as the
Oxford Dictionary and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. In the online Oxford
Dictionary, a “prisoner” is defined as a person legally committed to prison as
punishment for a crime or while awaiting trial. Similarly, in the online Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, a “prisoner” is described as a person who is kept in a prison or a
person who has been captured and is being kept somewhere.
For the purposes of this study, the definition of prisoner will follow the
definition in the Oxford Dictionary as a person legally committed to prison as
punishment for a crime. Although “conviction under terrorist legislation is not a
primary manner of identification” (Silke, 2011, p. 123), the term “terrorist prisoner”
in this study will be limited to a person legally committed to prison as punishment
for a terrorism crime under state anti-terrorism laws. In other words, a terrorist
prisoner refers to someone who is convicted by the Court for terrorism acts under a
country’s anti-terrorism laws, and consequently lives in prison or jail, whether for a
short or a long time, or even for life.
In this sense, the term “terrorist prisoners” does not include those who are
categorised as “suspected terrorists” or those who are being interrogated by police
departments, those who are awaiting trial or are in the trial sessions, or even those
with the status of fugitive because of acts of terrorism. Thus, this thesis focuses
solely on convicted terrorists. Until a guilty verdict is stated by the court and the
person is sentenced to imprisonment for terrorism acts, the person is not categorised
as a terrorist prisoner.
In addition, because the term prisoner is similar to others such as “convicted”,
“convict”, and “inmate”, these terms will be used interchangeably in this thesis. That
14 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
is, throughout this thesis the terms “terrorist inmate” and ‘terrorist convict’ are used
interchangeably with “terrorist prisoners”. The term “convicted terrorist” also has the
same meaning as is “terrorist prisoner”.
1.7 PUBLICATIONS
I have published and disseminated the following articles from the work
presented in this thesis:
1. Suarda, I Gede Widhiana (2016). A Literature Review on Indonesia’s
Deradicalization Program for Terrorist Prisoners. Jurnal Mimbar Hukum,
28(3), pp. 526-543 (Suarda, 2016).
2. Suarda, I Gede Widhiana (2015). Terrorism and Terrorist Prisoners in
Indonesia. Asian Criminological Society 7th Annual Conference on
Criminology and Criminal Justice in a Changing World: Contributions
from Asia (p. 86). Hong Kong: Asian Criminological Society (Suarda,
2015).
1.8 THESIS STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER OUTLINE
This thesis is comprised into eight chapters. Each chapter has a specific
purpose. However, they are related in terms of the objectives of the study, the
methodology, the findings and the discussion.
Chapter 1 provides an overall background for the study. It revolves around the
context of the research, the research questions, the objectives of the research, and the
significance of the research. Furthermore, the conceptual frameworks deployed in
this study, a working definition for the term “terrorist prisoner” and the list of my
publications are also briefly provided.
Chapter 2 reviews current literature on Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation programs. The literature surrounding the issue of Indonesia’s prison-
based deradicalisation programs is thoroughly investigated and research on this topic
is substantively evaluated. As a result, a research gap in the topic of Indonesia’s
prison-based deradicalisation program is identified.
Chapter 3 details the research methodology applied in this study. It discusses
the use of particular research methods for qualitative social research and legal
research. The methods are used because the set of research questions in this study
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 15
must be addressed by different methods. The chapter then also describes ethical
concerns for conducting fieldwork within the prison environment in Indonesia, as
well as the scope and limitations of this study.
Chapter 4 discusses fundamental matters relating to the two existing
Indonesian laws relevant to this study, Indonesia’s Anti-terrorism Laws and Anti-
terrorism Financing Law. Further, the relationship between these laws and the
prison-based deradicalisation programs being implemented by the Indonesian prison
authorities is presented.
Chapter 5 investigates how Indonesian prison officers experience the
rehabilitation of terrorists. Based on the officers’ first hand experiences in
implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs, I specifically discuss the
challenges facing Indonesian prison officers in their role in rehabilitating terrorist
inmates. The discussion includes an analysis of the reasons behind the beliefs about
such challenges experienced by the prison officers.
Chapter 6 moves further that analyses Indonesian prison officers’ views about
the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia. In this
chapter, I explore the perspectives, ideas, and opinions of the officers surrounding
the government initiative to establish a specialised terrorist prison in the Indonesian
correctional system.
Chapter 7 examines and assesses strategies to improve the role of Indonesian
prison officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs. The first half of
the chapter examines the practical need of Indonesian prison officers to rehabilitate
terrorist inmates. To validate the need, the previous findings and analysis about the
challenges faced by the Indonesian prison officers in the task of terrorist
rehabilitation are revisited. The second half of the chapter assesses strategies that
could be used to improve the officers’ role in deradicalisation. It recognises the
frameworks of policy and legal reform research that are applied on the study of law.
Chapter 8, the final chapter, comprises two sections. In the first section, I
summarise the research and the main findings of this study. The second section
offers recommendations: practical recommendations for the Government of
Indonesia and suggestions for future research.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 17
Literature Review
While criminologists have talked about rehabilitation of criminals for
decades, the idea of specific rehabilitation programs designed for terrorists is
a new idea. What is even newer is the widespread understanding of their
importance. (Stone, 2015, p. 223)
The issue of terrorist prisoners has been studied worldwide within the rising
issue of radicalisation during incarceration (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 561). The
amount of cross-disciplinary academic writing on terrorist prisoners has increased
substantially in recent years (Jackson, Smyth, & and Gunning, 2009, p. 4). Therefore,
an understanding of previous research is important to justify that this study asks new
questions and provide innovative insights.
The literature surrounding the issue of Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation program is thoroughly investigated in this chapter. Terrorism,
terrorist prisoners, and prison-based deradicalisation programs in the Indonesian
context are explored. Previous research on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation
program is substantively evaluated. As a result, a research gap on the topic of
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program is identified. Finally, the
implications of this study for the existing field of science are also presented.
2.1 TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: INCIDENTS, NETWORKS, AND
FUTURE THREATS
Bomb attacks in Indonesia began in 2000 with the targeting of churches,
followed by several suicide bombings up to and including 2005. Based on the
number of victims and international impacts, the most notorious attacks were the first
Bali bombing in 2002, the first Marriot Hotel bombing in Jakarta in 2003, the
bombing of the Australian Embassy in 2004, and the second Bali bombing in 2005
(Sarwono, 2012, p. 75). Because of subsequent investigations, in November 2005 the
Indonesian National Police (INP) killed one of the most important masterminds
behind these bombing attacks, Dr Azahari Husin.
18 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Between 2005 and 2009, bomb attacks were controlled successfully by the
INP, and Indonesia experienced no bombing incidents during this period (Sarwono,
2012, p. 76). The effectiveness of the INP in preventing attacks from 2005 to 2009
was the result of improved investigation, with a focus on prevention. Hence, the
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) cells were dismantled, and some future attacks were
prevented. Interestingly, the investigation’s processes were also supported by Nasir
bin Abas, “the former head of JI’s Mantiqi III and head of military training in the
Southern Philippines who became disillusioned with the al-Qaeda campaign of terror
against soft Western targets” (Abuza, 2009, p. 198). His role remains vital because
he provides valuable information for police investigations of JI and its operations.
However, in 2009, bombs exploded at the J.W. Marriott Hotel and the Ritz
Carlton Hotel in Jakarta. The bombing at the J.W. Marriott Hotel was the second at
that location, following an earlier attack in 2004. Several perpetrators were
identified, including Indonesia’s most wanted Islamist militant, Noordin M. Top. The
authorities claimed that he was the mastermind behind the attack (BBC, 2009).
Noordin was a fugitive after several bombing attacks, until the INP killed him in a
shoot-out during a raid in Central Java in September 2009. However, although
Noordin and Dr Azahari Husin had been killed, Indonesia was not become secure
from the threat of terrorism. Sydney Jones stated that:
It’s a major success for the police but it doesn’t mean, unfortunately, that the
problem of terrorism is over. It’s still unclear how many people were in
Noordin’s group and there are a number of fugitives still at large who have
at least the potential to replace him as the leader of an al Qaeda-like
organization. (Reuters, 2009, paragraph 7)
Attacks have still occurred since 2009, but with a shift in both the methods and
the targets. The perpetrators have not only used bombs as a strategy to attack the
targets, but have also used firearms. Moreover, the attackers are not only focused on
Western targets, but also on local ones. Heiduk noted that “Indonesian officials and
government institutions have increasingly become targets” (Heiduk, 2012, p. 33). A
failed bomb plot to assassinate former President Yudhoyono in 2010 is an example
of this change in strategy. The plot was uncovered by police surveillance and two
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 19
bomb-makers were killed during the subsequent raid. As another example, Hamparan
Perak police station in Sumatera Utara province was attacked and destroyed by
several people with firearms in 2010, killing three police officers (BBC Indonesia,
2010). Since this incident, several other police stations have been attacked by
terrorists and more police officers shot and killed. In March, June, and August 2014,
for instance, former Indonesian Police Chief General Sutarman declared that three
police officers who died in Bima were shot by terrorists (Merdeka.com, 2014).
Rather than attacking Western targets, therefore, evidence suggests that one of
the main trends in terrorism in Indonesia since 2009 has been attacking the police
(either by shooting police officers or destroying police stations). Another important
trend to emerge during this period has been attacks on the public, regardless of
whether they are of Muslim or other faiths. In April 2011, for example, there was a
bomb attack on a mosque in the Cirebon police station complex, as well as a planned
attack on the Christ Cathedral Church that was prevented by police. Later, in August
2013, the Vihara Ekayana Buddhist Centre in Jakarta was also the target of bombing
attacks (Kompas.com, 2013a). To summarise, since 2009 the terrorists have changed
from attacking mostly Western targets to attacking specific targets such as police
stations, churches, viharas (Buddhist temples), and even mosques. The finding of a
list of viharas located in and around Jakarta that was printed by suspected terrorists
(who were arrested in Jakarta and East Java in January 2014) indicates that targets
are random.
The majority of people assume that JI is behind the bomb attacks in Indonesia,
particularly the incidents from 2000 to 2005. Sarwono states that during this period
the perpetrators were JI members. JI was established in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Sarwono, 2012, p. 78; Ramakrishna, 2015, p. 184). This
group has a relationship with al Qaeda, indicated by the programs of Abdullah
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir sending the Bali bombers group to “pre-jihad
training” on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to jihad fronts in
Afghanistan, the Philippines, Ambon, and Poso (Sunarko, 2006, p. 127). JI also has
close links to other Islamist Militant groups throughout South East Asia, such as the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines (Arianti, 2012, p. 9; Jones & Morales,
2012, p. 213). Importantly, the main goal of JI is to establish a pan-Islamic country in
20 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
South East Asia (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011, p. 161; Jones & Morales,
2012, p. 214; Pusponegoro, 2003, p. 103).
In relation to the types of terrorist target, it could be argued that terrorism in
Indonesia is religiously motivated because JI pursue the replacement of the
established government with an Islamic government. Furthermore, JI is striving for
the creation of a pan-Islamic government in Indonesia despite the opposition of the
majority of Indonesian Muslims to this idea.
Classification of terrorism varies across the emerging literature in the fields of
sociology, criminology, and peace studies. Martin (2010, p. 46), for instance, divides
terrorism into five categories: state terrorism, dissident terrorism, criminal terrorism,
international terrorism, and religious terrorism. State terrorism (terrorism “from
above”) is terrorism committed by established governments against their perceived
enemies, either internationally or nationally, while dissident terrorism (terrorism
“from below”) is terrorism committed by various non-governmental actors against
governments, specific groups, or other perceived enemies (Martin, 2010, p. 46).
Criminal terrorism is terrorism in which the goal is financial or political gain, or
both, whereas international terrorism is terrorism in which the goal is a global effect,
or the target is an international symbol (Martin, 2010, p. 46). Religious terrorism is
“terrorism motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned
– and commanded – the application of terrorist violence for the greater glory of
faith” (Martin, 2010, p. 46).
However, critical scholars of criminology state that categorising terrorism can
be more of an obstacle than an aid to rigorous research, although they also argue that
attempts to categorise terrorism can be beneficial in gaining understanding of this
phenomenon (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011, p. 171). Therefore,
categorising the acts of terrorism in Indonesia into a specific typology may lead to a
better understanding of the problems. Based on both the current situation, and the
body of literature and empirical research, the acts of terrorism in Indonesia can be
categorised as religious terrorism according to the above definition. For instance,
Martin identified Laskar Jihad, an armed Islamic group in Indonesia, as a religious
terrorist group, along with Aum Shinrikyo, Lord’s Resistance Army, Palestine
Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, Jammu-Kashmir groups, Sikh groups,
and Algerian/North African cells (Martin, 2014, p. 156).
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 21
According to Gregg (2014, p. 40), religious terrorism can be divided into three
subcategories based on their goals: “fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious
government, and religiously cleansing a state”. Because the goal is to establish an
Islamic government in Indonesia, JI’s intention identifies them as an example of the
second subcategory.
On the other hand, Singh (2004, p. 65) has warned that blaming incidents only
on JI is not accurate because “there are many regionally-based terrorists groups that
have nothing to do with the JI”. Related to this statement, a report by Ansyaad Mbai,
the former Head of the Indonesian National Anti-terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional
Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]), offers support for Singh’s view.
Furthermore, Ansyaad Mbai stated that there are various concentrations of terrorist
groups in Indonesia, including Qoidah Aminah in North Sumatera and Aceh,
Mujahid Indonesia Barat in Lampung and Java, Islamic State for Indonesia (Negara
Islam Indonesia – [NII]) in South Kalimantan and Tasikmalaya, Mujahid Indonesia
Timur in Poso; Asmar in Sulawesi, Walid group in Ambon, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
(JAT) in Bali, Bima networks in West Nusa Tenggara, and the Solo networking
group (Tempo.co, 2014). These groups demonstrate the widespread nature of new
terrorist cells and their networks in Indonesia, whether they have links to JI or not.
This situation indicates that Indonesia remains under threat of terrorism in the
future. Even though a study has concluded that “Indonesia is the least risky, least
volatile, and most resilient” (White, Porter, & Mazerolle, 2013, p. 315) when
compared with the Philippines and Thailand, many experts (ICG, 2012, p. 24;
Sarwono, 2012, p. 84; Ungerer, 2011, p. 17) predict that terrorist attacks will likely
occur in Indonesia in the future. It does mean that terrorist attacks may still occur in
Indonesia in the future, despite greater risk elsewhere in the region.
2.2 TERRORIST INMATES IN INDONESIAN PRISONS: FACTS AND
FIGURES
Data concerning the exact number of convicted terrorists in Indonesian prisons
vary between reports and articles. Some reports (Abuza, 2009, p. 198; Horgan &
Braddock, 2010, p. 274) estimate that more than 300 individuals were sent to prison
by 2007, while Ungerer (2011, p. 11) suggests that around two-thirds of nearly 600
suspects were convicted between 2000 and 2010. Similarly, the IRIN reported that
600 of 830 individuals were sentenced for conducting acts of terrorism in the decade
22 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
2002 – 2012 (IRIN, 2012). Notwithstanding the different timeframes, the
inconsistent data reported in these sources is confusing.
More accurate data about the number of terrorist convicts can be seen on the
official website of the Directorate General of Corrections, Republic of Indonesia
(Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan Republik Indonesia – [Ditjenpas RI]). In this
official government database, the number of terrorist prisoners was first established
in 2011. The number of terrorist prisoners in the years 2011 – 2017 is given as 109
(Ditjenpas RI, 2011), 204 (Ditjenpas RI, 2012), 276 (Ditjenpas RI, 2013a), 277
(Ditjenpas RI, 2014a), 216 (Ditjenpas RI, 2015a), 205 (Ditjenpas RI, 2016a) and 224
(Ditjenpas RI, 2017), respectively. The data show that by August 2013 the number of
terrorist inmates had increased to nearly three times the number in August 2011.
Although the number of terrorist inmates remained steady in 2014, the number fell
sharply from 277 in 2014 to 216 in 2015, and then remained fairly steady in the
following two years. Overall, the number of terrorist prisoners in Indonesia has been
above 200 since 2012, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 below.
Figure 2.1 The Number of Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesia (2011 - 2017)
These prisoners are not isolated in one or two special prisons, but are dispersed
among several prisons across the provinces. By August 2015, the data show that 216
convicted terrorists were dispersed among 33 prisons and detention centres
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 23
throughout the islands, as presented in Table 2.1.2 Pasir Putih Nusakambangan
Prison holds the largest concentration of terrorist inmates (37), followed by Cipinang
Prison (23). The fewest inmates are held in Medan Prison, Palembang Prison, Banda
Aceh Prison, Magelang Prison, Kuningan Prison, Garut Prison, Ciamis Prison,
Cianjur Prison, Indramayu Prison, Wonosobo Detention Center, Sanggan Detention
Center and Tanggerang Women’s Prison, all of which hold only one terrorist
prisoner. Additionally, the data indicate that there is only one female terrorist held in
Indonesian jails.
Table 2.1 The Distribution of Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesian Prisons and Detention Centres
No. Prison/Detention Centre Province Terrorist
prisoners
1 Batu Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 19
2 Cipinang Prison Jakarta 23
3 Cirebon Prison West Java 11
4 Madiun Prison East Java 2
5 Medan Prison North Sumatera 1
6 Palembang Prison South Sumatera 1
7 Semarang Prison Central Java 18
8 Surabaya Prison East Java 12
9 Tangerang Prison Banten 13
10 Banda Aceh Prison Aceh 1
11 Besi Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 4
12 Cibinong Prison West Java 19
13 Karawang Prison West Java 4
14 Kediri Prison East Java 2
15 Kembang Kuning Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 10
16 Magelang Prison Central Java 1
17 Palu Prison Central Sulawesi 2
2 Since the fieldwork was conducted at the end of 2015, I used the data of terrorist inmates as reported
by August 2015 in considering the research sites for conducting the focus group discussions with
Indonesian prison officers. This consideration is further discussed in Chapter 3 (Research Design).
24 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
18 Pamekasan Prison East Java 7
19 Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 37
20 Permisan Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 10
21 Salemba Prison Jakarta 5
22 Kuningan Prison West Java 1
23 Subang Prison West Java 2
24 Garut Prison West Java 1
25 Ciamis Prison West Java 1
26 Cianjur Prison West Java 1
27 Indramayu Prison West Java 1
28 Lumajang Prison East Java 2
29 Cipinang Detention Centre Jakarta 2
30 Wonosobo Detention Centre Central Java 1
31 Jepara Detention Centre Central Java 9
32 Sanggan Detention Centre West Kalimantan 1
33 Tangerang Women’s Prison Banten 1
Total 216
Source: Ditjenpas (2015b)
Compared with the total number of convicted prisoners under the charge of
special criminal acts in Indonesian prisons, Table 2.1 indicates that the number of
terrorist prisoners is small. Specifically, of 74,449 prisoners convicted of special
criminal acts by August 2015, the number of terrorist prisoners was only 216
(Ditjenpas RI, 2015b). Therefore, the percentage of prisoners convicted of terrorist
offences is less than 1 percent of the total number of prisoners held under special
criminal acts. Table 2.2 shows the number of other types of prisoners convicted
under special criminal acts by August 2015 (Ditjenpas RI, 2015b).
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 25
Table 2.2 The Number of Prisoners Convicted under Special Criminal Acts by August 2015
Type of Crime The Number of Prisoner
Corruption 4,387
Drugs and Narcotics - Dealers 42,053
Drugs and Narcotics - Users 26,220
Illegal Logging 1,142
Human Trafficking 319
Money Laundering 110
Genocide 2
Source: Ditjenpas (2015b)
These facts and figures for convicted terrorists are similar to the trends in other
countries. For example, The Netherlands held only five terrorist prisoners in 2010
(Neumann, 2010, pp. 17-18), while Australia held 21 convicted terrorists in 2011
(Porter & Kebbel, 2011, p. 212), and Canada held 18 convicted terrorists in 2015
(Monaghan, 2015, p. 385). Despite these relatively small totals, Silke (2014, p. 3)
argues that “when such prisoners do start to appear in the prison system their impact
can be out of all proportion to their number”, a concern that raises the issue of
recruitment and radicalisation of “ordinary” prisoners. Similarly, with regard to
suspected terrorists, Walen (2011, p. 872) has argued that “they are predicted to pose
a threat larger than that of almost all other criminals”.
In addition, although Indonesian officials claim that many convicted terrorists
repeat acts of terrorism, as highlighted in the introduction, a firm official number of
recidivism cases for acts of terrorism has not been provided, including on the official
website of the DGC. This lack of clarity has been underlined by C. R. Jones (2014, p.
87) and Ungerer (2011, p. 17).
2.3 THE NATURE OF INDONESIA’S DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAM
FOR TERRORIST PRISONERS
Terrorist prisoners are not the same as other criminals (Goldman, 2014, p. 48).
Rather, they are special because this type of prisoner carries an ideology (Gunaratna,
2011, p. 67). A review conducted by Pressman and Flockton (2014, pp. 123-125)
26 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
confirmed that there are significant differences between terrorists, violent extremists,
and non-ideologically motivated violent offenders.
Pressman and Flockton (2014, p. 124) pointed out that although terrorists and
violent extremists both use violence to further political, religious, and ideological
aims, the acts of violent extremists commonly have no “intention to cause fear and
terror in civilian populations or decision makers”. The authors point to violent anti-
abortionists as an example. This group intends to cause enormous destructions to
public facilities such as property, buildings, vehicles, and hospitals, but “they have
not demonstrated an interest in indiscriminate civilian killing, or maximum diffuse
destruction” (Presman & Flockton, 2014, p. 124). In contrast, this psychological
intention is a common objective of terrorist attacks (Presman & Flockton, 2014, p.
124).
Furthermore, Pressman and Flockton (2014, pp. 124-125) identified a sharp
distinction between violent extremists and non-ideologically motivated violent
offenders based on a review of previous studies. Table 2.3 summarise the significant
differences between violent extremists and non-ideologically motivated offenders.
Table 2.3 Presman and Flockton Review of the Differences between Violent Extremists and Non-
Ideologically Motivated Offenders
Violent Extremists
Non-Ideologically Motivated Offenders
Motivated by ideologies, beliefs, and
social and religious political causes.
Known to engage in acts generally due to
motivations such as personal gain,
addictions, criminogenic needs, and impulse
control problems.
Advertise their attacks and they
communicate their goals.
Try to avoid detection and attention.
They are not mentally ill or
psychologically disordered.
Regularly exhibit personality disorders,
psychopathy, uncontrollable aggression,
behaviour problems, and/or other mental or
clinical disorders.
Source: Presman & Flockton (2014, pp. 124-125)
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 27
As a consequence of these differences between terrorists and other criminals,
terrorist prisoners should be rehabilitated under a specific program. Although Mullin
has observed that there are opportunities to adopt best practices from the
rehabilitative literature on ordinary prisoners, he also noted that “the content of
criminal and terrorist rehabilitation programs will always differ” (Mullins, 2010, p.
162).
A specific deradicalisation program for terrorist prisoners has been
implemented in several countries in order to achieve the goal of rehabilitation and to
stop the spread of radicalisation in prisons. Saudi Arabia, for example, has a strategy
called Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC). In general, the program is
recognised as a “soft” approach to terrorist prisoners within the concept of reform
and transformation (Porges, 2014, p. 169). In another example, the United Kingdom
has launched CONTEST (the government’s counterterrorism strategy) and the
revised PREVENT strategy (Pickering, 2014, p. 161).
Deradicalisation programs in several countries display similarities, or at least
have the same approach or pattern, for example France, The Netherlands, Spain, the
UK, and the USA (Neumann, 2010, p. 13). The programs in these countries focus on
security, with only a limited awareness of promoting reform (Neumann, 2010, p. 13).
On the other hand, the approaches also differ in some respects. For instance, of the
five countries named, only The Netherlands has implemented “concentration”
principles, whereby all terrorist prisoners are held in one place in the high security
prisons in Vaugh. The remaining four countries apply dispersal and partial
concentration policies (Neumann, 2010, p. 18). Although both policies “have
advantages and disadvantages” (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. xi),
Mulcahy, Merrington, and Bell (2013, p. 11) concluded that “overall, academics in
the field of terrorism agree that we may be facilitating radicalism by integrating
converted Islamic extremist with criminals”.
In the Philippines, a deradicalisation program exists, but the policy is designed
and implemented differently across the correctional system. For example, in the New
Bilibid Prison (NBP) convicted terrorists are integrated with ordinary inmates,
whereas in the Metro Manila District Jail (MMDJ) they are separated from the
general prison population (Jones & Morales, 2012, p. 219). To sum up, in terms of
deradicalisation programs worldwide, although every country has its own approach,
28 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
each country’s program has similarities, significant differences, or both to those of
other countries.
Through the prisons and detention centres, Indonesia also runs a
deradicalisation program for terrorist prisoners. However, Indonesia’s distinct
program for convicted terrorists does not just follow the global trend as implemented
in other countries. Arguably, the foundation of Indonesia’s program is underpinned
by two principal factors: (1) that Indonesia has terrorist prisoners; and (2) that there
is an indication of the spread of radicalisation in Indonesian prisons.3 Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, experts and studies conclude that Indonesia remains under the
threat of terrorism despite some of the most wanted terrorists being killed or
imprisoned. Therefore, the possibility of terrorist prisoners will remain.
Indonesia’s deradicalisation program for terrorist inmates has been
implemented by either prison services or other governmental agencies such as the
INP and the BNPT. Among these institutions, the program is coordinated by the
BNPT, which was established in 2010 based on the President’s Regulation Number
46. Ironically, although the program is coordinated by the BNPT, some studies
(Istiqomah, 2012, p. 268; Sarwono, 2012, p. 136) have stressed that the involvement
of many agencies in the implementation of the program has drawbacks in achieving
the goals of rehabilitation. Indeed, the program has been described as
“underfinanced, understaffed, and not terribly institutionalized” (Abuza, 2009, p.
198). To cope with these problems, Ungerer (2011, p. 19) recommended that the
coordination between the BNPT and prison services should be improved in their
efforts to rehabilitate convicted terrorists.
The literature shows that the rehabilitation initiatives for terrorist convicts can
involve disengagement, deradicalisation, or both (Hill, 2011, p. 32; Horgan &
3 A report prepared by the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (2016, p.
271) noted the problems associated with the term “radicalisation as an expression of legitimate
political thought” and its relationship to radicalism. This is because radicalism “does not, in itself, lead
to violence” (European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2016, p. 271). In this
context, S. Jones explained that the term radical “means so many different things” (Jones S. , 2006, p.
3). Further, and specifically in Indonesia, S. Jones identified that “five groups in particular need to be
distinguished” (Jones S. , 2006, p. 3). These five groups can be placed in three categories. The first
group rejects violence, such as Muslim political parties and Hizbut-Tahrir. The second groups are
willing to use violence, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and Salafis. The third groups are willing to
use violence and engage in terror attacks, such as Jema’ah Islamiyah and its affiliates (Jones S. , 2006,
pp. 3-5).
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 29
Braddock, 2010, p. 280; Mullins, 2010, p. 163). Deradicalisation is related to
psychological change in terrorists’ ideology, while disengagement focuses on
behavioural change. Both of these programs can be implemented at either a group
(collective) level or an individual level (Neumann, 2010, p. 12).
After an examination of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program, some
researchers (Abuza, 2009; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Osman, 2014; Sarwono, 2012)
have argued that Indonesia’s practices in managing terrorist inmates reflect
disengagement rather than deradicalisation. However, Schmid (2013, p. 41) stated
that Indonesia’s program is a combination of individual and collective
deradicalisation. In a study on radicalisation and deradicalisation in 15 countries,
Neumann (2010, pp. 47-58) identified Indonesia as a country that deploys individual
deradicalisation and disengagement programs, along with Afghanistan, the
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Yemen. Regardless of which programs are
best suited to Indonesia’s approach, all agree that the notable features of Indonesia’s
program are utilising a former terrorist, Nasir bin Abbas, to re-educate terrorist
prisoners; and providing monetary incentives or economic assistance to captured
terrorists, including their families.
Deradicalisation programs in Indonesian prisons are currently developed and
managed locally by prison directors and are consistent with a prison’s circumstances
and capability (Andrie, 2011, p. 10). Based on fieldwork conducted in some
Indonesian prisons and detention centres, Andrie concluded that most of these
prisons did not have a specific program for rehabilitating or deradicalising terrorist
prisoners (Andrie, 2011, pp. 10-14). Only two prisons were considered to have
adequate programs: Porong (Surabaya) Prison and Semarang Prison (Andrie, 2011,
p. 10; Maliki, 2013, p. 17).
How terrorist prisoners are housed depends on a prison’s capability. For
example, in Cirebon Prison, terrorist prisoners are prevented from interacting with
each other, whereas in Cibinong Prison they are given the freedom to communicate
with each other. Then, In Cipinang prison, terrorist inmates are placed in a special
block where they also have the opportunity to communicate (Ditjenpas RI, 2013b).
Theoretically, these methods could be classified as a mix of isolation and separation.
According to Neumann (2010, p. 17), there are three models of distribution for this
prisoner population: “namely whether they should all be held in one place
30 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
(concentration); whether they should be separated from the general prison population
(separation); and if they should be isolated from each other (isolation)”. Furthermore,
in terms of integration or segregation with general prisoners, C. R. Jones stated that,
although Indonesian prisons try to segregate terrorist inmates, interactions with
general prisoners remain a problem (Jones C. R., 2014). He argued that Indonesia has
no single strategy (Jones C. R., 2014).
2.4 REPORTED OUTCOMES OF INDONESIA’S DERADICALISATION
PROGRAM FOR TERRORIST INMATES
Discussion of the outcomes of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program reveals
disagreement about its efficacy. Although research has shown that Indonesian
prisons can be assessed positively for their deradicalisation initiatives (Ranstorp,
2009), a study conducted by Horgan and Braddock argues that such assessments of
initiatives that focus on monetary incentives are “inaccurate and certainly premature
to consider this true de-radicalisation” (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 267 and 269).
Moreover, Hasan and Yasin’s investigation concluded that weakness in the prison
system has allowed incarcerated terrorists to “continue their contribution to the
extremist’s long term strategy” (Hassan & Yasin, Indonesian Prisons: A Think Tank
for Terrorist, 2012, p. 12). Various articles and books on pro-violence ideology have
been published by incarcerated extremists. Despite their small number, Hasan and
Yasin reviewed that “the potential of such publications to radicalise the broader
community should not be underestimated” (Hassan & Yasin, Indonesian Prisons: A
Think Tank for Terrorist, 2012, p. 11).
Nurezki (2013, p. 90) stated that the effectiveness of the deradicalisation
program that is now being run by the Indonesian government is questionable due to
recidivism cases in terror activities. After an investigation based on various sources,
including fieldwork, he reported that 15 former terrorist prisoners had reoffended
(Table 2.4).
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 31
Table 2.4 List of Recidivist Terrorists
Name Previous offences Involvement in
Deradicalisation
Program
Post-release
activities
Current
status
1.
Abdullah
Sunata
Possession of firearms
and sheltering Noordin
Top. Orchestrated Bali
bombings.
In May 2006, District
Court in South Jakarta
sentenced Sunata to 7
years imprisonment.
Cooperated with
police while
undergoing
deradicalisation
program.
Accused of
masterminding a
terrorist training
camp in Aceh and
the plan to attack
the Presidential
Palace on 17
August 2010.
In 2010,
sentenced to
10 years
imprisonment.
2.
Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir
Amir of Jemaah
Islamiyah. Masterminded
several key bombings
such as Bali Bombing 1.
In 2003, sentenced to 4
years imprisonment.
Released in 2006 for
cooperating with police.
Rejected
deradicalisation
program
Financer and ran a
training camp in
Aceh.
In 2011,
sentenced to
15 years
imprisonment.
3.
Aman
Abdurrahman
Masterminded the
bombing of Cimanggis in
2004. Sentenced to 7
years imprisonment.
Released in 2008.
Rejected
deradicalisation
program. Launched
a counter-
deradicalisation
narrative while in
prison.
Provided financial
assistance to
Dulmatin at a
military training
camp in Aceh.
In 2010,
sentenced to 9
years
imprisonment.
4.
Agus
Kasdianto
alias Hasan
alias Musaf
bin Nasim
Involved in the bombing
of Senen Atrium 2001.
Also involved in
Cimanggis bombing.
Sentenced to 5 years
imprisonment.
Involved in a
rehabilitation
program in prison.
Participated in a
terrorist camp in
Aceh.
In 2011,
sentenced to 9
years
imprisonment.
5.
Air Setyawan Sheltered Urwah and
Noordin Top. Involved in
Australian Embassy
bombing. In 2004,
Sentenced to 5 years
imprisonment.
Went through
rehabilitation
program in prison.
Delivered bomb
to bekasi.
Shot dead in
Bekasi,
August 2009.
6.
Bagus Budi
Pranoto alias
Urwah
Collaborated with
Noordin Top. Sentenced
in 2004 to 4 years
imprisonment. Released
in 2007 for good
behaviour.
Rejected the
program. Launched
a counter-
deradicalisation
narrative while in
prison. However,
later cooperated
with police.
Wanted by the
police in 2009 for
his connection
with the Ritz
Carlton and JW
Marriott
bombings.
Shot dead in
Solo,
September
2009.
7.
Enceng
Kurnia alias
Arham alias
Arnold
Sheltered Dulmatin and
Umar Patek. In 2006
sentenced to 6 years
imprisonment. Released
in 2008.
Went through a
deradicalisation
program in
Cipinang prison.
Ran a terrorist
camp in Aceh
Shot dead in
Aceh, March
2009.
8.
Fadli Sadama Involved in a robbery at
Lippo Bank in Medan.
Imprisoned from 2004 to
2007.
Put through
deradicalisation
program. Released
for good behaviour.
Sheltered Urwah
and involved in a
robbery at Bank
Niaga in Medan.
In 2013,
Escaped from
Tanjung
Gusta Prison
in North
Sumatra.
32 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
9.
Luthfi
Haedaroh
alias Ubeid
Collaborated with
Noordin Top. Sentenced
to 4 years imprisonment.
Released in 2007.
Put through
deradicalisation
program.
Trainer for a
military camp in
Aceh.
In 2010,
sentenced to
10 years
imprisonment.
10.
Heri Sigu
Samboja alias
Soghir
Assembled bomb that
exploded outside
Australian embassy in
Jakarta. Sentenced to 7
years imprisonment in
2005. Released 2008.
Put through
deradicalisation
program. Released
for good behaviour.
Masterminded
bombing of
Danish’s Embassy
in Jakarta.
In 2011,
sentenced to 8
years
imprisonment.
11.
Rahmat Puji
Prabowo alias
Bejo
Collaborated with
Noordin Top. Sentenced
in 2004 for 7.5 years
imprisonment.
Did not participate
in deradicalisation
program. Mentored
drug addicts while
in prison.
Sheltered Urwah.
Transported
explosives.
In 2010,
sentenced to 3
years
imprisonment.
12.
Mustofa alias
Abu Tholut
Took part in the bombing
of the Atrium shopping
mall in Central Jakarta in
2001. Found guilty of
possessing illegal
ammunition and
explosives in 2003.
Sentenced to 7 years
imprisonment in 2004 but
received a reduced
sentence in 2007.
Put through a
deradicalisation
programme in
Depok, West Java.
Alleged member
of the Tanzim Al
Qaedah group in
Aceh. Supplied
weapons.
In 2011,
sentenced to 8
years
imprisonment.
13. Suryadi
Masood alias
Umar
Bombed MacDonald’s
restaurant in Makassar,
October 2002. Sentenced
to 8 years imprisonment.
Followed through a
deradicalisation
program in
Cipinang prison.
Purchased
firearms for
training camp in
Aceh.
In 2010, faced
possible death
sentence.
14. Sri Puji
Mulyo
Siswanto
Withheld information
from police regarding the
group led by Subur
Sugianto. In 2006,
sentenced to 6 years
imprisonment.
Put through a post-
release
rehabilitation
program by Noor
Huda. Re-
radicalised due to
old networks.
Provided shelter
for Urwah.
In 2011,
sentenced to 8
years
imprisonment.
15. Thoriqudin
alias Abu
Rusydan
Sheltered Bali bombers
and Mukhlas. In 2003,
sentenced to 3.5 years
imprisonment. Released
in 2005 for good
behaviour.
Showed good
behaviour in prison
and cooperated with
the police Refused
deradicalisation
programme.
Continued to
support Jemaah
Islamiyah
activities but
condemned
violence.
Active in
public forums
and the media.
In early 2013,
labeled the
Indonesian
government as
thogut.
Source: adapted from “A Hazy Redemption: Can Radicalisation Work in Indonesia?” by L.
P. Nurezki, 2013, Master Thesis, National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore, pp.
91-93.
In contrast, after analysing Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program
in terms of the level of religious re-education and the level of institutionalisation,
Eckard (2014, p. 199) concluded that “Indonesia has a low to moderate level of
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 33
institutionalisation and a moderate level of religious re-education, which indicates an
overall moderate level of effectiveness”. In a comparative analysis of prison-based
deradicalisation programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Western Europe,
Eckard found that the prison-based deradicalisation program that is now being run by
Saudi Arabia was the most effective (Eckard, 2014, p. 199). Further, Eckard found
that the Indonesian deradicalisation programs was moderately effective, while that of
Yemen was lees effective. In comparison with programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,
and Yemen, prison-based deradicalisation programs in Western European countries
had a low level of effectiveness. Eckard (2014, p. 199) presented the overall
assessment of prison-based deradicalisation programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,
Yemen, and Western Europe in a quad chart, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 in the next
page.
Figure 2.2 Overall Assessment of Prison-based Deradicalisation Program for Terrorist Prisoners in
Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Yemen and Western Europe
Level of
Religious Re-
education
Level of Institutionalization
High
High
Low
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Low
Yemen
Western Europe
Source: adapted from “Prison-based Deradicalization for Terrorist Detainees: An Analysis
of Programmatic Religious Re-education and Systematic Institutionalization and their
Impact on Achieving Deradicalization”, by T. N. Eckard, 2014, PhD Thesis, Northern
Illinois University (NIU), DeKalb, IL, p. 199.
34 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
According to Eckard’s findings, several aspects of Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation program need to be evaluated in order to make the program more
effective, especially at the level of institutionalisation (Eckard, 2014). In this regard,
the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in implementing the program, and their
views on the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists, are useful to
examine.
However, the effectiveness of deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners
is not solely an Indonesian issue. As Eckard’s study revealed, prison-based
deradicalisation programs in Yemen and Western Europe countries are less effective
than Indoesia’s program. Many studies have demonstrated that the effectiveness of
deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists is debateable (Caitlin & Szmania,
2016; Ezzarqui, 2010; Ganor & Falk, 2013; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; IPI, 2010).
Related to this issue, El-Said (2012) concluded that “no single formula can deal with
all cases of violent extremism in a single region … and there is no single recipe for
success”. Therefore, any evaluation of the existing Indonesian program must be
conducted thoroughly and critically because Indonesia has a significant number of
terrorist prisoners and more such prisoners are likely in the future.
2.5 LIMITATIONS IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE
Since the 9/11 attacks, terrorism as a research area has become of greater
interest than previously (Silke, 2007, p. 90). This increased interest was predicted by
Walters, because many countries enacted or revised their own anti-terrorism laws
after this time (Walters, 2003, p. 125). Various studies have been conducted, with
journals specifically concerned with terrorism published since the attacks, such as
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism, and Political
Aggression and Critical Studies on Terrorism. It is apparent that terrorism has
become a fruitful research area throughout the world.
Indonesian terrorism research shows the same trend as seen internationally.
Terrorism is not observed exclusively by law and justice scholars; it is discussed by
scholars from various backgrounds. Compilation work by Nainggolan (2002)
provides an example of discussion on terrorism from political, economic, social,
military, security, and religious perspectives, as well as how terrorism affects
relationships between countries on regional and global levels. In Hendropriyono’s
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 35
(2009) doctoral thesis at Gadjah Mada University, terrorism is observed from a
philosophical point of view. Meanwhile, in Soeharto’s (2007) doctoral thesis at
Padjajaran University, the topic of terrorism is observed from law and justice
perspectives. He examined the protection of the rights of the suspected terrorist, the
defendant, and the victim. However, discussions on the protection of rights for
terrorist inmates were not included (Soeharto, 2007).
On the other hand, studies on terrorism face the challenge of the definition of
terrorism itself, as discussed in Chapter 1. There is no universal definition of exactly
what terrorism is. Martin (2010, p. 31) concluded that “there is some consensus – but
no unanimity – on what kind of violence constitutes an act of terrorism”. This
challenge does not affect the meaning of studies on terrorism. In fact, many relevant
research topics fall within the area of terrorism research. For example, terrorist
prisoners, radicalisation and de-radicalisation in prisons, counterterrorism, and the
causes of terrorism are specific research topics within the broader area of terrorism
studies.
Specifically, many experts and scholars throughout the world have addressed
research topics on terrorist prisoners and radicalisation in prisons. They examined the
terrorist’s life in prisons, and the spread of radicalisation among prisoners.
Nowadays, radicalisation in prisons is a trending topic among experts, as Useem and
Clayton (2009, p. 561) noted: “the radicalisation of prisoners is one of the most
discussed…”
Previous studies have concluded that radicalisation has already happened in
prisons and found that some radicalised persons were involved in terrorist attacks
after release from prison. Hamm (2009), for instance, demonstrated that some
previous studies revealed indoctrination of bombing actors while in prisons.
Indoctrination spread in prisons in various countries, namely in Morocco, Spain, a
British young offender institution, Jordan’s high-security Suwaqah prison, and
California’s New Folsom Prison. Another study focused on radicalisation in Spanish
prisons, finding that they were unsafe from radicalisation (Trujillo, Jordan, Gutierrez,
& Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2009). Trujillo et al. claimed that higher security has been
implemented for Muslim inmates, because they “demonstrate behavioral patterns in
terms of horizontal and vertical cohesion, endo-groupal identity, and the
legitimisation of terrorism which lead to and indicate a tendency towards radical
36 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Islamism” (Trujillo, Jordan, Gutierrez, & Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2009, p. 578).
Moreover, the authors argued that control and prevention of radicalisation in Spanish
prisons is even more problematical (Trujillo, Jordan, Gutierrez, & Gonzalez-Cabrera,
2009, p. 578).
Similarly, some researchers have demonstrated that radicalisation has already
taken place in Indonesian prisons (Andrie, 2011; ICG, 2007; Septian, 2010).
Previous studies claimed that terrorist prisoners in Indonesia successfully influenced
other inmates to become jihadist. The spread of radical beliefs to prison officers
worsens the situation. In other words, terrorist inmates are not only successful in
radicalising other inmates but also some of the Indonesian prison officers. Some
cases have shown that prison officers were turned into radicals and jihadists (ICG,
2007). It is ironic because their duty is to rehabilitate both terrorist and ordinary
prisoners. The ICG (2007, p. 9) explained that Beni Irawan, a prison officer at
Kerobokan Prison, became “the most militant of their charges, with all the ardor of a
new convert”. He was accused in 2006 of smuggling a laptop computer into Iman
Samudra’s4 cell.
The spread of radicalisation in prisons has become a global issue, especially in
countries that hold terrorist inmates. To cope with this issue, a specific rehabilitation
program for terrorist prisoners has been developed, with the primary goal of the
program being de-radicalisation or disengagement. As a result, deradicalisation or
disengagement is discussed worldwide in academic scholarship. Experts are not only
discussing radicalisation but also deradicalisation or disengagement for convicted
terrorists. For example, Veldhuis (2012) examined an argument for a realist approach
to rehabilitation and reintegration programs for terrorist prisoners, while Schmid
(2013) presented a conceptual discussion and literature review on radicalisation,
deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation. In his review, he explored these terms
and the discourses surrounding them (Schmid, 2013).
According to Schmid (2013, p. 20), previous research over the past 10 years
has focused on Islamist radicalisation, and the deradicalisation of jihadist terrorists.
Schmid (2013, p. 20) demonstrated that existing literature on the topic informs a
4 Imam Samudra was one of the three main actors behind the Bali bombing in October 2002. The
other two were Amrozi and Ali Ghufron. These three perpetrators were sentenced to capital
punishment and executed in 2008.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 37
number of conclusions, regardless of the fact that the findings about religious
radicals might not apply to other types of radical groups (e.g. left-wing militant
radicals). Based on an extensive literature review on the topic, he concluded
(Schmid, 2013, p. 20):
1. Most terrorists are clinically normal, although their acts are considered
widely as extra-normal in moral terms.
2. Backgrounds of terrorists are very diverse; there are many paths to terrorism
and there is no single profile of a terrorist.
3. Radicalisation is usually a gradual, phased process.
4. Individual poverty alone does not cause radicalisation towards terrorism, but
un(der)employment may play a role.
5. Grievances play a role, but often more as a mobilisation device than a
personal experience.
6. Social networks or environments are crucial in drawing vulnerable youths to
a terrorist movement.
7. Ideology often plays an important role in that it can provide the true believer
with a “license to kill”.
8. Disengagement from terrorism often occurs without deradicalisation.
These conclusions indicate that discussion focusing on radicalisation receives
more attention than does deradicalisation. Deradicalisation or disengagement is only
mentioned in Conclusion 8, while radicalisation and its aspects are the focus of
conclusions 1 to 7. More specifically, conclusions 3 to 7 show why someone
becomes a terrorist; and conclusions 1 and 2 show who becomes a terrorist. Schmid’s
review is valuable for synthesising “what we think we know about radicalisation”
(Schmid, 2013, p. iv) and for examining various deradicalisation and counter-
radicalisation programs. He has distilled the current literature on radicalisation,
deradicalisation, and counter-radicalisation globally.
As the scope of this study is Indonesia and its prison-based deradicalisation
program, the question is what aspects are researchers focusing on within this topic, or
how are studies analysing Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs. This
literature review found that the various research projects on the Indonesian prison-
based deradicalisation program could be divided into two major groups: those about
38 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
the program itself and those about the terrorist prisoners, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.
This division is based on the “angle” from which the program is viewed in the study.
In the first group, aspects of the prison-based deradicalisation program itself are
examined, such as the implementation of the program or analysis of the program
components. In the second group, the prison-based deradicalisation program is
examined from the perspectives of terrorist prisoners, such as their responses to the
program or the extent of their involvement in the program.
Figure 2.3 Grouping of the Existing Research on Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program
Firstly, regarding the first group of studies, research on Indonesia’s prison-
based deradicalisation program that is focused on the program itself widely available
in the literature (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Istiqomah, 2012; Johnston, 2009;
Neumann, 2010; Nurezki, 2013; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010).
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program has been selected either for
comparative analysis or as a case study analysis. For example, Eckard (2014)
examined the prison-based deradicalisation programs in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen and Western Europe. The study provides a comparative analysis of programs
among countries. Then a case study analysis of these programs compares them to the
Research topic on Indonesian prison-based
deradicalisation program
The program The terrorist prisoners
Focus or 'angle' of Discussion
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 39
USA’s programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similar to Eckard, Neumann (2010),
Johnston (2009) and Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek (2010) selected
Indonesia’s prison-based de-radicalisation program for analysis alongside those of
other countries. However, these studies did not compare the programs; they applied a
single case study analysis to each national deradicalisation program, including
Indonesia’s program (Johnston, 2009; Neumann, 2010; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, &
Boucek, 2010).
In its report, the ICG (2007) explored some practical aspects of Indonesia’s
program, particularly how terrorist prisoners are housed and what strategies have
been used by the Indonesian authorities to deal with terrorist prisoners. Similarly,
both Nurezki (2013) and Istiqomah (2012) analysed Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation program and its implementation. However, Nurezki and Istiqomah
provide different recommendations for preventing recidivism concerning terrorism
acts. Nurezki (2013, pp. 137-138) argues that the best strategy for deradicalisation in
Indonesia is disengagement, while Istiqomah (2012, p. 273) argues that a reformation
of the correctional system is required.
Secondly, regarding the second group of studies, empirical qualitative studies
on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program viewed from the perspective of
convicted terrorists’ experiences are also available (Andrie, 2011; Osman, 2014;
Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono, 2012; Sukabdi, 2015). The focus of these existing studies is
diverse. Some researchers (Ungerer, 2011, p. 2; Sarwono, 2012, p. 45) examined the
motivations of terrorist prisoners and the factors that influenced them to become
involved in terrorist activities and violent actions. Why the prisoners chose to either
re-engage or disengage from violent acts after release from prisons was also
investigated. Other research analyses prisoner radicalisation and the authorities’
efforts to prevent the spread of radicalisation in Indonesian prisons (Osman, 2014).
Osman and Ungerer used different sources when investigating the
deradicalisation program. Osman (2014, pp. 222-226) evaluated deradicalisation
efforts implemented by the INP and by civil society, while Ungerer (2011, pp. 14-16)
elaborated on and discussed deradicalisation efforts run by the INP and the DGC.
Based on interviews with terrorist prisoners and former terrorist prisoners, these
studies found that most of the subjects claimed that they had not been involved in the
deradicalisation program (Ungerer, 2011, p. 16) and that economic assistance from
40 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
the police did not influence their changing views on terror activities (Osman, 2014,
p. 224). In their conclusions, both Ungerer (2011, p. 19) and Osman (2014, p. 226)
stress the importance of the role of Indonesian prisons in rehabilitating terrorist
prisoners; thus a prison-based deradicalisation program is critical for best practice.
In his report, entitled Kehidupan di Balik Jeruji: Terorisme dan Kehidupan
Penjara di Indonesia, Andrie (2011, pp. 17-18) discussed terrorist prisoners’
responses to the deradicalisation program, founding that most of the participants
refused to be involved in the program. His study not only examined terrorist
prisoners’ views but also the programs in the prisons. Based on observations,
literature review and fieldwork, he investigated prisons’ programs, whether prison
had a deradicalisation program for convicted terrorists (Andrie, 2011, pp. 11-14). In
this sense, his study could also be included in the group that observed the prison-
based deradicalisation program from the program perspective.
A recent study that selected terrorist prisoners and former terrorist prisoners as
the subjects of research was conducted by Sukabdi (2015). This study presents more
direct and specific discussions on the relationship between the program and terrorist
prisoners. Sukabdi (2015, p. 52) identifies five substantial findings: “terror activists’
behavior transformation process in Indonesia, critical areas of development needed in
changing terrorism perpetrators’ behaviors, key elements in rehabilitation, criterion
for successful rehabilitation, and parameters of effective deradicalisation”. This study
shows it is possible to transform behaviour from pro-violence to non-violence. To
rehabilitate Indonesian terrorist prisoners, six critical dimensions of development are
needed: social skills, personal skills, vocational skills, spiritual maturity, domestic
skills, and contextual insight (Sukabdi, 2015, p. 46). Furthermore, Sukabdi (2015, p.
49) argues that a successful rehabilitation program for convicted terrorists is
indicated by participants’ rejecting violence and adopting more positive behaviours.
In conclusion, from the two major groups of existing research on the topic of
the Indonesian prison-based deradicalisation programs, a research gap within this
topic can be identified, namely, a lack of studies focused on Indonesian prison
officers as the implementers of the deradicalisation program. Therefore, researching
these prison officers’ experiences and perspectives regarding the prison-based
deradicalisation program is worthwhile. The findings will extend the body of
literature on the topic of Indonesian prison-based deradicalisation programs.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 41
The Designer of the Program
Besides extending the body of literature, researching this topic will help gain
an integrated understanding of the complexity of implementing the deradicalisation
program. Implementing this program is part of a broader process in which several
parties are involved: the program is designed by the authorities (the prison director),
implemented by the implementers (the prison officers), and applied to the
participants (the terrorist prisoners), as illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Furthermore, by extending the object or subject of research into the prison
officers’ experiences and perspectives, research on the Indonesian prison-based
deradicalisation program can then be divided into three major groups: the program
(the tool), the terrorist prisoners (the participants in the program), and the prison
officers (the implementers of the program). Figure 2.5 illustrates an updated division
of the research on Indonesian prison-based deradicalisation program after the subject
of research into the officers’ experiences and perspectives is included.
The Implementer of the Program Prison Officers
Terrorist Prisoners The Participants in the Program
The Prison Director
GOAL:
Rehabilitation/Deradicalisation
Figure 2.4 The Process of the Deradicalisation Program for Terrorist Prisoners in the Context of
Indonesian Correctional Services
The Designer of the Program
42 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Figure 2.5 Including Prison Officers’ Perspectives in the Research Topic of Indonesia’s Prison-based
Deradicalisation Program
To sum up, this study focuses on the experiences and perspectives of
Indonesian prison officers charged with implementing the deradicalisation program.
The investigation was narrowed to the examination of prison officers’ challenges in
implementing the program, prison officers’ views on the establishment of a special
prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia, and strategies to improve future delivery
of the program by prison officers.
Investigating the challenges that Indonesian prison officers face in
implementing the program is critical. Specifically, this will extend the body of
knowledge on prison-based deradicalisation program in the Indonesian context.
Although some researchers (Istiqomah, 2012; Maliki, 2013) have conducted
interviews with Indonesian prison officers and a prison director, they did not
investigate the challenges of implementing the program. For example, although
Maliki’s study also examined the implementation of the rehabilitation and
reintegration program for terrorist prisoners, the prison officers’ challenges were
apparently not investigated; interview results and discussions with only Semarang’s
prison director were provided (Maliki, 2013, pp. 6-7). In Istiqomah’s study, although
she conducted and presented her results of interviews with the prison officers, a
Research topic on Indonesian prison-based
deradicalisation program
The program
(the tools)
The terrorist prisoners
(the participants of the program)
The prison officers
(the implementers of the program)
Focus or 'angle' of discussion
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 43
thorough examination of the prison officers’ challenges in implementing the program
is not available. Therefore, research on the challenges that Indonesian prison officers
face would extend the body of knowledge on prison-based deradicalisation programs,
particularly in the Indonesian context.
Moreover, Indonesian authorities have established a special prison for
convicted terrorists in Sentul, Bogor – West Java. There is still contention within the
utilities on whether it is useful in rehabilitating and reintegrating incarcerated
terrorists. However, in-depth studies or empirical research have not been conducted
by either the Indonesian Government or scholars to review the need for this prison.
To identify the strengths and weaknesses of this special prison, empirical research
focused on prison officers’ views of the facility is necessary, because their views
could play an important role in examining the continued existence of this contested
initiative. For these reasons, ascertaining Indonesian officers’ views is essential to
extend the body of current knowledge.
Equally important is to investigate practical recommendations in order to
strengthen the prison officers’ role in supporting the effectiveness of the prison-based
deradicalisation program. Although previous studies provide recommendations on
the implementation of deradicalisation programs in the Indonesian prison
environment, such recommendations remain theoretical and abstract; for example,
recommendations to deliver proper training for prison officers (Nurezki, 2013) and
for correctional institution reform (Istiqomah, 2012). Applicable strategies and
policies that focus on improving prison officers’ role in implementing the prison-
based deradicalisation program have not been provided. Therefore, researching and
assessing applicable strategies would be beneficial, particularly for the legal,
regulatory and policy reform agendas.
2.6 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
This research makes an original contribution to criminal justice policy and
practice in Indonesia. By investigating and examining Indonesian prison officers’
experiences, the study extends the body of knowledge around prison-based
deradicalisation programs, specifically in the Indonesian context. Indonesian prison
officers’ perspectives regarding deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates was
thoroughly investigated. My review of the literature determined that the primary
44 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
focus of previous studies is the program and the inmates. In contrast, there is a lack
of qualitative studies that focus on prison officers’ experiences in implementing the
programs. Although programs have been assessed, users of the programs were not
assessed. Therefore, the results of this study will advance the discussion of prison-
based deradicalisation programs from program oriented to prison-officer oriented.
Moreover, discourses surrounding the establishment of a special prison for
terrorist inmates arise among both academics and policy makers, with pros and cons
commonly advanced on this hotly debated issue in Indonesia. However, the
perspectives of prison officers on this issue are not available in the existing literature,
including whether they agree or disagree with the prison’s establishment, and what
their hopes for it might be. From this study, the findings on prison officers’
perspectives on this topic will contribute to the fields of criminal justice studies,
criminology, and correctional science.
Further, this study provides a uniquely practical contribution to the Indonesian
authorities. By uncovering prison officers’ challenges in implementing the
deradicalisation program, the weaknesses can be identified and then evaluated. These
findings are valuable resources for investigating strategies to strengthen the role of
Indonesian prison officers, especially regarding the implementation of Indonesia’s
prison-based deradicalisation program and preventing the spread of radical beliefs
from terrorist inmates to prison officers.
In conclusion, this study contributes to the discipline of terrorist rehabilitation
and prison-based deradicalisation programs. More broadly, the study contributes to
several fields such as corrections, penology, political violence, and criminal justice.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 45
Research Design
A good research design ensures you will get the best evidence – the most
relevant, credible, valid, trustworthy, reliable and authentic possible – and
also that you haven’t overlooked possible sources of criticism or possible
counter-evidence. It matches up the sources available, and the questions
needing answers, with the kinds and amounts of evidence needed to develop
a case or demonstrate a situation. It allows time for reflection to creatively
develop plausible explanations; and it ensures the purposes of the research
are properly met. (Wadsworth, 1997, p. 27)
This chapter outlines the methodology employed in this study and provides an
account of ethical concerns for conducting fieldwork within the prison environment
in Indonesia. The chapter begins with a discussion on the research design and
methodology used in this study (Section 3.1) followed by discussion of the research
site and why it was selected for data collection purposes (Section 3.2). Next, this
chapter discusses participants and their recruitment (Section 3.3) and shows the data
and legal materials for answering the research questions (Section 3.4). The method
for data collection (Section 3.5), and collection methods for legal and non-legal
materials (Section 3.6) are presented, before discussing analysis of the data (Section
3.7). As this study needed human participation, ethical considerations are described
(Section 3.8). Finally, this chapter discusses the scope of the study and the
limitations of the research (Section 3.9).
3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
As discussed in Chapter 2, this study aimed to bridge the research gap on the
topic of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. The gap in existing
research on this topic is the lack of studies on terrorist rehabilitation viewed through
the lens of the implementers. Hence, Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation
programs were examined from the viewpoint of the implementers of the program,
that is, Indonesian prison officers. Specifically, the aims of this study were to
examine the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in rehabilitating terrorist
inmates and to investigate the strategies for improving the officers’ role in terrorist
46 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
rehabilitation. To achieve these aims, the set of research questions is discussed
comprehensively in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.
In line with the proposed research questions, this study had three objectives:
(1) to investigate Indonesian prison officers’ challenges in implementing terrorist
rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs; (2) to analyse Indonesian prison
officers’ views regarding the establishment of a special prison for terrorist inmates in
Indonesia; and (3) to examine and assess strategies to improve the role of Indonesian
prison officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs. These objectives
were investigated throughout the firsthand experiences of Indonesian prison officers
in dealing with terrorist inmates inside prisons.
In doing so, this study used qualitative social research and legal research
methodologies. These methodologies were used because the set of research questions
in this study had to be addressed by different methods, as asserted in the quotations
above (Baker, 1999, p. 9; Wadsworth, 1997, p. 27). Moreover, in applying
methodology for a specific research project, Crompton and Jones (1998, p. 72)
echoed that “different methods are appropriate for different problems”. In terms of
data collection, Burton (2013, p. 55) explained that research questions are inevitably
the starting point to determine whether they can be answered by collecting primary
data. The connection between the methodology and the research question is
discussed in the following subsection as well as in the discussion on the selected
methodological approach.
3.1.1 The Methodology and Research Questions
Qualitative social research methodology was used to investigate the challenges
faced by prison officers implementing the deradicalisation program (Research
Question 1), as well as to analyse their views on the establishment of a special prison
for convicted terrorists in Indonesia (Research Question 2). Primary and secondary
data were collected to address Research Questions 1 and 2.
Qualitative social research and legal research methodologies were combined to
identify strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison officers in
implementing the deradicalisation program (Research Question 3). Because the
context of the problem is about change (Hutchinson, 2010, p. 63), reform-oriented
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 47
research was applied. Therefore, this study combined these methodologies to
examine Research Question 3.
The research design is outlined in Table 3.1, which shows the connection
between the methodologies and the research questions. Use of qualitative social
research and legal research methodologies are discussed further in the following
subsection.
Table 3.1 Research Questions and the Associated Methodologies
Key Research Aims:
To examine the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-
based deradicalisation programs and to identify policy and law reform options related to the
improvement of Indonesian prison officers’ role in terrorist rehabilitation.
Research Question
Methodology
Qualitative Social
Research Legal Research
1 What are the challenges for Indonesian
prison officers implementing prison-
based deradicalisation programs for
convicted terrorists?
X
2 What are Indonesian prison officers’
views on the establishment of a special
prison for convicted terrorists in
Indonesia?
X
3 What strategies can be used to improve
the role of Indonesian prison officers
in implementing prison-based
deradicalisation programs?
X X
3.1.2 Qualitative Social Research Methodology: Empirical Legal Research
Qualitative and quantitative research methodologies play an important role and
have long histories in the development of the social sciences. Both methodological
approaches have been widely used in the development of many specific fields of
social science such as economics, politics, and psychology. Qualitative and
48 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
quantitative research methodologies have different approaches, which include but are
not limited to differences in philosophical and theoretical approaches, aims or
purposes, and techniques. Selecting which methodology, and the methods to use
(qualitative, quantitative, or mixed) depends on the issues, research problems, and,
most importantly, the proposed research questions.
Use of qualitative or quantitative social methodologies to study law is a
relatively new phenomenon, starting in the 19th century. These methods can be used
to seek a specific issue within a legal context, so both methodologies are widely
employed in many studies. This applies to both the public law and the private law
fields (Burton, 2013; Cownie & Bradney, 2013). In the Australian context, non-legal
methodology has been used by scholars such as White, Dean, and Mackenzie, who
used qualitative methodological approaches in their studies (Hutchinson, 2010, pp.
130-133).
Using methods from other disciplines for legal research is defined as
conducting empirical legal research (Burton, 2013, p. 55) or non-doctrinal legal
research (Hutchinson, 2010; Leeuw & Schmeet, 2016), or socio-legal studies
(Banakar & Travers, 2005; Cownie & Bradney, 2013). Drawing from the literature
on the use of qualitative social methodology in the legal context, this study is a work
of empirical legal research. Although this study could also be classified as socio-
legal research, empirical legal research is more appropriate because it employs focus
group methods for data collection, which are classed as empirical work. According to
Cownie and Bradney (2013, p. 45), conducting socio-legal research is not always
empirical. For this reason, this study is classified as empirical legal research.
An empirical legal researcher, according to Burton (2013, p. 58), can adopt
different research techniques and strategies that broadly fall into the qualitative and
quantitative definitions. Various methods such as in-depth interview, focus group,
questioners, and case study are available and can be used to answer the proposed
research questions. The critical point for an empirical legal researcher is deciding the
appropriate methodological approach for the research questions.
3.1.3 Legal Research: Policy and Law Reform Research
Besides using a qualitative social research methodology, legal research was
also used in this study, particularly to develop arguments for Research Question 3.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 49
This methodological approach was required to examine a potential policy or legal
reform related to the role of Indonesian prison officers in implementing the prison-
based deradicalisation program. Hence, in examining Research Question 3, empirical
legal research and legal research were combined. Referring to the review of Hanley
et al. (2016), the results from empirical legal research are used to identify possible
legal or regulation reforms. In this regard, Hanley et al. concluded that empirical
research contributes to law reform by “identifying and evaluating reform options to
redress the problem” (Hanley, Fileborn, Larcombe, Henry, & Powell, 2016, p. 559).
To identify strategies to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in
implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs, this research applied the
frameworks of policy and law reform research. According to Hutchinson (2010),
policy research and law reform research are categorised as additional legal research
frameworks, along with theoretical research. By using the frameworks of policy and
law reform research, relevant laws and regulations were identified and then analysed
to decide whether the provisions require amendment, or whether new provisions are
needed to solve identified problems.
3.2 RESEARCH SITE
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a number of Indonesian prisons and detention
centres hold terrorist inmates. Three of these prisons were selected as the research
sites: Cipinang, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, and Surabaya prisons. These prisons
were selected because they hold significant numbers of terrorist prisoners compared
to the numbers held in the other prisons and detention centres. Figure 3.1 shows the
geographical positioning of the research sites in Indonesia.
50 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Figure 3.1 The Research Sites
Source: adapted from http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-cPZhivuKlmU/Tk-
i0t2qnDI/AAAAAAAAD-w/wW0vjRxCQsc/s1600/peta-indonesia.jpg
According to the online data of the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC)
to August 2015, the largest number of convicted terrorist inmates was in Pasir Putih
Nusakambangan Prison, which then held 37 individuals, followed by Cipinang
Prison with 23 individuals, and Surabaya Prison with 12 individuals. The 10 prisons
and detention centres that held the largest number of terrorist convicts in Indonesia at
this time were Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, Cipinang, Batu, Cibinong, Semarang,
Tanggerang, Surabaya, Kembang Kuning, and Permisan Prisons (Figure 3.2). There
is also one detention centre that holds a significant number of terrorist inmates:
Jepara Detention Centre.
At August 2015, the number of terrorist inmates in Surabaya prison was
lower than that in Batu Nusakambangan Prison, Cibinong Prison, Semarang Prison,
and Tangerang Prison. Both Batu Nusakambangan Prison and Cibinong Prison held
19 individuals, whereas Semarang and Tangerang prisons held 18 and 13 individuals,
respectively. Besides its significant number of terrorist inmates, Surabaya prison was
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 51
selected because a previous study found that this prison is successfully managing
terrorist prisoners and achieving the goals of a prison-based deradicalisation program
(Andrie, 2011, p. 9). In evaluating the implementation of the prison-based
deradicalisation program in Surabaya prison, Andrie’s study concluded that terrorist
prisoners are likely becoming “softer” and more willing to cooperate in the prison
(Andrie, 2011, p. 10). Examining the experiences of Surabaya’s prison officers is
therefore valuable in order to gain insights into the implementation techniques used
in this prison.
Figure 3.2 The Ten Indonesian Prisons with the Largest Number of Terrorist Prisoners
Geographically, the three selected prisons are all located in the area of Java.
Pasir Putih Prison is one of the prisons on Nusakambangan Island, which is in
Central Java Province. Cipinang Prison is in the capital city of Jakarta, and Surabaya
prison is located in Surabaya in East Java Province.
3.3 PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR RECRUITMENT
Participants in this study were selected using a purposive sampling method.
This method is normally adopted for focus group research (Liamputtong, 2011, p.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
52 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
50), and the investigated topic is shaped by a specific group of participants, in this
case, Indonesian prison officers. The participants provided firsthand information,
generating the desired data.
Besides working in the selected prisons, the participants had taken part in the
duties and responsibilities associated with rehabilitating terrorist inmates. In addition,
work experience was also considered as a selection criterion: participants had to have
a minimum of 2 years of relevant work experience.
Therefore, the criteria that the Indonesian prison officers had to meet for the
focus group were:
(1) To have duties and responsibilities associated with prisoners’
rehabilitation and/or deradicalisation, including terrorist inmates.
(2) To have a minimum work experiences of 2 years.
Other factors outside these criteria were not considered in the selection of
participants. For instance, age, religion, or gender were not taken into consideration
because they were considered not relevant to the subject of this study.
Once the sampling method was selected, the next step was to recruit qualifying
participants. This involved three stages: obtaining formal permission from the
authorities, discussing the research project with the prison directors, and then
recruiting the participants.
Obtaining formal permission from the authorities is critical because it can lend
credibility to the research (Minichiello, Aroni, & Hays, 2008, p. 171). A formal
request letter was sent to the Director General of Corrections of the Republic of
Indonesia (see Appendix B and Appendix C). The letter included a summary of the
research proposal, the Ethics Certificate from QUT, participant criteria, and a
consent form for the participants.
The letter was given to the Director General of Corrections, I Wayan K Dusak,
personally in his office in Jakarta. During the meeting, the research project was
discussed. The DGC of the Republic of Indonesia issued a formal permission letter,
Letter Number: 02 PAS.DL 01-542, September 23, 2015 (see Appendix D and
Appendix E). The letter was signed by Endang Sudirman, the Secretary of the DGC
of the Republic of Indonesia. In accordance with the request, the researcher was
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 53
granted formal permission to conduct fieldwork in three prisons: Pasir Putih
Nusakambangan Prison, Cipinang Prison, and Surabaya Prison.
To comply with the requirement stated in the formal permission letter, the next
step was to discuss the research project with the prison directors of the selected
prisons. A formal permission letter from the DGC of the Republic of Indonesia was
addressed to each prison director or to the prison authorities. The researcher
explained that the research project would conduct a focus group with the prison
officers who had had relevant responsibilities for at least 2 years. The prison
directors then passed this request to qualifying potential participants. As a result,
several eligible prospective participants were available in each selected prison.
Once prospective participants were determined, the next step was recruitment.
The candidates were asked individually about their willingness to participate in this
study, and particularly to engage in the focus group discussion. They were asked
directly in random order at the research site. Through this process, 13 prison officers
were selected to participate in the series of focus groups. I provided an Information
Sheet (see Appendix F) to the research participants. The sheet contained background
to the research, a summary of the research proposal, and necessary information about
the research. All participants signed the Consent Form (see Appendix G) that
informed them of their rights as research participants.
3.4 DATA AND LEGAL MATERIALS
This study used data and legal materials for answering research questions. As
the research questions in this study required different methodological approaches, the
connections among research questions, data and legal materials should be clarified.
As discussed previously, because qualitative social research methodology was
employed specifically for investigating and analysing both research questions 1 and
2, either primary or secondary data were used. Specifically, data from focus groups,
the research diary, and states documents were used. On the other hand, data and
materials for legal research were combined in examining Research Question 3.
Materials for legal research were also used because legal research was applied to
answer Research Question 3. The materials included primary legal materials,
secondary legal materials, and non-legal materials. Primary legal materials such as
Indonesian laws, regulations, and policies surrounding the issue of terrorist
54 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
rehabilitation were used as the first preference. Secondary legal materials such as
legal journals and textbooks were used. In addition, to enhance arguments and
recommendations, non-legal materials or non-legal literature were also used.
Table 3.2 summarises the correlation between the research questions, the data,
and the legal materials used in this study. Data collection methods are presented in
Section 3.5, and the collection methods for legal and non-legal materials are
presented in Section 3.6.
Table 3.2 The Correlation between Research Questions, Data, and Materials
Research
Question
(RQ)
Empirical Legal Research Legal Research
Primary Data Secondary Data
Primary
Legal
Materials
Secondary
Legal
Materials
Non-Legal
Materials
RQ1 Focus group,
complemented
by research
diary
Previous studies,
official reports,
and state
documents
RQ2 Focus group,
complemented
by research
diary
Previous studies,
official reports,
and state
documents
RQ3 Focus group,
complemented
by research
diary
Previous studies,
official reports,
and state
documents
The ATL,
the ATFL,
and other
relevant
laws and
regulations.
Legal
literature
(e.g. journal
articles,
textbooks,
proceedings,
websites,
encyclopaedi
as)
Non-legal
literature
Note: ATL = Anti-Terrorism Law; ATFL = Anti-Terrorism Financing Law
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 55
3.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS
In line with the use of a social research methodology, this study used two main
types of data: primary and secondary. Primary data were collected through focus
group discussions. To increase the trustworthiness of the data collected, a research
diary was also used to record fieldwork activities and prominent insights related to
the topic of this study (Duong, 2010). Moreover, secondary data were collected
through literature searches.
3.5.1 Primary Data
Focus Groups
In relation to the selection of a data collection method in a study or a research
project, Silverman (2013, p. 6) demonstrated that choosing the method of data
collection is not about “right” or “wrong”. It is always about “more or less
appropriate” (Silverman, 2013, p. 6), and then it must be justified within the practical
and analytical issues (Silverman, 2013, p. 48). In this context, the focus group was
used as a primary data collection method for this study. Throughout the fieldwork
phase, three focus groups with Indonesian prison officers were conducted.
The focus group was selected as data collection method because this
methodology is an “ideal” approach for examining the stories, experiences, points of
view, beliefs, needs, and concerns of individuals (Kitzinger, 2005, p. 57). Moreover,
focus groups were appropriate for this study because they were useful for exploring
the gap between what Indonesian prison officers say and what they do regarding
terrorist rehabilitation or deradicalisation (Conradson, 2005, p. 131). Further, the
literature recognises conducting focus groups as more efficient than conducting
personal interviews, as concluded by Liamputong (2011, p. 7) and Morgan (1997, pp.
13-14). On the other words, one of the strengths of the focus group is its relative
efficiency.
However, using focus groups as a data collection method has its weaknesses.
Referring to the work of Sussman et al. (1991) on a program for adolescent tobacco
use cessation, Morgan (1997, p. 15) explained that “the concerns for focus groups
include both a tendency toward conformity, in which some participants withhold
things that they might say in private, and a tendency towards ‘polarisation,’ in which
some participants express more extreme views in a group than in private”. In dealing
56 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
with the issue of conformity, I tried to accommodate the wishes of participants and to
make them feel as comfortable as possible. For instance, I stated at the beginning of
the focus group that opinions among the participants might differ, but that this was
fine because each individual had different experiences. Furthermore, for the
convenience of participants, prior to conducting the focus group, I asked about the
venue and whether they preferred the discussions to be conducted within or outside
the prison, such as in a restaurant or a rented room. All participants agreed to and
were happy for the focus group to be conducted within the prison. Practically, this
was beneficial for me because it saved time on venue setup and because the
discussion could be scheduled when participants were not working. I also asked the
participants whether they were willing for the discussion to be recorded. The
participants expressed no objection to recording of the discussion.
In dealing with the issue of polarisation, as the moderator I tried to manage
discussions carefully and to stimulate the participants to engage actively in the
discussions. No single participant expressed any extreme views while discussing the
questions. Participants were not asked questions individually; rather, they were
encouraged to discuss the issues and to share their own ideas. As noted by Wilkinson
(2011, p. 169), “although focus groups are sometimes referred to as ‘group
interviews’, the moderator does not ask questions of each focus group participant in
turn but, rather, facilitates group discussion, actively encouraging group members to
interact with each other”. However, if a particular participant did not express an
opinion on a topic, they were then asked individually for a comment, even if it was
only a short comment, such as agreement, disagreement, objection, or satisfaction.
Focus group discussions were conducted to discuss three related issues:
1. Indonesian prison officers’ challenges while implementing deradicalisation.
2. Indonesian prison officers’ views on the establishment of a special prison
for terrorist prisoners.
3. The needs of Indonesian prison officers in implementing terrorist
rehabilitation programs.
To guide the discussion, a set of primary questions were prepared, since semi-
structured focus groups were chosen as the data collection tool (see Appendix A:
Question Guide for Focus Groups). These questions led to the several issues
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 57
surrounding the rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners. For instance, what are the
challenges for rehabilitating and supervising terrorist prisoners? Do you know about
the deradicalisation program? What do you think about the establishment of a special
prison for convicted terrorists? What should be considered by the government when
rehabilitating terrorist convicts inside the prisons? Note that the questions probed the
experiences and perspectives of prison officers while dealing with terrorist inmates in
the prison facilities.
A series of focus groups was carried out in November 2015 and June 2016. It
started in Cipinang Prison on 1 November 2015, then in Pasir Putih Nusakambangan
Prison on 2 November 2015. The last session was conducted in Surabaya Prison on
25 June 2016. The focus groups took about one hour each on average. After the focus
group was completed, all participants were given an incentive to compensate their
time and effort in taking part in the focus group. Participants received
IDR250,000.00 (equal to AUD25.00) to be used for a dinner in a local restaurant.
The details of these focus groups are presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Details of Focus Group Discussions
Prison Province/State Venue Duration Date/Month/Year
Cipinang Jakarta Inside the prison 1:17:14 01/10/2015
Pasir Putih Central Java Inside the prison 1:27:39 02/10/2015
Surabaya East Java Inside the prison 0:44:39 25/06/2016
To determine whether a follow-up session was needed, saturation theory was
applied (Liamputtong, 2009). After the third session of the focus group, it was
determined that a subsequent session was not needed because additional information
on the issue was no longer generating new understanding (Morgan, 1997). Reliable
answers to the research questions were gained from these three sessions of the focus
groups. Therefore, the research moved to next step, coding and analysing the data,
followed by writing up (Kitzinger, 2005).
58 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Research Diary
A research diary was used to complement the focus group data. Gillham (2000)
argues that a research diary is a log book to record personal notes on observations,
questions, ideas, or insights. A research diary provided field notes “in action” at the
time of conducting fieldwork and also represented the progress of the research.
Moreover, the diary helped to increase the trustworthiness of the primary data. To
ensure the quality of the diary, observations were always noted directly after the
activities occurred (Duong, 2010).
During the focus groups, some important comments from the participants were
noted, and some expressions and body language that indicated correlations with their
ideas. Hence, the diary enhanced the data from the focus group. The research diary,
however, was not used as the main source of data for this study. It was
complementary to the data from focus group discussions.
3.5.2 Secondary Data
Secondary data was a valuable source of deep insights into the issue being
researched, providing different perspectives and ideas on the topic of Indonesia’s
prison-based deradicalisation program. If secondary data used in combination with
other data, it may bring important insights. In this case, secondary data enriches my
empirical evidence on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs.
Moreover, state documents and official reports “helped strengthen the credibility,
validity, and trustworthiness of the data collected from the field” (Duong, 2010, p.
100). Because the deradicalisation program is a national program to counter
terrorism in Indonesia, the discussion of the issue needs to be contextualised.
Therefore, the analysis cannot be based on primary data alone.
Secondary data used in this study comprised previous studies around the issue,
official reports, and state documents such as laws, regulations, and states policies.
These secondary data were mainly collected through literature methods and from the
internet. However, several laws and regulations that were not available in the library
were collected from state actors during fieldwork in Indonesia.
3.6 LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL MATERIALS COLLECTION METHODS
In terms of legal research, legal resources used in this study were primary and
secondary legal materials, and non-legal material. Primary legal materials, according
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 59
to Iosipescu and Whitehead (2004, p. 13), are “the records of rules laid down by
those bodies vested with the authority to declare the law”. Further, secondary legal
materials are “preliminary research tools that assist the student in finding, evaluating,
and understanding primary materials” (Iosipescu & Whitehead, 2004, p. 73). Similar
to Iosipescu and Whitehead, Watt and Johns (2009, p. 111) illustrate that the law
itself is the primary legal material, while discourse about the law is the secondary
legal material.
3.6.1 Primary Legal Materials
The meaning of primary legal materials is not synonymous with primary data.
Primary legal materials clearly denote laws issued by the states. On the other hand,
primary qualitative data includes data collected from the field by, for example,
conducting interviews, focus groups, or surveys. Legislation and case reports are the
most common sources of primary legal materials (Bott & Talbot-Stokes, 2010, p. 9).
Legislation includes not only statutes but also subordinate legislation that “is made
under powers conferred by a statute” (Iosipescu & Whitehead, 2004, p. 13), such as
regulations. Within the context of the Indonesian legal system, this includes
government regulations and presidential regulations (Marzuki, 2011).
In line with the topic of this study, the primary legal materials used in this
study were the Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL), the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law
ATFL, the Correctional Institution Law (CIL), and some relevant regulations.
Judicial decisions (cases) were not used in this study because they are less relevant to
the objectives of the study. Primary legal materials were collected through literature
and library methods. Searching on the internet was used because many laws and
regulations are also available online. Primary legal materials that were not available
in the library or via the internet were collected from state actors during fieldwork in
Indonesia.
3.6.2 Secondary Legal Materials
In this study, secondary legal materials and secondary data were the same in
the form – both were textual. However, they differed in content. As explained by
Iosipescu & Whitehead (2004, p. 73), secondary legal materials are materials
basically used for understanding primary legal materials. Secondary legal materials
were used in this study, as mentioned in the previous section. These materials
60 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
included articles from law journals, textbooks, conference papers or proceedings,
encyclopaedias, and websites. The information was basically legal in content. In
contrast, the secondary data was not only legal in its content but also included
broader information. In the context of the social research approach used, the
secondary data covered state documents, policies, previous studies, or any other
sources.
Secondary legal materials were first collected through the literature and library
method, and through the internet. Particular secondary legal materials were then
selected based on relevance to this study.
3.6.3 Non-Legal Materials
In addition, non-legal materials were also used to assess Research Question 3.
Non-legal materials on topics such as psychological, political, economic, social, and
criminal justice management issues were also used. These materials are used in order
“to give some guidance to the literature and information services of that particular
area” (Campbell, Poh-York, & Tooher, 1996, p. 422). According to Marzuki (2016,
pp. 204-206), non-legal materials are materials that are not related to the legal field;
however, findings from other disciplines are often used in the legal research context
to enrich and strengthen the analysis.
Similar to the collection of primary and secondary legal materials, non-legal
materials were also collected through literature and library methods, and from the
internet. Relevant non-legal materials were selected to provide evidence to support
the identified policy recommendations and legal reform approaches.
3.7 DATA ANALYSIS
The difficult part of the qualitative research process is data analysis (Boeije,
2010, p. 82). The analysis of qualitative data consists of two main activity streams:
unfolding and then structuring the data (Boeije, 2010, p. 77). Qualitative data is also
challenging because “the concepts that will come to play an actual role during the
analysis and in the final results are not known in advance” (Boeije, 2010, p. 83).
As stated in the section of data collection method above (Section 3.5), primary
data were generated from the focus groups with Indonesian prison officers. Prior to
data analysis, I acknowledged that there has been some debate on the application of
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 61
analyses designed for other qualitative methods (e.g. in-depth interviews or semi-
structured interviews) to analysis of focus group discussions. Some argue that it is
inappropriate to apply such analyses to focus groups (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 172).
However, others suggest that analyses designed for other qualitative methods can be
applied similarly to focus groups (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 172). In this study, the
second perspective was followed because my interest was the individual voices
rather than the dynamic aspect of interaction within the group.
There are various ways of analysing focus group data as noted by Wilkinson
(2011, p. 169): “content, thematic, ethnographic, phenomenological, narrative,
experiential, biographical, discourse, or conversation analysis”. For the purposes of
this study, thematic analysis was applied. According to Braun and Clarke (2006, p.
79), thematic analysis is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns
(themes) within the data”. In performing the thematic analysis, I undertook six
processes in line with the step-by-step guide of Braun and Clarke (2006, pp. 86-93).
3.7.1 Familiarisation with the Data
Firstly, focus group data was transcribed into written form. This phase is usual
for all qualitative studies in which data is generated through verbal communication
such as in-depth interviews. Drawing from the existing literature, Braun and Clarke
(2006, pp. 87-88) noted that this stage was “an interpretative act, where meanings are
created, rather than simply a mechanical act of putting spoken sounds on paper”.
This phase was challenging and time-consuming. However, after transcription
of the focus group proceedings, I had started to familiarise myself with the data.
Then I read and reread the data to familiarise myself with the content. By doing this,
I generated an initial list of ideas regarding the content of the data.
3.7.2 Generating Initial Codes
After data familiarisation, I started coding. Coding is necessary in thematic
analysis, and initial and axial coding are required to deconstruct data (Liamputtong,
2011, p. 173). Coding is a technique of assigning codes and sub-categories to written
codes or transcripts in order to aid meaningful data retrieval (Barbour, 2008). In the
early stages of coding, I started to index the information. Indexing acts “as [a]
signpost to interesting bits of data, rather than representing some final argument
about meaning” (Seale, 1999, p. 154).
62 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
In this research, two sets of characters were used to index the prisons: letters
and numbers. Cipinang Prison was indexed as FG1, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan
Prison was indexed as FG2, and Surabaya Prison was indexed as FG3. For the
confidentiality of the participants, only numbers were used. These provided specific
short names for the information of focus group participants. To designate the
research sites at which the focus groups were conducted, they were separated by a
colon. I marked them in numerical order. For example, FG1:2 denotes information
given by focus group participant number 2 in Cipinang Prison and FG3:4, denotes
information given by focus group participant number 4 in Surabaya Prison. Thus the
information was kept confidential but the indexing assisted in checking information
in the transcript.
After the indexing, a table was created. The left column indicated data extract
while the right column indicated the codes. By doing this, initial codes from the data
produced.
3.7.3 Searching for Themes
In this phase, broad themes were identified. I started to analyse my codes and
considered how different codes could combine to form a broader theme. I used a
visual method – a thematic map – to help sorting the codes into themes. At the end of
this activity, I had collected some candidate themes and subthemes.
Then I grouped these candidate themes and subthemes into three main issues
related to the research questions of the study:
1. The challenges to implementing the prison-based deradicalisation program.
2. The opinions regarding the establishment of a special prison for terrorist
inmates.
3. The officers’ needs in the task of rehabilitating terrorist inmates.
As a result, some candidate themes and sub themes were generated to the
proposed issues.
3.7.4 Reviewing Themes
The next stage was reviewing the themes. I found that some candidate themes
were not really themes because there was not enough data to support them, for
example, the candidate theme of “payment”. I also found that some themes collapsed
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 63
into each other; for example, the themes of “training on communication” and
“training on deradicalisation” could be combined into one theme, the “direct need” of
the participants. Similarly, the themes of “need other actors” and “a good
collaboration with BNPT” became the theme “indirect need”.
I checked my results against the data set as a whole to ensure that my thematic
map accurately reflected the meanings evident in the data set at this level (Braun &
Clarke, 2006, p. 91). At the end of this stage, I found that my thematic map worked,
and so progressed to the next phase of defining and naming the themes.
3.7.5 Defining and Naming Themes
At this point I defined and refined the themes that I presented for the analysis.
By defining and refining the themes, I identified, in the words of Braun and Clarke
(2006, p. 92), “the essence of what each theme is about (as well as themes overall),
and determined what aspect of the data each theme captures”. I found that most of
the identified themes contained subthemes. For example, the theme of “the readiness
of the prison officers” contained the subthemes of “internal factors” and “external
factors”. Only one theme, “an absolute agreement”, had no subthemes. This theme
related to the point of view of the focus group participants regarding the initiative of
the Government of Indonesia to establish a special prison for convicted terrorists.
3.7.6 Producing the Report
As the last phase of this analysis, I started to write the report for this thesis. The
complicated story of my focus group data was presented in detail, showing the
validity of my analysis. The three main issues were presented and supported by a set
of thoroughly formulated themes.
Firstly, the challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers when implementing
the prison-based deradicalisation program included the themes:
1. Terrorist prisoner personalities.
2. The readiness of Indonesian prison officers.
3. The sustainability of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program.
4. Institutional infrastructure problems.
5. Unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.
64 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Secondly, the establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners included
the themes:
1. An absolute agreement.
2. Advantages and disadvantages.
3. The policy issues.
Thirdly, the needs of Indonesian prison officers in supporting their task of
terrorist rehabilitation included the themes:
1. Direct need.
2. Indirect need.
3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
As mentioned previously, participants in this research were Indonesian prison
officers who were tasked with rehabilitating terrorist prisoners. Willing participants
from this particular group were invited to join a focus group. This research was
designed to ensure no harm to any participants. Safety issues for this research were
important because conducting research in the prison environment can be dangerous
(Kraska & Neuman, 2012, pp. 82-83). Thus, ethical considerations were mandatory
in this research.
I submitted an ethics application to the university ethics committee prior to
conducting fieldwork. The application required a brief project summary, including
the research participants and their involvement, the research questions and aims,
potential risks and benefits, details of data collection (e.g. where and when the data
would be collected), and how the data would be stored and reported. The application
was approved by the university ethics committee with approval number 1500000642,
from 29 July 2015 to 29 July 2017.
This research was assessed as “low-risk” because participants in the focus
group discussions were limited to prison officers. Prisoners were not participants in
this research. Moreover, participants were interviewed about their tasks and
responsibilities in the normal course of their work: how they implement the
programs, the challenges they face, and their needs were the main topics of the focus
groups. The research did not ask about sensitive or personal topics, nor was it likely
to discover illegal activities, even inadvertently or unexpectedly.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 65
Having correctional jobs delivering deradicalisation programs, participants
were familiar with speaking to share their experiences about the implementation of
the program. Participants were asked what official processes were in place to manage
terrorist prisoners. In addition, participants were aware of the nature of the research
before they agreed to participate; thus the level of risk was estimated as no more than
the inconvenience of participating in a focus group discussion. That is, the potential
risks for the proposed research was minimal but might include inconvenience. But, in
order to minimise the identified risks, this research project ensured that participants
were aware of the following:
1. The nature and objectives of the research.
2. Their participation in the research was voluntary.
3. They were not required to provide answers to all questions during the focus
group interview.
4. Their confidentiality would be preserved throughout the research via use of
codes rather than names.
5. Focus group interviews would be conducted at locations and times that were
most convenient to participants.
Furthermore, participating in this research should not be made uncomfortable
to them. Careful attention was paid to the questions asked of the participants. To
avoid negative emotions and to ensure they experienced no discomfort or became
stressed, prison officers were not asked sensitive questions. Sensitive questions such
as their beliefs and the value they placed on in their personal life were not asked.
The questions were designed only to gain understanding about their experiences in
implementing the deradicalisation program.
In addition to ethical concerns, I also had to obtain participant consent due to
the fact that this research was conducted with human subjects. Prior to the
discussions, I provided information (see Appendix F) and consent forms (see
Appendix G) to the participants to be signed. This is important to ensure they were
aware of their rights and responsibilities as participants in the research. This is also
important for the participants to gain an understanding of the purpose and usefulness
of the research, as well as the way that the data would be gathered and used. Through
66 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
this process, the participants were informed that they could withdraw from the
research project at any time until the final submission.
The informed consent form was translated into Bahasa Indonesia for the
participants who could not read or speak in English. Even though I explained the aim
of study and the conditions of consent in Bahasa Indonesia, the version in Bahasa
Indonesia had been made available for the participants. Finally, all participants had
signed Bahasa Indonesia versions of the consent form.
The last concern was related to the obligation to protect the confidentiality and
privacy of the participants (Hagan, 2012, p. 63). Throughout this research,
discussions were anonymised. All participant names and details, such as address and
date of birth, were not included in the transcripts. Identifying features were included
on the consent form but were not be attached to the transcripts. This data, the
recordings, and the transcripts were stored in a locked cabinet on campus. Data could
only be accessed by the researcher and the supervisors.
3.9 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
3.9.1 Scope
The scope of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program in this research was limited
to the in-prison program. Investigations and analysis of deradicalisation outside the
prison or after release were not included. Limiting the scope of this research was
motivated by parole considerations. As Abusa (2009, p. 200) notes: “Indonesia’s
justice system does not have a system of parole”. Discussions about a post-release
deradicalisation program are complementary.
Additionally, in terms of radicalisation, the scope of this research was limited
to Islamic radicalisation because this problem is the core of terrorism in Indonesia
(Sarwono, 2012, p. 75). Empirical research has demonstrated that a number of
former members of radical Islamic groups “have transformed into terrorists” (Hasani
& Naipospos, 2012, p. 170).
3.9.2 Limitations
This research has two limitations. The first is related to the data collection
method, particularly regarding the number of focus group participants. Conducting
focus groups with the prison officers in the three selected prisons was sufficient to
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 67
address the research questions. However, it would have been beneficial to select
three more prisons as research sites because of their holding significant numbers of
terrorist prisoners. These facilities are Batu Prison, Cibinong Prison, and Semarang
Prison (see Figure 3.1). Due to time constraints, budget and personnel, only three
prisons were selected. However, as this research employed qualitative methodology,
“the aim is not statistical representativeness, but instead the chance to look in detail
at how selected participants experience the world” (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 59).
The second limitation relates to the proposal to compare results with the
experiences of Singaporean prison officers with deradicalisation. I applied for formal
permission from the Singapore Prison Service (SPS) to conduct research but the
application was rejected. In this case, the second limitation was the unfortunate
outcome of the application to conduct fieldwork in the Changi Prison complex in
Singapore. Therefore, a comparison between Indonesian and Singaporean prison
officers’ experiences and perspectives of the implementation of deradicalisation
programs was not possible. Nevertheless, an opportunity for a rigorous further
research project remains. If intergovernmental cooperation and further funding can
be secured, a comparative study is likely to be conducted. This comparative study
could extend beyond Indonesia and Singapore to include other South East Asian
countries that have implemented prison-based deradicalisation programs, such as
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 69
Legal Frameworks
Barely a month after 9/11, the federal government introduced a massive anti-
terrorism bill that for the first time created and defined crimes of terrorism
under Canada’s Criminal Code. The bill’s definition of terrorism was clearly
inspired by the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 in requiring proof of
religious, ideological, or political motive and the commission of a broad
range of harms that went well beyond violence against civilians. (Roach,
2005, p. 513)
As noted in the above quotation, the incident of 9/11 in the year of 2001 caused
the Canadian Government to define terrorism crimes under its Criminal Code.
Besides Canada, many countries have responded to the 9/11 attack with tough new
laws on counterterrorism. However, introducing new anti-terrorism laws in some
countries, including in Indonesia, provoked debates about the appropriate response to
the incident in the USA (Roach, 2011, pp. 2-3). Indonesia, according to Roach (2011,
p. 3), “refused to enact a draft law on anti-terrorism law that would have brought
back some repressive Soeharto-era practice”. However, the government then enacted
an anti-terrorism law immediately after the Bali bombings in October 2002.
This chapter describes Indonesian laws that have been promulgated specifically
to prevent and supress acts of terrorism and terrorism financing. The purpose of this
chapter is to provide an understanding of the Indonesian laws relevant to this study.
Two laws discussed in this chapter. They are Indonesian Law No. 15 of 2003 in
conjunction with Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 on the
Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism (the Anti-Terrorism Law – [ATL]) and Law
No. 9 of 2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism
Financing (the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law – [ATFL]). There are many provisions
outlined in these laws; however, this chapter primarily investigates the provisions
that relate to the topic of this study.
The first section of this chapter (Section 4.1) discusses the ATL. It also
provides some of the interactions between the ATL and the ATFL. The ATFL is then
70 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
discussed (Section 4.2). Finally, the last section (Section 4.3) provides a summary of
the chapter.
4.1 INDONESIA’S ANTI-TERRORISM LAW
4.1.1 Introduction
A special law on terrorism was enacted by the Indonesian Government shortly
after the first Bali bombing on 12 October 2002. President Megawati Soekarnoputri
announced the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 on the
Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism (Perpu No. 1 tahun 2002 tentang
Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme) and the Government Regulation in Lieu
of Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Application of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
No. 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism for the Bombing Acts in
Bali on the 12th October 2002 (Perpu No. 2 tahun 2002 tentang Pemberlakuan
Perpu No. 1 tahun 2002 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme pada
Peristiwa Peledakan Bom di Bali pada Tanggal 12 Oktober 2002). These laws were
introduced and enacted on 18 October 2002. The reasons of the promulgation of
these emergency laws are (Juwana, 2006, pp. 295-296):
First, terrorism had “claimed human lives intolerably and raised widespread
fear among the community [and] caused loss of freedom and damage of
property”. Second, terrorism had maintained extensive networks, posing a
threat to national and international peace and security. Third, national
legislation was required to implement international conventions relating to
terrorism. Lastly, the Anti-Terrorism Law was a matter of urgency because
existing legislation in Indonesia was inadequate and failed to deal
comprehensively with combating criminal acts of terrorism.
These laws are “emergency” laws because they were issued by the president.
Ordinarily, laws can be issued only by the House of Representatives, with the
approval of the President. However, under emergency legislative powers, the
President can issue Government Regulations in Lieu of Law. According to Article 7
(1) Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Making of Laws and Regulations, Government
Regulations in Lieu of Law have authority equivalent to Law. Pursuant to Article 7
(1) of the law, the hierarchy of Indonesian law is:
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 71
a. The 1945 Constitution.
b. The People’s Consultative Assembly Decree.
c. Law/Government Regulation in Lieu of Law.
d. Government Regulation.
e. Presidential Regulation.
f. Provincial Regional Regulation.
g. Municipal or Regency Regulation.
Government Regulations in Lieu should be approved by the House of
Representatives in subsequent sessions. If a law is not approved, it shall be revoked
as prescribed in Article 22 of the 1945 Constitution (Marzuki, 2011).
Referring to Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Making of Laws and Regulations and
the 1945 Constitution, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 and
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2002 are two examples of the
implementation of emergency legislative power by the President. These emergency
laws were then adopted by the House of Representatives through Government
Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 as Law No. 15 of 2003 and Government
Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2002 as Law No. 16 of 2003 at its next session
on 4 April 2003.
Based on the theoretical framework of criminal law sources, terrorism is
categorised as a specific crime. In terms of specific crimes, it is accepted as general
knowledge in criminal law and criminal justice science that crimes are divided into
two types: general crimes and specific crimes (Arief, 1998; Hamzah, 1994;
Moeljatno, 1989; Soedarto, 1991). General crimes are criminal acts according to the
penal codes, whereas specific crimes are nominated criminal acts according to
specific acts or laws. As a consequence, terrorism is a specific crime because it is
based on Indonesian Law No. 15 of 2003 on the Eradication of the Crime of
Terrorism. Many crimes are classed as specific crimes in Indonesia. Corruption, for
instance, is a specific crime because it is based on Indonesian Law No. 31 of 1999
about the Eradication of Corruption, while crimes such as murder, theft, and robbery
are general crimes based on the Indonesian Penal Code.
72 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
4.1.2 The Substance of Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law
The Law No. 15 of 2003 in conjunction with Government Regulation in Lieu
of Law No. 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism, known as
Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL), consists of eight chapters and 47 articles.
The content covers acts of terrorism; other acts related to acts of terrorism;
investigation, prosecution, and the trial session; compensation, restitution, and
rehabilitation; and international cooperation. In the context of this research, the
investigation focuses on criminal acts of terrorism under the ATL. A detailed
discussion of criminal acts of terrorism under the ATL is presented in
Subsection 4.1.3.
Chapter I of the ATL is the general provision. This chapter defines specific
terms that are used in the ATL, such as the definition of the act of terrorism. Article 1
(1) states that: “The crime of terrorism is any act that fulfils the elements of a crime
under this Government Regulation in Lieu”. However, this is not a literal definition.
It defines the scope of acts of terrorism related to the provision in the law itself. The
criminal act of terrorism is formulated in Chapter III of the ATL.
Besides the criminal act of terrorism, the ATL also stipulates other criminal
acts related to the acts of terrorism (see Chapter IV). These acts are offences
particularly conducted while criminal justice processes are ongoing. For example,
intimidation of investigators, public prosecutors, lawyers, or judges who are
examining terrorism offences is an offence under Article 20 of the ATL that carries a
minimum sentence of 3 years and a maximum of 15 years. In other examples,
sentences of 3 years minimum and 15 years maximum apply for providing false
testimony in a trial of a criminal act of terrorism, for submitting false material
evidence, or for attacking a witness or the officials in a trial of a criminal act of
terrorism. In several special criminal acts, the formulation of the crime related to the
main offence is included. For instance, the Anti-Corruption Law (Law No. 31 of
1999)5 and the Anti-Money Laundering Law (Law No. 8 of 2010)6 have provisions
about other offences that relate to the main offences of the specific type of crime.
The offences are commonly related to criminal acts that are conducted while criminal
justice procedures are undertaken.
5 See Chapter 3 of the Law No. 31, 1999. 6 See Chapter 3 of the Law No. 8, 2010.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 73
The provision on jurisdiction of the ATL is stipulated in Chapter II. The
applicability of the ATL is based on the territorial principle and the extra territorial
principle. The law, therefore, is not only applied to criminal acts of terrorism
conducted in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia7 (territorial principle) but also
to acts conducted in other countries (extraterritorial principle), provided the victims
are Indonesian citizens8; acts that are directed at Indonesian government facilities,
including premises of diplomatic or consular officials9; or acts conducted on board a
vessel under the flag of Indonesia or an aircraft that is registered under Indonesian
laws.10 Santoso (2013, p. 93) points out that “the law is expected to be able to
effectively reach the crimes of terrorism defined in its content, which are committed
beyond the territorial limits of the State of the Republic of Indonesia”. An important
aspect of the ATL is its scope. The law confirms that the ATL does not apply to
political criminal acts (Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 10; Juwana, 2006, p. 297). This
exclusion of political crimes is also formulated in Chapter II of the ATL.11
Chapter V contains relevant criminal procedure law. Because terrorism is a
special crime, the ATL contains provisions for some exceptions to criminal
procedure law that are not available in the Penal Procedure Code (Law No. 8 of
1981). The exceptions apply to all stages of criminal procedure law: the
investigation, the prosecution, and within the trial session; hence, the ATL confers on
investigators, public prosecutors, and judges some extraordinary powers (Juwana,
2006, p. 398). Nevertheless, if not regulated specifically in the ATL, the criminal
procedure law for the crime of terrorism still refers to the Penal Procedure Code
(Law No. 8 of 1981).12 Among others, a provision that attracts concern from
academics is the use of any intelligence report as preliminary evidence
(Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 129; Butt, 2009, p. 15; Santoso, 2013, p. 99), which is
allowed by the ATL.13 However, determination of the adequacy of preliminary
7 See Article 3 (1), ATL. 8 See Article 4 (a), ATL. 9 See Article 4 (b), ATL. 10 See Article 4 (e), ATL. 11 See Article 5, ATL. 12 See Article 25 (1), ATL. 13 See Article 26 (1), ATL.
74 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
evidence is based on an inquiry process by the Head or Deputy Head of the District
Court, and is conducted in closed session.14
Chapter VI of the ATL contains provisions on compensation, restitution, and
rehabilitation. Rights for compensation and/or restitution are granted to victims15,
meanwhile rights for rehabilitation are granted to the accused if they are found not
guilty by the court.16 Chapter VII contains a provision on international cooperation.
Therefore, Chapter VII relates to Chapter II of the ATL on jurisdiction. As noted by
Santoso (2013, p. 93) and Juwana (2006, p. 398), the provision of international
cooperation in the ATL reinforces the law on acts of terrorism committed
extraterritorially.
Chapter VIII is the ATL’s final chapter. It contains the concluding provision.
In Article 47, it states that this law has binding power since the law was issued on 18
October 2002. In contrast, Article 46 states that the ATL may be applied
retroactively. This is a controversial provision because it contradicts the main
criminal law principle of non-retroactivity.
Based on the provision of Article 46, the ATL could be used to prosecute acts
of terrorism conducted before the promulgation of the law. The implementation is
based on the law or government regulation in lieu of law, such as the promulgation
of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Application of
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the
Crime of Terrorism for the Bombing Acts in Bali on 12 October 2002. However, the
application of the retrospectivity principle to arrest and prosecute several terrorist
suspects in connection with the first Bali bombing has faced challenges. Masykur
Abdul Kadir, a defendant in the case of Bali Bombing 1, submitted a judicial review
on the Law No. 16 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of
Law No. 2 of 2002 on the 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing as a Law. A ruling of the
Indonesian Constitutional Court stated that the Law No. 16 of 2003 was
unconstitutional because it contradicts the 1945 Constitution. As a consequence, this
law did not have any binding power (Santoso, 2013). Nevertheless, the issue of
applying a law retroactively is still debated (Santoso, 2013, p. 97).
14 See Article 26 (2) and (3), ATL. 15 See Article 36, ATL. 16 See Article 37, ATL.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 75
4.1.3 The Crime of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Law
In line with the context of this research, investigation focuses on acts that
constitute terrorism under the ATL. Under the ATL, there are some acts categorised
as terrorism, but this law does not define what terrorism is. Yet, as stated previously,
Article 1 (1) states that: “The crime of terrorism is any act that fulfils the elements of
a crime under this Government Regulation in Lieu”. Although Chapter III of the
ATL on the “Criminal Act of Terrorism” covers articles 6 to 19, the acts of terrorism
are set out from Articles 6 to 16. In addition, Articles 17 and 18 cover the application
of the ATL to corporations, while Article 19 covers sentencing guidance for the
juvenile perpetrators.
As a consequence, if someone’s acts fulfil the elements of crime as formulated
in articles 6 to 16 of the ATL, they can be prosecuted as terrorists. The same holds
true for corporations and juveniles. If the acts of corporations or juveniles fulfil these
elements of crime as formulated in articles 6 to 16 of the ATL, they can be
prosecuted as terrorists. However, the application of the criminal responsibility and
criminal sanctions for a corporation suspect are based on Articles 17 and 18.
Meanwhile, the application of the criminal responsibility and criminal sanctions for a
juvenile suspect are based on Article 19, which stipulates that suspects of terrorism
acts who are under 18 years old cannot be subject to the death penalty, life
imprisonment, or the stipulated minimum imprisonment (see Figure 4.1).
Moreover, from the provisions of Articles 6 to 16, terrorism is defined
generally in Articles 6 and 7. Article 6 states that (Butt, 2009, pp. 2-3):
Any person who by intentionally using violence or threats of violence,
creates a widespread atmosphere of terror/fear or causes mass casualties, by
taking the liberty or lives and property of other people, or causing damage or
destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities or
international facilities, faces the death penalty, or life imprisonment, or
between four and 20 years’ imprisonment.
Furthermore, Article 7 states that:
76 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Any person who by intentionally using violence or threats of violence,
intends to create a widespread atmosphere of terror/fear or causes mass
casualties, by taking the liberty or lives and property of other people, or
causing damage or destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment,
public facilities or international facilities, faces imprisonment for a
maximum of life imprisonment.
As a consequence, a perpetrator can be charged under Article 6 of the ATL if
the acts resulted in taking lives, or property, or causing damage or destruction
(Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 9). In contrast, these results are not needed if the perpetrator
is charged under Article 7 of the ATL. If someone intends to perform acts that use
violence where such actions may create an atmosphere of terror in the society, they
can be charged under Article 7 (Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 11). Due to this
differentiation, Atmasasmita (2012, pp. 9-11) has noted that Article 6 and Article 7
have different qualifications. Article 6 is categorised as delik materiil while Article 7
is qualified as delik formiil. These qualifications (delik materiil or delik formiil) are
based on the focus of the provision on whether a result is stipulated as an element of
the crime or not. From criminal law theory, delik materiil means that the focus is on
the results of the prohibited acts; on the other hand, delik formiil means that the focus
is on the acts that are prohibited, regardless of their results (Hamzah, 1994;
Moeljatno, 1989).
Besides the qualification of the acts, the differences between Articles 6 and 7
are the maximum penalties. The maximum penalty in Article 6 is capital punishment,
while in Article 7 it is life imprisonment. Atmasasmita (2012, p. 11) argued that
formulation of life imprisonment as the maximum imprisonment in Article 7 is not
fair because the result of the acts has not been considered. This argument implies that
the formulation of criminal sanction in Article 7 needs further evaluation and
potentially amendment.
In addition to articles 6 and 7, a range of specific acts of terrorism is also
defined under the ATL. Article 8 covers “a range of offences relating to various
aspects of aviation security” (Juwana, 2006, p. 296) and provides “the same penalties
as Article 6 – that is, death, life imprisonment, or between four and 20 years’
imprisonment – to people who” (Butt, 2009, pp. 4-5):
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 77
a. destroy, make unusable or damage air traffic safety buildings or
thwart efforts to make those building secure;
b. cause destruction to, the non-usability of, or damage to air traffic
safety buildings, or thwart efforts to make those building secure;
c. intentionally and illegally destroy, take or move signs or equipment
for flight safety; make the signs or equipment fail to work; or install
the incorrect signs or equipment;
d. by omission, cause signs or equipment for flights safety to be
destroyed, damaged, taken or shifted, or to cause the installation of
the incorrect signs or equipment for flight safety;
e. intentionally and illegally destroy or render unusable an aircraft
owned entirely or in part by another person;
f. intentionally and illegally cause an aircraft to have an accident; or
destroy, make unusable or damage an aircraft;
g. by omission, cause an aircraft to have an accident; or destroy, make
unusable or damage an aircraft;
h. with intention enrich oneself or another illegally, obtain insurance
and cause the burning, explosion, destruction, damage or
inoperability of an aircraft insured against danger, [loss of] its cargo,
or [loss of] income from the receipt of its cargo;
i. in an aircraft by means of an illegal act, seize or take control the
aircraft in flight;
j. in an aircraft with violence, threats of violence, or threats of another
kind, seize or take control the aircraft in flight;
k. as a part of a conspiracy with another person, and with
premeditation, cause serious injury to a person or damage to an
aircraft thereby endangering the flight, with intent to steal the
independence of a person;
l. intentionally and illegally commit an act of violence against a person
on an aircraft during a flight, if that act could jeopardise the safety of
the aircraft;
m. intentionally and illegally damage an official aircraft or cause
damage to that aircraft so that it cannot fly or jeopardises the safety
of the flight;
n. intentionally and illegally put in place or causes to be put in place on
an official aircraft, using any means, equipment or materials which
78 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
could damage the aircraft, making it unable to fly or causing damage
to that aircraft which could jeopardise safety on the flight;
o. as a part of conspiracy with another person, with premeditation, and
causing serious injury to a person, perform the acts referred to in (l);
(m); and (n);
p. provide false information, knowing that the information is false,
which jeopardises the safety of an aircraft in flight;
q. in an aircraft, perform an act which could jeopardises the safety of
the aircraft in flight;
r. in an aircraft, perform an act which could disrupt the order and
procedures of the aircraft in flight.
Although elucidation of Article 8 mentions that Article 8 elaborates on the
provisions contained in Chapter XXIX A of Book II the Indonesian Penal Code
(Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana – [KUHP]), Article 8 is almost “a word-to-
word reproduction of the Articles 479 (a) to (r) of the KUHP” (Butt, 2009, p. 5).
Another specific terrorism-related offence is stated in Articles 9 and 10 of the ATL.
Article 9 covers explosives, firearms, and ammunition offences relating to
terrorism (Juwana, 2006, p. 296). Article 10 describes the use of chemical,
biological, and other weapons (Juwana, 2006, p. 296). Both articles do not focus on
the result of the acts, so could be categorised as delik formiil (Atmasasmita, 2012, p.
14 and 16). Article 9 states that (Butt, 2009, p. 5):
Any person who illegally brings into Indonesia, makes, accepts, attempts to
obtain, transfers or tries to transfer, controls, carries, has supply of,
possesses, stores, transports, hides, uses or takes to or from Indonesia: a
firearm, ammunition, explosives or other dangerous materials with intent to
perform an act of terrorism, faces the death penalty, life imprisonment, or
between 3 and 20 years’ imprisonment.
Article 10 states that (Butt, 2009, p. 6):
Any person who intentionally uses chemical weapons, biological weapons,
radiology, micro-organism, or radioactivity or its components, thereby
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 79
causing an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear, causing mass casualties,
endangering health, disrupting the life, security and rights of people, or
damaging strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities or
international facilities, faces the same penalty as contained in Article 6.
Article 9 is adapted from Article 1 (1) of Indonesia’s Emergency Law No. 12
of 1951 on the Possession of Firearms and Explosives by adding the specific element
of an intent to perform an act of terrorism (Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 14). On the other
hand, Article 10 is a new formulation scoping acts of terrorism in the Indonesian
legal regime, along with Articles 6, 7, 11, and 12 (Atmasasmita, 2012, pp. 16-17).
Offences for financing any criminal acts of terrorism under the ATL are
formulated in articles 11 and 13. However, Article 11 was repealed after the Law No.
9/2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Criminal Acts on Financing Terrorism
had been promulgated. Article 13 (1) has also been repealed. These repeals occurred
because the content of these articles is more relevant to the new law on terrorism
financing: Law No. 9 of 2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Criminal Acts on
Financing Terrorism known as Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Financing Law (ATFL).
This law is discussed is more detail in Section 4.2.
Like Article 11, which has been revoked, Article 12 of the ATL prohibits
providing or collecting assets intentionally that could be used, partly or wholly, for
terrorism acts. However, this article has not been repealed after the promulgation of
the ATFL. In detail, Article 12 states that (Butt, 2009, pp. 6-7):
Any person who supplies or collects assets to be used, or which that person
should have known will be used, entirely or in part to perpetrate the
following, between three and 15 years’ imprisonment:
a. illegally accepting, possessing, using, transferring, altering, or
disposing of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, biological
weapons, radiology, microorganisms, or radioactivity and its
components that cause or could cause death or serious injury or
damage to property.
b. stealing or seizing nuclear materials, chemical weapons, biological
weapons, radiology, microorganisms, or radioactivity and its
components.
80 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
c. smuggling or obtaining illegally nuclear materials, chemical
weapons, biological weapons, radiology, micro-organisms, or
radioactivity and its components.
d. seeking through force, threat of force or any form of intimidation
nuclear materials, chemical weapons, biological weapons, radiology,
microorganisms, or radioactivity and its components.
e. threatening to
1) use to nuclear materials, chemical weapons, biological
weapons, radiology, microorganisms, or radioactivity and its
components to cause death, serious injury or property
destruction.
2) perpetrate the crime referred to in (b) in order to force another
person, international organization, or other state to do
something or refrain from doing something.
f. attempting to perpetrate the crimes referred to in (a), (b), or (c).
g. participating in the perpetration of the crimes referred to in (a) – (f).
Article 13 of the ATL stipulates acts facilitating or providing assistance
intentionally to terrorism perpetrators by (Butt, 2009, p. 7):
a. giving or lending money, property or other assets to the perpetrator of a
terrorism crime; or
b. hiding the perpetrator of terrorism crime; or
c. concealing information about a terrorism crime.
Anyone who is found guilty of conducting these acts is subject to
imprisonment for a minimum term of 3 years and a maximum term of 15 years. As
mentioned previously, Article 13 (a) above was repealed after the promulgation of
the ATFL because this provision more closely relates to the criminal acts of terrorism
financing.
Regardless of the repealing of Article 13 (a), the stipulated terrorism criminal
acts in Article 13 are inchoate offences that are accessories to the perpetrator of the
criminal acts of terrorism. Articles 14, 15, and 16 are also provisions on inchoate
offences. The inchoate offences are covered by the KUHP yet the ATL also enacted
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 81
specific provisions on inchoate offences as well as enacting various new terrorism
offences. As noted by Roach (2011, p. 150), inchoate offences under the ATL
include “intentional assistance, incitement, plotting or attempting to commit acts of
terrorism, and also facilitating an act of terrorism outside Indonesia”.
Article 14 of the ATL imposes the death penalty or life imprisonment on those
who plan and/or incite others to commit a crime of terrorism referred to in Article 6
to Article 12 of the ATL. Based on elucidation in Article 14, preparation conducted
either physically or financially, or of human resources is included as a plan in
committing terrorism crime. Inciting is defined as conducting incitement and
provocation, giving of gifts, money or promises. It is clear from this elucidation that
incitement is directed specifically to the intellectual actors of terrorism crime (Butt,
2009, p. 7). Therefore, an intellectual actor of terrorism crime is subjected to the
death penalty or life imprisonment (Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 24).
Article 15 of the ATL imposes the same penalty as that of a perpetrator to
those who conduct any plot, attempt, or assistance to commit any criminal act of
terrorism referred to in articles 6 to 12 of the ATL, because it is deemed assistance.
According to Atmasasmita (2012, pp. 23-24), an accessory in this article is defined
as providing assistance prior, at the same time, or after the criminal act was
conducted.
Similar to Article 13, Article 16 covers accessories to terrorism crime.
However, articles 16 and 13 have differences. “Accessory to terrorism” in Article 13
applies to perpetrators who live or stay in Indonesia, while Article 16 focuses on
perpetrators who live or stay outside the territory of Indonesia (Juwana, 2006, p.
298). According to Article 16 (Butt, 2009, p. 7):
Any person outside of the territory of Indonesia who provides assistance,
facilitation, the means or information for the commission of a terrorism
crime referred to in Article 6-12, faces the same penalty as for the
perpetrator.
The definition of “assistance” and “facilitation” refers to the elucidation of
Article 13, which defines these terms. Assistance is defined as an act of providing
82 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
assistance before or during the commission of the crime, whereas facilitation is
providing assistance after the committal of the crime.
Articles 17 and 18 of the ATL cover the application of the ATL to corporations
as the perpetrators of terrorism crimes. These articles contain provisions explaining
to what extent the individual acts within a corporation can be identified as terrorism
crime committed by the corporation. The main criminal sanction that can be imposed
on corporations under the ATL is a fine; the corporation can also be frozen, have its
license revoked, or be declared a forbidden corporation. At the time of writing, there
have been no corporations accused of criminal acts of terrorism under the ATL.
Finally, the ATL’s Article 19 is applied to juveniles who commit criminal acts
of terrorism under the ATL. Article 19 clarifies two points. The first is to what extent
a perpetrator of the crime of terrorism is categorised as a juvenile or minor.
According to Article 19, anyone who is aged under 18 years is subject to exclusion
from the application of criminal sanctions as formulated in the ATL. That is, all who
are aged under 18 years are categorised as juveniles or minors. The second point is
the criminal sanctions that are applied to juveniles and minors. Criminal sanctions
applied to juveniles and minors are lighter than those applied to adults. Article 19
stipulates that the period of minimum imprisonment, the death penalty, and life
imprisonment are not applied to juveniles or minors.
4.2 INDONESIA’S ANTI-TERRORISM FINANCING LAW
4.2.1 Introduction
The Indonesian Government ratified the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism by issuing Law No. 6 of 2006. Within this
ratification, the Indonesian Government is obliged to enact a special law on the
criminal act of terrorism financing. Following the ratification, the Government of
Indonesia then promulgated a special law that is Law No 9 of 2013 on the Prevention
and Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism Financing, known as the Anti-Terrorism
Financing Law (ATFL).
In fact, some of Indonesia’s special laws are available to be applied to
prosecuting criminal acts of terrorism financing, similarly to the ATL. Before the
promulgation of the ATFL, this type of criminal act would be charged under the ATL
since the ATL has provisions on terrorism financing as formulated in Articles 11 and
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 83
13 (a). Besides the ATL, another law that could be used to charge the accused of
terrorism financing crime is Law No. 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of
Money Laundering, known as the Anti-Money Laundering Law (AMLL).
However, Husein (2012, p. 79) identified that the existing laws had not
comprehensively provided prevention and eradication of terrorism financing. Husein
noted that the term “terrorism financing” had not been used explicitly and had not
been defined, even though the ATL has provisions on the crime of terrorism
financing (Husein, 2012, p. 48). Although the criminal act of terrorism is included as
one of the predicate crimes in the AMLL, the law could not be implemented
effectively to prevent and eradicate terrorism financing crime (Husein, 2012, p. 73).
Preventing terrorists and terrorist organisations from funding their activities is
an essential component of any successful counterterrorism strategy, and is a binding
requirement under several United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions.
Countries should enact laws that criminalise the financing of terrorism in accordance
with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
and are encouraged to implement the recommendations of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) on criminalising terrorist financing (Amrullah, 2017). Based on such
convention and the FATF recommendations, Amrullah (2017, p. 3) explains that the
Indonesian Government enacted a special law on terrorism financing – the ATFL –
in 2013. Procedures and proper mechanisms allowing for freezing, seizing, and
confiscation of terrorist assets and funds used or allocated for the purpose of terrorist
financing should also be enacted in accordance with the relevant UN Security
Council resolutions and subject to appropriate review.
4.2.2 The Nature of the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law
The ATFL consists of 11 chapters and 33 articles in total. The content covers
the scope of the law; acts of terrorism financing; other acts related to acts of
terrorism financing; prevention; blocking; lists of suspected terrorists and terrorist
organisations; investigation, prosecution, and examination in the court; cooperation
on prevention and eradication; and transitional provision. In this context of this
research, investigation focuses on the criminal acts of terrorism financing under the
ATFL, and is presented in detail in Subsection 4.2.3.
84 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
As with the ATL, Chapter I of the ATFL is the general provision. This chapter
defines specific terms that are used in the ATFL. Among others, the definition of
terrorism financing is stated in Article 1 (1): “Financing of terrorism is any act to
providing, collecting, giving, or lending funds, either it is committed directly or
indirectly, and it is used and/or will be used for committing terrorism activities,
terrorist organisations, or terrorists”. As a part of the general provision, this
definition is a general definition of terrorism financing under the ATFL, while
specific criminal acts of terrorism financing are formulated in Chapter III. Chapter I
is akin to a summary of the following articles, in which the elements of terrorism
financing crime are formulated.
Chapter II of the ATFL stipulates the jurisdiction of the law. Article 1 of the
ATFL reflects the territorial and extraterritorial principles. The law can be applied to
anyone who commits a terrorism financing crime in Indonesia or outside the territory
of Indonesia, or to a fund that relates to terrorism financing crime in Indonesia or
outside the territory of Indonesia. Article 2 (2) paragraph (a) of the ATFL contains a
“passive national principle” because Indonesian citizens are also subject to the ATFL
for those who commit terrorism financing crime internationally. Article 2 (2)
paragraphs (b) to (g) contain active national principles because the law can be
enforced on anyone committing terrorism financing crime in other countries.
Consequently, foreigners who commit terrorism financing crime under the ATFL are
subject to criminal sanction in cases that are connected to criminal acts of terrorism:
against Indonesian citizens17
against Indonesian Government facilities, including diplomatic or
consular officials’ premises18
that force the Indonesian Government to take or not take actions19
to an aircraft operated by the Indonesian Government20
17 See Article 2 (2) para b, ATFL 18 See Article 2 (2) para c, ATFL 19 See Article 2 (2) para d, ATFL 20 See Article 2 (2) para e, ATFL
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 85
committed on board a vessel under the flag of Indonesia or an aircraft
that is registered under Indonesian laws,21 or
the acts of financing terrorism committed by a stateless person who
resides in Indonesia.22
Therefore, instead of active and passive national principles, Article 2 of the
ATFL also reflects the extraterritorial principle because the law can reach anyone
who commits the crime outside the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, similar to
the ATL. This article also specifies the details of the application of the extraterritorial
principle.
In terms of exclusion of political crime, the ATFL has the same provision as
that of the ATL. The ATFL also confirms that political crime is excluded.23 Thus, the
spirit of these two special criminal laws is the same – that is, to draw a clear line
between terrorism and political crime, both to guarantee public rights and to prevent
arbitrary action by the ruling government.
Chapter III of the ATFL describes the elements of the criminal act of terrorism
financing. This criminal act is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.3 in this
chapter. Besides the criminal act of terrorism financing, the ATFL also stipulates
other criminal acts related to the acts of terrorism financing (see Chapter IV). These
offences pertain to administrative matters particularly, for instance, an obligation to
maintain confidentiality of documents related to suspicious financial transactions or
to the financing of terrorism.24
Chapter V contains a preventive measure, and then Chapter VI regulates how
to freeze funding that is used or might be used to commit terrorism crime in
Indonesia. Chapter VII focuses on the list of suspected terrorists and terrorist
organisations published by the government, and the procedure for publishing
personal identities and corporations on the list. Chapter VII also covers how to block
funding, as well as how to object to a listing. Thus the provisions of these three
chapters are related.
21 See Article 2 (2) para f, ATFL 22 See Article 2 (2) para g, ATFL 23 See Article 3, ATFL. 24 See Article 9, ATFL.
86 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Furthermore, Chapter VIII has a provision on special criminal procedure law
implemented for the crime of terrorism financing. Because terrorism is a special
crime, the ATFL covers some exceptional provisions of criminal procedure law that
are not provided in the Penal Procedure Code (Law No. 8 of 1981). The exceptions
cover all stages of criminal procedure law: the investigation, prosecution, and the
trial session. Chapter IX covers cooperation on prevention and eradication of the
criminal act of terrorism financing. The focus is not only cooperation among related
agencies in Indonesia but also between the Government of Indonesia and that of
another country or jurisdiction.
Finally, Chapters X and XI relate to the existence of the ATL’s articles 11 and
13 (a). They clarify that articles 11 and 13 (a) of the ATL are repealed after the
ATFL is promulgated.25 The transitional provision, on the other hand, states that
offences that are being processed at the level of investigation, prosecution or
examination in the court are still charged under the ATL.26
4.2.3 The Crime of Terrorism Financing under the Anti-Terrorism Financing
Law
In line with the context of this research, this investigation focuses on acts that
constitute terrorism financing under the ATFL. Based on the provisions in Chapter
III, three Articles (articles 4, 5, and 6) contain the elements of criminal acts of
financing terrorism. In the provisions of these Articles, a criminal act of financing of
terrorism is stipulated only in Article 4, whereas Articles 5 and 6 are inchoate
offences.
Although articles 7 and 8 are also included in Chapter III, these provisions do
not specify the element of terrorism financing crime. They are guidelines in
conjunction with the criminal acts of terrorism financing. The provisions of Article 7
contain a guideline for cases in which a convicted party cannot not pay fines imposed
by the ruling. Similarly, Article 8 covers the application of the ATL to corporations
as the party accused of terrorism financing crime.
Article 4 of the ATFL states that any person can be charged for terrorism
financing if they are intentionally providing, collecting, giving, or lending funds,
25 See: Article 48, ATFL. 26 See: Article 47, ATFL
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 87
either directly or indirectly, with intent to be used in whole or in part for criminal
acts of terrorism, terrorist organisations or terrorists. Anyone who commits this
criminal act is subject to a maximum of 15 years imprisonment and a maximum fine
of up to IDR1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah), or around AUD1,000,000 (one
million Australian dollars). Based on the provisions of Article 4, there are two main
elements of the criminal act of terrorism financing: intentionally providing,
collecting, giving, or lending funds; and the intention that such funding be used in
conducting criminal acts of terrorism, or be provided to terrorist organisations or
terrorists. The general prosecutor must prove these elements in the trial session.
ATFL Article 5 is an inchoate offence that applies to accessories to the
perpetrator of the criminal acts of terrorism. The provisions of Article 5 stress that
anyone who conducts any plot, attempt, or assistance to commit any criminal act of
terrorism financing will be sentenced the same as the perpetrator of such an act of
terrorism financing. The provisions of Article 5 of are almost identical to those of
Article 15 of the ATL.
A new provision related to inchoate offences is also available in Article 6 of
the ATFL. It states that those who plan, organise, or incite another person to commit
any criminal act of terrorism financing as defined in Article 4 face life imprisonment
or a maximum of 20 years imprisonment. This provision is almost identical to that of
Article 14 the ATL, where the intellectual actor is subjected to heavier criminal
sanctions than those imposed on the actual actor.
Article 7 of the ATFL is a guideline for cases in which the convicted person
cannot pay the relevant fines, requiring that they are subjected to confinement for
1 year and 4 months. This is an exceptional provision to Book I of the KUHP.
According to the KUHP’s Article 30 (4), the confinement as the replacement for the
fine should be no longer than 8 months.
Like Article 7, Article 8 of the ATFL also contains guidelines in the event that
the perpetrator is a corporation. According to Article 8 (4), if found guilty of
committing terrorism financing, a corporation faces a maximum fine of
IDR100,000,000,000 (one hundred billion rupiah), or around AUD10,000,000.
Besides receiving the fine imposed by the court, a corporation is subjected to
additional sentences: freezing of the business of the corporation, in part or totally;
revoking its license and declaring it a forbidden corporation; liquidating the
88 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
corporation; expropriating the corporate assets; the state taking over the corporation;
and/or the announcement of the court decision. These sentences can be imposed on
either a corporation or a corporate controller, as stated in Article 8 (1) of the ATFL.
4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In the context of Indonesia, criminal acts of terrorism and terrorism financing
are specific crimes because they are nominated criminal acts under special laws.
Terrorism is based on the ATL, while terrorism financing is based on the ATFL.
Consequently, a perpetrator of terrorism is prosecuted under the ATL, while a
perpetrator of terrorism financing is prosecuted under the ATFL. Nevertheless,
before the promulgation of the ATFL in 2013, perpetrators of terrorism financing
crime were charged under the ATL, the AMLL, or both.
Based on the review of the substance of the ATL and ATFL, there are
similarities and differences between these two laws. The similarities showed from
the provisions on jurisdiction and the scope of the laws. Both laws provide the extra-
territorial principle (Article 4 of the ATL and Article 2 paragraph 2 of the ATFL) and
the restriction from the laws being applied to political crimes, crimes relating to
political crimes, crimes with political motives, and crimes with political objectives
(Article 5 of the ATL and Article 3 of the ATFL). Furthermore, both laws provide a
chapter that contains provisions on other criminal acts related to the criminal acts of
terrorism and terrorism financing, in Chapter IV of both laws. On the other hand,
these laws also contain some differences. There is a specific chapter on prevention
under the ATFL, while prevention provisions are absent from the ATL. A chapter on
compensation, restitution and rehabilitation is formulated in the ATL, whereas in the
ATFL is not formulated.
Comparisons between the ATL and the ATFL in this summary specifically
concern the provisions on criminal acts. In Chapter III of both laws, there are
similarities and differences in the provisions on terrorism (under the ATL) and
terrorism financing (under the ATFL). There are some similarities in the formulation
of the criminal acts between the ATL and the ATFL.
Firstly, there are similarities in the provisions on sentencing of inchoate
offences. Those who commit inchoate offences are subjected to the same penalties as
the perpetrator. This is an exception to the general provision of Book I of the KUHP,
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 89
in which those who are attempting to commit, or are accessories to serious crime or
felony (kejahatan), face lighter sentences than the perpetrator’s sentence; the
sentence is reduced by one-third (Article 53 paragraph 2 KUHP and Article 57
paragraph 1). For example, if someone is found guilty of attempted murder under
Article 338 KUHP, the maximum penalty would be reduced by one-third. Therefore,
because Article 338 KUHP provides a maximum of 15 years imprisonment for the
perpetrator of murder, a person attempting to commit murder who is charged under
Article 338 KUHP would face a maximum of 10 years imprisonment (Suarda, 2011,
p. 188).
A second similarity is found in the provisions for corporations. Both the ATL
and the ATFL state that a corporation can also be charged as the perpetrator of a
crime. This is also an exceptional provision to the KUHP, which specifies only the
individual as the perpetrator. A third similarity concerns intellectual actors.
Provisions in Article 14 of the ATL and Article 6 of the ATFL are directed to
intellectual actors of the crimes. Both articles impose heavier penalties for the
intellectual actor than for the perpetrator.
On the other hand, there are two differences regarding the provisions on
criminal acts of terrorism and terrorism financing between the ATL and the ATFL.
The first is related to the formulation of the definition of the crime. In the ATL,
terrorism is not defined, although Article 1 (1) states that terrorism is any act that
fulfils the elements of a crime under the ATL, which is not actually a definition. This
statement serves to emphasise that there are several types of criminal acts of
terrorism as formulated in several articles in the law. This is typical of Indonesian
laws, in which the most important factor is the elements of the crime as formulated in
such articles. This is a characteristic of a civil law system, which was adopted by
Indonesia from the civil law system of The Netherlands. The ATFL, on the other
hand, tries to define the acts of terrorism financing more clearly rather than stating
that the crime of terrorism financing is a crime as formulated in a specific article.
The ATFL defines terrorism financing in Article 1 (1) and then stipulate in Article 4,
which includes criminal sanctions to a maximum of 15 years imprisonment and a
maximum fine of up to IDR1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah).
90 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
The second difference relates to the specific crimes formulated under the ATL
and the ATFL. The ATL has six main typologies of criminal acts of terrorism,
namely:
1. Terror attack.
2. Intended to create terror attack.
3. A range of offences relating to various aspects of aviation security.
4. Explosives, firearms, and ammunition offences relating to terrorism.
5. The use of chemical, biological and other weapons.
6. Providing or collecting assets intentionally to be used, partly or wholly, for
terrorism acts and further offences relating to chemical and biological
weapons, including the provision of assistance or funds to obtain them.
In contrast, the ATFL has only one type of terrorism financing crime, that is
that is, “providing, collecting, giving, or lending funds, either directly or indirectly
with intent to be used in whole or in part, relating to terrorism, terrorist organization
or terrorist” as formulated in the Article 4 of the ATFL. In fact, this criminal act was
prosecuted under the ATL, the AMLL, or both, before the promulgation of the
ATFL. Since the issue of the ATFL, this act is charged under the ATFL.
To conclude this summary, it is important to highlight that someone conducting
the crimes of terrorism or terrorism financing within Indonesian jurisdiction will be
prosecuted as a terrorist. If they are found guilty and sentenced by the court, they
become a convicted terrorist. They are sent to prison and are then treated as a
terrorist inmate. Furthermore, they are likely to be required to participate in prison-
based deradicalisation programs, implemented in either a special prison for terrorists
or a general prison. This conclusion provides the connection between existing
Indonesian special laws on terrorism (the ATL and the ATFL) and prison-based
deradicalisation programs or rehabilitation programs for terrorist inmates. Figure 4.1
shows the connection of these programs with the ATL and Figure 4.2 shows the
connection with the ATFL.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 91
Figure 4.1 Connection between Acts of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL) and Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program
ATL
Allegations of
terrorism
Trial
Not Guilty
Guilty
Person
Corporation
Death (Exclude minors)
Life Imprisonment
(Excludes minors)
Imprisonment
Fine
Freezing or license is revoked
PRISONS
SOCIETY Release Release
Criminal acts
Prison-based
deradicalisation
program
92 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Figure 4.2 Connection between Acts of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law (ATFL) and Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program
ATFL
Allegations of
terrorism
financing
Trial
Not Guilty
Guilty
Person
Corporation
Life Imprisonment
(Exclude minors)
Imprisonment
Fine
Additional sentences:
PRISONS
SOCIETY Release Release
Criminal acts
Prison-based
deradicalisation
program
freezing of the business of the corporation, in part or totally
revoking license and declaring it a forbidden corporation
liquidating the corporation
expropriating the corporate assets
taking over of the corporation by the state
announcement of the court decision
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 93
The Challenges of Terrorist
Deradicalisation: Indonesian
Prison Officers’ Experiences
In jurisdictions where violent extremist prisoners are held in separate
facilities, prison staff will find themselves only working with violent
extremists. In other countries where violent extremists are integrated into all
prisons, or dispersed among a few high-security prisons, prison staff may
work with violent extremists on a less frequent basis. In both scenarios, the
way in which prison officials deal with violent extremist prisoners (who
sometimes refuse to conform to legitimate expectations) can be one of the
greatest challenges to the professionalism of prison staff. (UNODC, 2016, p.
27)
To answer Research Question 1, as outlined in Chapter 1, this chapter
investigates Indonesian prison officers’ experiences with terrorist rehabilitation.
Specifically, this chapter presents the results and discussion on the challenges facing
Indonesian prison officers in their role in rehabilitating terrorist inmates. It draws on
both primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected from a series of focus
groups conducted to identify challenges encountered in implementing the Indonesian
prison-based deradicalisation program. Secondary data were taken from existing
research, state documents, and agency reports. To analyse collected primary data, a
qualitative thematic analysis was used (see Chapter 3).
This chapter begins with an overview in Section 5.1, followed by results and
discussion on the personalities of terrorist inmates, the readiness of Indonesian prison
officers, the sustainability of programs, the prison environment, and the
unavailability of collaborative mechanisms, which are presented in sections 5.2, 5.3,
5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, respectively. A conclusion to the chapter follows in Section 5.7.
94 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
5.1 OVERVIEW
Chapter 2 argued that there is a gap in the literature concerning the
implementers’ lens on the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs
in the context of Indonesia. This thesis seeks to bridge this gap by examining
Indonesian prison officers’ experiences on deradicalisation through deploying
qualitative research and legal research methodologies as discussed in Chapter 3.
Further, the connection between the existing Indonesian laws on anti-terrorism and
prison-based deradicalisation programs was presented in Chapter 4. This chapter
reports on the investigation into Indonesian prison officers’ challenges in
implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. The chapter discusses five
challenges that this research found are faced by Indonesian prison officers
implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.
Firstly, it is argued that the personalities of the terrorist inmates is one of the
challenges. Terrorist inmates’ beliefs and behaviour are discussed; these beliefs and
behaviour promote difficulties in implementing prison-based deradicalisation
programs. Secondly, the readiness of the officers themselves is perceived as a barrier
to implementing the programs. In terms of the officers’ task to deliver
deradicalisation programs, both individual and collegial weaknesses were identified
as challenges for terrorist rehabilitation. Thirdly, the sustainability of the program is
apparently an obstacle. Incidentally and partiality of the implemented program were
perceived as shortcomings in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation
programs. Fourthly, institutional infrastructure problems contribute to the challenges
in the implementation of such programs. The issues of overcapacity and obscurity of
segregation practices in Indonesian prisons lead to difficulties in implementing the
programs. Fifthly, there is an issue of the unavailability of collaborative mechanisms
among the implementers of the program. Although many agencies are involved in the
program, it is argued that the collaboration remains unorganised.
5.2 TERRORIST INMATES’ PERSONALITIES
The focus group results revealed that one of the greatest perceived challenges
for Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs
is the beliefs and behaviour of convicted terrorists. This challenge was experienced
by focus group participants on a daily basis through contact with terrorist inmates, as
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 95
well as while implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. The focus group
results also revealed that the personalities of terrorist inmates are unique and differ
from the personalities of other types of inmates.
5.2.1 Terrorist Inmates’ Beliefs
In terms of the beliefs of terrorist inmates, there were several challenges faced
by Indonesian prison officers implementing Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation program. Challenges recognised by the focus group participants
were the beliefs of terrorists that:
1. They are not criminals.
2. They are heroes in a divine war.
3. They were the only most “right” individuals in interpreting Islamist
religious teachings.
Furthermore, these challenges were perceived as difficult issues to cope with
because these established beliefs were related to the hearts and minds of imprisoned
terrorists. One focus group participant emphasised this difficulty:
We could not deal with terrorist inmates’ beliefs because in the bottom of
their heart they said they were not wrong. It was about convicted terrorists’
hearts and minds and it was so difficult to be challenged. On the contrary,
interventions for non-terrorist convicts were much easier because in the
bottoms of their hearts they believed they were wrong. In this case we have a
huge chance to “touch” and then rehabilitate them. Yet, it was not so for
convicted terrorists. (FG2:4)
Firstly, imprisoned terrorists apparently have a strong belief that they are not
criminals. Based on the series of three focus groups (FG1, FG2, and FG3) with
Indonesian prison officers, all of the participants had experienced that most terrorist
prisoners hold strong beliefs that they are not criminals. No participant rejected this
assertion. Thus, the terrorists did not feel guilty, even if they had been found guilty
and sentenced by the courts. Subsequently, as one focus group participant said:
96 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
When they were sent to and live inside the prison, they still believe that they
were not criminals. (FG1:1)
Similarly, another focus group participant stated:
Although the acts of terrorist inmates took many lives, terrorist inmates feel
very confident that they did not commit any criminal acts, so they believe
that they were not prisoners. (FG2:4)
Indonesian prison officers believe that the “criminal” label is not accepted by
most terrorist inmates. Despite their criminal acts being recognised as crimes of
terrorism, this will never be accepted by most terrorist inmates. In other words,
terrorist inmates have strong self-justifications for perpetrating violence and bombing
attacks and do not see themselves as criminals.
A number of authors have reported analyses of comparisons between terrorists
and other types of criminals. These studies demonstrated terrorists differ from other
criminals (Ganor, 2002; Goldman, 2014; Gunaratna, 2011; Mahan & Griset, 2013;
Presman & Flockton, 2014; Silke, 2014; UNODC, 2016). Silke (2014, p. 4) has
examined that:
terrorist prisoners rarely describe themselves as “terrorists”. Instead they
portray themselves as soldiers, freedom fighters, volunteers, partisans, the
resistance; at least in their own minds if nowhere else. Normally they bitterly
contest any effort to describe them as criminals.
There are similarities between the beliefs of convicted terrorists as expressed
by the Indonesian prison officers in this study and those described by Bakti (2014)
and Goldman (2014). Bakti concluded that terrorist inmates are not mentally
disordered individuals, and neither are they psychopaths nor psychotics (Bakti, 2014,
p. 196). Goldman’s investigation outlined that “psychologists have confirmed those
terrorists are psychologically normal. Violent criminals, on the other hand, tend to
suffer from mental disorders and can be unstable” (Goldman, 2014, p. 48). In the
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 97
words of Yehoshua, “these prisoners entered prison with a sense of righteousness”
(Yehoshua, 2014, p. 146).
The previous discussion suggests that terrorism differs from other crimes. The
case of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, an ideologue terrorist inmate, is a useful example for
analysing the differences between terrorist and ordinary criminals. A report
published by Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) stated that Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir expressed no regret for the crime that he committed. Ba’asyir said that “I
have no regret for helping military training in Aceh because the aim of the training
was to strengthen the capacity to defend Islam from enemy attacks; such training is
not just permitted by Allah, it is required” (IPAC, 2013, p. 9). Ba’asyir vehemently
justified his acts through “striving to achieve a common good for their community”,
as explained by Gupta (2008, p. 32). Gupta clearly argues that “this ubiquitous
pursuit of altruistic goals separates a terrorist from a common criminal” (Gupta,
2008, p. 32).
Secondly, convicted terrorists portrayed themselves as “heroes”. In the
Indonesian context, convicted terrorists particularly imagined that they are heroes in
a divine war for Islam. Because the background of the terrorist inmates was jihadist,
they were all inspired by what others see as a misunderstanding of Islam teachings. A
focus group participant said:
Most of convicted terrorists claimed themselves as prisoners of war from the
battlefield of war between Islam and their enemies, including the established
Indonesian Government. (FG1:3)
Furthermore, another focus group participant shared his communication
experiences with a convicted terrorist:
He said, “I am not a detainee; I am not a prisoner; I am a prisoner of war”.
That’s what I experienced when I did my job; and to me it’s a bad
experience. (FG3:5)
98 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Another focus group participant underlined the difficulty dealing with those
who are “hardliner” or “ideologue” convicted terrorists, who show a strong belief in
their ideology:
An ideologue of convicted terrorist needs a specific treatment. They cannot
receive us. Because the majority of them feel that they were right. They were
not breaking the law with a belief that “My law is Allah”. I am defending my
religion so they do not have a guilty feeling at all. It’s absolutely different
with other criminals. (FG2:4)
Due to this belief of the terrorists, focus group participants argued that they
experience difficulties implementing effective prison-based deradicalisation
programs. However, the focus group participants also believed that there are a
number of terrorist inmates who could be rehabilitated, particularly those who are
categorised as “medium- or low-risk terrorist inmates” (FG1:2 and FG2:4).
Furthermore, terrorists’ beliefs of themselves as heroes of a holy war seem to
be consistent with Hasan’s (2007) study on Imam Samudra’s justification for the Bali
Bombings. Imam Samudra was one of the masterminds of the Bali Bombings and
was sentenced to death. In his article, Hasan (2007) demonstrated that Samudra’s
idea of a perpetual war was the most critical aspect of his thinking. He assessed that
Imam Samudra (2007, p. 1043):
holds to the belief that non-Muslims will never allow Muslims to live in
peace and thus armed jihad is the only kind of relationship that could exist
between Muslims and the non-Muslims. Using the abrogation argument, he
holds that armed jihad is a standing obligation until the end of the world. It
has to be observed until all lands fall under the rule of Islam. The basis of the
relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, thus, is war, not peace.
Thirdly, participants reported a further belief held by convicted terrorists that
they were the “most right” individuals in interpreting Islamic teachings. One focus
group participant realised that “many of them have a high confidence in the religious
matters, particularly Islam and Islam teachings” (FG1:2). Furthermore, he stated that:
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 99
When we started conversations about Islam with the aim to challenge
convicted terrorists’ beliefs about jihad, they showed a strong argument by
referring to the Al-Quran. And, they always showed to us an advanced
interpretation. (FG1:2)
It would be difficult for us to implement deradicalisation programs,
particularly on facilitating a religious discussion, because they were totally
ready to challenge my interpretation about Islam. I do believe they will
refuse my interpretation, particularly on the interpretation of jihad. (FG3:5)
The quotes above demonstrate that these Indonesian prison officers experience
a challenge in facilitating discussions on Islamic teachings with terrorist inmates
when the inmates believe that they are the “most right” individuals in interpreting
Islamic teachings.
This issue requires better communication between Indonesian prison officers
and terrorist inmates. As a strategy to improve communication, one focus group
participant started conversations about non-religious topics, normally based on day-
to-day activities, for instance “soccer or life skills” (FG3:5).
Focus group participants also noted that convicted terrorists viewed their
incarceration as a time for reflection, or that they imagined prison as a place of
isolation. A convicted terrorist told a focus group participant that: “life in prison is a
time and place to re-organise the strategy for the struggle; it does not matter for me
to live in prison” (FG3:5). From this experience, the participant said that “whatever
interventions that will be introduced and applied for convicted terrorists, it will be
useless because this inmate is so strong in holding their beliefs” (FG1:5).
In addition to this, as an expression of frustration because of terrorist inmates’
beliefs, another focus group participant said that:
It was a wasting time and energy for us to deal with an inmate with beliefs
like this, so we need help in this matter. It is an ideology. (FG2:4)
This finding that terrorist inmates believe they are the “most right” individuals
in interpreting Islamic ideology agrees with the findings of the International Crisis
100 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Group (ICG, 2007, p. 12) and Bakti (2014, p. 176), which showed a negative
response of terrorist inmates to a discussion about Islam delivered by an outsider of
their circle. Bakti (2014, p. 176) illustrated the impact of the initiative of the National
Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terosrisme –
[BNPT]) when Islamic scholars from Jordan (Ali Al-Halaby) and from Egypt
(Syaikh Najih Ibrahim) presented to terrorist inmates in the Nusakambangan prison
complex. The inmates totally disagreed with the interpretation of Islam delivered by
those scholars.
As pointed out by Gunaratna (2011, p. 67), ideological debate and religious
counselling sessions are vital components of the rehabilitation program for Islamist
terror detainees. Therefore, further research should be conducted to investigate the
extent to which the debate and discussion can positively contribute to the
deradicalisation of terrorist inmates.
5.2.2 Terrorist Inmates’ Behaviour
The behaviour of convicted terrorists was recognised as an obstacle by focus
group participants to the successful implementation of prison-based deradicalisation
programs. Focus group results revealed that there were two challenges concerning
the behaviour of terrorist inmates: reacting against the officers and refusing to
participate in any programs. These findings further support the issue of violence
against prison officers as a direct challenge to the prison authorities (McEvoy, 2001;
UNODC, 2016).
Reacting against the prison officers was often experienced by focus group
participants in day-to-day interactions with terrorist inmates. One indicator was an
unwillingness to greet prison officers. Many focus group participants had
experienced this unwillingness to reply to greetings offered by prison officers.
Several terrorist inmates showed negative attitudes to prison officers by rejecting any
greetings offered. To greet someone, an Indonesian Muslim normally says
“Assallamualikum” and the other will reply by saying “Waalaikumsalam”.
Indonesian prison officers who greeted terrorist inmates in this manner found that
terrorist inmates would not reply to the greeting; they ignored such greetings and
tended to behave in an introverted manner towards the officers:
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 101
Simply, some of them, if we meet they will not greet as. If we greet them,
they will not reply. (FG2:2)
Terrorist inmates tended to maintain the distance with us. They don’t want to
get “close” with us. From their body of language and expression we can see
that. They won’t say a greeting to us. They won’t shake hands with us.
(FG2:3)
The focus group participants considered this refusal a critical moment that
indicated the willingness of these individuals to participate in correctional programs,
including prison-based deradicalisation programs. Logically, if inmates do not want
to greet prison officers, they are unlikely to participate in prison-based
deradicalisation programs. A focus group participant realised this:
That’s it, sir. That’s a challenge for us. When I was moved here for a job
promotion, I found that all convicted terrorists won’t speak with me. Even
they look like they want to fight with me. That’s my first experience when I
moved to this prison. (FG2:4)
Indonesian prison officers faced difficulties due to resistance from terrorist
inmates. Interestingly, a focus group participant thought that terrorist inmates were
“brave individuals” (FG3:5) because they showed no fear of the consequences of
their behaviour, including for their lives. They were commonly ready to die for their
beliefs. One focus group participant expressed his experiences in managing terrorist
inmates:
When there was a conflict nearly happening between terrorist inmates and
other inmates, a terrorist inmate said “dead was fine”. If the conflict
occurred, the safety of the prison officers would be at risk. We were in
trouble as well. (FG3:3)
Although terrorist inmates sometimes appeared to be accepted by other
“ordinary” inmates in the prison (ICG, 2007), this was usually not the case. This
situation was a potential security threat and could lead to a conflict between terrorist
102 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
inmates and other inmates. In one prison where a focus group were conducted, such a
conflict had almost occurred. A focus group participant explained:
Yes, it nearly happened a clash between terrorist inmates and narcotics
inmates. At that time, there was a concert inside the prison. The problem
arose because the concert started while terrorist inmates had not finished
pray. It was nearly finished actually. A group of terrorist inmates complained
to the other group who were in the concert, and the situation got worse. They
shouted at each other, and then crowded. Terrorist inmates yelling “Allah
Akbar ... Allah Akbar … Allah Akbar”. Sometimes, a small thing in the
prison could end up as a big problem. (FG3:3)
The cumulative outcome of these beliefs and attitudes is the rejection by
terrorist inmates of participating in any kind of interventions and programs delivered
by prison officers and prison authorities. For instance, when terrorist inmates were
sick and needed medical treatment, “they do not want to go to the prison’s
polyclinic” (FG2:1). Moreover, the participant said:
If they are sick, they will not take the drugs offered by the prison’s
polyclinic. It was their presumption that the drugs provided by the
government were “haram”. It was like that. So there is a presumption that
what the country provides for them is “haram”. So they do not want to take
it. They usually try to use an alternative medicine brought from their friends
or family visiting them in the prison. (FG2:1)
Another participant talked about the activities at in-house mosques that:
Some terrorist inmates will refuse to attend prayer in the in-house mosque
together with other types of inmates. They will pray in their own block.
(FG3:5)
In terms of prisoner rights to receive conditional release and remission, terrorist
inmates showed unwillingness to accept these rights. Some convicted terrorists, as a
focus group participant emphasised, “rejected those benefits offered by the prison
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 103
authorities” (FG2:3). Terrorist inmates showed a strong preference to remain in the
prison rather than take early release; they refuse because the parole requirements
include signing a declaration contrary to their beliefs, such as to “obey the
Government of Indonesia and obedience to Pancasila” (FG2:3).
These findings are consistent with a previous study carried out by Hannah et al
(Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008). Hannah and colleagues (2008) classified the
spectrum of the potential activities undertaken by radicalised prisoners, particularly
using passive or non-violent resistance, and using active or violent resistance to
prison authorities. These two types of terrorist inmate behaviour have been
experienced by Indonesian prison officers.
Non-violent resistance is indicated by inmates ignoring greetings expressed by
prison officers. This passive action tends to block the opportunity to communicate
with prison officers. Refusing any treatment options such as seeing the in-house
doctor or receiving medications, and refusing prisoner rights such as parole or
conditional release, could also be identified as non-violent resistance against prison
authorities. However, during my fieldwork, no self-harm activities were reported,
such as hunger strikes at the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay as observed by
Hannah et al. (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. 43).
Further, using violence to resist prison authorities was indicated by the
potential harm faced by the focus group participants. The following quote by Hannah
et al. is based on the report of the UK Prison Officers Association as published in the
Observer in 2007, describes a major event in which a group of inmates launched
violence against prison officers (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. 44):
when an officer confronts a Muslim prisoner in Belmarsh, he or she often
finds themselves surrounded by five or six other Muslim inmates. They are
becoming a lot more defensive … Tariq al-Daour, jailed for establishing an
online jihad network, was caught making a website in his cell at Belmarsh
urging terror attacks. When al-Daour refused to hand over his laptop, a riot
ensued as prison officers clashed with a group of al-Qaeda sympathisers.
A participant in a focus group indicated that he had “almost suffered violence”
(FG3:4). It means that there is a great risk to Indonesian prison officers of violence
104 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
from terrorist inmates. Although the focus group participants did not mention
personal experiences of direct attacks by terrorist inmates, several prison riots in
Indonesian prisons have been documented as initiated by the terrorist inmates, for
instance, the riot in Tanjung Gusta Prison in 2013. Due this incident, some prisoners
escaped. The investigation of this prison riot concluded that the actor behind the riot
was a terrorist inmate, Fadli Sadama (Kompas.com, 2013b). In 2016, a prison officer
in Cirebon Prison was a victim of an attack committed by a terrorist inmate during an
incidental operation to investigate illegal items such as drugs and weapons. The
incident occurred when the officer tried to enter the block where terrorist inmates
were housed (Liputan6, 2016).
Besides their beliefs and behaviour, refusing involvement in prison-based
deradicalisation programs was reinforced by deradicalisation terminology.
Participants perceived that terrorist inmates are very sensitive to this terminology;
they do not want to be called radical because “they think what they had have been
conducting was right and there was nothing wrong with that, so that was not a radical
matter” (FG1:3). Regarding this issue, this focus group participant suggested “to
revaluate the terminology of deradicalisation with other terminology such as re-
education” (FG1:3).
5.2.3 Non-Cooperative Terrorist Inmates: A Greater Challenge
The focus group results showed that Indonesian prison officers have
established terminologies to classify terrorist inmates based on their risk. There were
three terms commonly used: “non-cooperative”, “cooperative”, and “grey” terrorist
inmates. According to the focus groups in Cipinang, Pasir Putih, and Surabaya
prisons, these terms are used and applied in the prison to categorise every terrorist
inmate (FG1; FG2; and FG3). This was a form of risk assessment, and focus group
participants relied on it to determine the extent to which terrorist inmates meet and
cooperate with prison officers and prison authorities.
Non-cooperative terrorist inmates are those who totally refuse to cooperate
with prison officers and prison authorities. They are those who “rejected any prison
programs, including deradicalisation programs which were developed by prison
officers or prison authorities” (FG1:1). Terms such as “ideologue”, “high-risk” and
“hardliner” are used interchangeably with non-cooperative terrorist prisoners.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 105
Cooperative terrorist inmates are the opposite: “if they accepted to cooperate
with prison officers and prison authorities, they will be classified as this type of
terrorist inmates” (FG3:2). Convicted terrorists belonging to this group were also
“willing to be involved and be participated in activities run by the prison officers,
including in deradicalisation programs” (FG2:5). The terms that are also used for
these prisoners are “low-risk” and “follower”.
Between these categories, there is a group of individuals who can be classified
as a “grey” group. According to a focus group participant, this type of terrorist
inmate can be characterised thus:
They mainly accept government incentives like grants for establishing an in-
house farm, running a small business, receiving prisoners’ rights like
remission and conditional release granted by the prison authorities, but
refusing to participate in any religious programs. (FG2:5)
In this case, they also accepted correctional processes such as parole and
remission, which are rejected by non-cooperative terrorist inmates. This type of
convicted terrorist is also called “militant” or “medium-risk”.
In the existing literature, classification of terrorist inmates has been discussed
by Gunaratna (2011) in his article “Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative”.
He categorised terrorist inmates as high, medium, or low risk. High-risk terrorists are
terrorist leaders in both operational and spiritual aspects. Despite undergoing many
programs, they strongly resist ideological change. Medium-risk terrorists are
members or operatives in terrorist organisations. They are commonly ready to
commit violence and experience hatred. Although few cases indicated whether there
was a genuine shift or a strategic calculation, Gunartna believes some in this group
can be rehabilitated. Low-risk terrorists are supporters and sympathisers. The
knowledge of these individuals of the ideology is weak and they generally take for
granted what they are told. They believe that what they are doing is justified by their
religion (Gunaratna, 2011, p. 78).
In the current study, Indonesian prison officers classified terrorist inmates into
three categories consistent with Gunaratna’s classifications: non-cooperative terrorist
inmates equate with high-risk terrorist inmates; grey inmates equate with medium-
106 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
risk inmates; and cooperative inmates equate with low-risk terrorist inmates.
Although the terms differ, the meaning of the terms and the treatment needed for
each inmate category are similar to the findings of this study. Furthermore,
Gunaratna (2011, p. 78) explained that terrorist classifications are essential,
particularly to identify suitable responses to inmates, such as the qualifications of the
Islamic scholars who deliver and lead discussions. Gunaratna (2011, p. 78) suggested
that practitioners should be able to differentiate between high-, medium-, and low-
risk terrorist inmates because they require different responses.
In connection with the BNPT’s role in the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs, the current study found that the prison officers and the
BNPT use different terminology to classify individual terrorist inmates. Although the
BNPT’s terminology is not regarded as official, the differences are interesting to
highlight. According to Suhardi Alius (Tempo.Co, 2016), the chief of the BNPT,
terrorist inmates can be divided into four levels, based on their participation in
prison-based deradicalisation programs:
1. Level 1: terrorist inmates who refuse to follow any prison-based
deradicalisation programs.
2. Level 2: convicted terrorists who meet with authorities but they refuse to
follow prison-based deradicalisation programs.
3. Level 3: convicted terrorists who cooperate with authorities but refrain from
inviting other terrorist inmates to join in prison-based deradicalisation
programs.
4. Level 4: terrorist inmates who have progressed in the deradicalisation
process and are also open to inviting others to participate in the programs.
Comparing classifications for terrorist inmates between Suhardi and focus
group results (i.e. effectively comparing the study results with the BNPT
classifications), it could be concluded that non-cooperative convicted terrorists
would fall into Level 1, while the grey convicted terrorists would fall into Level 2.
Cooperative terrorist inmates, however, might fall into Level 3 or Level 4, as
illustrated in Figure 5.1 in the next page.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 107
Figure 5.1 Classification of Terrorist Inmates in Indonesia: Terminology Comparison between the
National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]) and
Prison Officers
Furthermore, in terms of the non-cooperative, cooperative, and grey groups of
inmates, all of the focus group participants agreed that the greatest challenges for the
implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs come from the non-
cooperative group. Participants argued that these inmates will absolutely reject or
refuse to participate in the programs and refuse to use prison facilities. As some
focus group participants explained:
Non-cooperative terrorist inmates will always refuse any government
interventions, treatments, benefits, etc. (FG3:5)
Discussing a treatment or intervention for non-cooperative terrorist inmates
and cooperative terrorist inmates, I do believe that we can do nothing with
Terrorist Inmates
Non Cooperative
Refuse to follow the program Level 1
Grey Meet with authorities, but refuse to engage in deradicalisation
Level 2
Cooperative Refrain to encouraging other terrorist inmates
Level 3
Willing to encourage other terrorist inmates
Level 4
108 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
non-cooperative terrorist inmates. When we were delivering the programs,
they will almost always refuse it. (FG2:1)
Those who are non-cooperative terrorist inmates will not go to the prison’s
mosque to pray together with other inmates. They rejected to use prison
facilities. (FG3:5)
Regarding the grey and cooperative groups of terrorist inmates, some focus
group participants commented:
So, we could deliver and apply rehabilitation programs for those who were
cooperative terrorist inmates, and might be the medium risk [grey group].
We could do it. (FG2:4)
For terrorist inmates who were on the grey group or militant or cooperative
terrorist inmates, I think we can set them again. We can rehabilitate both of
them. (FG1:2)
On the other hand, other focus group participants had different opinions about
grey and cooperative groups. They explained:
To me it’s a bit different. Terrorist inmates that were in the “grey” group just
take the benefits such as conditional release and remission, or even only to
receive incentives given by the prison authorities. But, after release they will
do the same offence; commit terror. (FG3:5)
I have a different opinion. Those [who] cooperate with us cannot be
automatically identified as a person who deradicalise[s] successfully. I have
a chat experience with a cooperative terrorist inmate that makes me wonder
about his engagement with his radical belief. For example, there was AA
Gym photo on the wall with the 3S slogan: “Senyum, Salam, Sapa” (Smile,
Regard, Greeting). However, the inmate said, “There was one S missed, sir:
Serang (Attack)”. Actually, this prisoner was cooperative with us. So we
cannot judge them just by the extent they were cooperative or non-
cooperative with us. We have to go through what they think. (FG1:3)
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 109
This was an interesting result. From the above quotes, it seems that participants
have one of two opinions regarding the grey and cooperative groups of terrorist
inmates. Some believe that grey and cooperative groups of inmates can be managed
easily. For some of the participants, the inmates in this group showed a willingness
to participate in the programs implemented by the officers.
On the other hand, some focus group participants believe otherwise. They
believe that the grey and cooperative groups of terrorist inmates should not be
assessed as easily managed. These inmates might be willing to participate in a
delivered program but this is not a guarantee that their radical beliefs will diminish.
Imprisoned terrorists who are classified in the grey and cooperative groups cannot be
assumed to have deradicalised or to have renounced the use of violence to achieve a
goal.
The result of the current study on the classification of terrorist inmates used by
Indonesian prison officers supports Ungerer’s (2011, pp. 16-17) study, which
categorised Indonesia’s terrorist inmates into three groups: white, grey, and black
groups. The white group equates with the non-cooperative terrorist inmates;
meanwhile the black group equates with the cooperative terrorist inmates. Regarding
the grey group, Ungerer (2011) stressed that the inmates in this group are willing to
receive benefits such as financial support but they still engage in terrorist activities.
5.3 THE READINESS OF INDONESIAN PRISON OFFICERS
By using qualitative thematic analysis, a broad theme on the readiness of
prison officers emerged. This theme arose, for example, in discussions of how
confident the officers were to implement prison-based deradicalisation programs, and
in discussions about the institutional problems experienced by the prison officers.
Thus, besides terrorist inmates’ personalities as a challenge in the implementation of
such programs, the readiness of Indonesian prison officers is also a great challenge
for the implementation of the program.
Before discussing this broad theme of the readiness of Indonesian prison
officers, two related subthemes that emerged from focus group data should be noted
as challenges for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs:
internal factors and external factors. Internal factors are factors that relate to “inside”
the Indonesian prison themselves, such as self-evaluation and prison officers’
110 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
personal aspects. External factors are those that relate to “outside” the Indonesian
prison themselves, such as group-evaluation and prison officers’ collegial aspects.
5.3.1 Internal Factors (Individual Aspects)
The study found two results that can be classified as internal factors of the
readiness of prison officers that become barriers to implementation:
1. Lack of skills and abilities in terrorist deradicalisation and rehabilitation.
2. Lack of knowledge of religious Islamic teachings.
First, while Indonesian prison officers may have substantial experience in
dealing with prisoners, they lacked specific abilities and skills for dealing with
terrorist inmates. The existing skills base is limited to dealing with general prisoners
such as burglars, robbers, and murderers. Through personal improvisation, officers
applied their existing skills when dealing with convicted terrorists. The following are
two quotes from focus group participants describing recognition of their lack of
applicable abilities and skills:
Frankly, prison officers have no specific training or knowledge in dealing
with terrorist inmates. It never happened before. So in any prisons if there is
a terrorist inmate, what are we going to do? Especially on deradicalisation
programs, or on how to deradicalise someone, currently we are not going so
far to this point. (FG3:5)
But, with a terrorist, a belief, this is different ... We can do nothing, we do
have a legal basis, the Correctional Institution Law [CIL], but the focus was
to general inmates. It is not about a specific type of inmates. That’s all we
have. (FG2:4)
The quotes above indicate that although Indonesian prison officers are
confident dealing with general prisoners, they feel that their existing abilities and
skills are inadequate for implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.
Therefore, intervention and treatment applied to terrorist prisoners is similar to that
applied to general prisoners. A focus group participant stressed the reason for this:
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 111
It is because this prison holds all type of the prisoners; it does not
specifically address terrorist prisoners. (FG2:3)
Second, although all the focus group participants were Muslim, they felt
weaker or less informed than terrorist inmates about the Islamic teachings and the
ideology of Islam. As presented in Chapter 2, the type of terrorism in Indonesia is
religious terrorism, particularly concerning the misinterpretation of Islam and jihad.
In the name of jihad and Islam, convicted terrorists tend to use violence to achieve
their established goal. Based on the backgrounds of terrorist prisoners imprisoned in
the three Indonesian prison research sites, this is correct – they are all jihadist.
Indonesian prison officers believe that terrorist inmates have an advanced
understanding of Islamic teachings and ideology.
Convicted terrorists, according to focus group participants, are well-educated
individuals in the field of Islamic teachings. Hence, if a convicted terrorist provoked
a debate on Islamic teachings or the ideology of Islam, focus group participants were
unlikely to argue. Focus group participants believed they would lose a debate about
Islamic teachings because “we were not good enough in the ideology of Islam”
(FG2:2). Starting a debate on Islamic teachings with terrorist inmates was viewed as
useless and to be avoided. Focus group participants said:
Terrorist inmates received the same treatment and rehabilitation programs in
all prison in Indonesia. The problem is the programs have not reached their
ideology. What we can do was running a kelas pengajian (religious classes).
But, still we have limited abilities to run such programs. (FG2:3)
To start a religious chat with terrorist inmates is very difficult. If we say
something about religion especially Islam, they will say: “Your Islamic
knowledge is weak. I am the best in interpreting Islam ideology.” So it’s
useless to discuss about Islam with them. (FG3:5)
These results indicate that prison officers’ professionalism in rehabilitating
terrorist inmates is an issue of concern for the Indonesian correctional system.
However, it must be appreciated that the officers’ gave a self-evaluation and an
honest assessment. The more surprising result is the explanation by the prison
112 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
officers about their colleagues who work in prisons that do not have terrorist inmates.
They strongly believe that their colleagues would struggle with many issues if a
convicted terrorist were sent to those prisons. Focus group participants imagined:
I still have many issues that we cannot solve in dealing with terrorist inmates
even until now. I have around four years’ experiences on the ground but still
I am not sure whether I am right or wrong. I do believe my colleagues who
have no experience with terrorist inmates will be crazier than me if someday
they were given responsibility for rehabilitating terrorist. (FG1:3)
If my colleagues were given a specific task to rehabilitate a terrorist inmate
at the first time, they will get confused with what they have to do. What do I
have to do with this guy? What treatment do they need? And many more
questions. I can imagine that this will be experienced by my colleagues who
work in the prison with no terrorist inmates inside previously. (FG3:5)
In conclusion, the focus group results identified two issues as internal factors
related to the readiness of the Indonesian prison officers to implement prison-based
deradicalisation programs. The first is acknowledgement of the limitations of the
skills and abilities of the prison officers. The second is acknowledgement of their
limited capabilities in religious Islamic teachings and experiences. These findings of
the current study are consistent with those of Eckard (2014), who concluded the
typical problem of Indonesian prison officers with limited skills and abilities, and
those of Maliki (2013), who assessed that Indonesian prison officers’ religious
education and experiences were often lower than those of terrorist inmates.
Interestingly, Maliki further explained that this problem occurs not just because the
training is not available – it is related to the attitude of the prison officers themselves,
in that some do not care about terrorist rehabilitation (Maliki, 2013, p. 12).
These findings are also consistent with studies by C. R. Jones (2014, p. 88) and
Ungerer (2011, p. 12), who concluded that prison officers and prison populations
regard terrorist inmates highly because the inmates are devout religious men willing
to lay down their lives for Islam. These studies may explain the results of the current
study regarding why focus group participants thought that they lacked capabilities in
religious teachings and experiences, compared to those of terrorist inmates. Osman
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 113
(2014, p. 219) concluded that many prison officers avoid arguments with terrorist
inmates because they might be angered or cowed when their “Muslim-ness” is
questioned by terrorist inmates. In many cases, according to Osman (2014, p. 219),
terrorist inmates are left to themselves by prison officers, who do not wish to be
called thogut or syaitan (evil).
Regarding the importance of facilitators’ religious capabilities and the socio-
economic aspects to rehabilitating terrorist inmates, it is interesting to compare
studies by the ICG and Sukabdi. The ICG’s (2007, p. 13) report stated that socio-
economic issues are more important than religious teachings, while Sukabdi (2015,
p. 47) found that facilitator knowledge on religion is the most important part of
terrorist rehabilitation. Sukabdi’s study (Sukabdi, 2015, pp. 47-48) identified that,
from 21 key elements in terrorist rehabilitation, the most important is facilitators’
knowledge about religious teachings, followed by empowerment of convicted
terrorists, and humbleness of practitioners (95%, 93%, and 79%, respectively).
Both studies presented rigorous empirical evidence. However, they used
different sources of data to explore this issue. In the first study, the data were
collected from the implementers, who were senior police officers, by conducting
interviews. In the second study, the data came from participants who were terrorist
inmates and former terrorist inmates. Therefore, further research on the impact of the
religious knowledge of Indonesian prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation is
strongly suggested.
5.3.2 External Factors (Collegial Aspects)
From the prison officers’ perspectives as the implementers of the program,
further challenges were identified, namely the limited number of prison officers, a
lack of professional support and training, and a lack of legal protection. These factors
can be classified as external factors affecting the readiness of Indonesian prison
officers for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs.
In this study, the limited number of prison officers affected the readiness of
Indonesian prison officers to implement the deradicalisation program. They faced
difficulties supervising prisoner movements and communication between terrorist
inmates and ordinary inmates. Some focus group participants (FG1, FG2, and FG3)
acknowledged that recruitment was evident in Indonesian prisons. They believe that
114 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
one of the root causes of this phenomenon is the inadequate number of prison
officers to supervise every terrorist inmate’s activities. As one focus groups
participant said that:
We were limited in number. You might say it’s a classic reason but that’s the
fact we encountered. Here in this prison we have 1700+ inmates but the
officers who supervise the inmates were only 12 officers. Can you imagine
that? Twelve officers should supervise the movement of 1700+ inmates.
Moreover there are terrorist inmates who interact with these 1700+ inmates.
How to overcome with this problem? (FG3:5)
This finding on the limited number of prison officers regarding the
implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program is consistent
with those of studies by Abuza (2009, p. 198) and Eckard (2014, p. 170), who
highlighted that understaffing is one of the key problems for Indonesia’s prison-
based deradicalisation.
Another issue is the absence of professional support and training for
Indonesian prison officers specifically on terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalisation
programs. Although the focus group participants showed a strong commitment to
rehabilitating terrorist prisoners, lack of professional support and training affects
Indonesian prison officers’ readiness to implement programs. In my fieldwork,
Indonesian prison officers confirmed that:
We are not receiving any specific training yet regarding the management and
rehabilitation model for terrorist inmates. (FG3:5)
The Directorate General of Corrections [DGC] itself has not yet provided
training on deradicalisation programs; so, what we are going to do with the
programs? Suddenly we were pushed to organise such program for terrorist
inmates. We do not know what we have to use. Finally, yes there was
nothing so special interventions for terrorist prisoners. (FG1:3)
The finding on the lack of professional support and training for Indonesian
prison officers on deradicalisation is consistent with many other studies (Eckard,
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 115
2014; ICG, 2007; Maliki, 2013; Osman, 2014; SFCG, 2013). To address this
weakness, studies have recommended that the Government of Indonesia “establish an
on-the-job training program for prison administrators designed to improve
management practices, supervision of wardens, and knowledge of problem inmates”
(ICG, 2007, p. ii).
Furthermore, turning now to legal protection for Indonesian prison officers
charged with terrorist rehabilitation, this was also found to be weak, or even
unavailable. Focus group participants want support through appropriate legal
protection in performing their job of rehabilitating terrorist prisoners. One participant
said that:
Convicted terrorists will be accompanied by the Muslim Defender Team
[Tim Pembela Muslim – TPM] if they have any legal problems during their
incarceration. In contrast, we do not have it at all. (FG2:3)
Similarly, another focus group participant said: “terrorist inmates get fully
support of legal advice from TPM; however, we did not get this privilege in
implementing deradicalisation programs” (FG2:1). Further, he said that:
The availability of legal protection will make Indonesian prison officers
become more confident implementing prison-based deradicalisation
programs and other interventions for terrorist inmates. If there is a clash
between prison officers and terrorist inmates, we would like to get
appropriate protection instead of to be blame and charged in conducting
offences breaking prisoners’ rights. (FG2:1)
Focus group participants highlighted the lack of legal protection related to
possible conflict between prison officers and terrorist inmates. If the conflict or clash
occurs during the incarceration of terrorist inmates, the officers should receive
appropriate legal advice and legal protection.
The lack of legal protection for Indonesian prison officers has not been
described in the previous studies. This finding does explain that the risk to
Indonesian prison officers implementing deradicalisation programs was overlooked
116 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
in the previous studies. These findings are rather disappointing because there have
been incidents in Indonesia where threats have been made to Indonesian prison
officers and their families, and a target killing has also occurred (Liputan6, 2016).
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have reminded prison
administrations to “take appropriate steps to ensure the personal safety of staff
working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners” (UNODC, 2016, p. 33).
Attacks from terrorist inmates on prison officers most likely happened, as
mentioned in the finding on terrorist inmates’ personalities. Therefore, a research is
recommended on the extent of the need for legal protection for Indonesian prison
officers who have the specific task of rehabilitating terrorist inmates.
5.4 PROGRAM SUSTAINABILITY
The Indonesian Government seems to realise that a hardline approach alone
will not solve the problem of terrorism. Capturing, prosecuting, punishing, or even
killing a terrorist cannot solve the problem. The Indonesian Government and most
countries throughout the world have realised that a soft approach is an important part
of solving and preventing terrorism, including rehabilitating terrorist inmates
(Gunaratna, 2011; Gunaratna & Ali, 2015; Neumann, 2010; Schmid, 2013).
Therefore, the Indonesian authorities have initiated deradicalisation programs either
outside or inside prisons (Bakti, 2014, pp. 173-174).
From my fieldwork in three Indonesian prisons, it demonstrated that Cipinang,
Pasir Putih, and Surabaya prisons have been running prison-based deradicalisation
programs. Existing studies (Andrie, 2011; ICG, 2007; Osman, 2014) also indicate
that these prisons have implemented deradicalisation programs for convicted
terrorists. However, based on the experiences of focus group participants charged
with implementing these programs with terrorist inmates, the current study identified
that the programs have incidental and partial weaknesses. These issues were grouped
under a broad theme of the sustainability of the programs. In the other words, the
analysis indicated that one of challenges for implementation of the programs is the
sustainability of the programs. This finding is consistent with the analysis of the
current literature, which indicated that the nature of the programs was recognised as
unsustainable (Bakti, 2014; Gunaratna, 2015; ICG, 2007). The focus group finding
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 117
that showed Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs are incidental and
partial is discussed in the following sub-sections.
5.4.1 An Incidental Program
Activities implemented for terrorist prisoners were mainly based on the
Correctional Institution Law (CIL) as the umbrella legislation of the Indonesian
correctional system. Focus group participants explained that “we mainly rely on the
CIL as the umbrella act for rehabilitation of prisoners” (FG2:4). The more applicable
legal material for the CIL is the Government Regulation Number 31 year 1999 on the
Guidance of Prisoners, which also applies for general prisoners, that is, for all types
of inmates. The existing Indonesian law and regulations on correctional services was
designed for general prisoners and was not intended to be applied to specific types of
prisoners, including terrorist inmates. Regardless, interventions for terrorist inmates
are basically based on the CIL.
The focus group results reinforced the view that the Indonesian prison-based
deradicalisation program is an incidental program. The program was designed as a
minor accompaniment to the established treatments and interventions for general
prisoners, a logical consequence from the absence of a specific national policy on a
prison-based deradicalisation program. As I highlighted in Chapter 2, although a
deradicalisation program has been implemented in Indonesian prisons, the
Government of Indonesia has no national policy on their use. As a result, in a prison
that holds convicted terrorists, the prison director has to develop their own relevant
policies and practices. In relation to this ad hoc policy, a focus group participant said
that:
Because prison officers do not have standard operating procedures [SOPs] to
be used in rehabilitating terrorist inmates, we end up relying solely on the
consideration of the prison director. So, it’s different ... The prison director
was pleased by the DGC to establish their own policy in managing and
rehabilitating terrorist inmates regarding local socio-cultural norms. (FG1:3)
As Indonesia has no national policy on prison-based deradicalisation programs,
the interventions and treatments applied for terrorist inmates are generally the same
as those applied for general prisoners, as regulated in the CIL and the Government
118 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Regulation Number 31 year 1999 on the Guidance of Prisoners. Three focus group
participants from different prisons said of a comparison between the intervention
program for general prisoners and the deradicalisation program for terrorist
prisoners:
Interventions were the same. Frankly in this prison there is no specific
regulation related with the treatment or interventions for terrorist inmates, as
well as specific treatment for the corruptor. It’s because it’s a general prison
so we used general interventions and programs as provided in the CIL.
That’s what we did for general prisoners. So in dealing with terrorist
prisoners, we used our own experiences that we learned from dealing with
various types of inmates. (FG3:5)
To check whether the intervention for terrorist inmates has failed or
succeeded, we again used general guidance as outlined in Law 12/1995.
Because the prison is intended for all type of inmates; it was not for specific
inmates like terrorist inmates. (FG2:1)
I do believe we have to treat them differently. But, currently, in this prison
we rehabilitate them the same as other inmates. (FG1:1)
Furthermore, the incidental policies and practices for prison-based
deradicalisation programs were obvious because the assistance of several other
parties (state or non-state actors) in the design and implementation of terrorist
rehabilitation was only temporary. For instance, the Australian Government via the
New South Wales (NSW) Correctional Services, trained Indonesian prison officers
about Violent Extremists Risk Assessment (VERA) including officers from Cipinang
and Pasir Putih prisons. Focus group participants acknowledged that:
We have joint cooperation with NSW Correctional Services, and they urged
us to employ VERA for the assessment of terrorist inmates. I think DGC still
try to find the appropriate model to be used specifically for terrorist inmates.
(FG1:3)
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 119
Related to assessment for a convicted terrorist, yes, I got training about
VERA from NSW Correctional Services. (FG2:2)
The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) assisted Indonesian prisons that
hold terrorist prisoners, especially by providing religious Islamic scholars to lead
discussions on Islamic teachings. This activity was also provided by the BNPT under
the BNPT’s deradicalisation program, and by non-state actors. Other than the MoRA
and the BNPT, “a corporate also provided the same assistance in presenting Islamic
scholars to deliver a speech and discussion on religious classes (kelas pengajian)”
(FG2:3). Besides providing Islamic scholars in the prison, non-state actors also get
involved actively to help Indonesian prisons to design and implement prison-based
deradicalisation programs. Some non-state actors, for example the Prasasti
Perdamaian Foundation (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian – [YPP]) and the Search for
Common Ground (SFCG), have provided assistance for the prison officers with the
prisoners’ rehabilitation program, including terrorist rehabilitation. These non-
government organisations (NGOs) helped the prison officers and prison authorities to
design, implement, and evaluate appropriate training for dealing with high-risk
prisoners. A focus group participant said:
Well after VERA, we also have joint cooperation with YPP. They provided
an instrument to cover the profile of a terrorist inmate. It was used to decide
the distribution of the inmate. It’s like a book record that includes terrorist
identity, background, the case and what factors are pushing them to commit
terror acts. To get this data, we were urged to use interview the individual
prisoners. (FG1:3)
Furthermore, he explained that:
There was also cooperation with SFCG. They also offered an assessment
instrument, they called profiling. It is actually similar to YPP’s. It may be
just the approach was different. YPP’s was more focused on the
psychological side of a convicted terrorist. They always remind us that
convicted terrorists always were a multi personal. So we have to be careful
120 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
that what they say is not necessarily the truth. On the other hand, profiling
more focus on the humanist aspects. (FG1:3)
These activities indicated the program was incidental, complementing
established rehabilitation programs applied to general inmates. As a result,
Indonesian prison officers believe that this is a challenge in rehabilitating terrorist
prisoners. They believe inviting Islamic scholars to lead religious discussions “has no
effect for the terrorist inmates because they were just coming once and there were no
further actions” (FG2:2). Although prison officers have improvised, focus group
participants viewed this as unsatisfactory (FG1; FG2; and FG3).
To sum up, incidental programs and practices on deradicalisation is one of the
challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers implementing deradicalisation
programs. Focus group data revealed that the Indonesian prison officers modified
established rehabilitation programs as they have been applied for general prisoners as
regulated in the CIL and Government Regulation Number 31 year 1999; they then
applied these programs to terrorist inmates within their own personal experiences of
working within the prisons. This finding concurs with those of Bakti (2014, p. 191)
and Istiqomah (2012, p. 269), who concluded that treatments and interventions
applied to terrorist inmates were the same as those regulated in the CIL.
Furthermore, an incidental program was indicated by the findings on the
assistance available for Indonesian prisons from other institutions, such as NSW
Correctional Services, the YPP, the SFCG, and the MoRA. These findings are
consistent with those of Eckard’s study, which showed that the Indonesian
deradicalisation program was an ad hoc and fragmented program (Eckard, 2014, pp.
165-166). In addition, unlike in Cipinang, Pasir Putih, and Surabaya prisons, prison-
based deradicalisation programs have not been developed and established in several
prisons even though these prisons also hold terrorist inmates. Example are Pakjo
Prison in South Sumatera and Gunungsari Prison in South Sulawesi (Andrie, 2011).
Overall, these findings support Eckard’s conclusion that Indonesia’s prison-
based deradicalisation program is a low to moderate institutionalised program
(Eckard, 2014, p. 164). Therefore, Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program
differs from those of other countries such as Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia,
which have been “given credit for their achievements in the development of a
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 121
structure for counter-terrorism policies” (Gunaratna & Hassan, 2011, p. 55). From
the results and the existing literature on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation
program discussed above, the nature of the Indonesia’s program can be described as
an incidental program, as illustrated in the Figure 5.2 below.
Figure 5.2 Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program: Prison Officers’ Perspectives
Note:
BNPT = Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter Terrorism Agency);
CIL = Correctional Institution Law; DGC = Directorate General of Corrections; INP =
Indonesian National Police; MoRA = Ministry of Religious Affairs; MUI = Majelis Ulama
Indonesia (Indonesia Ulema Council); NGOs = Non-Governmental Organisations.
Implementer Deradicalisation Programs
DGC/Prison
Officers
BNPT
INP
MoRA
MUI
NGOs
Existing
rehabilitation
program for
ordinary prisoners
(under CIL)
Incidental
program for
terrorist
inmates
Ordinary
Inmate
Terrorist
Inmate Other
Actors
Rehabilitation
122 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
5.4.2 A Partial Program
Several interventions and activities fall under prison-based deradicalisation
programs in Indonesia. However, they have not all been applied to all terrorist
inmates – even among those in the same prison. This situation reinforces the partial
nature of the program, which is, in part, due to rejection of program involvement by
non-cooperative terrorist inmates, as explained by a focus group participant that:
Convicted terrorists, especially who were in the category of non-cooperative
terrorist inmates or the “ideologue” will reject any programs offered by the
prison officers. (FG2:2)
In terms of the number, focus group participants also stated that majority of
terrorist inmates rejected any kind of program interventions, including prison-based
deradicalisation activities:
We have asked terrorist inmates to participate in the training, and it has been
done in other prisons, such as Cibinong, Semarang, Porong, Poso, and so on.
The response of convicted terrorists to involvement in the programs was
actually antipathy. The majority of them were not interested in joining such
programs. They were so disrespectful of what we offered to them. So not all
convicted terrorists get involved in, even we push them harder. (FG1:3)
Terrorist prisoners, especially the non-cooperative, will reject any activities
or interventions that we have developed especially for terrorist inmates.
(FG2:1)
From the above quotes, it can be seen that the terrorist inmates showed a strong
determination to not engage in any activities initiated by the prison authorities. This
refusal is because the prison authorities and the prison officers were perceived by the
terrorist inmates as “the government’s tool” (FG2:5) inside the prison walls. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, the existing literature shows that the Indonesian
Government is perceived as an enemy (thogut) by terrorist inmates. Thus, the
Indonesian prison officers were also perceived as enemies. This perception is a huge
challenge for Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 123
programs. In accordance with these findings, previous studies showed that, when the
terrorist inmates were asked about their participation or engagement in prison-based
deradicalisation programs, most of the interviewees said that “they hadn’t been part
of any deradicalisation programs while in prison” (Ungerer, 2011, p. 16).
Apart from the rejection of programs, a timeline for the interventions also has
prevented all of the terrorist inmates receiving prison-based deradicalisation
programs. In Cipinang prison, for example, initiatives of conflict management
training (CMT) and life skills training (LST) proposed by the SFCG have been
implemented; however, not all of the terrorist inmates have had the same opportunity
to participate because these initiatives were provided by NGOs and only offered for a
limited time. Therefore, terrorist inmates sent to the prison more recently did not
receive the same interventions. However, a focus group participant said that “CMT
and LST were appropriate interventions for terrorist inmates; and it showed a good
result for the rehabilitation of the participants” (FG1:3).
Although CMT and LST were judged appropriate activities by the Indonesian
prison officers, the sustainability of the program was not guaranteed because of
funding. A focus group participant explained that “because the programs were costly,
we do not know if DGC can provide suitable funding” (FG1:3). Therefore, the partial
nature of the program is associated with uncertain funding and timeline limitations.
Terrorist inmates’ refusal to participate in any prison programs has been
mentioned in the previous section. Regarding the timeline constraints for the
assistance provided by other agencies, this finding is consistent with the report
published by the SFCG, which assisted the DGC and prison officers to apply CMT
and LST to terrorist inmates. The report recognised that the program was only a one-
year project, from June to December 2013 (SFCG, 2013). In addition, the problems
of funding for the implementation of the prison-based deradicalisation program in
Indonesia match those observed in earlier studies, such as those by Abuza (2009) and
Eckard (2014).
Interestingly, VERA was recognised as a less relevant risk assessment
instrument in the context of socio-cultural Indonesia. One focus group participant
stated:
124 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
VERA was less relevant to be applied to terrorist inmates in Indonesia. If
VERA was used for terrorist prisoners’ risk assessment in the Indonesian
context, the result might be bias. All terrorist inmates in Indonesia will be
classified as radical and pro-violence individuals. In fact, some of them have
successfully left pro-violence acts. (FG1:3)
Furthermore, he explained that:
For example, if a respondent asked: would you like to mati syahid (to die in
the name of Islam)? I do believe if Indonesian, as a Muslim majority
country, were asked like that, they will be willing to do that. It’s because our
religious teaching is like that. We were afraid, if VERA will be used, it’s not
just terrorist inmates were radical, Islamic students in Islamic schools will be
also identified as radicals. (FG1:3)
Until recently, the finding that VERA is regarded less relevant to the socio-
cultural context of Indonesia was not discussed in the existing studies. Therefore, this
result needs further investigation, particularly from “the lens” of the program.
Next finding relates to family assistance in the Indonesia’s prison based-
deradicalisation program. Focus group participants believe that family involvement
in the program policy will foster the successful attainment of the goals of the terrorist
rehabilitation and integration programs. However, based on the experiences of focus
group participants, family assistance is not included in the existing programs – the
programs are not holistic within the family of terrorist inmates. For this reason,
besides partiality due to rejection, timeline limitations, and funding, Indonesia’s
prison-based deradicalisation program can be considered as a partial program due to
its scope not including terrorist inmates’ families. A focus group participant said that:
The family of terrorist inmates must be taken care of. It should be included
in the BNPT’s programs. School fees for their children or small capital for
his wife to run a small business must be assisted. (FG2:3)
Moreover, another participant said, “I believe that assistance or attention to the
terrorist inmates’ families would be useful in reducing their radical beliefs” (FG3:1).
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 125
Further, one participant noted the importance of the family rather than the prison
officers in reducing terrorists’ radical beliefs:
So, the most important thing was that the government approaches,
supervision and intervention must be holistic. That’s why for terrorist
deradicalisation was not just for the prisoner but also for their family. The
role of family was very important to prevent a terrorist inmate continuing
their wrongful acts in the future. We, prison officers, are nothing compared
to terrorist inmates’ family on deradicalisation. (FG3:5)
Based on observation during the focus groups, there was a strong belief among
focus group participants about the need for family assistance to be incorporated into
the program. A possible explanation is that full care of the families of terrorist
inmates will lead to easier communication with the terrorist inmates, resulting in
more effective rehabilitation or deradicalisation.
Regarding the finding that families were not included in the programs,
although it differs from that of a study by Kruglanski, Gelfand, and Gunaratna
(2011), it is partially consistent with the ICG’s (2007) report. In this report, the ICG
highlighted that there was an incentive provided by the Indonesian National Police
(INP) for the families of some terrorist inmates but not for others. For example, the
families of jihadi detainees from Ambon did not receive any incentive from the
authorities.
Moreover, this result suggested that if the family assistance was included, it
would help the task of prison officers in achieving the goals of terrorist rehabilitation
and deradicalisation programs. This result agrees with the findings of other studies
(ICG, 2007; Pendleton, 2008; Ranstorp, 2009), which concluded that family
assistance is an important part in terrorist deradicalisation in the Indonesian context.
In addition to this, it is interesting to compare the result of the current study
with those of Sukabdi’s (2015) study, particularly on the behavior transformation
process of convicted terrorists in the Indonesian context. Sukabdi’s study showed
that the most important points for the behavior-transformation process from pro-
violence to non-violence were the understanding of the contexts of daar al harb
(state of war) and daar as salam (state of peace), as admitted by 98% of the study
126 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
participants (Sukabdi, 2015, p. 44). According to Sukabdi (2015, p. 44), other factors
were finding their kin, such as their family, friends, significant others being hunted
and arrested by law enforcement (91%), being arrested (67%), meeting bombing
victims (23%), interacting with law enforcement people with good attitudes (19%),
and disappointment toward leaders (16%). Meanwhile, there was a small number of
reading inspiring Islamic books by reputable charismatic ima’am (clerics) about
jihad, using the soft method (2%).
Therefore, the focus group participants’ belief in the current study, that the
absence of family assistance was an issue in the implementation of programs for
terrorist inmates, differs from Sukabdi’s results. Although family is also one factor in
supporting behaviour transformation of terrorist inmates, in Sukabdi’s study, the
findings indicated that socio-economic assistance is not the issue. The issue is when
a convicted terrorist realises their family is also being hunted and arrested.
In this matter, a further study on the extent of family assistance can improve
terrorist rehabilitation is suggested. Moreover, as mentioned previously, other studies
(ICG, 2007; Pendleton, 2008; Ranstorp, 2009) have demonstrated that family
assistance is a vital part of terrorist rehabilitation in Indonesia. In addition, related to
the prisoner re-entry process, Naser and La Vigne have reviewed studies on families
and criminal behaviour, and concluded that “prisoners with greater contact with
family have more positive post-release outcomes” (Naser & La Vigne, 2006, p. 94).
5.5 INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEMS
In terms of institutional infrastructure problems, participants realised implicitly
that rehabilitating terrorist inmates requires a supported and well-funded prison
environment. If the prison environment is not conducive, such as being overcrowded,
it will hinder the efforts to rehabilitate convicted terrorists, or act as a trigger factor
for the spread of radicalisation inside the prison.
From the results of the focus group series, two infrastructure issues were
identified as barriers to achieving the objectives of the prison-based deradicalisation
program. They are the overcapacity issue and the practices for housing terrorist
convicts. These issues were evident, for example, in discussions of the large number
of inmates in the prisons and whether there should be segregation or integration of
terrorist inmates and ordinary inmates. From these two issues, a broad theme of
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 127
institutional infrastructure problem emerged. Thus, I concluded that institutional
infrastructure problems are challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers
implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.
5.5.1 Overcapacity
The Indonesian prison system continues to face the problem of overcapacity.
This problem has been always evident throughout most Indonesian prisons,
especially prisons located in the big cities (General Elucidation of The Decree of the
Minister of Law and Human Rights Number M.HH-07.OT.01.03, year 2011).
Based on the findings from the focus groups in the three Indonesian prisons
studied, this common problem affects the tasks and responsibilities of prison officers
during implementation of the deradicalisation program in these prisons. Participants
from all the focus groups were mainly concerned that overcapacity helped the spread
of radical beliefs in the prisons (FG1; FG2; and FG3). A participant explained the
negative impact of overcapacity on the deradicalisation program:
Because one prison officer has to look after and supervise so many inmates,
which is why in the prison sometimes we failed to prevent the spread of
radical beliefs. It was much easier to supervise if they were placed on the
field together and we supervise from the top. We could. But now, in one
block there were five wings where each wing has 12 rooms, so there were 60
rooms in one block. How do we supervise effectively? In this case, we might
fail to prevent the spread of radical beliefs. (FG3:3)
A focus group participant in another prison also acknowledged that
overcapacity was a barrier in preventing the spread of radical beliefs. As they
admitted, in the prison site there had been a case in which some ordinary prisoners
was suspected of recruitment by a terrorist inmate, “Abu Husna” (FG2:2). Another
focus group participant stated that a narcotics prisoner was successfully recruited in
the prison. This required transferring the offender to another prison, “preventing
further communication between terrorist inmates or the recruiter and the narcotics
offender” (FG3:1).
On the other hand, a big prison and a large population of inmates were an
advantage for convicted terrorists who were running small businesses inside the
128 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
prison. Large numbers of prisoners meant large numbers of prospective consumers.
A large prison population certainly provides benefits for the businesses inmates set
up in the prisons. This is particularly evident in Surabaya Prison, where convicted
terrorists were given considerable freedom to establish and run businesses inside the
prison. Hence, overcapacity in the prison aids undesirable activities by terrorist
inmates.
These data showed that the correlation between a large number of inmates in a
prison and the presence of terrorist inmates is interesting because terrorist inmates
might benefit from the large number of inmates. At least two benefits were
identified:
1) Inmates have a great opportunity to recruit followers or sympathisers from
other type of inmates
2) Inmates have a huge market through which to develop their businesses
inside the prison.
Furthermore, how prison officers evaluated the situation is an interesting
question to be explored. In answering a follow-up question during the focus group,
“is close interaction between terrorist inmates and other types of inmates good or bad
for prison officers?” the responses were diverse; some liked it while others did not,
as can be seen in the following quotes:
To me it was good. When they have mingled with each other, then there was
comfort. We could definitely guarantee the security. (FG3:1)
I was worried. We do not know exactly what they did. So we are afraid there
was a recruitment process. (FG1:3)
Nevertheless, if terrorist inmates have plentiful opportunities to interact with
other types of inmates due to overcapacity, the probability that their established
radical beliefs will spread is higher, as expressed by a focus group participant:
Because terrorist inmates can freely interact with many inmates in the
prison, terrorist inmates have a huge chance to transfer their radical beliefs to
other inmates. They also can go to the other blocks. Moreover, if there was
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 129
overcapacity and lack number of officer issues, like here in this prison,
recruitment will easily occur. We had difficulty supervising all of their
activities. (FG3:5)
Overall, the data from the focus groups demonstrated that officers believe
overcapacity is a good environment for terrorist inmates, but is bad for the prison
officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. As the above quote
notes, it is difficult to supervise many inmates with minimal officers, heightening the
risk of radicalisation within the prison. To deal with this problem, currently
Indonesian prisons that hold terrorist inmates have to develop their own policies and
practices on housing terrorist inmates.
These findings match those observed in Gunaratna’s (2011, p. 65) study that
identified a correlation between the prison environment and the spread of radical
beliefs in the prison. The findings are also consistent with those of a number of other
previous studies (Eckard, 2014, p. 170; Istiqomah, 2012, p. 31; Jones C. R., 2014, p.
87; Osman, 2014, p. 222), which outlined overcrowded prisons and the problems in
practices for housing management of terrorist inmates, whether segregated from or
integrated with other inmates. Interestingly, these four studies also mentioned prison
corruption, which did not arise in focus group discussions in the current study.
Regarding prison overcrowding, UNODC (2016, p. 11) realised that
overcrowding often occurs in low-resource countries and post-conflict environments,
where meeting basic requirements may pose significant challenges. UNODC (2016,
p. 12) suggested that “tackling poor conditions in prisons should therefore be
considered as an integral part of the effort to counter violent extremism in prisons”,
such as in Somalia. This country successfully tackled overcrowding, providing
running water, beds and televisions for the prisoners, which led to reduced prison
violence, and enabled prison officers to deliver disengagement activity effectively.
As presented in Chapter 2, the DGC has no national policy on how terrorist
inmates should be housed in Indonesian prisons. Therefore, terrorist inmate housing
depends on the policy of individual prison directors, policy as to whether they will be
segregated from or integrated with other inmates, or perhaps isolated. In the three
prisons studied, I found that in Cipinang and Surabaya prisons terrorist inmates were
placed in a special block separated from the other types of inmates. In Pasir Putih
130 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Nusakambangan Prison they were housed in the same block with ordinary prisoners;
however, previously they were placed in a special block. At the time of writing, Pasir
Putih Nusakambangan Prison no longer has a special block for terrorist inmates.
These practices, according to focus group participants, become a challenge for
implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. The problem of housing is
discussed in the following section.
5.5.2 Obscurity of Segregation Practices
The practices for housing terrorist inmates in Indonesian prisons present a
challenge for Indonesian prison officers. As mentioned earlier, terrorist inmates’
housing depends on the policy of the prison directors regarding segregation from or
integration with other inmates. The practices, however, remain unclear, even when a
segregation policy has been chosen. As a result, communications among terrorist
inmates occurs, as well as close contact between terrorist inmates and other ordinary
inmates. Two focus group participants emphasised that:
For example, even here in this prison where terrorist inmates were housed in
a special block, communication between terrorist inmates and other type of
inmates remain happens. It is because on a specific time they must do the
same activities such as doing prayers together in the mosque or doing sports.
(FG1:1)
The DGC has not ruled on the housing policy and practice for terrorist
inmates. So it depends on the prison director. Because their vision and
mission were varied, the policy adopted in each prison that holds terrorist
inmates were also varied. Each prison director has their own consideration in
this matter. (FG1:3)
Moreover, focus group results indicated that there is a similar concern about
the need to segregate non-cooperative terrorist inmates who are ideologues or
hardliners from the rest of terrorist inmates, and within prison population. A focus
group participant noted that “segregation policy must also be made for terrorist
inmates” (FG3:5). A focus group participant strongly argued that imprisoned
terrorists who are categorised as non-cooperative should be segregated from those
who are categorised as cooperative. It is because:
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 131
The practices to mix non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates will
affect the implemented programs received by cooperative terrorist inmates.
(FG2:4)
Thus, participants believe that unclear housing practices on segregating non-
cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates will affect the outcome of the program
received by the cooperative terrorist inmates. The following two quotes show the
effect of unclear housing practices for terrorists on the deradicalisation program.
Unclear policy and practices in segregating non-cooperative and cooperative
terrorist inmates might affect our effort negatively in implementing
deradicalisation programs. (FG2:4)
It was a challenge for us if the housing practices for terrorist inmates were
unclear, particularly in limiting contact between non-cooperative convicted
terrorists or “radical inmates” or “the ideologist”. If non-cooperative and
cooperative convicted terrorists can make close contact, positive results in
rehabilitating cooperative convicted terrorists will vanish. (FG3:2)
In this situation, Indonesian prison officers’ efforts to rehabilitate terrorist
inmates will be affected. Focus group participants worried that, although
deradicalisation programs have been implemented for terrorist convicts, and
especially for cooperative terrorist inmates who are willing to engage in a program,
“the effect of the implemented program will be diminished if they have a chance to
get in touch and gain communication with non-cooperative terrorist inmates”
(FG3:1). Through opportunities to communicate, non-cooperative convicted
terrorists will always try to convince cooperative convicted terrorists to keep their
established radical beliefs and view the imprisonment as a time for isolation. As one
focus group participant said:
If non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates were housed in one
block, they will absolutely gain better communication with each other. In
this occasion, I believe they have a leader (Amir) who is an “ideologist” or a
non-cooperative terrorist convict. If this was happens, we can do nothing
132 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
with the rest of the group especially to those who are cooperative with us. I
do strongly believe that all terrorist inmates regardless their radical level will
follow what the Amir (the leader) said. The program that we implemented
will be useless indeed. (FG1:3)
Regarding policies on housing for incarcerated terrorists, the three Indonesian
prison research sites deployed different policies. Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison
had an integration policy, while Cipinang and Surabaya prisons had a segregation
policy. Based on the fieldwork for this study, focus group participants believe the
policy adopted has a specific causal link to outcomes.
The focus group result in Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison indicated that
integration was better than segregation. This was because prison officers had
experienced a negative impact from segregation. When terrorist inmates were housed
in the same block, they became a strong group. Therefore, the prison integrated
terrorist inmates with the ordinary inmates. As such, a terrorist inmate may be
housed in the same cell with non-terrorist inmates.
In Cipinang Prison, however, focus group data indicated that terrorist inmates
must be segregated. Prison officers in Cipinang supported the policy of segregation.
This policy was adopted due to Cipinang Prison experiencing a riot situation where
fighting between terrorist inmates and other ordinary inmates occurred. Since that
time, terrorist inmates have been housed in a special block separated from other
ordinary inmates.
The policy and practices in Surabaya Prison are interesting. Although a
segregation policy has been adopted, in some cases the practices in Surabaya Prison
indicate integration. Because of the overcapacity issue, with no room available in
other blocks, other types of inmates are sometimes housed in the special block where
terrorist inmates are housed. Furthermore, Surabaya’s prison officers apparently
support integration policy. To some extent, they believe that integration is better for
terrorist deradicalisation, even though it was not clear how they judged whether a
terrorist was deradicalised or not. Hence, although segregation policy was adopted,
the practices showed considerable integration. In other words, Surabaya Prison
employed a “middle road” or “mixed” policy of segregation and integration.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 133
Differences in policy and practices on the housing of terrorist inmates among
prisons in Indonesia have been found in other studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007;
Osman, 2014; Ungerer, 2011). According to Eckard (2014, p. 168), this issue was
triggered by the absence of a formalised deradicalisation policy. In addition, the
current finding of the need to segregate non-cooperative terrorist inmates who are
ideologues or hard-liners from the rest of the prison population supports those of
previous studies (ICG, 2007, pp. 8-9), which found that some non-terrorists were
successfully radicalised by Imam Samudra in Kerobokan Prison; and even a prison
officer, Beni Irawan, was also radicalised.
Although in some cases radicalisation has occurred in Indonesian prisons due
to an integration policy, some focus group participants noted that it was effective for
terrorist rehabilitation. Therefore, investigating the effectiveness of integration policy
for terrorist deradicalisation is an interesting topic for future research.
In addition, the availability of a special block for terrorist inmates can cause an
imbalance in the distribution of room for other ordinary inmates. The number of
terrorist inmates is not high; if they are housed in a separate block, each terrorist
inmate probably has their own room. This environment can be the opposite of that
for non-terrorist inmates. According to a focus group participant, “it occurred in
other blocks where the number of non-terrorist inmates was so high then they should
be placed together in one room” (FG3:5). Housing management for all inmates in the
prison, however, faces various and significant challenges.
5.6 UNAVAILABILITY OF COLLABORATIVE MECHANISMS
Focus group data revealed two prominent insights related to collaborative
mechanisms as challenges in the implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation programs. The first was the lack of cooperation and coordination
between the BNPT and the DGC, and the second was unorganised partnerships.
From these challenges, it appears partnerships have not been well-managed among
the key actors in terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs. Furthermore,
a broad theme of unavailability of collaborative mechanisms emerged by analysing
these challenges.
In considering the terminologies of “collaboration” and “partnership”, these
terms are used interchangeably in this thesis because it was difficult to distinguish
134 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
the two terms in the field (Duong, 2010, p. 169). Collaboration and partnership both
involve a common environment, networking, shared goals, and shared commitments
(Carnwell & Carson, 2009). However, strictly speaking, partnerships go beyond
merely working together; they represent the higher end of the linkage continuum of
involvement, collaboration, participation, and partnership (Carnwell & Carson,
2009).
According to Kaats and Opheij (2014), coordination mechanisms and
cooperation are essential parts of effective collaboration between organisations that
automatically entail cooperation between people in the organisations. The existing
literature on collaboration and partnership shows that there are some indicators that
can be used to evaluate whether collaboration is good or bad. However, the available
evaluation criteria were not used to evaluate the coordination and cooperation
between the BNPT and the DGC on prison-based deradicalisation programs because
this research had a different focus: to examine Indonesian prison officers as the
implementers of terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs.
5.6.1 Lack of Cooperation and Coordination between the BNPT and the DGC
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs have been run by three
major state agencies: the INP, the BNPT and the DGC (Bakti, 2014). Although these
state actors treat convicted terrorists and claim that they are working for terrorist
deradicalisation and rehabilitation, their main objectives are different (ICG, 2007;
Osman, 2014). Hence, Eckard (2014, p. 169) concluded that the objectives of
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program are difficult to determine.
The INP’s deradicalisation program, for example, is directed to further
investigation or intelligence-gathering from arrested terrorists. The use of the
accused terrorists for the purpose of intelligence-gathering showed positive results
where several terrorist plots were dismantled (ICG, 2007). The BNPT, according to
several studies, is more focused on terrorist disengagement than on deradicalisation
(Eckard, 2014; IRIN, 2012). This is understandable because the scope of the BNPT’s
program on deradicalisation is broader, covering inside and outside prison facilities
(Bakti, 2014). The focus of the DGC is the closest to terrorist rehabilitation, although
it does not address terrorist deradicalisation (Istiqomah, 2012).
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 135
Other institutions are also involved in the prison-based deradicalisation
programs, both state and non-state actors. State institutions involved in prison-based
deradicalisation programs include the MoRA. Meanwhile NGOs that are helping
Indonesian prisons to develop programs and evaluate terrorist rehabilitation include
the YPP and the SFCG, as identified earlier.
Of the many agencies that are involved in prison-based deradicalisation
programs, the focus group results revealed that the lack of cooperation and
coordination between the BNPT and the DGC was a significant problem. Although
the BNPT coordinates the national deradicalisation program,27 the majority of focus
group participants were disappointed with the BNPT’s performance in this area.
Focus group participants explained:
Identifying problems with the deradicalisation program for terrorist inmates,
BNPT was too far from us. BNPT should be directly involved in the
interventions, whatever the programs or activities; and then, together with us
implementing it in the prison. So far it was not like that. We, prison officers,
were likely to be working alone on terrorist rehabilitation. (FG2:4)
When BNPT came to the prison, they asked to meet with terrorist inmates.
They sent a letter and provided the catering. We facilitated the room in the
prison. They met with the inmates, provide a gift, took photos, and gone.
Terrorist inmates went back to their cells. That’s it. We need more than that.
Moreover, BNPT was a specific state body on counter terrorism so they
should be able to do more. (FG1:3)
However, one focus group participant mentioned that, since 2014, the
involvement of the BNPT in the implementation of deradicalisation programs inside
the prison had been better than previously. He was quite optimistic about the
involvement of the BNPT since then:
27 Based on Article 3 (d) Presidential Decree Number 46 year 2010 on National Counter Terrorism
Agency.
136 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
I am going to mention BNPT’s programs both in the past and the present.
Since its establishment in 2010 until 2014, BNPT’s programs on prison-
based deradicalisation were not clear. They came to prison without a clear
focus. They just had a chat, took photos, finished, that’s all. They only did
this in every site visit to prison. And they asked the same things of terrorist
inmates, for example why you were here, what’s wrong, whoever was
coming. Terrorist inmates don’t like it. After 2014 and 2015, it was better.
The questions and activities given to terrorist inmates were various, such as
asking terrorist inmates their opinions about jihad, then they borrowed a
book. In the next visit, they had a discussion regarding the book. I, as a
prison officer, like these activities where it seems to be structured and
measurable. (FG3:5)
Although one focus group participant mentioned that there was an
improvement in terms of performance of the BNPT in coordinating the program, all
agreed that there were many shortcomings that must be solved regarding program
coordination and cooperation between the BNPT and the DCG. Therefore, the
unclear nature of the BNPT’s contribution to the program was believed by the focus
group participants as one of the challenges for deradicalisation programs. Indonesian
prison officers hope that collaborative mechanisms between the BNPT and the DGC
can be evaluated so that the BNPT’s staff and prison officers can work together to
better implement the programs. As a focus group participant noted:
Cooperation and coordination between BNPT and DGC need an evaluation
and the findings should improve implementation of the prison-based
deradicalisation program. (FG1:1)
Focus group data indicated that lack of coordination and cooperation between the
BNPT and the DGC was one of the challenges in the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs. These issues are evident in practice, where prison officers
had experienced lack of support from the BNPT’s staff in working together to
achieve terrorist rehabilitation or deradicalisation. This result is consistent with those
of other studies (IRIN, 2012; Istiqomah, 2012; Sarwono, 2012). “To design a global
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 137
strategy to counter jihadi ideology inside the prison”, Istiqomah (2012, p. 268)
suggested that the correctional system and its administration require reform.
Furthermore, the lack of coordination and cooperation between the BNPT and
the DGC resulted in a “passive” attitude among some Indonesian prison officers
towards prison-based deradicalisation programs. Indonesian prison officers believe
that the BNPT, within its establishment objectives, has the main task of
deradicalisation of imprisoned terrorists, particularly the “hard-liner convicted
terrorist” (FG3:4). Another participant also agreed, saying that:
Without intention to pass the job [rehabilitating convicted terrorists], the
responsibility for deradicalising convicted terrorists must be at the BNPT’s
hand. (FG3:5)
A strong commitment to building an effective partnership between the DGC
and the BNPT is evidenced by a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the
agencies, signed by the former Minister of Law and Human Rights, Amir
Syamsudin, and the former head of the BNPT, Ansyaad Mbai, on 23 July 2014
(Ditjenpas RI, 2014b). Recently, the Director General of Correction, I Wayan K
Dusak, and the Deputy of the BNPT, Abdul Rahman Kadir, also signed a MoU on
the management of a deradicalisation centre in the special prison for terrorist inmates
(Ditjenpas RI, 2016b). However, as found in the current study, realisation of this
commitment can be questioned, especially at the lower level of actors or in the real
implementation of the collaboration.
Further research from different perspectives is recommended to assess whether
the same problem is encountered by the BNPT’s staff. In addition, future studies
need to evaluate collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT, especially because it
is apparent that achieving good collaboration has been difficult. In this regard, all the
evaluation criteria in the existing literature on partnerships and collaboration could
be used.
5.6.2 Unorganised Partnerships
The key state agencies for prison-based deradicalisation programs are the
DGC, the BNPT and the INP, with support by others such as the MoRA. Besides
138 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
state agencies, non-governmental bodies involved in prison-based deradicalisation
activities include the SFCG, the Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation (Yayasan Prasasti
Perdamaian – [YPPP]) and the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum –
[LBH]). The involvement of many agencies in the effort to rehabilitate terrorist
inmates, on one hand, is beneficial because “it will help prison officers in
rehabilitating terrorist inmates” (FG2:5). This suggests that prison officers need
collaboration with other people or agencies in order to rehabilitate or deradicalise
terrorist inmates. As a focus group participant realised that:
If rehabilitation or deradicalisation of terrorist inmates was only the
correctional responsibility, we work alone on it, it will be so difficult.
(FG3:3)
However, focus group participants also recognised that collaboration between
agencies has not been managed well. Consequently, programs implemented as a
result of collaborative work have not been particularly successful in terrorist
deradicalisation. For instance, focus group participants believe that Islamic scholars
provided by the MoRA and several private companies to lead religious classes (kelas
pengajian) do not meet the needs of terrorist inmates:
What we have done is regular religious classes [kelas pengajian] to all the
prison population including terrorist inmates. It was held in the prison’s
mosque. However, related to terrorism and terrorist prisoners, we need an
active role from the MoRA, for example, in providing a leading cleric or
Islamic scholar who can challenge terrorist beliefs. (FG2:3)
We do have religious classes [kelas pengajian] that were supported by the
MoRA, Indonesia Ulema Council [Majelis Ulama Indonesia], and private
companies. However, the content of these classes were mostly general issues
on Islam that encourage people to be a good person as a Muslim. This was
not relevant for terrorist inmates since they have their own interpretation
about Islam. (FG2:2)
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 139
The quotes above demonstrate that the classes were not focused on the issue of
terrorism and the needs of terrorist inmates. The content of such religious classes
(kelas pengajian) that have been delivered to the prison population (including
terrorist prisoners) is the same as that for community groups. According to a focus
group participant, “the content of the speech and discussion must be directed to and
should challenge the beliefs of incarcerated terrorists” (FG2:2).
The participation of non-state actors in Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation programs, on the other hand, was highly appreciated by the focus
group participants. For example, the CMT and LST programs were facilitated and
organised by the SFCG in cooperation with the DGC, the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute
(LBH) and the Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation (YPP). These interventions were
valued as “the most appropriate activities to be used and integrated in prison-based
deradicalisation programs” (FG1:3). Moreover, the activities were not only
recognised as successful by the implementers, but were also recognised by
participants. For example, a convicted terrorist, Abdul Rouf, who was sentenced to
16 years in prison for his involvement in the first Bali Bombing attack, recognised
the program was good:
This is the third day of a five-day training course I am following here. The
result is very good. I can understand more about other inmates, the
differences among us here. (SFCGI & DITJEN PAS, 2010, p. 5)
Although focus group participants were satisfied with the programs delivered
by these NGOs, the sustainability of activities initiated by the NGOs remains a
problem of critical concern. As NGOs conduct activities and evaluate project
outcomes within a strict timeline, the survival of interventions greatly depends on the
input of the DGC and or the BNPT. A focus group participant commented that:
We do not know whether the program will continue or not, depending on
funding and our boss. We are just executors. (FG1:3)
Overall, the involvement of many agencies, either state or non-state actors, is
problematic. Indeed, many agencies are involved in prison-based deradicalisation
140 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
programs, as the focus group participants have experienced, but partnerships and
collaboration remain unorganised. This finding is consistent with those of a number
of studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; IPI, 2010; IRIN, 2012; Ungerer, 2011). These
previous studies explain that, although there are many actors working on terrorist
deradicalisation, the efforts have not been fully integrated.
The principal findings of this investigation suggest that, although partnerships
have been emphasised as playing an important part in achieving the goals of the
deradicalisation program, evaluation of the implementation is required. Furthermore,
various capacity constraints on partnerships must also be considered, such as
managing barriers to working together, budgeting issues, resource sharing, and other
possible difficulties in working collaboratively. Therefore, further research on
developing effective partnerships and collaboration among institutions, either state or
non-state actors, is worthwhile.
Together, these results provide important insights into the existence of
unorganised partnerships in delivering prison-based deradicalisation programs in the
Indonesian context. In addition, if a partnership is going well, the programs should
continue for the terrorist inmates. Therefore, the future of collaboration with NGOs
on prison-based deradicalisation programs should be maintained; otherwise, the
programs will remain incomplete program, as will the effect on terrorist inmates.
5.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has investigated the challenges that Indonesian prison officers
face when implementing Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. To
investigate such challenges, thematic qualitative analysis was employed. Analysis of
the focus group data revealed five broad themes as challenges faced by Indonesian
prison officers:
1. Terrorist prisoners’ personalities.
2. The readiness of Indonesian prison officers.
3. The sustainability of the program.
4. Institutional infrastructure problems.
5. Unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 141
Furthermore, the discussion of the findings in this chapter indicates that,
although the Indonesian Government has paid considerable attention to
deradicalisation initiatives and has undertaken a wide range of activities to
rehabilitate terrorist inmates, programs have been scattered and without focus. Thus,
these efforts have not helped significantly in reducing recidivism related to terror
acts. It is evident that a number of terror acts in Indonesia have been committed by
former terrorist inmates. The spread of radical beliefs in Indonesian prisons is also
evident (Andrie, 2011; ICG, 2007; Ungerer, 2011).
To sum up, the analysis of Indonesian prison officers’ experiences reported in
this chapter provides insights useful for the evaluation of existing policies and
practices for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs. The
analysis suggests that the experiences and perspectives of prison officers as the main
implementers of prison-based deradicalisation programs must be considered. In
addition, the analysis sets the scene for the next chapter, which focuses on
Indonesian prison officers’ perspectives on the establishment of a special prison for
terrorists. The opinions and ideas of Indonesian prison officers regarding this
initiative were investigated.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 143
The Perspective of Indonesian
Prison Officers on the
Establishment of a Special
Prison for Terrorist Inmates in
Indonesia
Another aspect of this is the conscious choice on whether to segregate the
violent extremist offenders or integrate them in the larger prison population.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both alternatives. On the one
hand, separating this group from the general population makes them easier to
manage and reduces the risk of malign influencing. Moreover, necessary
resources including extra security measures and training for instructors and
specialist personnel are only needed in a limited number of locations. On the
other hand, integrating extremist offenders among other categories of
inmates prevents the formation of tight groups, and confronts extremists with
alternative perspectives and ideas that might contribute to their
deradicalisation. (Stone, 2015, p. 227)
This chapter presents the results and discussion pertaining to Research
Question 2, that is, the perspectives of Indonesian prison officers on the
establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners. To gain insights into this
issue, the study employed a thematic qualitative analysis similar to that used in the
investigation of Research Question 1. Primary data was collected through a series of
focus group discussions with Indonesian prison officers, while secondary data was
gathered from existing research and relevant state documents.
The chapter begins with an overview in Section 6.1. Further, sections 6.2, 6.3,
and 6.4 present a detailed discussion of the results: an absolute agreement on the
establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists (6.2); advantages and
disadvantages of a special prison for terrorist inmates (6.3) and related policy issues
(6.4). The last, Section 6.5 presents concluding remarks of the chapter.
144 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
6.1 OVERVIEW
The previous chapter explored the challenges faced by the Indonesian prison
officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. Five challenges were
identified on the implementation of such programs, namely terrorist inmates’
personalities, the readiness of the officers, the sustainability of the program,
institutional infrastructure problems, and unavailability of a collaborative
mechanism. In dealing with the issue of radicalisation in prisons, the Indonesian
Government instituted several initiatives, such as the establishment of the National
Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]).
Recently, a special prison for terrorist prisoners was established in Sentul,
Bogor, West Java, under the management of the Directorate General of Corrections
(DGC). This chapter provides an analysis of the perspectives of Indonesian prison
officers on the establishment of this special prison. The chapter shows that there was
an absolute agreement among the focus group participants on the establishment of a
specialist prison for terrorists in Indonesia, despite their acknowledgement that such
prison have both advantages and disadvantages. Policy recommendations related to
the initiative are also proposed.
6.2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL PRISON FOR TERRORIST
PRISONERS: AN ABSOLUTE AGREEMENT
Before presenting the results of the investigation into the perspectives of
Indonesian prison officers on establishing a special prison for convicted terrorists,
the terms “special prison” and “general prison” need to be clarified in the Indonesian
context. The two types of prisons have both similarities and differences.
6.2.1 Terrorist Inmates: General Prison versus Special Prison
The institutionalisation and management of both prison types is similar. Both
special and general prisons are operated and controlled by a Branch Office of the
Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum dan
HAM) in the local government, and the DGC in the central government, which has
responsibility for the Minister of Law and Human Rights. Currently, the
administrative structure of Indonesian corrections consists of four levels of
institutions, from central to local:
1. The Ministry of Law and Human Rights.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 145
2. The DGC.
3. The Branch Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights.
4. Prisons (special or general).
Prisons are established and built in each district level. Apart from prisons, the
Government of Indonesia also has a detention centre (Rutan or Rumah Tahanan) in
each district level, the main function of which is to detain those who are on remand
for criminal acts but are not yet convicted.
The differences between special and general prisons are related to their
purposes. Special prisons are for specific offenders; hence, the inmates have
committed the same type of crime. For example, when someone is accused of a
drugs-related crime and is sentenced to imprisonment, they will be sent to a special
prison for drugs and related offences, called a narcotics prison. Thus all the inmates
in narcotics prisons are drugs offenders, and no prisoners convicted of drugs-related
offences are held with regular prisoners in general prisons. Therefore, in the context
of this thesis, the scope of special prisons differs from that of general prisons, based
on crime types; special prisons may use treatments for inmates that differ from those
in general prisons. The management of prisons in the Indonesian context dictates that
special prisons be built separately from general prisons.
Besides special prisons established and built based on specific crimes, there
are also special prisons based on the gender and age of the offenders, such as those
for women and juveniles. For example, Indonesia has established the Kupang
Women’s Prison and the Mataram Juvenile Prison, based on the Decree of the
Minister of Law and Human Rights Number: M.HH-10.OT.01.01 year 2011. In
terms of narcotics prisons, more narcotics prisons have been established in 2012 in
Langsa, Langkat, Muara Subak, Pangkal Pinang, and Kasongan, based on the Decree
of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number: M.HH-04.OT.01.01 year 2012.
Also based on this decree, juvenile prisons were established in Bandar Lampung and
Bandung.
The discourse on establishing a special prison for convicted terrorists in
Indonesia was initiated by the former Minister of Law and Human Rights 2009–
2011, Patrialis Akbar. This initiative was developed as an addition to the established
prison classifications of juvenile prisons, youth prisons, women’s prisons, men’s
146 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
prisons, general prisons, narcotics prisons, and open prisons; it was also proposed to
transform Sukamiskin Prison from a general prison into a special prison for convicts
convicted of corruption. When this initiative was introduced, the Ministry of
Religious Affairs (MoRA) and the House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat – [DPR]) agreed with its intent (Bakti, 2014, p. 289).
However, many scholars and practitioners disagreed with this initiative.
According to Bakti (2014, pp. 195-196), they believed this initiative could not be
realised at that time. This was due to a common belief that, if terrorist convicts are
held in one place, they will become stronger as a terrorist group and therefore have
increased opportunities to incite violence against prison authorities. Because of the
strong debate about the pros and cons of this special prison, the Government of
Indonesia decided that, rather than being a special prison for terrorist inmates, the
new facility would be a deradicalisation centre. The BNPT then built this centre in
Sentul, Bogor, West Java, as a basecamp to deradicalise terrorist inmates (Bakti,
2014, p. 197).
Responding to this initiative, Handoyo Sudrajat, the former Director General of
Corrections, informed the public that the individuals sent to the centre would be
selected based on a risk assessment, and then only those classified as “high risk”,
hard core, or militant would be sent. A senior DGC official, Nugroho, confirmed that
one of the prisoners who was at the top of the list was Abu Bakar Ba’syir, because he
was categorised as an ideologist terrorist inmate (Koran Tempo, 2014). However,
prior to this initiative being abandoned, no convicted terrorists were sent to the
centre.
More recently, interest in establishing a special prison for terrorist convicts re-
emerged after apparent recruitment and the spread of radical beliefs in Surabaya
Prison. After the incident was investigated, an official report by the Indonesian
Government confirmed the problem. The government decided to proceed with the
original plan to establish a special prison for terrorist inmates. A legal basis for the
special prison was created through the Decision of the Ministry of Law and Human
Rights on the Establishment of Sentul Special Prison in Bogor, West Java (Ditjenpas
RI, 2016b). This prison was called Sentul Special Prison because it was located in
Sentul District, in the same area as the BNPT complex.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 147
Therefore, the current policy of the Government of Indonesia is to have a
special prison for convicted terrorists – not only a deradicalisation centre – with all
required facilities and resources. When fieldwork for this study was completed in
July 2016, the prison development was ongoing, with operations commencing in
January 2017 (Ditjenpas RI, 2016b).
This research was originally based on the concept that the need for a special
prison for terrorist inmates was still the subject of debate, and that there was still a
possibility the government would adopt an alternative solution. This scenario
remained until after completion of the first and second focus groups. The new prison
was established before I conducted the third focus group. In July 2016, during my
field trip, I inspected the special prison from the outside, at which time the physical
construction of the prison building was almost completed. A prison director and staff
for this prison had then been appointed by the government.
Although the policy of the Government of Indonesia had changed from only
having a discourse about and a plan for the prison to actually establishing the prison,
the focus of this study was not affected. The focus of this part of the study was solely
to provide insights into the perspectives of Indonesian prison officers on the
establishment of the prison, regardless of whether it was built or not.
As mentioned in the literature review, the distribution of terrorist inmates in
Indonesia can be classified as a mix of isolation and separation, and follows a general
pattern of distributing terrorist inmates through correctional facilities, as described by
Neumann (2010). Neumann’s pattern has three options: isolation, separation, and
concentration. Isolation means that terrorist inmates are isolated from each other;
separation means that terrorist inmates are separated from the general prison
population; and concentration means that terrorist inmates are held in one place
(Neumann, 2010, p. 17).
Terrorist inmates were previously only dispersed throughout Indonesian
prisons because Indonesia had no single strategy on how convicted terrorists should
be housed (Jones C. R., 2014). The practices in each prison that holds terrorist
inmates differ. For example, in two of the research sites (Cipinang and Surabaya
prisons), terrorist inmates are segregated from other inmates, while in
Nusakambangan Prison they are integrated. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, in
148 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Cibinong Prison, an isolation policy has been implemented. For this reason, the
Indonesian practices are a mix of isolation and separation models.
However, with the initiative of the Government of Indonesia to establish a
special prison for convicted terrorists, the existing Indonesian model on the
distribution of terrorist inmates has become a mix of the isolation, separation, and
concentration models. The establishment of a special prison for terrorist inmates
reflects a concentration principle. If not all terrorist inmates are housed in this special
prison as per the official policy (Ditjenpas RI, 2016b), then the practice could be
described as a partial concentration policy. Newman’s (2010) analysis that compared
the practices of five countries indicates that only Indonesia has opted for a mix of the
three models, as can be seen in the table 6.1 bellow.
Table 6.1 Comparison of the Distribution of Terrorist Inmates (Adapted from Newman’s Findings)
Country Model
Netherlands Fully concentration policy
United States of America A mix of dispersal and (partial) concentration policy
France A mix of dispersal and (partial) concentration policy
United Kingdom A mix of dispersal and (partial) concentration policy
Spain A mix of dispersal and (partial) concentration policy
Indonesia A mix of dispersal and isolation, separation, and (partial)
concentration policy
In the context of the implementation of a deradicalisation program in a
particular prison, the International Crisis Group (ICG) demonstrated that decisions
about segregating terrorist inmates from, or integrating them with, other types of
inmates are important (ICG, 2007). However, there is a dilemma in selecting a
method because both segregation and integration have negative impacts. For
example, in one case integration resulted in the recruitment of non-terrorist prisoners,
while in another case segregation resulted in the terrorist inmates gaining solidarity
(ICG, 2007, p. 7). Interaction between terrorist inmates and other types of inmates
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 149
remains a problem, even though a segregation policy has been applied in some
Indonesian prisons (Jones C. R., 2014).
Evaluating Indonesia’s model of distribution for terrorist inmates after the
establishment of the special prison for convicted terrorist needs further empirical
research. More specifically, finding which model is appropriate for each type of
terrorist inmate in Indonesia is essential.
6.2.2 An Absolute Agreement
In discussing the need for a special prison for convicted terrorists, focus group
results indicated that there was an absolute agreement on this initiative. Despite
expectations of a debate on the pros and cons of the initiative, all the participants in
the focus groups agreed with and fully supported the initiative.
One participant expressed a strong belief that “if you ask whether it was
needed or not, yes absolutely it’s necessary” (FG1:2). A participant in a different
focus group also said that “yes, a special prison for terrorist prisoners must be
established” (FG2:1). Although other participants were less emphatic – “I think
that’s fine if the terrorists prison will be established” (FG2:3) – they still indicated
agreement.
The following responses from the Indonesian prison officers show agreement
on the need for a special prison for convicted terrorists:
Yes, I agree. That’s why in every briefing or meeting with the authorities, I
always said we have to have a special prison for terrorist prisoners. Through
this prison we might develop special treatments and interventions intended
to solve terrorist prisoners’ issues and also the terrorism problem. (FG3:5)
I believe that a special prison is urgent. This is because we applied a general
method in rehabilitating inmates in this prison. A special method then can be
developed in a special prison. It should be different, how narcotics’
offenders were treated in narcotics prisons. (FG1:2)
The focus groups results, as presented above, revealed that attitudes towards a
special prison for terrorist prisoners were very positive. The data showed that there
was agreement among Indonesian prison officers on the initiative in the three
150 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
research sites (FG1, FG2, and FG3); no participant showed any signs or made any
comments indicating disagreement.
Therefore, the first finding on this issue was that the Indonesian prison officers
absolutely agreed with and supported the establishment of a special prison for
terrorist inmates in the Indonesian correctional system. In common with the
established management of correctional services, this new prison is under the
management of the DGC.
This agreement by Indonesian prison officers supports existing research. The
need to pursue policies of isolation for religious extremist inmates in the context of
US prisons was examined by Merola and Vovak (2012). Based on a survey of the
wardens of all state-level prisons in the US, the study indicated that the most
effective approach for dealing with religious extremists was an isolation policy
(Merola & Vovak, 2012, p. 735 and 753). Furthermore, the current finding is also
consistent with the recommendation proposed by Hassan and Yasin (2012).
Referring to the Saudi and Singapore prison models, they recommended the
Government of Indonesia establish a special prison facility for convicted terrorists
(Hassan & Yasin, 2012, p. 13).
However, the value of establishing a special prison for a specific crime is still
debatable. This issue not only concerns special prisons for terrorist inmates but also
those for all specific types of crime. In terms of corruption inmates, for example,
Mochtar said that “corruptors should get the same treatment as the other criminals”
(JakartaGlobe, 2010) such as rapists, because he considered these offenders are the
same as the other criminals.
Although one may argue that a special prison for a specific offence is not
necessary, such prisons have been supported by some experts. In specific
circumstances, establishing special prisons is highly recommended. In terms of crime
types and prison management, some have argued that the need for special prisons lies
in issues around offenders’ rehabilitation and supervision.
Firstly, regarding rehabilitation goals, different programs for specific offences
are required. When the inmates live in special prisons, they can receive treatments
and programs different from those for ordinary prisoners, and even specific therapies.
The different treatment is required because of the specific type of crime (Burkhead,
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 151
2007; Cropsey, Wexler, Taxman, & Young, 2007), for example, drugs and narcotics
offences. With these offences, the inmates are often also users who need special
rehabilitation programs to improve their health or prevent their death. In this regard,
many see drug users as victims; in criminology such offences are called “victimless
crimes”, that is, “crime where there is no apparent victim and no apparent pain or
injury” (Lehman & Phelps, 2008). As such, these offenders do not need punishment
but rather specific medical treatments and therapies in order to help them stop using
drugs and narcotics. As a result, rehabilitation programs are possible for these
inmates.
Secondly, the issue of supervision particularly arose in Indonesia after several
cases in which corruptors were living in the prisons. Hence, many people suggested
that it was necessary to hold corruptors in a special prison to ensure proper
supervision. In the Indonesian context, Haryono, a former deputy of the Corruption
Eradication Commission of the Republic of Indonesia (Komisi Pemberantasan
Korupsi – [KPK]), noted it would be easier for the KPK to supervise these prisoners
if they were housed in a special prison (Tempo.Co, 2008). Diansyah believed that, if
they were jailed separately, these prisoners would tend to receive different treatment
and facilities because they have more money to pay the prison officers than ordinary
prisoners do (Tempo.Co, 2008). Thus, corruptor inmates would be more comfortable
during their incarceration because they would have extra facilities or luxurious rooms
with sophisticated appliances, which are not allowed for ordinary inmates. This
situation is likely to make supervision easier. Further, it might be easier for the
prison officers and authorities to supervise and apply specific treatments for
corruptors.
To what extent is a special prison for terrorist inmates needed, specifically in
the Indonesian context? As mentioned earlier, the current study found that
Indonesian prison officers agreed with this initiative. However, the focus group
results also highlighted several impacts from the establishment of a special prison for
terrorist inmates. The results indicated that this initiative might have both advantages
and disadvantages. These findings are discussed in the following section.
152 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
6.3 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A SPECIAL PRISON
FOR TERRORIST INMATES
In addition to agreement on the establishment of a special prison for convicted
terrorists, a broad theme on the advantages and disadvantages of the special prison
emerged. Focus group participants noted several factors that must be considered
during the establishment of this prison, both positive and negative.
In answering questions about their views on the establishment of a special
prison for terrorist prisoners, overall agreement was followed by explanations of
advantages and disadvantages. Specifically, one focus group participant said:
To my understanding, Indonesia has approximately 270 or 280 terrorist
prisoners. If they were held in one special prison, it will have positive and
negative impacts. (FG1:3)
Similarly:
If terrorist prisoners were housed in a special detention centre, separated
from other prison populations, this policy will produce good and bad sides
indeed. (FG3:1)
From the series of focus groups, three issues under the advantages theme of a
terrorist prison were identified: improving security and supervision, preventing the
spread of radicalisation in prisons, and increasing the likelihood of terrorist
deradicalisation. On the other hand, two issues under the disadvantages theme were
identified: increased solidarity among terrorist convicts, and hindering the collection
of intelligence data. Analysis of these insights is discussed in the following sub-
sections.
6.3.1 Advantages
Participants thought a special prison for terrorist inmates would probably lead
to improved security and supervision. Some participants argued that “security might
be easier to be maintained” (FG1:3) and that “it could improve supervision for
terrorist prisoners” (FG3:1). By segregating terrorist inmates, there is no opportunity
for conflict between them and other types of inmates. In contrast, if they are held in a
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 153
general prison, the chances of conflict are high because of the various types of
prisoners held in these prisons. For example, in a case in Cipinang Prison, solidarity
among terrorist inmates grew in opposition to criminal gangs (ICG, 2007, p. 7).
A special prison for terrorist inmates was viewed by focus group participants as
likely to prevent the spread of radicalisation in prisons. As one focus group
participant put it:
Concerns about recruitment of other targeted prison population were nil. It
was because they were only one group, terrorist inmates. (FG1:3)
Furthermore, another focus group participant said that:
The advantages? Surely they cannot establish a new group with ordinary
inmates as new members. There was no way to communicate with other
types of inmates. (FG3:1)
Lastly, participants thought a specialised prison would increase the
opportunities to achieve deradicalisation. A special prison for terrorist inmates would
be supported by both professional officers and specific programs for terrorist
inmates. For example, a focus group participant said:
I do believe that the establishment of special prison for terrorist prisoners
will be followed by the availability of specific programs to be applied for
terrorist inmates. So the goal of terrorist rehabilitation can be achieved. We
don’t have this resource in general prisons. (FG2:2)
On the availability of professional officers for terrorist rehabilitation, a
participant noted:
If this prison is established, I do believe that it will be equipped with
professional officers who get specific training in dealing with the issue of
terrorism, including terrorist prisoners. (FG3:5)
154 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Because focus group participants believed that a special prison for terrorist
inmates would be equipped with professional officers and specific programs, they
also believed that the possibility of rehabilitating terrorist inmates would be
increased. These findings agree with the findings of other studies conducted by
Cropsey et al, in which conclude that “the smaller size of the prison, coupled with
more specialized staff, provide the formula for advancing the use of better practices”
(Cropsey, Wexler, Taxman, & Young, 2007, p. 80). On the other hand, they also
argue that “each special population is unique, and it is not adequate to provide
services or programs that are responsive to the needs of some offenders while
ignoring the needs of others” (Cropsey, Wexler, Taxman, & Young, 2007, p. 80).
This statement indicates that a specialised prison for specific offenders may face
challenges, regardless its benefit (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. 51;
Mulcahy, Merrington, & Bell, 2013, p. 11). Related to this issue, the following
subsection discusses the findings about the disadvantages of the establishment of a
special prison for terrorist inmates in Indonesia.
6.3.2 Disadvantages
Participants were concerned about increased solidarity among terrorist
prisoners, who they thought could become a strong terrorist group due to regular
interaction among these prisoners. The following quotes illustrate the participants’
perception that terrorist inmates would gain solidarity inside a special prison facility:
Due to daily interaction and chance to interact each other, they will become
a strong terrorist group. I do believe they will have an intense discussion
regarding their beliefs inside this special prison. (FG3:5)
If they were held in the special prison together, I think they will have a
leader which is an ideologue or non-cooperative terrorist inmate. This leader
will be respected and followed by all terrorist inmates. It was the reality that
I experienced in dealing with terrorist inmates. (FG1:3)
Moreover, a cooperative terrorist inmate could become more radical and then
become a non-cooperative terrorist (i.e. high risk, hard core, or an ideologue). This
transformation could occur because other ideologue or non-cooperative terrorist
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 155
inmates would have ample opportunity to spread their radical beliefs to cooperative
convicted terrorists (i.e. supporters). A focus group participant said that:
In this special prison, if they were mixed between non-cooperative and
cooperative terrorist inmates, I believe that they who are cooperative terrorist
inmates or low risk terrorist inmates will be affected by those who are non-
cooperative. Non-cooperative terrorist inmates will transfer their radical
beliefs so those who are cooperative terrorist inmates might be become more
radicals. (FG2:1)
Given the identified possible disadvantages, there is a potential further
investigation warranted on the drawbacks of the establishment of a special prison for
terrorist inmates. Moreover, a previous study (El-Said, 2012) has indicated a concern
with the initiative to establish isolation policies for terrorist inmates after examining
the approaches of Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen. He pointed out that isolating violent extremists from each other
and from other ordinary inmates, “without a professional, comprehensive and
financially sustainable de-radicalisation programme, supported by consciously
designed prison policy”, it could be resulting in hardening violent extremists’ views
(El-Said, 2012). Further, other less violent terrorist inmates could be persuaded by
violent extremists to adopt violent practices, as has happened in Jordan in the past
(El-Said, 2012, p. 46).
Neumann (2010, p. 21) also demonstrated that holding all convicted terrorists
in a separate prison facility or concentration was beneficial in that these inmates
would no longer adhere to their former leader or may have already turned against
their former leader. However, if they still engaged with their group and their leader, a
new structure might be created. Hence, the nature of the terrorist group should be
examined before a particular policy is selected.
Turning now to the focus group findings on hindering collection of intelligence
data, concern was expressed about reduced opportunities to gather intelligence data
on terrorist inmates’ activities inside the prison. Because the prison would only hold
terrorist inmates, opportunities to use non-terrorist inmates as informants to gather
intelligent data would be lost. Some information might still be forthcoming, but the
156 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
validity of the information would be unknowns. As a focus group participant said
that:
If in this special prison only occupied by terrorist prisoners, for example 10
terrorist inmates. Like or dislike, I would gain information from only those
10 people. But, are they willing to say the truth? I don’t think so. It was
different with the situation where they were housed in the general prison
with other types of inmates. Here for example, there are 1700-plus prisoners
while terrorist inmates were below than 20. For gathering intelligent data, I
can ask the rest of population. Might be information from around 50
prisoners was enough. (FG3:1)
This quote illustrates that, if terrorist prisoners are held in general prisons and
are integrated with other types of inmates, intelligence data can be collected via other
types of prisoners who cooperate with officers. This cooperation is important to
prison officers for security and supervision reasons. Such opportunities seem
unlikely if all the inmates in the prison are terrorists.
However, one participant said that “even though they were housed in the
special prison, I think we still can gather data from those who are classified as
medium-risk or low-risk terrorist inmates” (FG2:5). But he also stressed that “the
chance was limited and not as many as if they were housed in a general prison
together with ordinary inmates” (FG2:5). Thus, although gathering information
within a special prison for terrorists is possible, it would not be easy. From the focus
group results, it can be concluded that difficulties in gathering intelligence data are a
key disadvantage of establishing a special prison for terrorist inmates.
The initiative of establishing a special prison for convicted terrorists in the
Indonesian context needs further evaluation in order to determine if it leads to or
correlates with better deradicalisation or rehabilitation of terrorist convicts. Research
could investigate to what extent establishing a special prison supports the
achievement of rehabilitation and supervision objectives. The current results on the
perceived advantages and disadvantages of the initiative imply that further research
is needed. A question might be: To what extent do the advantages of establishing a
special prison for terrorist prisoners outweigh the disadvantages in the Indonesian
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 157
context? In addition, a cost–benefit analysis could be done, because the limited
funding in developing countries such as Indonesia is always a big issue.
6.4 POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO A SPECIAL PRISON FOR
TERRORIST INMATES
In the previous sections two broad themes were discussed regarding
establishment of a special prison for terrorist inmates: agreement on the need for
such a special prison, and the advantages and disadvantages of such a prison.
Another broad theme emerged around policy issues for the future management of
this special prison. Five issues were identified as of concern for the management of
this special prison:
1. The distribution criterion for the categories of terrorist inmates that should
be sent to a terrorist prison.
2. The decision maker for the distribution.
3. Distribution timing.
4. Strengthening partnerships.
5. Data availability on terrorist prisoners’ backgrounds.
Focus group participants argued that these issues must be considered if a
specialised prison for terrorists is to be established in Indonesia. Policies regarding
these issues could be grouped into three broad themes: the type of inmates,
distribution, and partnership. Policy 1 on the distribution criterion for the categories
of terrorist inmates that should be sent to a terrorist prison falls under the theme of
the type of inmates. Policies 2 and 3 on the decision maker for the distribution and
the distribution timing fall under the theme of distribution. Policies 4 and 5 on
strengthening partnerships and data availability on terrorist prisoners’ backgrounds
fall under the theme of partnership.
Figure 6.1 (in the next page) is a visual summary of the findings on the future
policy issues regarding the establishment of the special prison. The findings are
interrelated, with the main issue being the future management of the prison.
158 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Figure 6.1 Findings on the Future Policy Issues of a Special Prison for Terrorist Inmates
Merola and Vovak (2012, p. 754) concluded that policies on the incarceration
of religious extremists and individuals with terrorist ties are essential. They also
explained that it is useful to conduct research by asking the greatest experts in the
corrections field. Their study employed a survey of wardens at maximum security
state prisons in the US, including questions on policy, training, and other issues
related to the incarceration of extremist individuals (Merola & Vovak, 2012, p. 737).
In addition, their findings on several issues regarding the management of a special
prison for terrorist inmates are significant. The study provides empirical evidence for
the future on identifying strategic policies and formulating procedures in the context
establishing a special prison for terrorist inmates in Indonesia. Moreover, these issues
were identified from the implementers’ experiences, so the findings contain valuable
and practical recommendations. These findings are particularly relevant for the DGC,
the institution responsible for the management of such a prison, as well as for the
BNPT, the coordinator of the national deradicalisation program, which is responsible
for providing a national action plan for deradicalisation.
Types of Inmates
• Who should be sent? Non-cooperative inmates
Distri-bution
• Distribution timing
• Decision maker for distribution
Partner-ships
• Should be strengthened
• Sharing data on terrorist background
Policy Issues
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 159
6.4.1 Type of Inmate: Non-cooperative Terrorist Inmates
The most notable policy issue was about the placement criterion for terrorist
inmates. Which terrorist inmates would be housed in this special prison? Should it be
all terrorist prisoners or a selection only? A common view among focus group
participants was that non-cooperative terrorist inmates (high risk, hard core, or the
ideologue) must be housed in this special prison. One focus group participant said
that:
If the Government does establish this special prison, the population should
be non-cooperative terrorist inmates. It should be selected then who are non-
cooperative terrorist inmates. For those who are cooperative terrorist inmates
can be still held here in this general prison. So terrorist inmates with strong
ideology or hard liners must be housed in the special prison. (FG3:3)
Another focus group participant agreed, saying that:
So this special prison, as expressed by [Mr FG3:3] must be a prison for
terrorist inmates who are classified as non-cooperative terrorist inmates.
They are radicals. As long as they are willing to cooperate with the officers,
I think they do not need to be housed in the special prison. (FG3:1).
As discussed above, focus group participants suggested that non-cooperative
and cooperative terrorist inmates must be placed separately. These results are
consistent with those of another study (Bakti, 2014) that urge that terrorist inmates
must be identified and then classified into the leaders and the followers. Within these
classifications, Bakti (2014, pp. 199-200) suggested that those who are terrorist
leaders must be housed separately from other terrorist inmates, including militants
and supporters.
The following comments explain why the Indonesian prison officers suggested
housing non-cooperative terrorist inmates (high risk or hard core or the ideologue) in
the special prison:
160 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
I believe such special prison will be equipped with suitable resources to
handle non-cooperative terrorist prisoners, or ideologue, or high risk terrorist
prisoners. This was not evident in general prisons, so if the non-cooperative
terrorist inmates were housed here, we will find difficulties to rehabilitate
this type of terrorist inmates. (FG3:2)
Non-cooperative terrorist inmates must be placed in the special prison. It is
because they are so strong to hold their ideology, and we can do nothing
with that. But for medium or cooperative terrorist inmates they can be
rehabilitated here in general prison. (FG2:1)
Focus group participants believed that whatever the program implemented for
non-cooperative terrorist inmates, it would not be effective in general prisons. On the
other hand, prison officers were willing to rehabilitate terrorist inmates, particularly
those who are medium risk (grey group) and cooperative terrorist inmates. Although
they agree with the establishment of a special prison for terrorist inmates, they are
still willing to deal with some terrorist inmates in the general prisons in which they
work. They believe that low-risk and medium-risk terrorists can be handled and can
be deradicalised, and they are willing to implement a prison-based deradicalisation
program for these inmates.
In conclusion, regarding which group of terrorist inmates should be housed in a
special prison, the results indicated that non-cooperative terrorist inmates, the
ideologues, the hardliners, and the high-risk terrorist inmates should be housed there.
However, this finding differs from the intended policy proposed by the DGC and the
BNPT. Although the Director General of Corrections, I Wayan K Dusak, stated that
the DGC planned to build a high-security prison for non-cooperative terrorist inmates
in Nusakambangan, an official launch indicated that the special prison for terrorist
inmates located in Sentul, Bogor, East Java, was for cooperative terrorist inmates
(Ditjenpas RI, 2016b).
Thus the intended policy contradicts the realised policy, which could lead to
problems in practice. This finding agrees with that of Veldhuis et al. that “the
discrepancies between the intended and realised policy reveal that the dilemmas that
could have been foreseen in advance indeed led to difficulties in practice” (Veldhuis,
Gordijn, Lindenberg, & Veenstra, 2010). Therefore, this issue needs further research,
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 161
to answer this question: Is it more appropriate to place non-cooperative terrorist
inmates or cooperative terrorist inmates in the special prison for terrorists?
The results also showed the majority of focus group participants confirmed that
they could implement deradicalisation or rehabilitation programs for terrorist inmates
who were classified as cooperative terrorist inmates; that is, the supporters, and
medium-risk or low-risk terrorist inmates. This finding implies that not all terrorist
inmates should be held in the special prison. Participants agreed that cooperative
terrorist inmates can be housed and placed in general prisons, where they can interact
with ordinary inmates. This result highlights that the Indonesian prison officers
strongly believed in separating non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates.
The finding supports previous research carried out by Dugas and Kruglanski (2014)
in the context of the Sri Lankan deradicalisation program. Their study found that
segregation of the more and the less seriously committed offenders reduced inmates’
rejection of deradicalisation (Dugas & Kruglanski, 2014).
6.4.2 Decision Maker for the Distribution
A key policy issue was who will decide the placement of convicted terrorists?
Should it be decided by prison officers? A focus group participant argued that it must
be decided by the Indonesian National Police (INP), specifically by the Special
Detachment (Detasemen Khusus – [Densus]) 88:
The decision maker must be the INP, in this regard was Detachment 88. I
believe that they are the first officers who really engage in the identifying
characteristics or personalities of a single terrorist inmate. They understand it
because they’ve got lots of data on a single suspected terrorist. So in
deciding the distribution of a convicted terrorist, it should be decided by the
INP, especially by Detachment 88. (FG3:1)
Similarly, another participant implied that the decision maker for the placement
of convicted terrorists to the special prison should be the INP since “they have all
data from the investigation processes” (FG1:3). However, a focus group participant
at a different site commented that it must be decided by the BNPT:
162 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
For the assessment of a convicted terrorist in the special prison, it should be
BPNT’s task. They then should select it, which one for the inmates who
were non-cooperative and cooperative. (FG2:4)
In conclusion, the focus group participants did not regard themselves as
decision makers for the placement of terrorist prisoners in the special prison. This
suggests that the risk assessment processes for terrorist inmates should not be
responsibility of prison officers, but should be conducted by other authorities.
Further, the question is what individual professional should decide the distribution of
convicted terrorists? The results show that it should be decided by either the INP,
specifically by the Detachment 88, or the BNPT.
This result explicitly informs who the key actors for risk and needs assessment
of terrorist inmates should be. The actor identifies an individual convicted terrorist,
and classifies them as a non-cooperative, a cooperative, or a “grey” terrorist inmate
(in between non-cooperative and cooperative). According to the above results and
discussion, those who are classified as non-cooperative terrorist inmates should then
be housed in the special prison, with the others dispersed in general prisons.
There are two possible explanations why Indonesian prison officers do not
want to handle this responsibility. The first is a lack of training related to the
readiness of Indonesian prison officers to deal with terrorist inmates, as discussed in
Chapter 5. The second is unclear job descriptions among agencies that are involved
in prison-based deradicalisation programs, which result from a lack of coordination
and cooperation among state agencies, as also discussed in Chapter 5. There are three
state agencies that are at the forefront of this issue: the DGC, the BNPT, and the INP.
However, they had offered no risk and needs assessments at the time of writing.
Nevertheless, the results above should be interpreted with caution, and
possibility investigated further. It is to ensure that the Indonesian prison officers are
not avoiding responsibility for the task of risk assessments for terrorist inmates for
the wrong reasons.
Regarding this issue, a regulation has been introduced by the Ministry of Law
and Human Rights: the Regulation of Ministry of Law and Human Rights Number
12 year 2013 on the Risk and Need Assessment for Prisoner and Probationer
(Assessment Risiko dan Assessment Kebutuhan bagi Narapidana dan Klien
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 163
Pemasyarakatan). Although the assessor and the supervisor responsible for
conducting risk and needs assessments for prison inmates are not stipulated
explicitly, this regulation implicitly places the responsibility on the prison officers.
Article 1 paragraph 3, in Chapter I on General Provisions stipulates that the meaning
of “officer” in this regulation is a prison officer.
Subsequently, the title of Chapter III of this regulation nominates the officer
(i.e. the prison officer) as the implementer of risk and need assessments for prisoners.
In other words, based on the interpretation of the Regulation of Ministry of Law and
Human Rights Number 12 year 2013, prison officers are the official officers for the
purposes of assessing the risk and needs of an individual prisoner, including a
terrorist inmate. However, as the results of the current study show that prison officers
face difficulties in handling this task, further research is recommended on who
should be responsible for the risk and needs assessments of terrorist inmates.
6.4.3 Timing of Distribution to the Special Prison
Focus group participants believed that all convicted terrorists should be sent
directly to the special prison, not to a general prison, after they are sentenced by the
courts, even those classified as cooperative convicted terrorists and without any
preliminary risk assessment. After some time, specifically when they show good
behaviour and a decreased inclination to support terror acts or violence, they might
be sent to a general prison.
The following quotes emphasise the participants’ belief that a convicted
terrorist must be sent directly to the special prison, and that decisions to hold a
convicted terrorist in the special prison or to move them to a general prison should be
based on the result of a risk assessment. Focus group participants said that:
Soon after the conviction, they must be housed in the special prison. After
they receive specific treatments and activities and they have been assessed as
cooperative terrorist inmates or low risk, then they could be housed in
general prisons, such as in Cipinang, Palembang, Jember, etc. But, for those
who still identified as ‘ideologue’ or non-cooperative terrorist inmates, they
must be still there in the special prison. (FG1:3)
164 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Yes, they must be held in the special prison for terrorist prisoners since the
court sentenced the prisoner to jail. Then, they should participate in the
prison-based deradicalisation program organised by the special prison
authorities. Based on the risk assessment, non-cooperative terrorist inmates
must be still there in the special prison; meanwhile the cooperative or low
risk then could be dispersed to general prisons. (FG3:5)
These results show that Indonesian prison officers disagree with the existing
practice of sending convicted terrorists to general prison after they are sentenced. As
noted in Chapter 2, terrorist inmates are placed in several Indonesian prisons and
detention centres after they are convicted. A focus group participant strongly
disagreed with this existing practice:
I strongly disagree if convicted terrorists were sent to the special prison in
three months before they were released. To me, it will not be a real
deradicalisation for just three months before they were released. Convicted
terrorists must be distributed to this special prison directly after they are
convicted by the court. (FG2:2)
Overall, these results indicate that the Indonesian prison officers think that a
convicted terrorist should be placed into special prison directly after the court
verdict, and that a prison-based deradicalisation program should be implemented in
this special prison. After a risk assessment is completed by the authority in the
special prison, a terrorist inmate who is classified as cooperative can then be sent to a
general prison to receive further intervention from the correctional services.
Combining this finding with the previous finding on the willingness of the
Indonesian prison officers to rehabilitate cooperative terrorist inmates, the officers
consider that a general prison can be used to hold terrorist inmates, but only after
they are deradicalised in the special prison.
According to the Indonesian law of criminal procedures, the distribution of a
convicted offender should accord with the court jurisdiction in which they were
convicted. For example, for a criminal act committed in Denpasar, a suspect will be
both accused and convicted in Denpasar District Court, and then sent to a prison that
covers the Denpasar region. In this case, the convicted offender will be sent to
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 165
Kerobokan Prison. The case of Schapelle Corby, an Australian woman who was
charged with drugs offences, is an example of the distribution of a convicted
offender. She was found guilty in 2005 by Denpasar District Court and sentenced to
20 years in prison. She was then sent to Kerobokan Prison.
However, transferring an inmate to another prison outside the jurisdiction
where the criminal acts were committed is acceptable. The legal basis for transferring
prisoners to other prisons is Government Regulation No. 31 year 1999 on Guidance
of Prisoners, specifically stated in articles 46 to 54. This analysis is consistent with
the report of the ICG (2007, p. 7), which acknowledged that:
In Indonesia, there is not a single strategy, although there is a general policy
that prisoners who are threats to internal prison security should be
segregated; this includes narcotics offenders and those accused of terrorism.
If a national action plan stipulates that a convicted terrorist must be housed in
the special prison for terrorist inmates, regardless of their risk and needs, the opinion
of Indonesian prison officers could be realised easily. This process is likely to be
adopted by the Indonesian criminal justice agencies, and particularly the court.
However, until Indonesia completes a national action plan on prison-based
deradicalisation program, court decisions on distribution of terrorist inmates will
remain unclear. In the meantime, the current practice applied in the Indonesian
criminal justice system, where the prisoner is housed within the court jurisdiction in
which the trial was conducted, will continue.
6.4.4 Strengthening Partnerships
Strengthening partnerships also emerged as a policy issue for the management
of special prisons for terrorist inmates. This issue relates to the state agencies that
will be involved in the management of the special prison. Focus group participants
believed that, in order to deradicalise or rehabilitate terrorist inmates in a special
prison, some key state agencies should be involved: the INP, the BNPT, the DGC,
and the MoRA (FG1; FG2; and FG3). Among these key state agencies, effective
coordination and distribution of responsibilities should be developed; otherwise,
deradicalisation objectives and rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners will never be
achieved. Focus group data emphasised these views:
166 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Related to the management of the special prison for terrorist inmates, some
state agencies must be involved in it and then specific responsibility must be
identified. For example, the INP or Detachment 88 was responsible for the
security. For correctional services, that’s the prison officers’ responsibility.
However, for religious matters it should be under the MoRA. BNPT can
provide the real programs for terrorist deradicalisation. Something like that.
(FG2:3)
And, for this special prison, I do agree with [Mr FG2:3]. Dealing with
terrorist inmates is not just the prison officers’ task. Corrections, the police,
MoRA, BNPT must be working collaboratively. (FG2:4)
I also agree with [Mr FG2:3’s] opinions. So those institutions must be
responsible for the management of the special prison for terrorist inmates:
the police, BNPT, and corrections. (FG2:5)
Of these state agencies that should be involved in the prison-based
deradicalisation program in the special prison for terrorist prisoners, focus group
participants said the BNPT should be the coordinator. For example, one participant
said that:
I hope that BNPT will be the coordinator for the prison-based
deradicalisation program in Indonesia and of course for this special prison.
BNPT has the power to invite other state agencies to be involved in the
prison-based deradicalisation program since BNTP was a state agency
directly under the President. We can support them. (FG1:3)
Other focus group participants said:
BNPT should be the main agency on prison-based deradicalisation
programs. (FG3:5)
BNPT must be the first institution on terrorist’s rehabilitation. It was because
our organisation’s [DGC’s] vision and mission is not specifically directed to
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 167
terrorist inmates, while BNPT has it. From the beginning until the
interventions for terrorist inmates, it should be under BNPT. (FG2:3)
Furthermore, an interesting finding was the officers’ view on the level of
coordination between the DGC and the BNPT on the prison-based deradicalisation
program at the coalface. Even though participants emphasised that the BNPT must be
the coordinator, they expressed the view that the BNPT must work actively with the
DGC to implement the program. Focus group participants said that:
BNPT’s staff and prison officers must be working together. We have to be
like that on deradicalisation. Don’t put us at the front and BNPT’s staff at the
back. Again, we must be working together. That’s what we want. (FG2:4)
If this prison is established, BNPT must work directly in the field with the
prison officers. We must be working together to implement prison-based
deradicalisation programs. (FG1:3)
Apparently, Indonesian prison officers explicitly hope that effective
coordination between the BNPT and the DGC occurs to implement the prison-based
deradicalisation program. The officers felt that the DGC should not act alone and that
the BNPT should also become actively involved. Furthermore, Indonesian prison
officers and BNPT staff should work together to implement the deradicalisation
program in the special prison for terrorist inmates.
To sum up, the result of this study indicated that partnerships must be
strengthened for management of the special prison for terrorist inmates. There are
four state institutions that were recommended to be actively involved in the
management of the prison, namely DGC, INP, BNPT, and MoRA. Due to the
involvement of many agencies, a specific task must be given to each agency. As
described on the previous section, the findings indicated that DGC is responsible for
day-to-day management and INP for the security. BNPT on the other hand was
responsible for designing the programs, while MoRA in supporting high profile
clerics or Islamic scholars.
168 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
In terms of strengthening partnerships as a policy issue in the management of
the special prison for terrorist inmates, no studies have explored this. However, good
collaboration among institutions on the management of terrorist inmates in prisons
has been recommended in several studies, such as Vogt’s article in the context of US
corrections. He argued that “active cooperation between local, state, and federal
corrections and law enforcement organisations involved in anti-terrorism efforts is
essential” (Vogt, p. 6). Specifically related to the Indonesian context, Ungerer (2011,
p. 19) recommended that the coordination among the BNPT, the INP and prison
services should be improved in the efforts to rehabilitate convicted terrorists. Further
research on the topic of collaborative mechanisms for the management of the
Indonesian special prison for terrorist prisoners is recommended.
6.4.5 Availability of Data on the Background of Convicted Terrorists
In addition to strengthening partnerships, the results also indicated that to
support the rehabilitation effort in the special prison for terrorist inmates, data on
prisoners’ backgrounds should be passed to prison officers, including the officers
who will be in charge. This implies the need for management reform of the existing
criminal justice processes for handing terrorism cases. Focus group participants said
that:
We are part of the criminal justice system right? It consists of the
investigator, prosecutor, and the judge until the prison officers. They all have
data on terrorist inmates’ backgrounds except the prison officers. It must be
synchronised from the beginning until the end. So that’s why the data on a
convicted terrorist should also be passed to prison officers as the
implementers of the criminal justice system. (FG1:3)
There should be a completed document covered the terrorists inmate’s
background since the investigation processes by the police officers. From
this document, we will have preliminary data about the convicted terrorist.
We can learn about the motivation of the offender from this document. More
importantly, from this document we can classify the convicted terrorist
whether they are an ideologue, a medium risk, or low risk or just a supporter.
So this data is important to be passed to prison officers who work at this
special prison. (FG2:3)
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 169
As evident from the statements above, currently Indonesian prison officers do
not have enough information or data regarding the background and characteristics of
convicted terrorists. After an accused terrorist has been convicted and sent to prison,
they do not transfer with complete data on their background. This data is actually
available as a consequence of the investigation, prosecution, and trial stages; but
when the accused is convicted, the information is not passed to correction staff.
Prison directors receive only a short summary of the court verdict (petikan putusan),
which mainly contains brief information on identity of the convict, the criminal acts
for which they were committed, and the punishment.
As presented above, available data on convicted terrorists’ backgrounds is
critical for Indonesian prison officers. Participants were not satisfied with the current
practice. Based on their experiences, they consider a full copy of the court verdict,
rather than the current extract. A full copy of the court verdict is vital in order to
investigate a terrorist inmate’s background.
Based on the Article 226 (1) Indonesian Law Number 8, year 1981 on the Law
of Criminal Procedure (Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Acara Pidana – [KUHAP]),
the extract of the court verdict is passed to the convicted or his lawyers. On the other
hand, a full copy of the court verdict is passed to the prosecutor and the investigator
based on Article 226 (2) KUHAP. In relation to the provision of Article 270
KUHAP, a full copy of the court verdict is passed by the clerks to the prosecutor as
the executor of the court verdict. Although it is not stated explicitly in the KUHAP
that a full copy of the court verdict should be passed to the prison officers, these
provisions mean that a full copy of the court verdict should be received by the prison
officers through the prosecutor. In this case, the prosecutor has to pass a full copy of
the court verdict to the prison officers.
A full copy of the court verdict is a valuable document for the Indonesian
prison officers in order to provide preliminary data for the risk assessment of
individual terrorist inmates. However, no studies are available on this issue.
Although the ICG (2007, p. ii) recommended the Indonesian Government provide
assistance for the criminal justice system agencies in terms of sharing background
information on terrorist inmates, this recommendation has not been investigated
thoroughly. Future studies on the topic of Indonesian criminal justice procedures,
170 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
particularly on the management of legal data on terrorist convicts, are therefore
recommended.
6.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has presented findings on the perspectives of Indonesian prison
officers on the establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners. To gain
insights into this issue, the study employed a thematic qualitative analysis. Primary
data was collected through a series of focus group discussions with Indonesian prison
officers, while secondary data was gathered from existing research and relevant state
documents.
Throughout this chapter it was revealed that there was an absolute agreement
among the participants in the focus groups regarding the establishment of a special
prison for terrorist inmates in Indonesia. This policy was wanted by the prison
officers, regardless of its impact on counterterrorism. Furthermore, this chapter has
presented officers’ opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of a special prison;
hence, officers realised the potential drawbacks of this initiative. A number of policy
issues regarding the future management of this special prison are also presented in
this chapter.
The first is the distribution criterion to determine which categories of terrorist
inmates should be sent to a terrorist prison. Most focus group participants believed
that non-cooperative terrorist inmates must be sent to a special prison for terrorists.
The second issue is the decision maker for the distribution; participants
considered this should be the officers of the BNPT’s staff or Detachement (Densus)
88’s officers. The reason for this is that the officers feel that they do not have enough
knowledge and information to make such decisions.
The third issue is the timing of distribution. The officers recommended that,
after the court verdict, all convicted terrorists should be sent to and housed in the
special prison for terrorists. After evaluation by the authorities in this prison, terrorist
prisoners who are identified as cooperative or “grey” individuals can be sent to
general prisons to undertake further rehabilitation programs.
The fourth issue is strengthening partnerships. Because many institutions are
involved in the program for terrorist inmates, this chapter highlights that partnerships
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 171
are highly important in the implementation of the prison-based deradicalisation
program.
Lastly, the fifth issue is availability of data on terrorist prisoners’ backgrounds.
This policy issue is related to the partnerships issue because the focus group
participants stated they need data on terrorists’ background from other officers
involved in terrorism cases, such as the police or the prosecutor who investigated the
case.
The next chapter discusses strategies that can be used to improve the role of
Indonesian prison officers in the task of terrorist rehabilitation. The focus is the need
of the officers and how these needs can be met, and providing policy
recommendations and legal reforms for improving Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation program.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 173
Improving the Role of
Indonesian Prison Officers in
Terrorist Rehabilitation: A
Strategy for the Future
Prison and other officials who are professionally involved with violent
extremist offenders could be appropriately trained and educated to
understand and deal with the complexities of reintegration and rehabilitation
efforts. Prison staff and professionals involved in rehabilitation programs
could be trained to distinguish signs of radicalisation, communicate in a way
that is constructive and avoids conflict, and respond appropriately to a
potential extremist threat. (Good Practice Number 5 of the Rome
Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of
Violent Extremist Offenders)
This chapter presents the findings and discussion pertaining to Research
Question 3, that is, an examination and assessment of strategies to improve the role
of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation
programs. The first section (Section 7.1) of this chapter provides an overview,
followed by a discussion on the role of Indonesian prison officers in the
rehabilitation of terrorist convicts (Section 7.2). Section 7.3 presents the findings and
discussion on the needs of Indonesian prison officers regarding terrorist
rehabilitation. A correspondence between the findings on the challenges and the
needs of Indonesian prison officers regarding terrorist rehabilitation is discussed in
the Section 7.4. Section 7.5 discusses strategies for improving the role of Indonesian
prison officers in deradicalisation. Section 7.6 concludes the chapter.
By offering strategies for improvement, this chapter is a significant
contribution by the researcher to knowledge about prison-based deradicalisation
programs in the Indonesian context. Besides extending the body of knowledge, this
chapter also provides a significant practical contribution to the Government of
Indonesia, especially for the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) of the
174 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Republic of Indonesia in order to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in
terrorist deradicalisation.
7.1 OVERVIEW
The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine and provide strategies for
Indonesia, or other countries that hold terrorist inmates, on ways to improve the role
of prison officers in rehabilitating convicted terrorists within prison-based
deradicalisation programs. As discussed in Chapter 5, the role of Indonesian prison
officers in terrorist rehabilitation has been constrained by many challenges in
implementing prison-based programs. In this chapter, the needs of Indonesian prison
officers as the implementers of the program are investigated. A link between the
findings on the needs of the officers and the findings on their challenges in
implementing the program was developed; the needs and the challenges are
correlated.
Following this, policy recommendations for improving the role of Indonesian
prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation are then considered. Policy
recommendations specifically for the DGC of the Republic of Indonesia have been
identified: capacity building for prison officers who are in charge of terrorist
rehabilitation; developing collaborative mechanisms with other actors; and
developing a good partnership with the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan
Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]). Furthermore, these policy
recommendations must be implemented by removing the ambiguity that exists in the
current regulation related to the appointed implementer of the program in Indonesia.
The ambiguity lies in the provision in Article 34A (1) paragraph c, Government
Regulation Number 99, the year 2012 on the Second Amendment to Government
Regulation Number 32 the year 1999 on Conditions and Implementing Procedures
Related to Prisoner Rights. This provision, which nominates two institutions as the
implementers of the program, must be amended. This requirement produces an
ambiguity for both institutions in the implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation program.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 175
7.2 THE ROLE OF INDONESIAN PRISON OFFICERS IN TERRORIST
REHABILITATION
Currently, three state institutions are involved in Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation programs: the Indonesian National Police (INP), the BNPT and the
DGC. Based on this situation, the implementing actors at the coalface are generally
police officers, BNPT’s staff, and prison officers. Although the roles of both
Indonesian prison officers and BNPT’s staff are significant, the prison officers’ role
in terrorist rehabilitation is crucially important. Therefore, this role should be
examined; the prison lies near the end of the processes of the criminal justice system.
As noted by Osman (2014), most convicted terrorists will be housed in prisons.
Under the existing laws, the role of Indonesian prison officers as the
implementers of prison-based deradicalisation programs is not explicitly stipulated.
However, rehabilitating terrorist inmates and delivering prison-based deradicalisation
programs is an unavoidable task for prison officers for two reasons.
Firstly, under the general corrections system stipulated in Article 2 of the
Correctional Institution Law (CIL), the aim of the corrections system is to improve
and develop prisoners so that they do not violate the laws, and simultaneously to
encourage prisoners to fully reinvigorate and become active, productive, and useful
members of society. This law is an umbrella act for correctional services and must
therefore be applied for all prison inmates, including terrorist inmates.
Secondly, according to Article 2 (1) paragraph c of the Government Regulation
Number 99 year 2012 on the Second Amendment to Government Regulation
Number 32 year 1999 on Conditions and Implementing Procedures Related to
Prisoner Rights, a terrorist inmate should complete a deradicalisation program run by
the prison authorities and/or the BNPT, in order to be granted a remission. Although
this government regulation does not explicitly state that prison officers are the
implementers of the program, the above stipulation implies that they are the
implementers, whether or not the BNPT’s staff are involved.
Thus, it is inevitable that prison officers are the implementers of Indonesia’s
prison-based deradicalisation programs. They can work independently or collectively
with prison officers from other institutions. They also can work collaboratively with
other officers such as law enforcement officers and officials from the BNPT, the
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), and non-government organisations (NGOs).
176 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Because Indonesian prison officers are the implementers of prison-based
deradicalisation programs, developing and improving their role is important in order
to increase their effectiveness in this task (Nurezki, 2013). Moreover, within the
special prison now established for terrorist inmates in Sentul Bogor, the role of
prison officers who work in this prison is of concern. These officers are the actors in
most frequent contact with terrorist inmates as an unavoidable outcome of this
initiative.
Hence, the findings presented in this chapter are valuable for the Government
of Indonesia in designing policies that aim to improve Indonesian prison officers’
role in terrorist rehabilitation, in both the special prison for terrorist inmates and
general prisons. The officers should be equipped with suitable resources to support
their role in terrorist rehabilitation.
For this reason, the actual needs of Indonesian prison officers in this regard
should be identified. The following section discusses the findings on the needs of
Indonesian prison officers in their task of rehabilitating terrorist inmates. For this
purpose, data were collected through focus group discussions and analysed by
applying qualitative thematic analysis.
7.3 THE NEEDS OF INDONESIAN PRISON OFFICERS ON TERRORIST
REHABILITATION
From the focus group data, two broad themes emerged about the needs of
Indonesian prison officers: direct needs and indirect needs. For the purpose of this
thesis, “direct needs” are defined as needs viewed through the lens of prison officers.
These needs are directly related to their role as implementers of terrorist
rehabilitation programs. During the focus groups, many participants expressed a
requirement for training and unambiguous knowledge about implementing prison-
based deradicalisation programs. “Indirect needs” are needs that are external to
prison officers that help Indonesian prison officers to carry out terrorist rehabilitation
inside the prison. This theme arose from discussions about, for example, the term of
deradicalisation that is used for terrorist rehabilitation program. How prison officers
and other officials should work collaboratively in the implementation of Indonesia’s
prison-based deradicalisation program is another example of an indirect need of
prison officers for terrorist rehabilitation.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 177
7.3.1 A Direct Need: Training
From the focus group data, two subthemes related to the direct need of training
for Indonesian prison officers in deradicalisation were evident: the need for training
on deradicalisation programs and the need for training on communication. The first
can be classified as training in “hard skills”, while the latter is training in “soft
skills”. The most surprising finding was that the officers did not nominate relevant
training to develop their religious knowledge. Although lack of knowledge on and
experience with religious Islamic teachings was acknowledged as a challenge in the
implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, training in this area was
not expressed as a need by the focus group participants.
The present findings are consistent with those of other research that concluded
that both training for prison officers and partnerships for terrorist rehabilitation are
important (Andrie, 2011; Gunaratna, 2011; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015;
Neumann, 2010). These two factors are required for effective terrorist rehabilitation,
along with visionary leadership (Gunaratna, 2011, p. 67).
The Need for Training on Deradicalisation
The need for training on deradicalisation arose in all three focus groups. This
finding indicates that the issue of training is one of the greatest concerns among
Indonesian prison officers. Focus group participants acknowledged that they have not
received training specifically about the prison-based deradicalisation program, either
from the DGC or from other state and non-state actors. Focus group participants said
that:
To be honest, we as a prison officer have not received any specific course or
training on the management of terrorist inmates. More specifically on
deradicalisation; how to change a radical person to be a good gentleman?
(FG1:5)
DGC has never provided training on deradicalisation program, how to carry
out the program. Suddenly, the regulation stipulated to be used for terrorist
inmates. We do not know what we have to do. Yes, there is nothing special
with the interventions or treatments for terrorist prisoners. So we just applied
the existing interventions and treatments as we have for any ordinary
178 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
inmates. That is a general rule for the treatment of prisoners as regulated in
the Law Number 12, 1995. (FG1:3)
Due to the lack of training on terrorist rehabilitation, focus group participants
explained that they rely on personal experiences in managing general prisoners,
which is mainly based on the CIL. Although they could transfer their experience in
rehabilitating ordinary inmates, the need for specific training on prison-based
deradicalisation programs was still a concern for the focus group participants. As
they noted that:
We need a specific training on deradicalisation as we don’t have any
knowledge about deradicalisation. How are we going to change their mind if
we were regarded as a foolish person? For example, how can a math teacher
teach mathematics effectively if his students have labelled him as a person
who do not understand math? (FG3:5)
My skills as a prison officer are directed only in the context of general
inmates. If the government would like to add deradicalisation program for
terrorist inmates, we need a specific training on terrorist deradicalisation.
(FG2:2)
Furthermore, when discussing their skills in terrorist rehabilitation, a focus
group participant said:
We, prison officers, do not have sufficient experiences in dealing with
terrorist inmates. Our knowledge is limited to the rehabilitation of general
prisoners. (FG3:5)
The main reason given for the need for specific training on deradicalisation
programs was lack of knowledge about and experience in deradicalisation. The
officers are grappling with a specific activity that must be applied for terrorist
inmates. Their actions under the deradicalisation program in the prison were based
on the CIL and its relevant regulations.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 179
In comparing the results of this study with those of previous studies, the need
for training for Indonesian prison officers to support their task of terrorist
rehabilitation is consistent with the findings of other studies (Gunaratna, 2011; ICG,
2007; Neumann, 2010) that have encouraged the authorities to provide a specific
training for officers working on detention centre for extremist offenders. Gunaratna
(2011, pp. 73-75) identified that a number of essential aspects should be considered
as a working model for terrorist rehabilitation. He identified 12 essential aspects
(Gunaratna, 2011, pp. 73-75), including the significance of ongoing training and
education (Gunaratna, 2011, p. 75).
At the international level, the need for well-trained prison officers working in
prisons with violent extremists has been recognised by the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which noted that:
Staffs are the most important element of any prison system. Prison
administrations should recognize this and devote ample amount of time and
resources in the recruitment, selection and training of people who work in
prison. Ensuring that prisons holding violent extremist prisoners has
sufficient number of well-trained staffs. (UNODC, 2016, p. 27)
In the Indonesian context, Andrie (2011, p. 3) suggested that training for prison
officers is established in order to develop their knowledge and skills in managing
terrorist inmates. Further, Nurezki (2013, p. 136) recommended that prison officials
who are in charge of deradicalisation programs should be trained properly to better
understand terrorists’ behaviour.
The finding of a lack of sufficient training organised by the state agencies, such
as the BNPT and the DGC, was disappointing. In fact, several NGOs have organised
training for Indonesian prison officers in the rehabilitation of prisoners. The NGOs’
training programs are appreciated by the prison officers, as mentioned in Chapter 5,
but the programs have lapsed due to limitations in both funding and time. In its
report, the Search for Common Ground (SFCG) recommended the DGC to take over
the program and run it on an ongoing basis for the prison officers (SFCG, 2013).
Moreover, the finding on the need for training for the Indonesian prison
officers will now be examined in light of the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices
180 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (hereafter
referred to as the Rome Memorandum). The Rome Memorandum is an international
initiative on the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders and is
related to the issue of radicalisation in prisons. It provides best practices to guide the
development of rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs (Stone, 2015, p. 221).
The memorandum contains 25 good practices for consideration by countries for
their deradicalisation programs. The importance of training for officials working in
prisons with terrorists and extremists is described in Good Practice numbers 5 and 9
of the Rome Memorandum. Good Practice Number 5 states “ensure, as appropriate,
that all relevant staff are professionally trained and educated to deal with the
complexities of reintegration or rehabilitation efforts” (Stone, 2015, p. 238). Further,
Good Practice Number 9 states “as the personnel in most frequent contact with the
inmates, it is important that prison officers understand and are carefully attuned to
the rehabilitation process, even if they are not directly responsible for its delivery”
(Stone, 2015, pp. 239-240).
Based on the current findings and these two good practices in the Rome
Memorandum, I argue and strongly recommend that the Government of Indonesia
provides appropriate training on deradicalisation and rehabilitation for terrorist
inmates to equip prison officers and other prison officials to deliver prison-based
deradicalisation programs. Nonetheless, further investigation is required to establish
aspects of an effective training program, such as the curriculum and the educators.
This is an important area for future research.
The Need for Training in Communication
Reflecting on personal experiences in maintaining relationships with prison
inmates, focus group participants noted that a persuasive approach was a useful
strategy for establishing a good relationship with terrorist inmates. As a participant
mentioned: “I keep trying to talk with them even though they do not wish to talk.
That’s the lesson from my own experiences working in the prison” (FG2:2).
Furthermore, other focus group participants said that:
To gain a better communication, I do a persuasive way with terrorist inmates
in this prison. I know, initially, terrorist inmates will be angry but at the end,
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 181
they will accept us. So the important thing is communication, it should be
interactive and persuasive. (FG2:4)
In line with [Mr FG2:4], what we can do was credible. We cannot be
repressive. (FG2:2)
This is an excellent attitude of the officers who have been dealing with terrorist
inmates. A constructive way to communicate and avoid conflict has been recognised
by the UNODC (2016, p. 101) in its handbook about the management of violent
extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalisation in prisons. Communication
skills are complementary to the hard skills of prison officers who are tasked with
terrorist rehabilitation. However, the findings show there is still a need for soft skills
training in communication. Focus group participants argued:
So the point is actually the officers should have excellent communication
skills. How can the officers get in touch with terrorist inmates if they cannot
express their idea clearly? (FG3:5)
We used the communicative way with all the inmates. In accordance with
the Law Number 12 the year 1995, we must be persuasive. We cannot be
repressive. Here we need a skill on communication. (FG2:4)
Moreover, in the context of collecting data about terrorist inmates for profiling
or identification, a focus group participant said that they “conducted an interview
with terrorist inmates” (FG2:3). As mentioned previously in Chapter 5, Indonesian
prison officers in charge of the management of terrorist inmates have the special task
of gathering data on the terrorist inmates’ background, officially called profiling or
identification. To collect the data, they use both quantitative and qualitative methods.
In doing so, soft skills training in communication is important. The comments of
focus group participants illustrate the need for such communication training:
We conducted interviews and observations for data collection for profiling.
We observe the dynamics of terrorist prisoners in the prison. For this task,
182 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
we do need skills for gaining better communication during collecting the
data. (FG1:3)
We need to be trained on communication. Since the inmate is different with
other, we do also need a specific approach to get in touch with them. Even
though we can develop communication skills with ordinary inmates easily, it
will not automatically work with terrorist inmates. (FG2:2)
The need for training in communication skills is supported by previous studies
(Al-Hitar, 2011; Braddock, 2014), which indicated communicative activities form
part of a deradicalisation program (e.g. psychological counselling, dialogue, and
religious debate). Although unintended effects may occur, persuasive communication
is considered an integral aspect of deradicalisation programs (Braddock, 2014).
Therefore, training in communication is imperative, and should form part of the
capacity building for Indonesian prison officers who are tasked with implementing
prison-based deradicalisation programs.
In addition, although the finding that officers’ lack of knowledge about
religious Islamic teachings is a challenge in the implementation of deradicalisation
programs (see Chapter 5), focus group participants did not raise training on this
matter as a concern. A study by Merola and Vovak (2012) describes the involvement
of service providers on religious matters in the context of incarceration of religious
extremists. In this regard, Indonesian prison officers might think that religious
activities are the responsibility of other professionals, particularly clerics and Islamic
scholars.
7.3.2 An Indirect Need: Good Partnerships
The theme of indirect needs emerged from the analysis. This theme arose in
discussions on the best way to deliver the deradicalisation program and on
cooperation with the BNPT in the implementation of the program. Two factors
pertaining to this theme were acknowledged by the focus group participants as
supporting their task of implementing the prison-based deradicalisation program. The
first is related to the requirement stipulated in legislation for other actors in the
implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs. The second is
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 183
related to the issue of collaboration with the BNPT within the implementation of
deradicalisation programs in the prison.
In addition, these two aspects were recognised as principal challenges in the
implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, as discussed in chapters 5
and 6. In this chapter, however, the analysis focuses on the needs of the Indonesian
prison officers for support in their task as the implementers of the program.
The Need for Other Actors
As mentioned in chapters 5 and 6, many actors involved in Indonesia’s prison-
based deradicalisation program. In discussing their needs in performing the task of
terrorist rehabilitation, focus group participants were concerned about the need for
assistance from other actors. Focus group participants noted:
On the responsibility of terrorist rehabilitation, it must not be only the task of
prison officers indeed. It must be a task of all institutions. (FG1:3)
If it just a responsibility of prison officers, it will be so difficult for us.
(FG2:4)
Further, the cooperation of others agencies and people in the task of terrorist
rehabilitation was regarded as important. This cooperation is needed because many
issues are involved in dealing with this type of inmate. For instance, in terms of
religious teachings, a focus group participant acknowledged that “a role of clerics or
Imaam in a religious debate with a terrorist inmate cannot be ruled out” (FG2:1).
This field is definitely not an area of professional expertise of prison officers. The
following quotes also express the need for other actors in terrorist rehabilitation:
We need other actors such as; leading clerics, the police officers, BNPT,
MUI, and so on, for the implementation of deradicalisation programs for
terrorist inmates. (FG3:1)
For me, the collaboration with NGOs on delivering specific training for
terrorist inmates was perfect. Even though there are many weaknesses in the
184 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
implementation, but it helped us a lot to develop the understanding on
deradicalisation. (FG1:3)
In implementing deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates, we need
support from relevant institutions indeed, for example the Ministry of
Religious Affair. (FG2:3)
The comments above indicate that the implementation of deradicalisation
programs in prisons needs collaborative work with many actors and individuals.
Further, the model of an effective partnership for a deradicalisation program should
include the institutional level. In other words, an effective program involves not only
actors at the implementer level, but also at the institutional level.
The finding of the need for other actors to support prison officers in
implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs is consistent with the finding
of a previous study, which suggested that clergy and psychologists should assist
prison officers in rehabilitating terrorist inmates (Maliki, 2013, p. 18). In the
implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program, other actors
and professionals have been involved, including Islamic scholars, psychologists,
university scholars, and NGOs (Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Sarwono, 2012;
SFCG, 2013; SFCGI & DITJEN PAS, 2010).
Prison-based deradicalisation programs developed in other countries also
indicate that many actors are involved. For example, five religious scholars are
employed in the Yemeni deradicalisation program. These scholars are part of
Yemeni’s Religious Dialogue Committee. Then, Saudi’s program is supported by the
Advisory Committee Counselling Program, which is composed of many actors such
as religious clerics, religious experts, university scholars, psychologists, and
psychiatrists (Braddock, 2014).
Using the Rome Memorandum as a working model for the rehabilitation of
violent extremist offenders, the roles of different actors in prisons is acknowledged.
Good Practice Number 7 states that “rehabilitation programs could incorporate a
broad range of cross-disciplinary experts, with close coordination among the relevant
departments and personnel involved” (Stone, 2015, p. 239). Good Practice Number 7
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 185
suggests actors such as psychologists, social workers, religious scholars, aftercare
experts, and even family members can be involved (Stone, 2015, p. 239).
The involvement of many actors in prison-based deradicalisation programs is
inevitable. Accordingly, the Indonesian Government, particularly the DGC and the
BNPT should identify potential actors who may assist the services in prison-based
deradicalisation programs. Although some actors are already involved in Indonesia’s
program, other potential actors should be identified. Current actors should be
evaluated as well. For example, due to many critiques about the capability of the
Islamic scholars who lead religious debates and discussions with terrorist inmates,
the selection criteria for the scholars must be carefully considered. In addition, the
establishment of specific bodies to represent Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation programs should also be considered, for example, a body similar to
the Saudi Advisory Committee Counselling Program (Braddock, 2014).
The Need for Good Collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT
Turning to the issue of collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT, the
focus group data indicated that a good collaboration should be initiated. Although
many actors are involved in the programs, one focus group participant recognised
“BNPT and DGC as the two main actors for the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs” (FG2:3). However, as presented in Chapter 5, issues
about the coordination and cooperation between the DGC and the BNPT emerged.
The findings in Chapter 5 indicate that there is a deficiency in this regard. A focus
group participant emphasised that there should be good collaboration between the
DGC and the BNPT, and that such collaboration was mandatory in order to
implement effective prison-based deradicalisation programs:
BNPT should work collaboratively with us. At the moment, I think we were
working alone without appropriate support from BNPT. For the
effectiveness of deradicalisation program in the prison, BNPT and prison
officers should work together to implement the program. Yes, I realized
BNPT did some activities in the prison in the name of deradicalisation
program, but I think it has not been effective. (FG2:3)
186 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
When explaining the problem of lack of collaboration with the BNPT, a focus
group participant stated that:
So, the point was BNPT was too far from us. They must also involve in the
field directly with us. If they have a program, then they can apply in the
prison. (FG2:4)
In addition, another participant mentioned about the BNPT’s role in the
aftercare program. This participant considered that the task of the BNPT should be
expanded to terrorist inmates who have been released:
The task of BNPT is also related to aftercare program. After a terrorist
inmate is released they must be supervised by BNPT. This issue has never
been discussed. We do not know about what is happening out there after
terrorist inmates are released from the prison. I do believe many of them
may get back to his terrorist fellow for some reasons, mainly economic
issue. To me, this must be BNPT’s responsibility to look after the former
terrorist activities. (FG1:3)
Overall, these results indicate that, while it was difficult for Indonesian prison
officers to implement a deradicalisation program in the prison, it was even more
challenging to develop a good partnership with the BNPT. Since the deradicalisation
program was introduced in 2012 and terrorist inmates were required to participate,
prison officers experienced ineffective coordination between the BNPT and the
DGC. Unsurprisingly, focus group participants believed that a good collaboration
between the DGC and the BNPT is the first step towards supporting their task of
implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.
Regarding this finding, some studies have suggested that coordination and
cooperation between the BNPT and the DGC must be improved in the
counterterrorism effort in Indonesia. The existing studies conclude that there is a lack
of coordination and integration among the BNPT and other agencies on the
management of terrorist inmates (Eckard, 2014; IRIN, 2012; Istiqomah, 2012;
Sarwono, 2012; Ungerer, 2011). In 2011, Ungerer (2011, p. 19) found that
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 187
“operational coordination for BNPT remains largely with the INP”; he also
concluded that “this has been the weakest leg of the Indonesian counter-terrorism
system” (Ungerer, 2011, p. 19). Considering the similar finding in the current study,
this issue remains unsolved by the Indonesian authorities.
As discussed in Chapter 5, although a focus group participant recognised that
there was an improvement after 2014–2015 in the involvement of the BNPT in
terrorist rehabilitation, most participants were not satisfied with the BNPT’s
performance in Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. Based on the
findings of this study, a good partnership between the BNPT and the DGC is highly
recommended in order to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in
deradicalisation. Moreover, since the roles of the DGC and the BNPT have been
stipulated in the Government Regulation Number 99 in the year 2012 on the Second
Amendment to Government Regulation Number 32 in the year 1999 on Conditions
and Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights, coordination and
cooperation between the DGC and the BNPT are critical for the effectiveness of
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program.
Kaats and Opheij (2014, p. 1) posited that nowadays no organisation can solve
a problem on its own. Collaboration is important regardless of the sphere of action
(Bratton & Tumin, 2012). For this reason, I argue that collaboration or partnership
between the DGC and the BNPT is critical in achieving the goal of terrorist inmates’
rehabilitation. However, the issue of partnership or collaboration between the DGC
and the BNPT regarding Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program has been
overlooked. In the existing studies, although discussions that focus on the role of the
BNPT (Bakti, 2014; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015) and the role of the DGC (ICG,
2007; Istiqomah, 2012) are available, a thorough discussion on partnership between
the DGC and the BNPT is lacking. Therefore, future studies on effective partnerships
for Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program are highly recommended.
7.4 A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE FINDINGS ON THE
CHALLENGES AND THE FINDINGS ON THE NEEDS
The empirical results surrounding the needs of Indonesian prison officers in the
implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs highlighted three issues:
(1) the need for capacity building, (2) the need for support from other agencies, and
(3) the need for good collaboration between the BNPT and the DGC. In order to
188 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
assess these needs, we need to recall the findings and analysis presented in Chapter 5
on the challenges faced by the Indonesian prison officers in the task of terrorist
rehabilitation. Chapter 5 of the thesis discussed five broad themes prisoner officers
face as challenges in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs:
1. Terrorist inmates’ personalities.
2. The readiness of Indonesian prison officers.
3. The sustainability of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program.
4. Institutional infrastructure problems.
5. The unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.
Furthermore, the correlation between the challenges and the needs of
Indonesian prison officers on terrorist rehabilitation is examined. It shows that an
obvious correlation exists between the challenges and the needs of Indonesian prison
officers in terrorist rehabilitation. Table 7.1 illustrates the correlation between these
two things.
First, the need of Indonesian prison officers for training in both deradicalisation
and communication is related to the readiness of the prison officers for the
implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, particularly the internal
aspects of readiness. That is, recognition of the lack of personal abilities and skills
leads to the identified need for training. In addition, the need for training also relates
to the personalities of terrorist inmates. Providing training on deradicalisation and
communication for Indonesian prison officers will equip them with basic knowledge
and skills required for dealing with terrorist inmate personalities. Thus the
overarching issue is capacity building for Indonesian prison officers.
Second, the need of Indonesian prison officers for support from other agencies
and for good collaboration with the BNPT is related to the challenge of the
unavailability of collaborative mechanisms, the sustainability of the program, and the
institutional infrastructure problems. In order to overcome the challenge of the
unavailability of collaborative mechanisms, support from other actors and good
collaboration with the BNPT are two avenues through which to develop collaborative
mechanisms for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs. In
terms of program sustainability, the DGC should continue with life skill training
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 189
(LST) and conflict management training (CMT) for terrorist inmates by developing
collaboration with NGOs that have assisted prison officers in implementing LST and
CMT in several Indonesian prisons. Further, in order to overcome the challenge of
institutional infrastructure problems, establishing a specialised prison for terrorists is
the first step in the effort to rehabilitate terrorist inmates. Good collaboration
between the DGC and the BNPT is required to establish and manage such a prison.
Overall, recognition of these challenges translates into the need for support from
other actors and good collaboration with the BNPT.
Table 7.1 Correlation between the Challenges and the Need of Indonesian Prison Officers Regarding
Terrorist Rehabilitation
Challenges
Needs
Direct Indirect
TD TC SA GC
Personalities of Terrorist Inmates X X
Readiness of Indonesian Prison Officers X X
Sustainability of the Program X
Institutional Infrastructure Problems X
Unavailability of Collaborative
Mechanisms
X X
Note:
TD = Training on Deradicalisation;
TC = Training on Communication;
SA = Support from other Actors;
GC = Good Collaboration with the BNPT.
190 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
These findings are important for identifying strategies that can be used to
improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs. I argue that a reform option is one of the strategies to be
applied to rectify the problem, particularly concerning the issue of collaboration
between the BNPT and the DGC.
7.5 STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE
To find strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison officers in the
implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, this study applied the
frameworks of policy and legal reform research. Policy and legal reform research is
part of additional legal research frameworks that have been recognised and applied in
the study of law (Hutchinson, 2010). Applying these frameworks, the study
identified two strategies for improving Indonesian prison officers’ role in terrorist
rehabilitation: policy recommendations and regulation reform.
7.5.1 Strategy One: Policy Recommendations
The existing literature on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs
explains that Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs have been a “trial
and error” program (ICG, 2007; IPI, 2010), or an ad hoc program (Eckard, 2014;
Gunaratna, 2011; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015). Problems and issues have been
examined and identified. Consequently, previous studies have made many
recommendations: basing inmates’ rehabilitation on their individual motivations;
expanding financial assistance programs; improving coordination between
counterterrorism agencies (Ungerer, 2011); correctional institution reform
(Istiqomah, 2012); sharing data on terrorists’ background among parts of the criminal
justice system (ICG, 2007); and improving post-release monitoring (IPAC, 2013).
This study, however, provides different approach to investigating policy
recommendations by conducting a thorough empirical qualitative study through the
lens of the end users of the program, specifically, Indonesian prison officers. Focus
groups were conducted with this specific group of officers who are tasked with
rehabilitating terrorist inmates. From their firsthand experiences in implementing the
rehabilitation program, policy recommendations were generated, specifically for
improving their role in this process.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 191
Drawing on Majchrzak’s (1984, p. 12) idea of “conducting research on a
fundamental social problem in order to provide policy makers with pragmatic,
actioned-oriented recommendation for alleviating the problem”, this study aimed to
provide policy recommendations for the Government of Indonesia. Furthermore, by
conducting empirical research on Indonesian prison officers’ experiences and needs
regarding the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, I argue that
the Government of Indonesia specifically the DGC of the Republic of Indonesia must
consider three policy recommendations:
1. Build the capacity of prison officers who are in charge of terrorist
rehabilitation.
2. Develop collaborative mechanisms with other actors.
3. Develop a good partnership with the BNPT.
To implement the first recommendation, the DGC should design, implement,
and evaluate capacity-building activities for Indonesian prison officers who are in
charge of delivering terrorist rehabilitation programs in prisons. The findings from
the focus groups conducted in this study indicate that officers need training in
communication and deradicalisation. Therefore, these two activities should be
included in the capacity-building activities set out for implementers. Because
capacity building can be very expensive, a socio-economic approach approach can be
employed to investigate efficient initiatives.
Regarding the second recommendation, the DGC should develop good
partnerships with other actors for the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs. The Rome Memorandum suggests that the
implementation of deradicalisation programs requires a variety of actors in prisons,
including psychologists, social workers, religious scholars, aftercare experts, and
even family members (Stone, 2015). Because of the typology of these inmates,
prison officers cannot deliver the programs by themselves. Thus, good partnerships
with other actors and professionals are mandatory. Further research should evaluate
collaborative mechanisms among agencies supporting the implementation of prison-
based deradicalisation program and recommend improvements.
Concerning the third recommendation, because the BNPT is the coordinator of
Indonesia’s deradicalisation program, the DGC must develop a good partnership with
192 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
the BNPT. This policy recommendation is vital for realising collaborative work
between the DGC and the BNPT on prison-based deradicalisation programs. The
lack of collaboration was identified in 2011 (Ungerer, 2011), but in 2017, at the time
of writing, the problem still existed. Since its establishment in 2010, assigning the
BNPT as the coordinator of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program has not solved the
problem. According to Istiqomah, the BNPT and other agencies are struggling to
integrate under “the umbrellas of counterterrorism program” (Istiqomah, 2012, p.
273). Therefore, I recommend further research on the topic of partnerships and
collaborations regarding Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. Finding
the underlying reasons for this problem with collaboration would be beneficial.
Moreover, investigation of how collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT can
be improved is also recommended.
7.5.2 Strategy Two: Regulation Reform
As well as proposing policy recommendations, this study also proposes a legal
reform agenda. To examine which regulations should be reformed to improve the
role of Indonesian prison officers in deradicalisation, several relevant regulations
(primary legal materials) were collected:
1. Government Regulation Number 31 in the year 1999 on the Guidance of
Prisoners.
2. Government Regulation Number 32 in the year 1999 on Conditions and
Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights.
3. Government Regulation Number 28 in the year 2006 on the Amendments to
Government Regulation Number 32 in the year 1999 on Conditions and
Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights.
4. Government Regulation Number 99 in the year 2012 on the Second
Amendments to Government Regulation Number 32 in the year 1999 on
Conditions and Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights.
5. Presidential Regulation Number 46 in the year 2010 on National Counter
Terrorism Agency.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 193
6. Presidential Regulation Number 12 in the year 2010 on the Amendments to
Presidential Regulation Number 46 in the year 2010 on National Counter
Terrorism Agency.
After investigating and evaluating these laws, I found a problem with the
provision of Article 34A (1) paragraph c in regulation number 4 listed above (the
Government Regulation Number 99, the year 2012 on the Second Amendments to
Government Regulation Number 32 the year 1999 on Conditions and Implementing
Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights). This article stipulates that a remission will be
granted to a terrorist inmate if they have followed a deradicalisation program (with
certain conditions) held by Corrections and/or the BNPT. This provision causes an
ambiguity about the responsibility for implementing the program.
To begin with, the question is: Should the program be delivered by the BNPT,
Corrections, or both? Currently, both the BNPT and Corrections run deradicalisation
programs for terrorist prisoners, with a lack of coordination and cooperation between
the two institutions. To complicate the matter further, the INP also claims to
implement deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007;
Osman, 2014). Hence the ambiguity about which program(s) is an official program
in terms of the requirement for remission. Moreover, Idris and Taufiqurrohman
(2015) demonstrated several issues with the BNPT’s program related to its
implementation. Idris and Taufiqurrohman (2015, p. 85) argued that:
There is confusion whether it will be applied on the basis of voluntary
participation or forced participation. There is also a need to overcome the
lack of inter-agency cooperation and qualified human resources to run the
programme. In addition, it is not clear yet whether the terrorist prisoners who
have served their sentences but have not passed the programme evaluation
will be released from prisons or kept in the prisons until they pass the
programme.
The above statement and questions, including the recognition of the lack of
inter-agency cooperation, emerged because the main implementer is not stated
clearly in the Article 34A (1) paragraph c of the Government Regulation Number 99,
year 2012. Two institutions are responsible for the implementation of the program:
194 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
correctional institutions and the BNPT. However, collaborative mechanisms between
the DGC and the BNPT on prison-based deradicalisation programs is non-existent.
To sum up, Idris and Taufiqurrohman’s (2015) conclusion is related to the provision
of Article 34A (1) paragraph c Government Regulation Number 99, year 2012,
which stipulates two institutions (correctional institutions and the BNPT) for the
same task, namely, prison-based deradicalisation programs. However, further
provisions or policies on collaboration is not provided. Without a clear partnership
mechanism, correctional institutions and the BNPT will keep implementing the
program from their own perspectives and experiences. Therefore, the main
implementer must be clearly stated, as well as the collaborative mechanisms to be
applied. As explained by Kaats & Opheij (2014), collaboration is an important issue
nowadays, particularly when the participating parties face ambiguities.
Previous studies (Eckard, 2014; IRIN, 2012; Istiqomah, 2012; Sarwono, 2012;
Ungerer, 2011) also identified the problem of collaboration between the BNPT and
correctional institutions; however, investigation of the cause of the problem has been
overlooked. Through the lens of legal substance, the findings of this study suggest
that the problem of collaboration between the BNPT and correctional institutions is
caused by ambiguity in the legal provision for the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs. On the level of policy and practice, although the BNPT
runs deradicalisation programs in prisons, the findings of this study show that prison
directors assume the management of terrorist inmates. As presented in chapters 2 and
5, a prison director has discretionary power in housing policy and practice for
terrorist inmates in terms of whether they will be segregated from or integrated with
other inmates.
In conclusion, the vague statement about the main implementer of the prison-
based deradicalisation program in Article 34A (1) paragraph c Government
Regulation Number 99, in the year 2012 leads to ambiguity about the implementation
of the program at the coalface. Therefore, the provision in this article should be
amended. The main implementer of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation
program must be a single institution; otherwise, the program will remain ad hoc, or
consist of “trial and error” activities. Although other actors are mandatory in the
implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program, two or more
institutions should not be nominated as the main implementers. There should be a
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 195
single institution as the primary implementer. Other actors, on the other hand, can be
nominated as the complimentary implementers.
I argue that the provision of Article 34A (1) paragraph c Government
Regulation Number 99, the year 2012 is one of the root causes of the challenges
faced by the Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs. Appointing two institutions for the same task without
clear responsibilities for each institution leads to the issue of accountability. The
reason behind this provision may be to establish a “parallel” relationship (Scholten,
Maggetti, & Versluis, 2017, p. 358) in which Corrections and the BNPT share the
responsibility for implementing the prison-based deradicalisation program. However,
in the field, Corrections is the main implementer of the program (i.e. prison officers,
as discussed in chapters 5 and 6). Hence the participants in this study questioned the
accountability of the BNPT in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation
programs. As presented previously, a participant stated that the “BNPT was too far
from us. They must also involve in the field directly with us. If they have a program,
then they can apply in the prison” (FG2:4). Thus a parallel relationship for program
implementation clearly does not currently exist. The relationship is “supporting” in
nature (Scholten, Maggetti, & Versluis, 2017, p. 359). The prison officers hold the
core of responsibilities while other actors, including the BNPT’s staff, play a
supporting role in various activities.
Moreover, I argue that correctional institutions, under the management of the
DGC, should be appointed as the main implementer. The prison authorities should
primarily organise and run the program, which is subsequently implemented by the
prison officers. Correctional institutions, rather than the BNPT and other actors, are
more appropriate for this task for two reasons.
First, correctional institutions are responsible for rehabilitating inmates,
including terrorist inmates. This specific role is stipulated in Article 2 of the CIL, as
presented in Section 7.2. To reiterate, the article states that the aim of the corrections
system is to improve and develop prisoners so that they do not violate the laws, and
simultaneously to encourage prisoners to fully reinvigorate and become active,
productive, and useful members of society. The BNPT and other actors do not have
such a specific role, although they are also involved in the prison-based
deradicalisation programs.
196 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Second, in contrast to the BNPT and other actors, correctional institutions have
ample opportunities to interact with terrorist inmates through the arm of the prison
officers. Convicted terrorists are sent to and live in prisons for a specific period based
on their sentences, where prison officers meet and interact with them on a daily
basis. Therefore, appointing prison officers as the main implementers of prison-based
deradicalisation programs is more likely to support terrorist rehabilitation.
However, I must highlight here that appointing correctional institutions as the
main implementers of such programs does not mean that other actors are not needed,
including BNPT staff. If the BNPT appoints officers who are specifically responsible
for prison-based deradicalisation programs, these officers should work
collaboratively with the prison officers to implement the program. The “supporting
type of relationship” (Scholten, Maggetti, & Versluis, 2017, p. 359) should be
adopted. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, other actors such as clerics, psychologists,
and BNPT staff are definitely needed to work collaboratively with and to support the
correctional institutions in implementing deradicalisation programs. In other words,
other professionals must work collaboratively with the prison officers who are given
the specific responsibility for terrorist rehabilitation. For example, the prison
authority can invite other professionals to run specific activities such as religious
discussions or psychological counselling.
In conclusion, I recommend that a new regulation is enacted in order to realise
supporting relationships between the primary and complementary implementers of
prison-based deradicalisation programs. The responsibilities of the DGC, the BNPT,
and other actors in the implementation of these programs must be identified and
stipulated clearly in this new regulation. This legal foundation is vital for improving
collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT in the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs.
7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has answered the research question on strategies that can be used
to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-
based deradicalisation programs. Before formulating the strategies, the needs of
Indonesian prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation were identified. Through a
thematic qualitative analysis of these needs, two broad themes emerged, “direct
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 197
needs” and “indirect needs”. Direct needs are needs viewed through the lens of the
prison officers and directly relate to their role as the implementers of the programs.
Indirect needs are needs external to the prison officers that help the officers to carry
out terrorist deradicalisation programs inside the prison.
The findings discussed in this chapter can be adopted by the Government of
Indonesia in designing policies to improve Indonesian prison officers’ role in
terrorist rehabilitation. These policies are important not only for Indonesian prison
officers who are appointed to work in the special prison for terrorist inmates, but also
for those responsible for terrorist rehabilitation in general prisons. The officers
should be equipped with suitable resources to support their role in terrorist
rehabilitation.
Furthermore, two strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison
officers in terrorist deradicalisation were identified in this chapter. The first is
strategic policy recommendations, which include capacity building for prison
officers in charge of terrorist rehabilitation, developing collaborative mechanisms
with other actors, and developing a good partnership with the BNPT.
The second strategy is to reform a provision about the implementer of
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program as stipulated in Article 34A (1)
paragraph c Government Regulation Number 99 year 2012. The provision implies
that both the DGC and the BNPT can be implementers of the program. However,
currently collaboration mechanisms among the implementers of the program are
lacking. This provision causes ambiguity at the implementation level, as discussed in
Chapter 5. Although prison officers believe that the BNPT is the main implementer
of prison-based deradicalisation programs, in reality, terrorist rehabilitation programs
are primarily implemented by prison officers.
To solve this problem, I argue that Article 34A (1) paragraph c Government
Regulation Number 99 year 2012 must be amended by stipulating only one
institution as the main implementer, that is, the correctional institutions. However,
appointing correctional institutions as the main implementer of such program does
not mean that other actors are not needed. Other actors should be nominated as the
complimentary implementers. In rehabilitating terrorist inmates, correctional
institutions should be supported by other institutions such as the BNPT and the
MoRA.
198 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 199
Conclusions and
Recommendations
Rehabilitation is to help someone return to normal life by providing
education, training and therapy... Whether they are operational terrorists or
extremist supporters, they believe that violence and other extreme measures
are acceptable means to bring about political change. Terrorists and their
supporters are not mainstream but extreme. To facilitate their return to the
mainstream from the extreme, they must be rehabilitated. Rehabilitiation
may not be a perfect solution that transforms every single terrorist but it is
the best available solution. (Gunaratna, 2015, p. 5)
This chapter summarises the findings related to the research questions
presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis. It discusses how Indonesian prison officers
experience the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, and
presents strategies to potentially improve Indonesian prison officers’ role in terrorist
rehabilitation. The findings presented in this thesis are important because, despite its
limitations, rehabilitation is “the best available solution” for deradicalising convicted
terrorists, as stated by Gunaratna (2015, p. 5) in the quotation above.
Due the fact that Indonesia has a significant number of terrorist inmates, the
authorities have established a prison-based deradicalisation program for this type of
inmate. The program is implemented either by prison officers or by other actors such
as the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan
Terorisme – [BNPT]), the Indonesian National Police (INP), and Non-Governemnatl
Organisations (NGOs). Because prison officers are the main people who interact
with the prisoners on daily basis, researching their experiences is worthwhile. My
literature review indicated a research gap on the topic of Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation programs viewed from the lens of the implementer. Moreover,
investigating and assessing the voices of prison officers is important as one of the
sources for future policy.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections. Section 8.1
summarises the conclusions of my research and reiterates the main findings. Section
200 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
8.2 discusses the practical recommendations for the Government of Indonesia in
order to improve the role of prison officers in the deradicalisation program for
terrorist convicts. This is followed by a brief set of recommendations for future
research on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program.
8.1 CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has examined the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in
implementing deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners. In the Indonesian
context, although a considerable amount of research, policy, and political debate has
focused on terrorist prisoners (Hassan, 2007; Jones C. R., 2014; Osman, 2014;
Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono, 2013) and prison-based deradicalisation programs (Bakti,
2014; Eckard, 2014; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Istiqomah, 2012; Johnston,
2009), less attention has been paid to the Indonesian prison officers who are
implementing the program at the coalface. Therefore, this thesis aims to bridge this
research gap by examining the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in the
implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, and by identifying policy
recommendations and law reform options related to the improvement of Indonesian
prison officers’ role in terrorist rehabilitation. To achieve these aims, these research
questions were proposed:
1. What are the challenges for Indonesian prison officers in implementing
prison-based deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists?
2. What are Indonesian prison officers’ views on the establishment of a
special prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia?
3. What strategies can be used to improve the role of Indonesian prison
officers in implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs?
In answering these research questions, this study used qualitative social
research and legal research methodologies. These methodologies were used because
the research questions had to be addressed by different methods. The methodology of
qualitative social research was used to investigate the challenges faced by prison
officers implementing the deradicalisation program (Research Question 1), and to
analyse their views on the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists in
Indonesia (Research Question 2). Primary and secondary data were collected to
address these questions. Qualitative social research and legal research methodologies
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 201
were combined to identify strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison
officers in implementing the deradicalisation program (Research Question 3).
As prescribed in social research methodology, this study collected two main
types of data: primary and secondary. Primary data were collected through focus
group discussions. A series of three focus groups was carried out in November 2015
and June 2016. I conducted the first focus group in Cipinang Prison on 1 November
2015 with three prison officers, and the second focus group in Pasir Putih
Nusakambangan Prison on 2 November 2015 with five prison officers. The third
focus group was conducted in Surabaya Prison on 25 June 2016 with five prison
officers. On average, the focus groups took about an hour. Thematic analysis was
applied for data analysis. Furthermore, to increase the trustworthiness of the data
collected, a research diary was also used to record fieldwork activities and prominent
insights related to the topic of the study. Secondary data were collected through
literature searches.
In terms of legal research, legal resources that were used in this study are
primary and secondary legal materials, and non-legal material. The primary legal
materials comprised the Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL), the Anti-Terrorism Financing
Law ATFL, the Correctional Institution Law (CIL), and some relevant regulations.
These materials were collected through literature searches and library methods. The
secondary legal materials included articles in law journals, textbooks, conference
papers and proceedings, encyclopaedias, and websites. They were collected through
literature searches and library methods, and through the internet. The non-legal
materials were findings from other disciplines; materials that are not related to the
legal field are often used in legal research to enrich and strengthen the analysis.
The main findings of the research are presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7, to
answer research questions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The following subsections
summarise the main findings of the research.
8.1.1 The Challenges of Deradicalisation: Indonesian Prison Officers’
Experiences
The challenges for Indonesian prison officers in implementing prison-based
deradicalisation programs are discussed in Chapter 5. This thesis presents five
challenges that were identified from the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in
implementing the programs:
202 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
1. Terrorist inmates’ personalities.
2. The readiness of Indonesian prison officers.
3. The sustainability of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program.
4. Institutional infrastructure problems.
5. Unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.
Regarding the personalities of terrorist inmates, Indonesian prison officers
faced several challenges related to the beliefs and behaviour of these inmates. The
beliefs of terrorists that were recognised as challenges by the focus group
participants were beliefs that they (the terrorists) were not criminals, that they were
heroes in a divine war, and that they were the only “right” individuals in interpreting
Islamic religious teachings. In this context, many studies have demonstrated that
terrorists do differ from other criminals (Ganor, 2002; Goldman, 2014; Gunaratna,
2011; Mahan & Griset, 2013; Presman & Flockton, 2014; Silke, 2014; UNODC,
2016). Further, terrorists’ beliefs that they are heroes of a holy war are consistent
with Hasan’s (2007) study on Imam Samudra’s justification for the Bali Bombings.
Hasan demonstrated that Samudra’s idea of a perpetual war was the most critical
aspect of his thinking. The finding that terrorist inmates believed they are the “most
right” individuals in interpreting Islamic ideology agrees with the findings of the
International Crisis Group (ICG, 2007, p. 12) and Bakti (2014, p. 176), who showed
that terrorist inmates responded negatively to a discussion about Islam delivered by
someone outside their circle.
Besides the terrorist’s beliefs, participants recognised two challenges regarding
the behaviour of terrorist inmates: reacting against the officers, and refusing to
participate in any programs. These findings are consistent with those of a previous
study by Hannah et al. (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008). These authors
classified the spectrum of potential activities undertaken by radicalised prisoners,
particularly regarding the use of passive or non-violent resistance and active or
violent resistance to prison authorities. In terms of the current study, the participants’
challenge of prisoners reacting against the officers is a form of violent resistance,
while refusing to participate in any programs is a form of non-violent resistance.
In relation to the readiness of prison officers, the challenges fell under two
broad subthemes: internal factors and external factors. Internal factors are factors that
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 203
relate to “inside” Indonesian prison officers’ themselves, for example, self-evaluation
and prison officers’ personal characteristics. External factors are those that relate to
“outside” the officers, for example, group evaluation and prison officers’ collegiality.
Two internal factors were identified: limited skills and abilities of officers in
terrorist deradicalisation and rehabilitation, and limited knowledge of Islamic
religious teachings. The first acknowledges the limited skills and abilities of the
prison officers, while the second acknowledges their limited capabilities in religious
Islamic teachings and experiences. These findings are consistent with those of
Eckard (2014), who concluded limited skills and abilities is a common problem in
Indonesian prison officers, and those of Maliki (2013), who found that Indonesian
prison officers’ religious education and experiences were often less than those of
terrorist inmates. Further, studies conducted by C. R. Jones (2014), Ungerer (2011),
and Osman (2014) may help explain why the focus group participants thought that
they lacked capabilities in religious teachings and experiences. These studies
concluded that prison officers and prison populations regard terrorist inmates highly
because the inmates are devout religious men willing to lay down their lives for
Islam.
Three external factors were identified: the limited number of prison officers, a
lack of professional support and training, and a lack of legal protection. The limited
number of prison officers available to implement Indonesia’s prison-based
deradicalisation program suggests that understaffing is one of the key problems for
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program (Abuza, 2009; Eckard, 2014). The
finding of the lack of professional support and training on deradicalisation for
Indonesian prison officers is consistent with the findings of many other studies
(Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Maliki, 2013; Osman, 2014; SFCG, 2013). Previous
studies, however, have not uncovered a lack of legal protection.
When considering the sustainability of the programs, the results showed that
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program is incidental and partial. This
finding is consistent with the analysis of the current literature, which indicated that
the nature of the programs is recognised as unsustainable (Bakti, 2014; Gunaratna,
2015; ICG, 2007). The program was identified as incidental for two reasons: the
program was designed as a minor accompaniment to established treatments and
interventions for general prisoners; and the assistance offered by several other parties
204 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
(state or non-state actors) in the design and implementation of terrorist rehabilitation
was only temporary. The program was identified as partial because it is not applied
to all terrorist inmates, even among those in the same prison. Three further reasons
identify the program as partial: the rejection of program involvement by non-
cooperative terrorist inmates; a timeline for the interventions that prevents all of the
terrorist inmates from participating in the program; and non-inclusion of family
assistance in the existing programs.
Two institutional infrastructure problems were identified as barriers to
achieving the objectives of the prison-based deradicalisation program: the
overcapacity issue and the practices for housing terrorist convicts. Overcapacity was
a problem in most Indonesian prisons (General Elucidation of The Decree of the
Minister of Law and Human Rights Number M.HH-07.OT.01.03, year 2011). The
Indonesian prison officers believe that overcapacity affects their tasks and
responsibilities during implementation of the deradicalisation program. These
findings match those of Gunaratna (2011, p. 65), who identified a correlation
between the prison environment and the spread of radical beliefs in the prison. The
findings are also consistent with those of a number of previous studies (Eckard,
2014, p. 170; Istiqomah, 2012, p. 31; Jones C. R., 2014, p. 87; Osman, 2014, p. 222)
that describe overcrowded prisons and the problems associated with practices for
housing management of terrorist inmates, whether segregated from or integrated with
other inmates.
The practices for housing terrorist inmates in Indonesian prisons are also a
challenge for Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of the program.
Housing management for terrorist inmates depends on the policy of the prison
director on the segregation or integration of terrorist inmates. The practical
implementation of the chosen housing policy, however, is variable. For example,
even when a segregation policy is chosen, communication among terrorist inmates
may occur, as well as close contact between terrorist inmates and ordinary inmates.
Previous studies have noted differences in the policies and practices on the housing
of terrorist inmates among prisons in Indonesia (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Osman,
2014; Ungerer, 2011). In addition, the current finding of the need to segregate non-
cooperative ideologue or hard-liner terrorist inmates from the rest of the prison
population supports findings from previous studies (ICG, 2007), which found that
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 205
some non-terrorists were successfully radicalised by Imam Samudra in Kerobokan
Prison; a prison officer, Beni Irawan, was also radicalised.
Regarding the unavailability of collaborative mechanisms as a challenge faced
by the Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation
programs, there were two prominent findings. The first was the lack of cooperation
and coordination between the BNPT and the Directorate General of Corrections
(DGC). These issues are evident in practice. Prison officers have experienced lack of
support from the BNPT’s staff in working together to achieve terrorist rehabilitation
or deradicalisation, as discussed by Istiqomah (2012) and Sarwono (2012). The
second was unorganised partnerships. Of the many agencies that are involved in
prison-based deradicalisation programs, the focus group results revealed that the lack
of cooperation and coordination between the BNPT and the DGC was a significant
problem. Although the BNPT is the coordinator for the national deradicalisation
program, the majority of focus group participants were disappointed with the
BNPT’s performance in this regard. Moreover, collaboration between agencies has
not been managed well; hence, programs implemented as a result of collaborative
work have not been adequately focused on terrorist deradicalisation. This finding is
consistent with those of a number of studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; IPI, 2010;
IRIN, 2012; Ungerer, 2011), which explain that, although there are many actors
working on terrorist deradicalisation, the efforts have not been fully integrated.
8.1.2 The Perspectives of Indonesian Prison Officers on the Establishment of a
Special Prison
The perspectives of Indonesian prison officers on the establishment of a special
prison is discussed in Chapter 6. From the analysis of focus group data, this research
identified three themes: an absolute agreement on the establishment of a special
prison for convicted terrorists; the advantages and disadvantages of a special prison
for terrorists; and the policy issues related to a special prison for terrorist inmates.
The finding of an absolute agreement on the establishment of a special prison
for terrorist inmates was an interesting result. I expected a debate on the pros and
cons of this initiative. However, all the participants in the focus groups agreed with
and fully supported the initiative. This finding is consistent with the recommendation
of Hassan and Yasin (2012) that the Government of Indonesia establish a special
prison facility for convicted terrorists (Hassan & Yasin, 2012, p. 13).
206 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
In practice, the Indonesian model of distributing terrorist inmates through
correctional facilities, as described by Neumann (2010), has become a mix of the
isolation, separation, and concentration models. Before a specialised prison for
convicted terrorists was established, practices in several Indonesian prisons adopted
isolation and separation models, rather than the concentration model reflected in a
special prison. If not all terrorist inmates are housed in this special prison as per the
official policy (Ditjenpas RI, 2016b), then the practice could be described as a partial
concentration policy.
Further, from focus group data three advantages of a terrorist prison were
identified: improved security and supervision; prevention of the spread of prison
radicalisation; and increased likelihood of achieving terrorist deradicalisation goals.
In addition, two disadvantages were identified: increased solidarity among terrorist
convicts; and hindering the collection of intelligence data. These findings support
those of previous studies (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008; Mulcahy,
Merrington, & Bell, 2013), which noted that a specialised prison for specific
offenders may face challenges despite the benefits. Because focus group participants
identified some disadvantages of a special prison for terrorist inmates, this indicates
they do have concerns about this initiative, despite their overall support for it. In this
regard, participants identified a number of policy issues about the management of a
special prison for terrorist inmates, includes:
1. The distribution criterion for of terrorist inmates sent to the special prison
for terrorists.
2. The decision maker for the distribution.
3. The timing of the distribution to the special prison.
4. Strengthening partnerships.
5. Availability of data on the background of convicted terrorists.
8.1.3 Improving the Role of Indonesian Prison Officers in Deradicalisation
In Chapter 7, empirical research findings and legal research findings were
combined in order to identify strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison
officers in terrorist rehabilitation. Before identifying the strategies, the needs of
Indonesian prison officers regarding terrorist rehabilitation were investigated using
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 207
social qualitative approach. A legal research approach was also used, specifically, the
framework of policy and legal reform research.
Through thematic qualitative analysis, two broad themes emerged on the needs
of Indonesian prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation: direct needs and indirect
needs. Direct needs are needs viewed through the lens of prison officers and are
directly related to their role as implementers of the terrorist rehabilitation program.
Indirect needs are needs that are external to the prison officers but that help
Indonesian prison officers to carry out terrorist rehabilitation inside the prison. Two
subthemes related to the direct need for training of Indonesian prison officers in
deradicalisation: the need for training on deradicalisation programs and the need for
training on communication. The first can be classified as training in “hard skills”,
while the latter is training in “soft skills”. Further, two subthemes related to the
indirect need for good partnerships: the need for others actors and the need for good
collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT. Overall, the present findings are
consistent with those of other research that concluded that both training for prison
officers and partnerships for terrorist rehabilitation are important (Andrie, 2011;
Gunaratna, 2011; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Neumann, 2010). These two factors
are required for effective terrorist rehabilitation, along with visionary leadership
(Gunaratna, 2011, p. 67).
In examining the correlation between the challenges and the needs of
Indonesian prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation, my research revealed that there
is a link between the challenges and the needs of Indonesian prison officers in
terrorist rehabilitation. First, the need of Indonesian prison officers for training in
both deradicalisation and communication is related to two challenges found in this
study: the readiness of the prison officers and the personalities of terrorist inmates.
Recognition of the lack of personal abilities and skills leads to the identified need for
training. Thus providing training on deradicalisation and communication for
Indonesian prison officers will equip them with the basic knowledge and skills
required for dealing with terrorist inmate personalities.
Second, the need of Indonesian prison officers for support from other agencies
and for good collaboration with the BNPT is related to three challenges found in this
study: program sustainability, institutional infrastructure problems, and unavailability
of collaborative mechanisms. In terms of program sustainability, the DGC should
208 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
develop collaboration with NGOs that have assisted prison officers in implementing
life skill training and conflict management training in several Indonesian prisons, in
order to continue such training for terrorist inmates. Moreover, establishing and
managing a specialised prison for terrorists is the first step in the effort to rehabilitate
terrorist inmates, in order to overcome the challenge of institutional infrastructure
problems. Good collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT is required to
establish and manage such a prison. Finally, regarding unavailability of collaborative
mechanisms, support from other actors and good collaboration with the BNPT are
clearly needed.
Furthermore, through the policy and legal reform framework, two strategies
that could improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in terrorist deradicalisation
were developed and are presented in Chapter 7. Strategy One is a policy
recommendation that includes capacity building for prison officers who are in charge
of terrorist rehabilitation; developing collaborative mechanisms with other actors;
and developing a good partnership with the BNPT. Strategy Two is the
recommendation to reform the vague statement regarding the main implementer of
the prison-based deradicalisation program, as stated in Article 34A (1) paragraph c
Government Regulation Number 99 year 2012. The primary and subsidiary
implementers of the program must be clearly identified, as well as the mechanisms
for collaboration with other actors. This recommendation for policy reform is
important for the Government of Indonesia in planning and designing policies for
improving Indonesian prison officers’ role in terrorist rehabilitation. In addition, the
reform is valuable for Indonesian prison officers who are appointed to work in the
special prison for terrorist inmates, and for those responsible for terrorist
rehabilitation in general prisons.
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Many recommendations are available in the existing literature regarding
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. This study, however, provides
recommendations specifically based on the findings of research into Indonesian
prison officers’ perceptions and experiences of implementing such programs.
Therefore, the recommendations of this study are rooted in empirical evidence from
focus groups comprised of Indonesian prison officers.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 209
The recommendations of this study fall into two sets: (a) practical
recommendations for the Indonesian Government in order to foster effective terrorist
rehabilitation through its prison-based deradicalisation program; and (b) suggestions
for future research. The first set is revisited in Subsection 8.2.1 and the second in
Subsection 8.2.2.
8.2.1 Practical Recommendations for the Government of Indonesia
First, the primary implementer of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation
program must be one state institution. The government should not appoint two or
more institutions, which results in ambiguity around the legitimacy of, and
responsibility for, implementing the programs. Currently, based on the Government
Regulation Number 99 year 2012, two state institutions are “implicitly” appointed
responsibility for the program in the prisons: the prisons under the management of
the (DGC), and the BNPT. Further, this study recommends that Indonesian prisons,
under the management of the DGC, should be appointed as the main implementer of
the program, because the DGC has resources that are likely to support terrorist
rehabilitation. Nevertheless, appointing the DGC as the primary implementer does
not mean other actors are not needed in the implementation of such programs. This
research found that other actors are definitely needed by the Indonesian prison
officers in rehabilitating terrorist inmates. Other actors such as psychologists, Islamic
scholars, and educators are subsidiary implementers who support the primary
implementers in running specific activities for terrorist inmates.
Second, regarding the involvement of many agencies in Indonesia’s prison-
based deradicalisation program, I recommend that the BNPT must be the
coordinator. The BNPT has the power to invite other actors involved in the program
to assist the prison officers responsible for implementation in the prisons because the
BNPT has been appointed as the coordinator of the national deradicalisation program
based on Presidential Decree No 46 year 2010. By accommodating Indonesian prison
officers’ advice as the main implementer of the program in the field, the BNPT can
invite other actors (individuals or institutions) that are needed by the prison officers
to rehabilitate terrorists. Again, I stress that the coordinator and the implementer of
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program must be different actors. I
consider that the coordinator of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program
should be the BNPT while the primary implementer should be the DGC, through the
210 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
arm of Indonesian prison officers. Therefore, to coordinate subsidiary implementers
– other actors – in Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program should be the
responsibility of the BNPT.
Third, partnerships between the DGC and the BNPT must be improved. There
is no doubt that a good collaboration between these two institutions on the
implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program will foster
terrorist rehabilitation. The existing research identifies this partnership issue (Eckard,
2014; ICG, 2007; Istiqomah, 2012; Ungerer, 2011), which was also found in this
study. Based on these findings, this study suggests that improved partnership
between the DGC and the BNPT should clarify responsibility among prison officers
and the BNPT’s officials regarding the implementation of the program. To realise
this goal, however, the Government of Indonesia must introduce an “umbrella”
regulation that explains how these two state institutions should collaborate in
fostering terrorist rehabilitation.
Fourth, Indonesian prison officers who are responsible for implementing the
deradicalisation program for terrorist inmates must be equipped with both basic and
advanced training on deradicalisation. As found in this study, their lack of
understanding about deradicalisation, including prison-based deradicalisation
programs, affects their role in implementing the program. An analogy might be “they
are given a sophisticated appliance but are not given training to operate it”.
Furthermore, training on communication should be provided. Officers in the study
had experienced that good communication improves the trustworthiness of
participants (i.e. terrorist inmates) in programs. The officers strongly believe that this
environment fosters rehabilitation for terrorists.
Fifth, the Government of Indonesia must establish a “National Action Plan on
the Prison-based Deradicalisation Program”. The Rome Memorandum can be used as
a working model because it contains successful practices from many countries and
experts on counterterrorism (Stone, 2015). Although no “one size fits all” when
dealing with the issue of deradicalisation, lessons learned from other countries that
are recognised as successful and effective in the implementation of prison-based
deradicalisation programs can be adapted for the Indonesian context (Gunaratna,
2015; Gunaratna & Ali, 2015).
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 211
Sixth, the Indonesian prison authority should include family assistance in
designing the prison-based deradicalisation program. As discussed in Section 5.4,
participants of this research believe that family involvement in the program policy
could foster the successful attainment of the goals of the terrorist rehabilitation and
integration programs. Further, the initiatives of conflict management training and life
skills training should be developed by the DGC and the BNPT. Participants in this
research believed that both these types of training are appropriate interventions for
terrorist inmates in the Indonesian context.
8.2.2 Suggestions for Further Research
A finding in this thesis indicated that prison officers considered that both
incentives and religious counselling can be effective in terrorist rehabilitation.
However, the existing literature concludes that incentives are more effective than
religious counselling. Therefore, investigating the extent to which religious
counselling can positively influence the deradicalisation of terrorist inmates is an
interesting topic for further research.
Moreover, this thesis has discussed the issue of radicalisation occurring in
Indonesian prisons due to a policy of integration. However, some focus group
participants noted that integration can be effective for terrorist rehabilitation. Hence,
the effectiveness of integration policies for terrorist deradicalisation requires
investigation.
As noted in Chapter 2, this research focused on the lens of the prison officers
who implement deradicalisation programs. In practice, the BNPT is also involved in
the implementation of programs. Therefore, further research from different
perspectives is recommended to assess whether BNPT staff face the same challenges
as those of prison officers.
Further, research is needed to evaluate collaboration between the DGC and the
BNPT. A thorough examination is suggested to determine the nature and
effectiveness of the collaboration. Previously, achieving good collaboration has
proved difficult. Criteria based on the considerable body of existing literature on
partnerships and collaboration could be used for evaluation. Regarding other actors,
further research is recommended on developing effective collaboration among
212 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
institutions, both state and non-state actors that are involved with the prison-based
deradicalisation program.
In addition, two practical matters could also be investigated: the need for
training in religious teachings, and the implementation methods for deradicalisation
programs. Although the need for training in religious teachings did not emerge from
the analysis in this study, investigation of this issue is important. Exploratory
research, for example, could examine the perspectives of prison officers about the
extent to which such training could support their task of rehabilitating terrorist
inmates. Further, authorities could benefit from investigation of appropriate methods
to implement programs.
Finally, this thesis concludes that ongoing research is required about the policy
of establishing a special prison for convicted terrorists in the context of Indonesia.
The research might investigate whether, and to what extent, the advantages of such a
prison for terrorist inmates outweigh the disadvantages in the Indonesian context. In
addition, a cost–benefit analysis should be undertaken because limited funding is
always a major issue in developing countries, including Indonesia.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 213
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Appendices
Appendix A
Question Guide for Focus Groups
Question guide for addressing Research Question 1:
What do you know about the deradicalisation program? How do you
implement the program in the prison?
What activities have you undertaken to rehabilitate terrorist inmates? Do you
treat terrorist prisoners the same as other ordinary inmates?
What are the challenges when you undertake your activities, and how do you
face these challenges?
Are there any officials from other agencies who play a role in rehabilitating
terrorist prisoners? If yes, what activities have they conducted in the prison?
Do you think the activities support terrorist rehabilitation?
How do you assess whether deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners
are successful or not?
Question guide for addressing Research Question 2:
What you know about the plan of the government to establish a special prison
for convicted terrorists?
How do you perceive the establishment of a special prison for convicted
terrorists?
What should the government consider if a specialised prison for terrorists is
established?
Do you agree with this initiative? If yes (or no), what are the reasons?
Is close interaction among terrorist inmates in a specialised prison good or
bad for rehabilitating terrorists?
236 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Question guide for addressing Research Question 3:
How do you perceive your role in rehabilitating terrorist prisoners?
What do you think about the role of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency
(Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – BNPT) or other agencies in
rehabilitating terrorist inmates?
What are the challenges that the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC)
has faces in playing its role?
What kind of support do you think you need in order to improve your role in
rehabilitating terrorist inmates?
What policies has your institution established concerning your role in
rehabilitating terrorist prisoners?
How does your organisation respond to the needs of prison officers?
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 237
Appendix B
Formal Request Letter for Conducting Fieldwork in Indonesian Prisons
(English Version)
Subject : Fieldwork Permit Application
Annex : 1 exemplar
To: The Director General of Corrections
The Ministry of Law and Human Rights of Republic of Indonesia
Dear Sirs,
I, the undersigned,
Name : I Gede Widhiana Suarda
Place, Date of Birth : Denpasar, 10 February 1978
Address : PerumGraha Citra Mas Blok Z No. 6 Kaliwates, Jember.
Occupation : Lecturer of Law Faculty of the University of Jember
would like to apply for a fieldwork permit within the Directorate General of Corrections,
specifically at Cipinang and Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prisons. This research is part of my
PhD thesis to be presented at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Australia. I
hereby attach:
1. TOR and Proposal of Research;
2. Summary of Research Activity Plan;
3. Ethics Approval Certificate from QUT; and
4. Participant Willingness to Participate Form (Prison Officer).
I really appreciate your kind attention and cooperation.
Jakarta, 8 September 2015.
Faithfully,
I Gede Widhiana Suarda
238 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Appendix C
Formal Request Letter for Conducting Fieldwork in Indonesian Prisons
(Bahasa Indonesia Version)
Hal : Permohonan ijin penelitian lapang (fieldwork)
Lamp : 1 exp.
Kepada Yth: Direktur Jenderal Pemasyarakatan
Kementerian Hukum dan HAM Republik Indonesia
Dengan hormat,
Saya yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini:
Nama : I Gede Widhiana Suarda
Tempat/Tgl Lahir : Denpasar / 10 Februari 1978
Alamat : Perum Graha Citra Mas Blok Z No. 6 Kaliwates, Jember
Pekerjaan : Dosen FH Universitas Jember
mengajukan permohonan ijin kegiatan penelitian di lingkungan Direktorat Jenderal
Pemasyarakatan, khususnya di Lapas Cipinang dan Lapas Pasir Putih Nusakambangan.
Penelitian ini dilaksanakan sebagai bagian dari penulisan disertasi yang kini tengah saya
tempuh di Queensland University of Technology (QUT) Australia. Bersama ini saya
lampirkan:
1. TOR Proposal Penelitian;
2. Resume Rencana Kegiatan Penelitian;
3. Ethics Approval Certificate dari QUT; dan
4. Form Lembar kesediaaan bagi partisipan (Petugas Pemasyarakatan).
Atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya saya sampaikan terima kasih.
Jakarta, 8 September 2015
Hormat saya,
I Gede Widhiana Suarda
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 239
Appendix D
Formal Permission Letter for Conducting Fieldwork in Indonesian Prisons
(English Version from Certified Translator)
240 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Appendix E
Formal Permission Letter for Conducting Fieldwork in Indonesian Prisons
(Original – Bahasa Indonesia)
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 241
Appendix F
Participant Information Sheet
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT
RESEARCH PROJECT
– Focus group –
Title of the Study
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1500000642
RESEARCH TEAM
Principal Researcher: I Gede Widhiana Suarda PhD student
Associate Researchers: Professor Reece Walters Principal Supervisor
Associate Professor Mark Lauch Associate Supervisor
School of Justice, Faculty of Law,
Queensland University of
Technology (QUT), Australia
DESCRIPTION
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD for I Gede Widhiana Suarda at QUT.
The purpose of this project is to examine terrorist prisoner supervision models in Indonesia.
In order to propose an alternative model to Indonesia, a comparison with Singapore’s models
will be conducted.
You are invited to participate in this project because you are a prison staff/guard/warden and
are currently supervising terrorist prisoners.
PARTICIPATION
Your participation will involve an audio recorded focus group at the prison office or another
agreed location. The focus group will take approximately one hour of your time. Questions
will include: what programs do you use to supervise terrorist inmates in prison, why do you
use these supervision programs, and how do you evaluate the programs.
A focus group is interviewing participants in a group to collect data. You will not be
interviewed individually. In this research we will have 5 guards/wardens to take part a part in
the focus group. I will be the moderator that focuses the group discussion on specific themes
of interest and I will include a number of different perspectives on the given themes.
Please note that if you arrive late it may not be possible for you to participate.
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate you can
withdraw from the project without comment or penalty.
242 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
EXPECTED BENEFITS
This research will not benefit you directly. However, the research project will provide the
opportunity to discuss various issues and experiences related to de-radicalisation and
rehabilitation programs for terrorist prisoners.
The main benefit of the research is that it will significantly contribute to existing academic
literature on de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programs for terrorist prisoners. The
research findings will be an invaluable piece of research that could potentially influence
future policy and law reform regarding terrorist prisoner supervision.
To recognise your contribution should you choose to participate, the research team is
offering you a gift voucher of $25 AUD (equal to Rp. 250,000) for dinner at a local
restaurant.
RISKS
The potential risks for the proposed research are minimal but might include inconvenience
because of the time and place of the focus group. You might also experience anxiety or
nervousness during the focus group discussion.
For your convenience on the discussion, you are not required to provide answers to all
questions. You will be asked what official processes and programs are in place to manage
terrorist prisoners. If you explain to me that harming the prisoners is the best way to control
them, then I will stop the interview immediately and explain that this research is not related
to day-to-day management techniques.
Moreover, as the research project has the approval of prison management, the focus group
interview will take place during work hours and/or after hours. The focus group can take
place at prison premises and/or at place convenient for you and the other participants.
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially unless required by law.
Through this research all interviews will be anonymized. Your name will not be included in
the transcripts even though it will be included in the consent form. The data, recordings and
transcripts will be kept securely. They will be stored in a locked cabinet on campus at QUT.
Data will only be accessed by the researcher and the supervisors. Audio recording will be
destroyed at the end of the research project.
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your
agreement to participate.
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT
If have any questions or require further information please contact one of the researchers
listed below.
An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 243
I Gede Widhiana Suarda igedewidhiana.suarda@hdr.qut.edu.au +61 7 3138 4653
Professor Reece Walters reece.walters@qut.edu.au +61 7 3138 2708
Associate Professor Mark Lauch m.lauch@qut.edu.au +61 7 3138 7114
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project
you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research
project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner.
Thank you for helping with this research project.
Please keep this sheet for your information.
244 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice
Appendix G
Consent Form for Participants
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT
RESEARCH PROJECT
– Focus group –
Title of the Study
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1500000642
RESEARCH TEAM CONTACTS
I Gede Widhiana Suarda igedewidhiana.suarda@hdr.qut.edu.au +61 7 3138 4653
Professor Reece Walters reece.walters@qut.edu.au +61 7 3138 2708
Associate Professor Mark
Lauch m.lauch@qut.edu.au +61 7 3138 7114
STATEMENT OF CONSENT
By signing below, you are indicating that you:
Have read and understood the information document regarding this project.
Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction.
Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research
team.
Understand that you are free to withdraw at any time without comment or penalty.
Understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or
email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the
project.
Understand that the project will include an audio recording.
Agree to participate in the project.
Name
Signature
Date
Please return this sheet to the investigator.