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ORIGINS OF THEBATTLE
OPPOSITE A Panzergrenadier
from Rommel's Afrika Korps, all
wrapped and goggled ready for
action against the enemy, wind-
blown sand and the unrelenting
sun. (Bundesarchiv 1011-785-
0285-14A)
he th ree battles which took place in the des ert to the sou th of the
isolat ed railway stati on of El Ala mei n in 1942 ma rk ed th e climax of
Hitler's plan to wrest Egypt from the British. His goal of seizing the
Suez Canal and opening the Middle East to Axis forces had to be
ab an do ne d whe n his forces were soundly beaten. Th e success of these
three actions transferred the initiative back to the British and precipitated
the collapse of Gener alfeld marsch all Erwin Rom mel 's Panz era rme e Afrika,
forcing it into a long retreat across North Africa which eventually ended in
its complete annihilation in Tunisia the following year. The final battle of
El Alamein was a turning point in the war and was the last signal
achievement gained by the British before American troops entered the
conflict. Prime Minister Winston Churchill later claimed that before
Alamein the British Army had not gained a major victory; after Alamein it
did not suffer a major defeat.
The Desert War had begun as a colonial skirmish in September 1940
when Italian forces crossed the border from Libya into Egypt. The
garrison of 36,000 British under Gen Wavell faced 215,000 Italians led
by General Marshal Graziani. Undaunted by the overwhelming odds,
Wavell's forces attacked the invaders and threw them out, following up
the success with belligerent moves under LtGen O'Connor which
pushed the Italians back across the whole of Cyrenaica to El Agheila.
Du rin g the co urse of the final part of the a dvanc e, a British force of on e
armoured division and one infantry division completely destroyed an
The three architects of the
victory at El Alamein together
in Egypt in August 1942. From
left to right: Gen Sir Harold
Alexander (C-in-C Middle East),
Winston Churchill (British Prime
Minister) and LtGen Sir Bernard
Montgomery (Commander Eighth
Army). (IWM E15905)7
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MajGen Gatehouse, Commander
10th Armoured Division, in his
Crusader command tank prior to
the start of Operation Lightfoot,
the attack phase of the battle
of Alamein. (IWM E17616)
en emy army of ten divisions, c apt ur in g 130,000 Italians, for the loss of
1,928 men killed, wounded and missing.
At this point, the British government decided to hold Cyrenaica with
the smallest possible force while the rest of the army and air force
concentrated in Egypt prior to a move to Greece to help stem the Axis
troops who were trying to take over the country. Gen Wavell was against the
move reasoning that a further advance through Libya could capture the
po rt of Tripoli a nd evict Mussolini's Fascists from No rt h Africa completely.
He was overruled and valuable troops were sent to Greece, only to be
unceremonially evicted by the Germans with considerable casualties.
Gen Erwin Rommel then arrived in North Africa on 12 February
1941 a nd , with a small force of Ge rm an t ro op s to stiffen Italian resolv e,
proceeded to push the depleted British force right back to the Egyptian
border, leaving ju st the su rro un de d garrison in Tobruk as the only
British left in Libya. This small German contribution to the Italian-
sponsored campaign was gradually enlarged by new arrivals and
eventually became the famed Afrika Korps comprising of 15th and 21st
Panze r Divisions. It th en beca me the bac kbo ne of the Ita lia n-G erm an
army for the rest of the Desert War.
The British launched two attempts to push Rommel back and relieve
Tobruk during the early part of 1941; both failed. Wavell was then
replaced by Gen Claude Auchinleck as C-in-C Middle East. His forces in
Egypt were designated British Eighth Army and placed under the
co mm an d of Gen Alan Cun nin gh am. In Novem ber 1941 Cu nni ng ham
launched Operat ion Crusader again st Ro mm el . It was no t a gre at
success. Th er e followed a go od dea l of heavy fight ing and mu ch a dvan ce
and retreat by both sides. Tobruk was relieved and Rommel at one point
was pushed right back to El Agheila in Tripolitania where he first
started. During the fighting, Auchinleck lost faith in the performance of
Eighth Army's commander and replaced him with LtGen Neil Ritchie.
At this point Auchinleck's position was weakened by the removal ofBritish and Australian formati ons to the Far East to c ou nte r Jap an' s8
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entry into the war. Rommel, on the other
hand, had withdrawn his forces intact and was
reinforced early in 1942 by 90th Light
Division, ready to resume the offensive. Axis
forces attacked eastwards once again on 21
January and pushed the British back to a
prepared line running south from Gazala.
From early February until mid May therewas a lull in the fighting while the two sides
built up their forces in preparation for a
renewed offensive. Rommel struck first on 26
May and over the next few weeks out-fought
and out-manoeuvred Ritchie's army. During
the protracted struggle Eighth Army lost
50,000 men and was forced into retreat,
streaming back in some disarray towards the
Egyptian border. Tobruk was abandoned
alo ng with quanti ties of supplies an d
equi pmen t. A jub ilan t Rom mel pressed ha rdon th e heels of the British withdrawal, i nte nt
on driving straight though to Cairo.
On 2 3 J u ne t he bat ter ed Eight h Army took
up a posit ion ju st insi de Egypt at Mer sa
Matruh. Complete defeat became a distinct possibility. Auchinleck
realized that drastic steps had to be taken to prevent the enemy reaching
the Nile Delta and capturing the Suez Canal, for once Axis troops were
across the waterway, Hitler might be tempted to send forces south from
the Caucasus to link up with them and then move on the oil fields of
Iraq and Persia.
Auchinleck at this point removed Ritchie and placed himself in
pers onal co mm an d of Eight h Army. His overrid ing conside ratio n was to
keep the army intact, even if it meant giving up Egypt. After a two-day
running battle at Mursa Matruh, the withdrawal continued to a half-
pr ep ar ed defensive line at El Alamein. To th e re ar of this, jus t before th e
delta, he ordered more defences to be dug and asked his planners to
consider how further withdrawals into Palestine or south towards the
Sudan could be effected. Auchinleck planned to stop Rommel's advance at
El Alamein. Failing that, he would try again on a makeshift line before the
Delta. Whatever happened, he would not allow Eight Army to be
overwhelmed; it must be kept intact as a fighting force to continue thestruggle with the enemy, wherever the next battlefield might happen to be.
British Eighth Army, exhausted by its hurried retreat, was in position on
the El Alamein line by 30 Ju ne . Following close behi nd , t he equally weary
advance unit s of Rom mel 's Pan zer arm ee Afrika br us hed up against it the
same day. Both sides now squared up to each other across kilometres of
barren desert and quickly prepared for a decisive showdown: one aiming
for victory, the other merely trying to stop the rot. The fighting that
followed, however, did not end in a decisive showdown, for it took three
separate battles before a result could be declared.
The first of these battles is usually recognized as being First Alamein,
although many modern historians take exception to this title, believingthat Gen Auchinleck's successful attempt to stop Rommel was no more
With few features standing above
the flat desert landscape, a
British officer uses the height of
his Marmon Herrington armoured
vehicle to improve his view of
the enemy. (IWM E14068)
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than two weeks of disparate actions fought by two exhausted armies each
trying to regain the upper hand. The second battle was Alam Haifa,
Rommel's last, unsuccessful operation to get past a revitalized Eighth Army
into Egypt. By then things had cha nged; Auchinleck had gon e, rep laced by
Gen Harold Alexander, and Eighth Army had a new commander, LtGen
Ber nar d Montgomery . Alam Haifa mar ked th e begin nin g of the
turnaround in British fortunes: Rommel was stopped and the initiative
passed to Montgomery. Then, after both sides had spent almost twomonths in preparation, came the battle known to the world as El Alamein:
Montgomery's greatest triumph, when Rommel was finally defeated in a
stand-up fight.
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194226 Ma y Rommel attacks British line at Gazala and, after a long, drawn-out battle, breaks
through Gen Ritchie's Eighth Army.
14 June A general retreat by Eighth Army to the Marsa Matruh-Sidi Hamza line is
ordered. The 2nd South African Division is left to hold Tobruk.
21 June Tobruk falls.
25 June Auchinleck removes Ritchie and takes over direct command of Eighth Army.
26 June Auchinleck cancels his order for a stand on the Marsa Matruh-Sidi Hamza line
and instructs his formations to fall back to the El Alamein line, but the enemy is
already in contact and a two-day battle of disengagement is fought by the almost-surrounded British X and XIII Corps.
30 June All British forces are withdrawn behind the Alamein positions.
1-3 July Rommel launches an infantry attack against the Alamein 'box' with 90th Light
Division and sends his Afrika Korps round its flank. Both attacks fail to dislodge the British.
9 July Rommel attacks in the south of the line with the tanks of 21st Panzer and Littorio
Divisions, but fails to make a breakthrough.
10-14 July Australian 9th Division captures Tel el Eisa near the coast and withstands
counterattacks against both this salient and the Alamein 'box'.
15-17 July New Zealand Division launches an unsuccessful attack on the Ruweisat
Ridge, failing to dislodge the enemy.
21-22 July Combined Australian, New Zealand and South African attack on Rommel's
centre is initially successful. However, further countermoves by the enemy eventually
drive them back.26-27 July The Australians begin an attack south-westwards from Tel el Eisa towards the
Miteirya Ridge. By this time both sides are well established in defence and tired. The
Australian attack fails to shift the enemy and Auchinleck calls a halt. Both he and
Rommel realize that further gains are impossible before their forces have rested and
replenished their supplies. Both now strengthen their defences and gather for the next
attack. This first battle of Alamein has stopped Rommel's advance towards Cairo and
saved Egypt.
12 August Montgomery arrives in Egypt to take over Eighth
Army. Alexander has already assumed command as
C-in-C Middle East in place of Auchinleck.
31 August Rommel launches his final attack to break through
the Alamein line.
1-4 September After two days of fighting, Axis forces areunable to get past Montgomery's strong defences about
Alam Haifa Ridge and Rommel pulls back his army. His
retreat is then hit in the flank by the New Zealand Division,
but the counterattack is beaten off with only minimal
losses.
September-October Rommel continues to strengthen his
defences and Montgomery carries on with the build-up of
his forces ready for the showdown battle on the Alamein
line.
23 October Montgomery fires the largest artillery barrage yet
seen in the war and launches Operation Lightfoot. XXX
Corps attacks the northern minefields of Rommel's
positions and attempts to carve out an area ready for X
Corps to force two corridors through the Axis defences.
One of the hazards of the desert,
a sand storm, is rolling across
the flat terrain and will soon
engulf this British officer and his
jeep in an impenetrable cloud of
grit and choking dust. One such
incident disrupted Rommel's
initial attack during the first
Alamein battle. (IWM E17824)
12
C H R O N O L O G Y
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Welcome supplies, including
bread and water, arrive at
the Panzerwerkstattkompanie
(tank repair company) of the
21st Panzer Division's 5th Panzer
Regiment. (Bundesarchiv 1011-
782-0006-22)
The arrival of Lee and Grant
tanks in the desert at last gave
the British weapons that could
take on the German Panzer IVs
on something like parity. The
sponson-mounted 75mm gun
and the turret-mounted 37mm
gun gave it the kind of punch
that had been missing in British
armour. Illustrated here
is the Lee, it differed from the
Grant in having a commander's
machine gun cupola on the top
of the turret. ( IWME14050)
LEFT Troops from Australian
9th Division try to master the
workings of a captured Ital ian
47/32 M25 anti-tank gun. (IWI
E16678)
Once through the German line, Monty intends to bring the German armour to battle
on his terms. Secondary attacks are also launched in the south by XIII Corps to
confuse the enemy.24-26 October Montgomery's corps in both sectors of the line fail to penetrate the main
German defences. In the north the armour of British X Corps is reluctant to advance
too far forward of the infantry. Constant urgings by Montgomery fail to galvanize his
forces for a supreme effort.
26 October Australian 9th Division begins to carve out a salient around Point 29 in the north
and 1st Armoured Division attack Kidney Ridge to the south of the Australian effort.
27 October Rommel launches a counterattack against 1st Armoured Division with his
Afrika Korps, but is checked by the British division's anti-tank guns. Similar enemy
attacks against the Australians are also turned back.
28-30 October Montgomery now switches his main effort to the north and uses the
Australian Division to carve out a salient towards the coast. Rommel counters this
move by shifting more of his armour northwards.
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Italian infantry with their standard
infantry anti-tank gun, the 47/32
M35. This gun was built under
licence and derived from the
Austrian 47mm Boehler gun. No
shield was provided as the gun
could be broken down into five
loads for easy transportation. Its
low profile made it difficult to
detect in the desert. (IWM RML
627)
1 November Montgomery changes his plans again and decides to throw his main weight
into the line south of the Australians in Operation Supercharge.
2 November The New Zealand infantry attack on a two-brigade front and break into the
German defences. Superb fighting by 9th Armoured Brigade holds open a gap to
allow the armour of X Corps to pass through.
3 November A battle of attrition grinds down the enemy defences and they begin to
crumble. Cracks open in the line and more and more of Eighth Army's divisions begin
to fight their way through.
4 November The Battle of Alamein is won. Axis forces are in retreat, streaming back
towards the coast road, heading for the Egyptian border.
8 November Anglo-American forces under Gen Eisenhower land in Morocco and Algeria
then move swiftly into Tunisia. Rommel now has an Allied army to his front and rear.
23 November Rommel is back where he started in January 1942 at El Agheila. He plans
to make a stand, but then slips away as the British try to outflank his lines.
Panzerarmee Afrika is now in full retreat westwards, intending to make a stand on the
Mareth Line inside Tunisia.
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The North African desert was a graveyard of the reputations of many
senior British generals, as each in turned failed to bring about a
resolute victory. It was the only ground on which Britain was in
contact with Axis forces and to this battlefield were sent the best that
Britain had to offer. It is therefore not surprising that the Prime Minister
bec ame depr esse d by the c on tin ue d lack of success of his generals. In
J u n e 1942, after almos t two years of battl e, th er e sho uld have be en som e
concrete achievements to show for all the fighting, but British Forces
were right back where they started and, more to the point, they were in
serious troubl e. On th e enemy side, the array of senio r co mm an de rs
changed little in the Desert War. Those replacements that were sent to
North Africa were usually as a result of death, injury or sickness.
Gen Sir Claude Auchinleck
C-in-C Middle East (left), talking
to LtGen Neil Ritchie,
Commander Eighth Army, during
the ill-fated Gazala battle in May
1942. (IWM 13801)
BRITISH COMMANDERS
Senior commanders of XXX
Corps in discussion about the
forthcoming battle. From left
to right, LtGen Morshead
(Australian 9th Division), LtGen
Wimberley (51st Highland
Division, LtGen Leese (XXX
Corps) and MajGen Pienaar
(South African 1st Division).(IWM 17427)
General Sir Claude Auchinleck (1884-1981) had been appointed as
Commander -in-Chief Middle East in July 1941, replacin g Ge n Sir Archibald
Wavell, who was sacked after the disastrous attempts to relieve the besieged
por t of Tobruk. Ulster-born Auchinleck was a pro du ct of the colonial Indi an
Army, having been commissioned into 62nd Punjab Regiment in 1904. He
saw action in the First World War in Egypt, Aden and Mesopotamia. After the
outb reak of war in 1939, he c om ma nd ed the British and Fre nch tro ops in
northern Norway during the abortive campaign of 1940 and later took up
corps and army commands in England before moving east to become C-in-
C India. As C-in-C Middle East, Auchinleck had responsibility not only for
military events in North Africa, but for the continuing troubles in Palestine,
Iraq and Persia. He was a modest man, austere and spartan in his lifestyle,
but with a great regard for the welfare of the soldiers in his command.
Auchin leck was mu ch ad mir ed by his conte mpor arie s an d proved himself an
able co mm an de r when, a s head of Eighth Army, he stoppe d Rommel'sheadlong charge towards Cairo at First Alamein. Unfortunately, he was not
a great communicator and often irritated Churchill with his preoccupation
of trying to beat Romm el rath er than att endi ng to the Prime Minister's
urgings.
By August 1942, Churchill was so unhappy with Auchinleck's
performance that he insisted in changes of command being made.
Auchinleck was dismissed and replaced by two men: Gen Alexander as
C-in-C Middle East and LtGen Montgomery as commander Eighth Army.
General Sir Harold Alexander was born the third son of the Earl of
Caledon and was educated at Harrow. He graduated from Sandhurst in
1911 and gained a commission in the Irish Guards. He saw service in the
First World War as a battalion commander, during which time he was 15
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twice wounded and won both the MC and
DSO. Between the wars he served in India and
in 1937 at the age of 45 bec am e the youn gest
major-general in the British Army. He com
manded 1st Division in France in 1940 and
then I Corps during the evacuation at Dunkirk.
He then served in Burma before taking over in
the Middle East. Alexander was not recognizedas a com ma nd er of gre at strategic ability, but
he was a good administrator and diplomat. He
had a rep utat ion for su rro und in g himself with
good staff officers of great competence. In
North Africa he was more than pleased to leave
all strategic and tactical decisions to his army
commander.
LtGen Sir Bernard Montgomery was a thoroughly professional soldier
who h ad ma de a careful study of his craft in or de r to develo p definite id eas
of how war shou ld be con duc ted . He was bo rn in 1887, th e son of a bishop .
He left San dhu rst in 1908 an d jo in ed th e Warwickshire Regi men t on theNorth-West Fron tie r of India. Du rin g the First World War he jo in ed t he
BEF just after the retreat from Mons in August 1914. He was wounded two
months later and awarded the DSO. He ended the war as Chief-of Staff of
47th Division. In the inter-war years he became an instructor at Camberley.
At the outbreak of the Second World War he was in command of 3rd
Division. He took this formation to France in 1940 and then assumed
co mm an d of II Corps on the re tre at to Dunkirk . For the nex t two years he
rose in rank until he eventually led South-Eastern Army. Montgomery had
no doubts about his own ability and was contemptuous of the lack of
proficiency in others. He was a difficult man to work for, or to be in
command of, and had a number of detractors amongst his fellow officers.Many found him insufferable, but few doubted his competence.
After he had taken over Eighth Army in August 1942, Montgomery
sought to replace some of his subo rdin ate co mma nde rs with men that
he kn ew His ju dg em en t was usually prov ed righ t an d many of these m en
themselves went on to higher command. LtGen Sir Oliver Leese, a tank
specialist who had instructed at the Quetta Staff College in the 1930s,
was brought out to Egypt from the Guards Division to lead XXX Corps.
His performance in the desert eventually led to him taking over
co mm an d of Ei ght h Army later in th e war in Italy. Som eti mes
Montgomery was wrong in his c hoic e of sub ord ina tes as in the case of
LtGen Herbert Lumsden who was given the c om ma nd of X Corps.Lumsden had previously commanded 1st Armoured Division and was
elevated to corps co mm an d on the reco mme nd at io n of others. X Corps
did no t pe rfo rm well du ri ng the mai n battle of El Alam ein, whe re
Lumsden and his armoured commanders disagreed with the army
co mma nd er' s use of armour . Mo ntg omer y was not best pleased and
replaced Lumsden soon after the battle.
The war in the desert produced many fine divisional commanders, the
most impressive of which was LtGen Sir Bernard Freyberg VC, command er
New Zealand 2nd Division. The bravery he showed in the First World War
where he won Britain's highest decoration, continued in the desert, for the
actions fou ght by his division won gre at praise, no t least of which cam e
LtGen Sir Bernard Montgomery
(centre) with two of his corps
commanders. On the left is
LtGen Oliver Leese (XXX Corps)
and on the right LtGen Herbert
Lumsden (X Corps). (IWM
E18416)
LtGen Brian Horrocks,
Commander XIII Corps.
Horrocks was highly regarded
by Montgomery and the new
Eighth Army commander lost
no time in promoting him to
corps command. XIII Corps had
previously been led by LtGen
'Strafer' Gott who had been
Churchill's first choice to take
over Eighth Army after
Auchinleck, but Gott was killed
in an air crash days before he
could assume the command.
(IWM 16462)
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LtGen Sir Bernard Freyberg
(centre), commander of New
Zealand 2nd Division, greets the
Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony
Eden, on his visit to Egypt.
(E18781)
The Desert Fox,
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin
Rommel, Commander
Panzerarmee Afrika. Around his
neck he wears the Pour le MeriteCross that he won in the First
War and the Knight's Cross of
the Iron Cross with Oakleaves.
He was awarded his Knight's
Cross on 26 May 1940 and then
became the tenth recipient of
Oakleaves on 21 March 1941.
Further awards followed; on
20 January 1942 he was the
sixth person to be awarded
Swords and on 11 March 1943
was the first non-Luftwaffe
recipient of Diamonds to hisKnight's Cross. (IWM GER 1281)
from Rom mel himself who r ega rde d the New
Zealanders as being among the elite of the British
Army. Similar regard was given to the other two
commanders of Dominion divisions: LtGen Sir
Leslie Morshead of Aust ralian 9th Division an d
MajGen D.H. Pienaar of South African First
Division.
AXIS COMMANDERS
The Axis chain of command in North Africa was
rather complex. The theatre was, strictly
speaking, an Italian show, with Marshal Ugo
Cavallero as its Commando Supremo. Cavallero
was a veteran of the First World War who had spent a great deal of time
in the inter-war years in industry. He was C-in-C East Africa before
suc cee din g Marshal Badogl io as Italian Chief of Gen era l Staff in
November 1940. Marshal Cavallero reported directly to the Fascistleader Benito Mussolini in Rome. Also in Italy was the veteran Luftwaffe
c o m m a n d e r Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring who was C-in-C of
all German forces in the Mediterranean. German and Italian forces in
North Africa had been combined, with the overall commander of these
troops being Marshal Ettore Bastico. The reality was, however, that GFM
Erwin Rommel commanded the actual fighting troops. Bastico had
fallen out with Rommel over the strategy for retaking Tobruk in 1941
and rem ain ed hostile to the Ger man c om ma nd er for the rest of the
campaign. In practice then, the Germans had taken over the running of
the campaign and Rommel received his orders direct from the OKW in
Berlin. The set-up was frustrating for Rommel, for most of the decisionsrega rdin g the crucial provision of supplies, ship ping and tr ansp ort were
still controlled by the Italians and were not under his direct command.
Throughout the campaign Rommel was to be plagued by these supply
problems to such an extent that they had great influence on the
ou tc om e of several actions.
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (1891-1944) had joi ned 6th
Wuerttemberg as an officer cadet in 1910. During the Great War he was in
action in France, Romania and Italy. He was twice wounded and won the
Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class together with Germany's highest award for
bravery, the Pour le Merite. He later drew on his wartime experiences and
wrote a book called Infantry Tactics which was met with great acclaim
thr oug hou t Euro pe. Hitler was an admir er of the book and Rom mel for
a time commanded the Fuhrer's security battalion. Rommel never
qualified for th e Gen er al Staff bu t still ma na ge d to achieve regu lar
pr om ot io n duri ng the inter-war per iod to reach the ran k of Gener almaj or
in 1939. H is actions in co mm an d of 7th Pan zer Division in Fran ce in 1940
earned him a great reputation as an armoured commander. This
reputation grew with successes in North Africa after he had taken over
Axis armoured formations in March 1941. Nicknamed the 'Desert Fox',
he quickly gained almost legendary status on both sides from his use of
mobile forces. His superior tactical skill saw him achieve some remarkablevictories, the mos t spectac ular of whic h was at Gazala in May 1942. 17
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Three field marshals discuss
the situation in Egypt. From left
to right, GFM Erwin Rommel
(Panzerarmee Afrika), GFM Albert
Kesselring (German C-in-C
Mediterranean) and Marshal Ugo
Cavallero (Italian Commando
Supremo). (Bundesarchiv 1011-
786-0326-12)
Rommel visits the Afrika Korps
HQ in June 1942 to consult
with some of its senior officers,
From left to right, Oberst Fritz
Bayerlein (Chief of Staff),
Oberstleutnant Mellenthin
(in charge of operations),
GFM Rommel and GenLt Walther
Nehring (Commander Afrika
Korps). (Bundesarchiv 1011 -
784-0203-14A)
18
Rommel was made a field marshal by Hitler after his success in
recapturing Tobruk in Ju ne 1942.
There were many other very able German commanders in North
Africa, some of whom went on to greater things. General derPanzertruppe Walther Nehring led the Afrika Korps during First
Alamein. He had served in the German infantry in the First World War
and switched over to tanks in the 1930s. He commanded 18th Panzer
Division in Russia before joining Rommel. By the end of the war he had
risen to the command of First Panzer Army. After Nehring was wounded
in the Alam Haifa battle, the Afrika Korps was commanded by
Generalleutnant Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma. During the First World War
he had fought with distinction and was awarded the Bavarian Order of
Max-Josef and the title of Ritter. He was a professional soldier and
pursued his career during the inter-war years in the Reichswehr and later
in the Wehrmacht, becoming a specialist in the use of mobile forces. In
Russia he had commanded both 6th and 20th Panzer Divisions.
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RIGHT GenMaj Georg von
Bismarck, commander
21st Panzer Division, in front
of one of his division's Panzer
Ills from 5th Panzer Regiment.
Von Bismarck was killed by
British shellfire during the first
day of the Alam Haifa battle
on 1 September 1942.
(Bundesarchiv 1011-784-0231-
35)
FAR, RIGHT Gen Giuseppe de
Stefanis, commander Italian XX
Corps. De Stefanis had com
manded both the Trento and
Ariete Divisions in North Africa
before assuming corps
command. During Rommel's
retreat in November 1942, he
was assigned the command
of Commandotruppe Mareth
to prepare the defences
of the Mareth Line ready for
Panzerarmee Afrika to withdraw
into. He later commanded LI
Army Corps in Italy. (Private
collection)
OPPOSITE Gen Francesco
Arena, Commander Italian Ariete
Armoured Division. Gen Arena
took command of the division
in May 1942 and was later
awarded the Ritterkreuz by
Rommel after Alamein. Following
the collapse of Axis forces in
Africa, he commanded the Forli
Infantry Division in Greece and
then became a prisoner of war
to the Germans when Italy
pulled out of the conflict. He
escaped from a POW camp
in January 1945, but was
unfortunately shot dead
by a Russian patrol. (Private
collection)
Many of the Italian generals who commanded formations in
Panzerarmee Afrika have come in for a good deal of criticism. They are
often portrayed as being weak and ineffectual. This broad sweep of
censure is often unfair. Although leadership at the top was consistently
poor, some of the Italian divisions fought remarkably well in adversity and
their generals did the best they could with the means available. General
Giuseppe de Stefanis, commander of Italian XX Corps was a veteran
leader of combat units in the First World War. He commanded the
Pinerolo Division in Greece in 1941 and had won the Ordine Militare di
Savoia, one of Italy's highest military awards. He had led both the Trento
and Ariete Divisions in North Africa before being elevated to corps
command.
19
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OPPOSING ARMIES
There is no doubt that at the end of June 1942, when Eighth Army
had been forced back into Egypt and Rommel's army was in close
pursuit, Auchinleck's forces were at a very low ebb. The strength
that had been built up over the previous six months for the final
offensive to push Rommel ou t of Africa had been squandered in a
poorly fought battle at Gazala against an army commander who was a
master of mobile tactics. The Gazala action and those skirmishes that
followed did not, however, constitute a complete rout. Auchinleck had
all the while kept his army in existence. Although much of his force was
strung out across the desert and thoroughly disorganized, he still hadconfidence that he would be able to pull it together and face the enemy
for what could be its final battle.
BRITISH FORCES
Early in 1942 Eighth Army had been forced to provide formations for the
fighting in the Far East and it took time for new divisions and supplies to
be shipped out from the UK to gradually build it back to full strength.
Much of this new strength had been lost at Gazala, but Eight Army still
remained a potent force when Rommel entered Egypt. The composition
of Auchinleck's army during First Alamein was a mix of infantry and
armoured formations from Britain and its Dominions. Many of these
divisions, such as 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats), were veterans
British 6-pdr anti-tank gun in
action. The arrival of the 6-pdr
in North Africa in mid-1942 gave
the British a powerful weapon
with which to finally counter
German tanks. Its 2.84kg shell
could penetrate 50mm of armourat 1,500 metres. (IWM E15559)
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Early model American Stuart
light tank in British service with
riveted hull. The tank is from
7th Armoured Division and its
crew are looking towards the
high ground of Qaret el
Himeimat. (IWME16095)
of the fighting in North Africa with a long list of
battle honours to their name. Others were newly
arrived on the continent. There was a large con
tingent of divisions from the countries of the old
British Empire, with formations arriving from New
Zealand, Australia, South Africa and India. These
were especially welcome for Britain struggling to
raise enough equipped divisions for service onthree continents, for these formations had a repu
tation for being aggressive in attack and dogged in
defence. They were all well regarded by friend and
foe alike.
In late J un e 1942, the re were thre e corps in
Eighth Army: X, XIII and XXX Corps. HQ
X Corps, however, had arrived from Syria on
21 Ju ne , too late to have any pa rt in stem mi ng the
German onslaught. During the first action
at Alamein it remained in the delta. When
Montgomery arrived in Egypt he decided to reconstitute this formation with armoured divisions as a
mobile corps along the lines of the Afrika Korps. The other two corps
fought in all three of the Alamein battles, with both armoured and infantry
divisions under command.
Reinforcements for British units continued to arrive in North Africa
in regular quantities which kept all formations up to near their nominal
st re ng th. Ev en so, the re were times , especially after stiff acti ons , wh en
numbers in the division fell to levels which required the unit to be
pulled out of the line for rest and replenishment. Casualties were more
of a probl em for the Domi nio n divisions. Thei r replace ment s had to
come from their own national reserves. This made losses in action
keenly felt back home, which in turn created some disquiet among their
politicians. Also bolstering British forces were contingents of troops
from other European countries. The 1st Greek Brigade was used to hold
The first of the new Sherman
tanks to arrive with Eighth Army
were just in time to take part
in the final battle of El Alamein.
Until the German Tiger tank
came onto the scene in Tunisia,
the Sherman was able to engageall German armour in North
Africa on more or less equal
terms. (IWME18380)
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Captured Panzer III with the
long-barrel 50mm gun being
inspected by British troops.
(IWM E16567)
defensive positions in the line, and 1st and 2nd Free French Brigadeswere committed to secondary attacks on the edge of the Qattara
Depression during the final battle at Alamein.
British and Commonwealth divisions were organized along similar
lines. Infantry divisions contained three infantry brigades each with three
rifle battalions, a reconnaissance regiment, a machine-gun battalion and
three field and one anti-tank regiments of artillery. Armoured Divisions
comprised one armoured and one motorized infantry brigade with two
field and one anti-tank regiments of guns. Each armoured brigade
contained three armoured regiments and one motor battalion. Up until
First Alamein the artillery was distributed among brigades. Auchinleck
changed this so that all of the guns were centralized under the
command of Divisional HQ. This change was formalized for all divisions
in August 1942.
While training and support for Eighth Army was quite adequate,
weapons and equipment were often below the standards of the
Germans. One of the great problems was in British tank design which,
up until that time in the war, had not been very successful. They were
often easily outperformed by German models. Crusader and Valentine
tanks were the most numerous in the desert and both were armed with
small 2-pdr (40mm) weapons, although some later-version Crusader IIIs
with 6-pdr (57mm) guns were beginning to arrive in Egypt. TheCrusader also had a reputation for being unreliable. Things improved
somewhat with the arrival of the American-built Grant tank for this was
armed with both a large 75mm gun and a 37mm weapon which could
engage German tanks on something like an equal footing, but the tank
had its disadvantages. Its main gun was sponson-mounted on its side and
had a very limited traverse. Its three-metre high profile also towered
over the battlefield making it very difficult for it to be concealed in the
open desert. Just before Montgomery's final battle at El Alamein,
American Sherman tanks began to arrive in the theatre. These had a
turret-mounted 75mm gun, were capable of reasonably high speeds and
were highly manoeuvrable. With them, the British finally had a tank thatcould match German armour.22
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German Luftwaffe SdKfz 7
medium tractor pulling an 88mm
flak gun to be used in an anti-
tank role. The gun already has a
number of 'kills' to its credit as
shown by the rings around its
barrel near the muzzle. (IWM
MH5833)
Artillery crew of a German FH18
150mm field howitzer await
orders to open fire. The gun
could deliver a 43kg shell up
to a distance of 13,325 metres.
It became the standard German
heavy field howitzer of the war.
(Bundesarchiv 1011-783-0119-
17A)
The other critical problem encountered by the British was the
inade quac y of its main anti-tank gun , t he 2-pdr (40 mm). It ju st did nothave enough punch to stop enemy tanks at anything like the distance they
should be engaged. Fortunately, a new anti-tank gun, the 6-pdr (57mm),
was beginning to arrive in Egypt in large numbers. This was a much more
po te nt wea pon an d was quickly used to re-arm the anti-tank regim ents of
the Royal Artillery and then the anti-tank companies of the infantry
battalions themselves. The sensible deployment of this type of gun
curtailed Rommel's ability to charge at the British as he had done so often
in the past.
One of the greatest advantages that Eighth Army had over the enemy
was the sup por t of Air Vice-Marshal Sir Art hur Con ing ham 's Des ert Air
Force, flying from airstrips close to the action. During the earlier battles inLibya it was the German Luftwaffe and the Italian Regia Aeronautica that
commanded the sky from their more local landing grounds. The further
the Axis forces advanced into Egypt the less effective their air forces
became. It was not just the long flying time to the front that put them at a
disadvantage, the Desert Air Force had in the meantime gradually begun
to obtain a numerical advantage over its rivals. By the time of the Alamein
battles it had almost complete superiority over the enemy's air fleet and
was able to bomb and strafe rear areas with such regularity that it had a
marked effect on the con duc t of the battles on the gro un d.
AXIS FORCES
Whilst Panzerarmee Afrika was not solely a German formation, its
command was German, its strategy was German inspired and its tactical
deployment was German led. Its main strike force was contained in the
German Afrika Korps, with 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. This crack
formation was supported by the equally famous motorized 90th Light
Division. A little later, in July 1942, t hese we re jo in ed by 16 4th Li ght
'Afrika' Division. All of these divisions were well trained, well led and
highl y mob ile . Th ey were t he strike force of Ro mme l's army, bu t by no
means his only mobile units.23
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GFM Rommel inspects a
knocked-out Stuart tank
belonging to the headquarters
of a British armoured battalion.
(IWM MH5875)
An Italian M13/40 tank being
unloaded from a transporter.
The tank was slow,
uncomfortable and under
powered, but still served as the
basic armoured vehicle in all
of the Italian armoured units.
Its 47mm gun, however, was
accurate and its armour-piercing
capability was superior to the
British Crusader and Valentine
tanks which were armed with
the 2-pdr gun. (Ufficio Storico
Esercito Rome)
At First Alamein two Italian armoured divisions (Ariete and Littorio)
and one motorized division (Trieste) were with Rommel , combined in
Italian XX Corps. None of these divisions were quite as competent or as
skilful as their German counterparts for they were let down by theineffectiveness of their armour. They were, none the less, a vital link in
Rommel's mobile tactics. The often maligned Italian infantry divisions
with Panzerarmee Afrika were also indispensable. The Trento, Sabratha,
Bologna, Brescia and Pavia Divisions grouped in X and XXI Corps were
not as proficient as German formations, but could put up an effective
fight when suitably led and deployed. They were used to hold the line,
occupy territory and man fixed defences for just long enough to allow
the armoured divisions to intervene. In some ways they were seen as
'cannon fodder', there to absorb the shock of any major attack. Such
cynical use dispirited their commanders and affected morale in the
ranks. Most Italian troops simply wished for a speedy end to the war so24
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Italian crew of a 149/40 Modello
35 gun. The 149 mm piece fired
a 46 kg shell a maximum
distance of 23,700 metres. Its
large split trails used hammered
spikes for anchoring. (Ufficio
Storico Esercito Rome)
that they coul d all retu rn ho me , the ir dream s of African con ques ts
replaced by a determination to survive.
The Italian Army was inadequately served by its weapons. Its main
tanks, the Ml3/40 and the Ml4/41 variant, were the poorest in Africa in
terms of arma ment , arm ou r protect ion and perform ance an d its 47/3 2
M35 anti-tank gun had less penetrative power than the British
2-pdr gun . The same was not true of the eq ui pm en t in the Ge rma n
arsenal, for it contained two very prominent weapons, the Panzer IV
Special and the 88mm gun, that outperformed all else on the battlefield.
The Panzer IV tank was the best of the German armour and it was further
improved in the summer of 1942 by the introduction of a new longer-
barrelled 75mm gun to become Panzer IVF2 with almost twice the
pen etra tiv e powe r of its predec esso r. It was true t hat no t ma ny of thes e
tanks were available to Rommel during his initial move into Egypt, but
when they did put in an appearance, they proved to be extremely
effective. The 88mm gun was strictly speaking an anti-aircraft weapon, but
when used in an anti-tank role it proved to be irresistible. The flat
trajectory and h igh velocity of its shells outcl assed every ot he r we ap on o n
the battlefield. Its one drawback was its high profile; it stood very tall in
the open desert.
The two armoured divisions of the Afrika Korps both consisted of
one Panzer and one Panzergrenadier regiments. The Italian armoureddivisions were likewise configured with one tank regiment and one
motorized infantry regiment. The German 90th and 164th Divisions had
three motorized infantry regiments. Italian motorized and infantry
divisions each co nta in ed jus t two regime nts .
Romm el's pr oble ms were not confined to jus t count erin g the British,
he also had to contend with the battle for supplies. The provision of
vehicles, reinforcements, weapons and fuel were Panzerarmee Afrika's
great est worry. With th e batt er ed port s of Tripoli and Ben ghaz i located
hu nd re ds of kilo metre s in the rear, the lon g trek to obta in sufficient
quantities of supplies forwards into Egypt was a constant headache for
Rommel. Everything required for battle had to be shipped across the
Mediterranean Sea. There were often sufficient stores and transport 25
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available in Italy, but each ship bringing goods across to North Africa
had to run the gauntlet of naval and air attacks from British forces based
in Malta and Egypt, In July 1942 only 20 per cent of the required total
was unloaded in Libya, whilst in August Rommel's army used up twice
the amount that was landed. All stocks were running perilously low and
the scarcity of fuel especially had a great influence on the shape of the
battles fought in the summer of 1942.
ORDER OF BATTLE: BRITISH FORCES
Commander-in-Chief Middle East - Gen the Hon Sir
Harold Alexander
British Eighth Army - LtGen Sir Bernard Montgomery
Army Troops
1st Anti-tank Brigade
1st Armoured Brigade
2nd Anti-aircraft Brigade
12th Anti-aircraft Brigade
21st Independent Infantry Brigade
X Corps - LtGen Herbert Lumsden
XXX Corps - LtGen Sir Oliver Leese
23rd Armoured Brigade Group (Corps Reserve)
Indian 4th Division - MajGen F.I.S. Tuker5th Indian Brigade
7th Indian Brigade
161st Indian Brigade
51st (Highland) Division -
152nd Brigade
153rd Brigade
154th Brigade
MajGen D.N. Wimberley
1st Armoured Division - MajGen R. Briggs
2nd Armoured Brigade
7th Motorized Brigade
Hammerforce (From 8th Armoured Division)
Australian 9th Division - LtGen Sir Leslie Morshead
20th Australian Brigade
24th Australian Brigade
26th Australian Brigade
8th Armoured Division - MajGen C.H. Gairdner
24th Armoured Brigade (To 10th Armoured Division)
Hammerforce (To 1st Armoured Division)
10th Armoured Division - MajGen A.H. Gatehouse
8th Armoured Brigade
24th Armoured Brigade (From 8th Armoured Division)
133rd Lorried Infantry Brigade (From 44th Division)
Xlll Corps - LtGen Brian Horrocks
New Zealand 2nd Division - LtGen Sir Bernard Freyberg VC
5th New Zealand Brigade
6th New Zealand Brigade
9th Armoured Brigade
South African 1st Division MajGen D.H. Pienaar
1st South African Brigade
2nd South African Brigade
3rd South African Brigade
7th Armoured Division - MajGen A.F. Harding
4th Light Armoured Brigade
22nd Armoured Brigade
1st Free French Brigade Group
44th Division - MajGen I.T.P. Hughes
131st Brigade
132nd Brigade
133rd Brigade (To 10th Armoured Division)
50th Division - MajGen J.S. Nichols
69th Infantry Brigade
151st Infantry Brigade
1st Greek Brigade
2nd Free French Brigade Group26
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ORDER OF BATTLE: AXIS FORCES
Italian Commando Supremo - Benito Mussolini
Chief of Staff - Marshal Count Ugo Cavallero
German Commander-in-Chief South - GFM Albert Kesselring
Italian Commando Supremo Africa - Marshal Ettore Bastico
Panzerarmee Afrika - GFM Erwin Rommel
ITALIAN FORCES
Italian X Corps - Gen Enrico Frattini (acting)
9th Regt Bersaglieri
17th Divisione di Fanteria 'Pavia' - Gen Nazareno Scattaglia
27th Regt Fanteria
28th Regt Fanteria
27th Divisione di Fanteria 'Brescia' - Gen Brunetto Brunetti
19th Regt Fanteria
20th Regt Fanteria
185th Divisione Paracadutisti 'Folgore' - Gen Enrico Frattini
186th Regt Paracadutisti
187th Regt Paracadutisti
Raggruppamento 'Ruspoli' (Battle Group)
Italian XX Corps - Gen Giuseppe De Stefanis
101st Divisione Motorizzata Trieste' - Gen Francesco LaFerla
65th Regt Fanteria Motorizzata
66th Regt Fanteria Motorizzata
VIII Battaglione Bersaglieri
XI Battaglione Corazzato
132nd Divisione Corazzata 'Ariete' - Gen Francesco Arena
132nd Regt Corazzato
8th Regt Bersaglieri
III Gruppo Squadroni 'Nizza Cavalleria'
133rd Divisione Corazzata 'Littorio' - Gen Gervasio Bitossi
133rd Regt Corazzato
12th Regt Bersaglieri
III Gruppo Squadroni 'Lanceri de Novaria'
Italian XXI Corps - Gen Alessandro Gloria (acting)
7th Regt Bersaglieri
25th Divisione di Fanteria 'Bologna' - Gen Alessandro Gloria
39th Regt Fanteria
40th Regt Fanteria
102nd Divisione di Fanteria 'Trento' - Gen Giorgio Masina
61st Regt Fanteria
62nd Regt Fanteria
Italian Reserve (still forming)
136th Divisione Corazzata 'Giovani Fascisti' - Gen Ismaele di
Nisio
Regt Fanteria 'Giovani Fascisti'III Gruppo Squadroni 'Cavalleggeri di Monferrato'
GERMAN FORCES
90th Leichte Division - GenLt Theodor Graf von Sponeck
155th Regiment
200th Regiment
361st Motorized Regiment
164th Leichte 'Afrika' Division - GenMaj Carl-Hans
Lungershausen
125th Panzergrenadier Regiment
382nd Panzergrenadier Regiment433rd Panzergrenadier Regiment
Ramcke Parachute Brigade - GenMaj Hermann-Bernhard
Ramcke
Deutsches Afrika Korps - GenLt Wilhelm Ritter von
Thoma
15th Panzer Division - GenMaj Gustav von Vaerst
8th Panzer Regiment
115th Panzergrenadier Regiment
21st Panzer Division - GenMaj Heinz von Randow5th Panzer Regiment
104th Panzergrenadier Regiment
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OPPOSING PLANS
At the end of June 1942, when Gen Auchinleck's forces had been
forced right back inside Egypt after suffering great losses in men
an d materiel, defeat was a distinct possibility. In contrast,
Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika was brimful of confidence after weeks of
success, it had t he smel l of victory in its nostri ls an d was on the p oi nt of
driving the British out of Egypt. At least, tha t is how it ap pe ar ed to thos e
who were there and to governments overseas. This appreciation was,
however, flawed. The British had actually fallen back into a defendable
position and could call on fresh troops previously withdrawn from the
action. Other divisions were also at that moment en route for Egypt.Their l ines of commu nica tion h ad short ened an d reinforcements,
tanks, fuel and new eq ui pm en t were still arriving in the po rts ju st 120
kilometres to their rear. In contrast, Rommel's forces were all exhausted.
Their petrol supplies had almost dried up; their tank numbers had
dwindled through breakdowns and losses; supply lines snaked back for
hu nd re ds of kilometres across the desert to bom b-d ama ged ports in
their rear and they were shor t of reinfo rcemen ts, fuel, tanks, tra nsp ort
and guns. On paper at least, it looked as though Rommel could not go
on. His superiors, Kesselring, Cavallero and Bastico, all agreed that he
had overextended himself; all originally urged him to stop. He would
have no ne o f it; the Nile Delta see med th er e for th e taking .
The British had been brought to this unenviable position by a tactically
superi or enemy. Rommel 's repu tat ion rested on his use of his mobile
forces. Wh en he arrived jus t short of Alamein on 29 Ju ne he believed he
had the British on the run. It was therefore essential that he kept up the
momentum; to delay would be fatal. He knew that he would have to force
the Alamein line and relied on his momentum to take him through. He
could not afford to wait for his exhausted force to gather strength and let
his supply lines catch up with him, for the British would also use the time
to rest and improve their defences. Rommel saw the Alamein position as
another line on which to employ his usual tactics of a frontal assault by
infantry and a wide sweep by the Afrika Korps to move behind the
defenders, a plan that had worked so well in the past.
Auchinleck also stuck to the strategy he had used before. He would
fight Rommel on this new defence line and, whatever happened, he
wou ld keep Ei ght h Army intact . If he was forced int o ano th er retre at
then he would pull back to the next position already hurriedly being
pr ep ar ed in front of th e delta in his rear. In the mea nt im e he wou ld
fight a battle at Alamein. Tactically he would use the same plan as
Ro mm el but in reverse. He coul d not ma n the who le of th e line, s o he
would pu t stron g positions of infantry an d guns in 'box es' i n and ar ou nd
selected features, blocking the route, and then attack any penetrations
between them with mobile groups. As Rommel manoeuvred to find an
Group of German officers from
the Afrika Korps waiting for the
start of an attack. (Bundesarchiv
1011-782-OO23-O9A)
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opening, Auchinleck would manoeuvre to pre-
vent it. It was a good plan, for it worked.
Rommel's dash for the delta was halted in a
battle that was to become known as First Alamein.
Auchinleck then proceeded to construct a thick
line of defences to deal with the next Axis attack,
paying special attention to the northern sector
which he had extensively mined in an effort toforce Rommel to consider attacking in the south,
past the long Alam Haifa Ridge. Auchinleck
rightly determined that this ridge would be the
key to the next battle, for Rommel would have to
either pass alongside it or manoeuvre round it.
Either way, Auchinleck intended to be ready for
him. Then things changed; Churchill urged
Auchinleck to go back on the offensive while
Rommel gathered strength for his next push for
the Suez Canal, but Auchinleck insisted on more
time. Churchill would not agree on any furtherdelay and Auchinleck was replaced by LtGen Bernard Montgomery.
Exasperatingly for Churchill, Montgomery also decided he would not
go over to the offensive straight away. He would wait until he had seen
off Rommel's next attempt at a breakthrough. Once Rommel had been
halted, he would put in his attack, but even then he would not make his
move until he had overwhelming superiority in men and weapons, and
not before Eighth Army had reached a standard of training that met
with his own high ideals.
Auchinleck had evolved certain tactics for defensive action in the
desert. He realized that the wide featureless terrain made static positionsalone ineffective - they could be easily outflanked. It was important to
be able to move and concentrate against the point of enemy penetration
and to bring upon him the greatest amount of firepower that was
available. It was also pointless to have too many infantry in defensive
positions, but those that were there needed to have sufficient anti-tank
and artillery to provide an all-round defence. There also had to be an
overall balance between those troops and artillery holding the line and
those that were committed to a mobile role. Units and headquarters in
the immediate rear had to be prepared to defend themselves in the
event that the enemy managed to break through the forward positions
and overrun them. They also had to be able to hold out until mobileforces were able to help clear away the enemy. This doctrine led to the
arrangement of defence localities termed 'boxes', which usually
contained two battalions of infantry, and a battery each of field, anti-
aircraft and anti-tank guns. Th e r ema inder of the division was organized
into mobile groups.
Montgomery did not like the idea of boxes. He thought that divisions
should fight as divisions with all their artillery massed in support. He
also took note from Rommel and created a mobile corps of his own,
modelled along similar lines to the Afrika Korps, to be held in reserve
and used as a strike force. He planned to continue Auchinleck's work to
heavily fortify the northern sector of the line to a point where Rommelcould only realistically make his attack in the south. Montgomery would
A near miss as a mine explodes
close by some British transport,
although this is probably a
staged incident laid on for the
photographers. (IWM E18542)
German soldier at tempting to dig
a 'foxhole' in the stony desert.
With little natural cover, it was
important to get below ground
as soon as possible for safety.
(IWM MH5834)
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German signals post near Tel el
Eisa. The flat featureless terrainmade it possible to transmit (and
listen to) radio traffic over large
distances. The Germans gained
much important intelligence by
listening to the insecure chatter
of British units talking to each
other in plain language. (IWM
MH 5581)
the n mass his guns an d assemble his ar mo ur to mee t him, jus t as
Auchinleck had intended.
It has to be noted that both Montgomery and Auchinleck were
he lpe d in maki ng this decisio n by the use of ULTRA inte rcep ts. T he
break ing of the Ge rma n codes allowed bot h of these com man der s to
have an insight into Axis thinki ng. Such ga the rin g of intell igence was
not, however, all one-sided for the Germans were also receiving a wealth
of info rmat ion ab ou t British forces from two individual sources. Th emost important was from their own specialist listening service located in
the desert, which was picking up and analysing insecure radio chatter
em an at in g from Eig hth Army. It was amazing jus t what coul d be
deduced from units talking to each other over the air. More valuable
news, possibly mu ch mo re valuable at a hi gh er level, was ob tai ned by
deciphering dispatches sent to Washington by Col Bonner Fellers, the
US military attache in Cairo. The Italians and Germans were both able
to deci phe r Amer ican codes from the 'Black Book' encryp tion that
Fellers used. The nightly dispatches radioed to the USA after he had
visited British formations and talked with senior commanders was
decoded by the enemy before morning. When America entered the warFellers ha d privi leged access to th e most sensitive of in fo rma tio n and all
of this fell into G er ma n han ds . Th e Ger man s later adm itt ed that the
information unwittingly supplied by Fellers contributed decisively to
their victories in North Africa.
Rommel's last attack was emphatically turned back in the battle of
Alam Haifa and hopes for a renewed push to the delta faded forever.
Rommel knew that it was now the turn of the British to make their
attack. All he could do was strengthen his defences and make ready to
deal with the onslaught when it came. His plan rested on having
defen ces of such thickn ess and d ep th th at they were cap able of hol din g
the en emy back. In the even t of a British pe net ra tio n, his mobi le
armoured forces would then advance to seal it off. To counter this,
Montgomery could only use brute force and overwhelming numbers.
He knew that he would have to attack very strong positions and would
take large nu mb er s of casualties. Th e battle of attriti on which would
follow would have to be endured long enough for gaps to be opened for
the tanks to pass thr ou gh an d be ready to me et with the Axis ar mo ur
which would inevitably come at them. Then it would be down to a dog
fight to see who was the strongest.
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FIRST ALAMEIN
32
The El Alamein line into which Eighth Army retreated in late June
was a defence line in name only. Very little had been done to
pr ep ar e the g ro un d in terms of field fortifications; its main
strength was its natural location. The line stretched north to south
across 65 kilometres of desert over several low ridges and shallow
depressions. Anchoring the northern flank was the sea. In the south was
the Qattara Depression, a massive area of soft sand and salt marsh,
impassable to tanks and most kinds of tran spor t. Th e Alam ein line could
not therefore be outflanked; Rommel would have to come through it.
Attempting to block his way were three defended localities about 25 kilometres apart, the first around the railway station at El Alamein, the
seco nd in the middl e of the line abo ut Bab el Qatt ara and the t hird close
to the great depression at Naqb Abu. None of these localities had been
properly wired or mined.
The original German plan was for Axis forces to pause for six weeks
for res uppl y after th e cap tu re of Tob ruk , bu t the collaps e of the British
forces after Gazala led to approval being given to Rommel to advance
straight into Egypt. On 28 Ju ne , after som e initial reluct ance o n the p art
of senior com ma nd er s in the Medit err ane an, he received specific ord ers
to defeat the forces opposing him, seize the Suez Canal between Ismailia
and Port Said, occupy Cairo and eradicate any possible threat from
Alexandria. Cairo lay just 160 kilometres away and Rommel knew that if
he paused he would be giving Auchinleck time to reorganize. Delay
The isolated railway station of El
Alamein gave its name to the
famous battle which was fought
in the desert to the south. In
1942 there were just a few
buildings clustered round the
station, tens of miles from any
other habitation. (IWM E14398)
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These motorcyclists are totally
exhausted and have fallen asleep
where they stopped. The 'WL'
number plate shows them
to be Luftwaffe troops, probably
attached to one of the flak
batteries. The Afrika Korps palm
tree and Swastika insignia can
be seen on the front of the
sidecar. (Bundesarchiv 1011-
782-0041-32)
would be fatal. He realized that he would have to force the Alamein linewithout halting, even though his men were tired, his equipment was in
need of repair and his supply lines stretched almost to breaking point.
On 29 June, immediately after 90th Light Division had captured the
Mursa Matruh position, Rommel sent the division eastwards with the
armour of the Afrika Korps to make renewed contact with Eighth Army,
their transport refuelled from stocks captured from the British.
In Alexandria and Cairo confusion reigned. Sympathetic Arabs
began to prepare for the arrival of Rommel, openly sneering at the
plight of the British. Panic set in amongst the rear areas; confidential
documents were burned; elements of the Middle East Headquarters
were moved to Palestine; the Mediterranean Fleet left Alexandria to
disperse amongst the safer ports of Haifa and Beirut and arrangements
were made to block the harbour and destroy port facilities and stores.
On 30 Ju ne Rommel had his strike force ready to attack between the
Alamein position and Deir el Abyad. The 90th Light Division was on the
left and his two panzer divisions abreast of it on the right. He intended
to pass the armour down the southern side of the Miteirya Ridge
towards the British near Ruweisat Ridge. The 90th would skirt the
Alamein defences and then cut them off from the east while the Afrika
Korps was swinging south to Alam Nayil to take British XIII Corps in the
rear. Italian XXI Corps would come forward next and attack Alameindirectly from the west. Italian XX Corps was to follow behind the panzer
divisions then swing south to attack the Bab el Qattara position.
In the early hours of 1 July, 90th Light Division attacked eastwards
intending to pass to the south of the El Alamein Box. In poor light and
a sandstorm the leading units quickly lost their way and collided with the
Alamein defences. The exhausted Panzergrenadiers soon became
entangled in vicious fighting by an enemy who was better prepared than
they expected him to be. It was not until early afternoon that the
division was able to resume its advance. To the south the Afrika Korps
fared little better. Both 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions found their
approach to the start line difficult and arrived three hours late, bombedand disorganized by the Desert Air Force. When the advance finally got34
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The lonely figure of Gen Claude
Auchinleck watches the last of
his units arrive into the Alamein
line after the rout suffered at
Gazala and Mersa Matruh at the
end of June 1942. (IWM E13882)
under way, they found that the area around Deir
el Shein before the Ruweisat Ridge was held in
some strength by 18th Indian Brigade. The
brigade was newly arrived from Iraq and had been
plac ed un de r the co mm an d of Sou th African 1st
Division. The panzers now came under heavy
artillery fire from the Indians and the South
African Division. This was so me th in g of a shockfor Gen d.Pz Walther Nehr ing, co mm an de r of the
Afrika Korps, for intelligence had suggested that
these troops were much further to the east.
Nehring felt that he had no option but to attack
the position. This was no easy task and it was not
until 1900hrs that evening that his panzer
divisions managed to overwhelm the stiff
resistance put up by 18th Indian Brigade and take
Deir el Shein , losin g 18 of its pr eci ou s 55 tanks in
the process.
Meanwhile, 90th Light Division had also had a bad afternoon. On itsattempt to get around to the east of the Alamein Box it had run into
terrific artillery fire from th e guns of th e Sout h African Division and
had gone to ground. Rommel's personal intervention was unable to get
it movi ng again, for the arm y com ma nd er himself was cau ght in the
barrage and forced to lay on the open ground with his troops for three
ho urs . Fur th er back, the Italians were attacki ng the ot he r en d of the
Alamein position with little success.
While Rommel was face-down in the sand, Auchinleck was issuing
orders for a counterattack. It had been a good day for Eighth Army's
commander. His forces, suitably supported by the Desert Air Force, had
blunted Rommel's first attempt to get past the Alamein line. He had lost
the 18th Indian Brigade but had halted the Afrika Korps, and the slow
collapse of the posit ion at Deir el Shein th ro ug h the resista nce put up
by the Indians had allowed Auchinleck to gather fresh forces to block
the Germans. It was now essential that his defence should include
tactical attacks to deflect Rommel's intentions.
Auchinle ck ord ere d LtGen No me 's XXX Corps to hold Romme l's
advance while LtGen Gott's XIII Corps hit his right flank with armour. Gott
was told to attack on either side of the Ruweisat Ridge towards Deir el
Abyad. Now with both 90th Light Division and the Afrika Korps identified
in the nor th , Auch inle ck also dec ide d that the def end ed localities of Babel Qattara and Naqb abu Dweis could be abandoned to make his defence
more compact. The New Zealand Division could be withdrawn and
prepared for a mobile role, as could Indian 5th Division in the south.
Th e nex t day, 2 July, the Ge rm an 90t h Division failed to get mov ing
again in the face of heavy British artillery fire. Rommel realized that he
wou ld have to shift som e of his weigh t to the no rt h to hel p the division to
get eastwards along the coast road. Nehring's corps was ordered to detach
so me of his tanks bre ak to give some s up po rt to the 90t h Light Division.
The renewed German thrust and the British counter attack got
underway simultaneously. The clash rippled across the northern part of
the Alamein line. Fierce fighting, bo th no rt h and sout h of the RuweisatRid ge and on th e rid ge itself lasted until dark. Tanks of th e 1st 35
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TANKS AND ANTI-TANK GUNS OF THE ITALIAN ARIETE
DIVISION ATTACKING SOUTH OF RUWEISAT RIDGE DURING
THE FIRST BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN (pages 36-37)
The main German effort on 3 July lay south of the Ruweisat
Ridge. The Afrika Korps launched an advance but soon ran
into British armour, readying themselves for their own
attack. The action was short and sharp, during which the
Afrika Korps was firmly held by 1st Armoured Division. A
little further to the south, British XIII Corps was also
beginning an advance, aiming for Deir el Shein. It soon
clashed with the Italian Ariete Division, which was putting
in its own attack to the right of the Afrika Korps. The
Italians were met with a fierce exchange of artillery whichwas followed up by the infantry of the New Zealand Division.
Over 350 Italians were taken prisoner and 44 guns were
captured. The New Zealanders then manoeuvred to try cut
off the retreat of the Ariete, but found themselves engaged
by the Brescia Division of Italian X Corps in the depression
of El Mreir and had to retire. The battlescene shows M13/40
tanks of 1st Battalion of the Italian 132nd Ariete Armoured
Division advancing eastwards during the attack. The division
had performed well in the earlier Gazala and 'Knightsbridge'
battles and Rommel thought it was one of the better Italian
formations. The M13/40 tank (1) was the least effective
fighting vehicle in the desert, generally inferior to all other
tanks, but available to the Italians in relatively large
numbers - almost 2,000 were built during the war. It had a
slow cross-country performance, only able to reach speeds
of around 15 km/hour in action. It did, however, have anaccurate 47mm gun with an armour-piercing capability
superior to the under-gunned British tanks of the period
before Alamein. It was effective against infantry, but unable
to perform well against the faster and more heavily
armoured tanks of Eighth Army. The tank had a crew of four,
consisting of commander, loader, driver and radio
operator/machine-gunner. It did not have a specific gunner,
so the commander (2) also had to operate the main gun in
addition to his other duties. The Italian 47mm anti-tank gun
(3) was a useful weapon in the desert. Based on the
Austrian 4.7mm Bonier anti-tank gun, it did not have the
range of the devastating dual-purpose German 88mm gun,
but it had a much lower profile, was easier to dig in and wasoften only detectable by British tank crews when it was
too late to avoid its fire. The gun did not have a shield for
protection, which exposed its crew to the effects of high-
explosive shell fire. Supporting the advance is a
self-propelled Semovente M40 75/18 assault gun (4). It
consisted of a large 75mm gun mounted on an M40 chassis
and gave the Italians unequalled fire power on the desert
floor, but its low speed and thin armour made it vulnerable
to British tanks and artillery. (Howard Gerrard)
38
TANKS AND ANTI-TANK GUNS OF THE ITALIAN ARIETE
DIVISION ATTACKING SOUTH OF RUWEISAT RIDGE DURING
THE FIRST BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN (pages 36-37)
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The crew of a Panzer III from
21st Panzer Division watch the
inexorable columns of vehicles
of the Afrika Korps driving
eastwards to the El Alamein line
on 29 June 1942. (Bundesarchiv
1011-782-0016-32A)
Armoured Division were held by the anti-tank guns of the panzer
divisions and Nehring's armour was corralled on the northern side of
the ridge by the British artillery. The result was indecisive: Rommel's
tired forces were too weak to push aside Auchinleck's troops and the
British were too disorganized to completely repulse the advance. Eleven
more German tanks had been lost in the action, reducing the DAK's
pan zer force to just 26 r unn ers .
That night, his sleep broken by British bombing raids, Rommel
decided to try again the next day to effect a breakthrough. He intended
to pr ob e the British de fen ces to find a weak spot. T he DAK was to re ne w
its eastwards thrust while the Italian XX Corps advanced on its right
flank; Italian X Corps was to hold El Mreir. Rommel knew that his men
were exhausted, but reasoned that the British were also close to collapse;
one big push would break the line. Auchinleck, in turn, still favoured an
active defen ce an d ord er ed XIII Corps to adva nce north- west of Deir el
Shein in order to threaten the enemy's rear.
Th e ma in G er ma n effort on 3 July lay south o f the Ruw eisat Ridg e.
Early that morning the advance by the Afrika Korps ran into the British
armour readying themselves for their attack. The action lasted for over
an hour-and-a-half by which time t he G erm ans ha d virtually reac hed the
limit of their endu ra nc e. Ro mme l conti nu ed to urg e his me n on, bu t
little further progress was made. The Afrika Korps was firmly held by1st Armoured Division. Just to the south, British XIII Corps was
beginning its advance on Deir el Shein when it bumped into the flanks
of Italian Ariete Division who were crossing its front. An exchange of
artillery was followed up by an attack by the New Zealand Division in
which 350 prisoners and 44 guns were taken. The New Zealanders then
manoeuvred to try to cut off the retreat of the Ariete, but found
themselves engaged by the Brescia Division of Italian X Corps in the
depression of El Mreir. The third day of the battle closed with little
further progress by either side having been made, but it was the British
who could most feel pleased with themselves. The Axis advance to the
Nile Delta had been stopped in the north, in the centre and in the southon th e scratc h defen ce line of El Ala mein . 3 9
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A battery of 88mm flak guns
being used in an anti-tank role.
The very high silhouette of the
gun made it vulnerable to high-
explosive counter-battery fire.
(Bundesarchiv 1011-443-1574-
24)
Rommel now realized that he and his troops had reached their limit;
they were all exhausted. He had to accept that his quick dash for Cairo
was over. He gave orders for the Afrika Korps to pull back from the line
the next day and hand over their positions to Italian infantry. The field
mars hal ha d no t given up on his goal of seizing th e Suez Can al, h e was
just tak ing stock before he launched a renewed at tempt. In the
meantime, he ordered minefields to be laid and defensive positions to
be dug. Auchinleck at the same time was trying to figure out his next
move. He had stopped Rommel's attack and now outlined his future
intentions to his corps commanders, Norrie and Gott. The Axis forces
must be completely destroyed, he explained, and he would do this by
containing the enemy's eastern and southern flanks then attacking his
rear. Th e whole of XIII Corps, tog eth er with 7th Mot or and 4th
Armoured Brigades would drive into Rommel's right rear and then roll
up Panzerarmee Afrika from the south. 'The enemy must be given no
rest,' he ordered.
On 4 July the British moves beg an, b ut found t hat the G er ma n
withdrawals they detected the night before had not taken place.
Immediately the armoured brigades advanced they met an enemy anti-
tank screen and were stopped. A little to the south the New Zealand
Division applied pressure against an ineffectual Italian opposition at El
Mreir and 1st Armoured Division probed gingerly in the north. All of these
moves were half- hearted atte mpts , al tho ugh they did clear the en emy off a
great part of the Ruweisat Ridge. As the official history of the campaign
com men ted : 'T he 4t h July was a day of disjointed en gag eme nts which h ad
no significant results.' T he tr oops of Eigh th Army an d their com ma nd er s
were all tired; no great effort was forthcoming.
The next day Auchinleck tried to reposition his forces to continue
with the left hook that he had planned, but eventually realized that with
his limited amo un t of ar mo ur it mig ht be mo re p ru de nt to try a mo re
shallow book aimed at Deir el Shein. Both corps were now ordered toconcen trate th eir efforts towards this depr ess ion to th e sout h west of th e40
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British patrol behind enemy lines
intercept an Axis truck and
capture the occupants. The
event is re-staged for the benefit
of an accompanying
photographer (IWM E12810)
Ruweisat Ridge. This they did over the next few days, but again the
results were disappointing, with little new ground taken. At the same
time, Rommel reasoned that as Auchinleck was shifting more and more
of his streng th in the no rt h, he mi gh t try a move in the sou th aim ed at
first taking Bab el Qattara, then sweeping northwards to get behind
British XIII Corps . T he attack was pl an ne d for 9 July.
Auchinleck was pre-warned of these moves by ULTRA intercepts and
decided that he would also attack, this time in the far north from out of the
Alamein Box. He ordered LtGen W.H. Ramsden, the new commander of
XXX Corps, to capture Tel el Eisa and Tel el Makh Khad. Both were
defended by Italians and air reconnaissance showed that their defences
were not highly developed. The capture of these two features would put a
salient into Rommel's positions from which mobile forces could move
towards the Miteirya Ridge and Deir el Shein.
The move would also threaten the enemy's supply line along the
coastal road. Gott's XIII Corps was to prevent the enemy reinforcing the
coastal sector dur in g the attack. Ram sde n had the use of bo th the So uth
African Division and the newly arrived Australian 9th Division for the
op er ati on . Th e attack was pl an ne d for 10 July.
On 9 July Rom mel attack ed the now ab an do ne d Bab el Qattara
defensive position. A set-piece assault was put in by 21st Panzer and the
Littorio Armoured Division. Not surprisingly the move was completelysuccessful. Rommel thought that he had found a weak spot and ordered
his troops to thrust southwards to Qaret el Himeimat, also calling the
90th Light Division forwards to push eastwards to find a way around the
Eighth Army's southern flank. As they did so, in the early hours of 10
July, a th re at en in g ru mb le of gun s was he ar d from the nor th .
Auchinleck's forces were also on the move.
Australian 9th Division and South African 1st Division, backed by
armour, attacked out of the Alamein Box behind a very strong artillery
ba rra ge of an intensity not yet seen in the d esert. T he Italians were t aken
completely by surprise and lost virtually the whole of the Sabratha
Division and a large part of the Trieste. By l000hrs the South Africans
were on Tel el Makd Khad and the Australians had cleared the coastal 41
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side of the railway and were attacking Tel el Eisa, overrunning the
importan t German radio intercept unit that had given Rommel so much
information on British movements over the previous year.
On hearing news of the British attack, Rommel left Bab el Qattara
and sped north, collecting a battle group of 15th Panzer Division on the
way. He feared disaster, later admitting that he thought the enemy was
in hot pursuit westwards scattering the fleeing Italians and destroying
his supplies. The German 164th Division was at that time in the processof arriving on the front and its 382nd Regiment was immediately sent to
engage the Australians. This counterattack was held by LtGen
Morshead's division and the next day it succeeded in capturing the
whole of Tel el Eisa. Over the next four days Rommel's forces tried again
and again to evict the Australians from this feature covering the western
approach to Alamein, but the Commonwealth troops held on to their
gains. Unfortunately the South Africans had withdrawn from Tel el
Makh Khad through some misunderstanding of their orders. Rommel
had prevented a catastrophe, but at the expense of using the troops he
was gathering for his own renewed advance. He now admitted that
British Eighth Army was in the hands of a new commander who wasdeploying his forces 'with considerable skill.' Rommel was finally being
forced to dance to someone else's tune.
On 12 and 13 July the enemy continued to attack the Tel el Eisa
salient. Rommel also tried to cut it off by attacking the Alamein Box, but
both efforts failed. On the nigh t of 14 July Auchinleck launched a new
attack along the line of the Ruweisat Ridge aiming to break through the
enemy's centre. XXX and XIII Corps assaulted the ridge together. On
the right, Indian 5th Division (XXX Corps) attacked Point 64 on the
centre of the feature, the New Zealand Division (XIII Corps) was on the
left attacking Point 63 at the western end of the ridge and the 1stArmoured Division gave support along the line of the inter-corps
boundary. The night attack was preceded by Albacore aircraft dropping
flares and fighter-bombers strafing the enemy lines.
At first both divisions made good progress as they fought their way
through the Italian Brescia and Pavia Divisions who were holding the
ridge. The advance slowed down when they met extensive minefields
and there was some loss of cohesion when the New Zealanders were
attacked by tanks from 8th Panzer Regiment of 15th Panzer Division and
lost 350 prisoners. Throughout the day the pressure applied by the
British forced the two Italian divisions to give way and by late afternoon
of 15 July both Points 63 and 64 were taken and most of the ridge was inEighth Army's hands. The 1st Armoured Division remained further back
ready to exploit a breakthrough.
Rommel originally thought that the attack was just a large raid
against the Ruweisat Ridge, believing that Auchinleck would continue
with his main effort nearer the coast, but when news of the collapse of
the Pavia and Brescia Divisions reached him he realized that something
much bigger was afoot. He immediately ordered German troops to the
spot. To lead the counterattack against Ruweisat Ridge Rommel used
the reconnaissance units of his panzer divisions and these hit the New
Zealanders with some force, pushing them off the western end of the
feature. The ferocity of the attack carried the Panzer reconnaissance
troops down the slopes, overrunning the HQ of 4th New Zealand2
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Italian troops laying anti -tank
mines in front of the wire fence
of their forward positions.
(Ufficio Storico Esercito Rome)
Brigade and capturing the whole of the HQ staff, including BrigadierBurrows. The British armour meanwhile continued to stand back and
wait for the right moment to counter attack. The right moment never
came, for the New Zealanders continued to be pushed back and the
German advance only came to a halt when it brushed up against 1st
Armoured Division itself. The day had been saved once again for the
Axis army by Rommel's speedy deployment of scratch units and once
again the field marshal had been given a nasty scare.
Auchinleck's attack had gained half of the Ruweisat Ridge, but had
fallen well short of his original intentions. The early successes of the
Indian and the New Zealand Divisions had not been exploited by the
tanks and there remained a great antipathy between the armour and the
infantry commanders. The Commonwealth troops in particular had a
very poor opinion of the effectiveness of British tank support.
Infantry/armour co-operation was at an all-time low.
During the night of 15 July Rommel remained concerned that the
British would attack again with armour. To forestall this, the next day he
ordered an assault to be made on the Indian 5th Division near Point 64.
In the event this came to nothing. The Australians also attacked out of
their salient at Tel el Eisa towards the Miteirya Ridge, but they, too,
made little progress. The next day it was more of the same, both sides
made attempts to take new ground only to be turned back by soliddefences. One item of significance did take place, however, when the
Desert Air Force managed to fly 641 sorties, a record number for a
single day. At the end of Auchinleck's attacks all that had substantially
changed was that the British held the eastern half of Ruweisat and were
faced by Germans instead of Italians. None the less, much had still been
achieved in that Rommel now abandoned any thought of further
attacks. His situation had been made worse by the loss of 2,200 tons of
ammunition and 50,000 gallons of fuel to the bombs of the Desert Air
Force during raids on Matruh.
On 18 July, 7th Armoured Division sent light tanks and armoured
cars out into the desert in the extreme south of the line to harass andconfuse the flank of Panzerarmee Afrika. 4
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These moves acted as a diversion, for Auchinleck was on the
offensive again, trying to engineer the breakthrough that he still
thought was within his grasp. Spurred on by the endless urgings of
Churchill, Eighth Army's commander launched another assault. On 22
July, 5th Indian Division attacked along Ruweisat Ridge towards Deir El
Shein an d the New Zealand Division attacked t he western e nd of the
ridge and El Mreir Depression. Opposing them were the Italian Brescia
Division in Deir el Shein and the 21st Panzer Division on the westernen d of the ridge. B oth Co mmo nw eal th Divisions ma de it to their
objectives, but both were evicted by the 5th and 8th Panzer Regiments
before British armoured support could get up to them. When the British
tanks did eventually make contact with the Germans they suffered
tr em en do us casualties, losing 132 of thei r nu mb er dur in g the day
against the loss of ju st th ree of the enemy. Ind ian 5th Division tried
again al on g th e ridg e on 23 July, bu t its efforts en de d in failure .
Despite every attack failing to crack the enemy's defences,
Auch inlec k ha d still not given up on his desire of bre aki ng th ro ug h
Rommel's line. Once again he switched his effort to the coastal sector
an d on 26 July, Austra lian 9 th Division an d So uth African 1st Division
mad e an atte mpt to gain the easte rn en d of the Miteirya Ridge. Gaps
were made in Axis minefields and infantry went through, but all efforts
were repulsed before armoured support could get forward to help. The
fighting spilled into the next day but the moment was lost and the
abortive attack was called off.
Auchinleck now followed Rommel's earlier decision and also went
on to the defensive. He issued instruction to his corps commanders to
strengthen their defences, rehearse plans for meeting any enemy attack
and to rest, reorganize and re-train their troops. Auchinleck was sure
that Rommel would not resume his attacks before he had likewise rested
and ga ined str engt h. T he first battle of Alam ein was over. Ro mm el h ad
been stopped and the initiative had been wrested from him. Eighth
Army was beginning to believe that Rommel could eventually be beaten,
but there was still a long way to go and a lot of hard fighting to be done.
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BATTLE OF ALAMHALFA
Auchinleck had stopped Panerarmee Afrika, but the danger had
not gone away. Rommel's forces were still gathered within Egypt
and were gaining strength for a new push into the Delta. In the
north, Gen Navarini's Italian XXI Corps held the line, with German
164th Division superimposed on the Trento and Bologna Divisions
between the sea and Deir el Shein. The southern sector was the
responsibility of Italian X Corps, commanded by Gen Orsi, with the
Brescia Division and GenMaj Ramcke's 288th Parachute Brigade holding
from Deir el Shein to Gebel Kalakh. The Folgore Parachute Division
guarded the remainder of the line southwards to Naqb abu Dweis. Inreserve were the two mobile corps, with de Stefanis' XX corps containing
the Ariete and Littorio Armoured Divisions and the Trieste Motorized
Division, lined up in positions behind the infantry. Nehring's Afrika
Korps with the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions was in army reserve. The
90th Light Division was out of the line resting.
Facing the enemy, Eighth Army began to lay extensive minefields
and organize defensive positions ready to receive Rommel's forces
should they decide to continue the attack. The northern sector near the
coast was held by Australian 9th Division of XXX Corps. Then came
South African 1st Division and Indian 5th Division holding the line
down to the Ruweisat Ridge. In reserve behind them was 23rd
Armoured Brigade. South of the ridge was XIII Corps. The New Zealand
2nd Division and 7th Armoured Division held the line southwards to
Himeimat. The 1st Armoured Division was the mobile reserve.
First Alamein was initially seen as a great victory, but this feeling soon
turned into the depressing realization that Eight Army had achieved
little in the long term. After over two years of fighting, the British were
back where they started from. This state of affairs drew great criticism
from those responsible for the direction of the war in London.
Auchinleck further annoyed Churchill when he declared that he could
not resume the attack against Rommel until at least the middle ofSeptember. He army was tired and needed reinforcement, resupply and
retraining. Churchill, ever the belligerent, was beginning to lose
patience. He conferred with his Cabinet and with his Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, Gen Sir Alan Brooke, and decided that changes
would be made.
There was much political manoeuvring about how these changes
would be resolved, with Churchill and Brooke arguing as to who would
be best for each job. A compromise was reached in August when they
both visited Egypt, whereby Auchinleck was relieved of his command
and replaced by Gen Sir Harold Alexander as C-in-C Middle East and
LtGen Sir Bernard Montgomery was designated Commander EighthArmy. Montgomery was not Churchill's first choice, although he was
German Panzergrenadier lifting
a British anti-tank mine prior to
the Alam Haifa battle. (IWM MH
5863)
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Brooke's. Churchill had originally insisted that there should be some
continu ity of co mm an d in the dese rt rathe r tha n a wholesale
rep lace men t of leaders from outside the theatre . He dem an de d that
LtGen Gott should move from XXX Corps to take over Eighth Army,
even though the corps commander was exhausted by his long stay in the
desert and needed a rest. Churchill, as usual, got his own way and Gott
was appointed to the command. Fate, however, intervened when Gott
was killed a few days later in an air crash.Th e appo int men t of Mon tgom ery to the com ma nd of Eighth Army
has bee n seen as on e of the gr eatest strokes of goo d fortu ne of the war
for the British Army. Virtually unknown outside the military when he
arrived, Mon tgome ry soon became Britain's greatest co mm an de r of the
war. G rea t in ter ms of his successes an d fame, b ut per ha ps no t so gre at in
his pursui t of self-aggr andizemen t and in his relations hips with others .
For every admirer to which he could do no wrong, there was a detractor
full of criticism rega rdi ng his cond uct . Bu t there is no do ub t that his
arrival in Eig hth Army was a br ea th of fresh air. Fr om t he very m o m e n t
he arrived he began moulding his new army into a formation that met
with his rigid a ppr oval . After a two-year seesaw of victories a nd d efeats,Mo ntg ome ry was de te rm in ed to 'kick Ro mm el ou t of Africa for goo d'.
LtGen Montgomery instigated many changes in his command. He
urged much closer co-operation between ground forces and the Desert
Air Force. He insisted that his divisions would fight as divisions together
with all their supporting arms, there would be no more fragmentation
of effort. He was ad am an t tha t he would no t attack until his nume ric al
str engt h was mu ch gr eat er tha n the enemy, an d that all of his me n were
properly trained and equipped for the tasks they would be given in
battle. H e main tai ne d that all of his order s wou ld be meticulo usly
carried out and that there would be no 'bellyaching'. At Alamein, as in
all of his futur e battles , he woul d no t mov e unti l he was ready an d only
then with overwhelming force. There was a new commander at the head
of Eigh th Army, a nd ev eryon e kn ew it.
To co mm an d XIII Corps in place of Gott, Mont gom ery brou gh t out
LtGen Brian Horrocks from England. The forty-six-year-old Horrocks
had worked with Monty in South Eastern Command and had impressed
his boss with his energetic enthusiasm. He had seen action as a battalion
commander in France in 1940 before taking over a brigade and then
helped train both 44th and 9th Armoured Divisions as their GOC.
July and August were spent by both sides building up their forces ready
to lau nch an attack. Ju st pri or to t he renew al of the ad vance eastw ardsthe ma in tank stren gth of Pan zera rme e Afrika was 443, co mpris ing
200 Ge rm an an d 243 Italian tanks. Of these , twenty-six were t he new
Panzer IV Specials with the long 75mm gun, ten were older Panzer IVs with
the short-barrel gun, 71 were Panzer IIIJs with the long 50mm gun and
93 Panzer IIIs with the old gun. All of the Italian tanks were various marks
of the Medi um Ml 3/ 40 . In addition the Ger man s had 29 light tanks an d
the Italians 38.
Rommel knew that time was most definitely not on his side.
Reconnaissance showed that the British were laying extensive minefields
and thickening their defences, especially in the northern sector near the
coast and in front of the Ruweisat Ridge. The British with their short supply
lines were also winning the battle of the build-up and were growing
German Panzergrenadier counts
down the seconds to the start of
an attack. (IWM HU5624)
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stronger by the day. The strengthening of the British defences ruled out
any ho pe of maki ng an easy bre akt hro ugh in the no rth, or across the
Ruweisat Ridge. The south seemed to be the area most favourable for his
attack. This sector of the line was not as heavily fortified, although Eighth
Army troops were still busy constructing new defences and extending their
minefields even as Rommel watched.
German intelligence had also identified that a large convoy bringing
over 100,000 tons of wea pon s, tanks , eq ui pm en t an d stores was du e toarrive at Suez in early September. Rommel, on the other hand, with his
extended lines and difficulties in transporting material across the
Mediterranean, was finding it hard to assemble an effective force. He
had to attack soon or face an even stronger enemy. He therefore
decided to launch a new attempt to reach the Delta around the period
of the full moon which was due on 26 August.
The German field marshal decided to employ the tried and tested
tactics he had used previously in the assault, opting for a night attack
through the British southern flank and an advance 45 kilometres eastwards
past Alam Haifa ridge so that by dawn he could unleash his Afrika Korps
north wards ro un d the re ar of Eighth Army's positions. Th e right flank of
his attack would be protected by all of the highly mobile German and
Italian reconnaissance units. Guarding the left flank would be the Ariete
an d Littorio Ar mo ur ed Divisions of Italian XX Corps, with the reste d 90th
Light Division moving on the extreme northern flank of the assault.
Rommel had great confidence in his troops and most especially in the
Afrika Korps. This plan seemed to be the most promising, but to ensure
success it relied on surprise, speed and having sufficient supplies available
to support a mobile attack. To gain surprise Rommel planned to assemble
his armoured forces by night and camouflage them by day. To mask the
direction of the attack, diversionary raids and smaller attacks would be
made in the north by Italian infantry.
It was a good plan, but one that was obvious to the British.
Auchinleck had already concluded that the enemy assault would most
probably be in the south, with an armoured thrust driving eastwards
then swinging up behind Alam Haifa, and had taken steps to counter it.
ULTRA intercepts had also confirmed that this was Rommel's intention,
so wh en Mo ntg om ery arrived in Egypt to take co mm an d of the situatio n
he was presented with advance warning of his opponent's overall
strategy. This rem ove d Rom mel 's ele me nt of surpris e.
The key to the battle would be the Alam Haifa Ridge. If the Germans
could get past it to the east, they could shift northwards and meet theBritish arm ou r on favourable gro un d, b eh in d the bulk of Eight h Army's
positions. If Mont gome ry's forces could hol d the ridge, then Rom mel
would not dare move further eastwards towards the Suez Canal with the
whol e of Eigh th Army do mi na ti ng his lines of com mun ica tio ns.
Montgomery therefore strengthened his forces on and around the
feature. He brought forward the newly arrived 44th Division and lined up
two of its brig ade s - 131st an d 133rd Bri gades - alon g the r idge with all
of its divisional artillery an d anti-tank gun s. On th e west ern en d he place d
22nd Armoured Brigade from 10th Armoured Division. Further west the
defensive position about Alam Nayil was held by the New Zealand
Division, stre ng the ned by the add ition of 132nd Brigade. Jus t to theno rt h, at the easte rn en d of Ruweisat Ridge, was XXX Corps ' reserve, the 47
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23rd Armoured Brigade. Monty planned to wait and see which way
Rommel moved before committing the 23rd Armoured Brigade against
him. Further to the east, around Point 87, was 10th Armoured Division's
8th Armoured Brigade. Holding the line in the south was 7th Armoured
Division, with 4th Light Ar mo ur ed Brigade a nd 7th M otor Brigade.
Montgomery planned for these two brigades to try to hold any enemy
attack, but to withdraw in the face of the German advance into positions
around Samaket Gaballa. It was important that the division was kept
intact and not overwhelmed by superior forces, for once the Afrika Korps
had moved east, the 7th Armoured Division was to harry its flanks. To the
north, XXX Corps was to hold the line with the three Dominion divisions
already in place and absorb any diversionary attacks.
Th e ele men t of spe ed requ ir ed for Romme l's success was down to t he
Afrika Korps. It had to move its tanks through the British minefields and
into open desert before dawn. Rommel was confident that it would. The
third element essential for success, good supplies, and more importantlylarge quantities of petrol, was beyond Rommel 's control. He ha d been
pro mis ed ade qu ate fuel for the attack, b ut the full mo o n of the 26 Augu st
came and began to wane while his fuel bunkers contained just the standard
two days' worth of fuel. No th in g extra ha d reac hed Egypt or inde ed Nor th
Africa. The supply situation for Panzerarmee Afrika was somewhat eased
wh en Kesselring aut hor ize d the transfer of 1,500 tons of fuel from t he
Luftwaffe, eno ug h for four days' us age. F urt her relief was promi sed by
Cavallero, who insisted that a nu mb er of pet rol tan kers were du e to arrive
in Benghazi and Tripoli on 30 August. On these slim promises, Rommel
steeled himself for battle an d ord er ed the assault to go ahea d as pla nn ed.
Rommel's attack got off to a poor start during the night of 30-31August. Shortly after passing the eastern boundary of the Axis minefields
Captured Soviet 75mm gun used
by the Germans in an anti-tank
role. It may have knocked out the
burning tank in the background.
(IWM MH5862)
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the att acking troop s came u p against uns usp ecte d belts of British mine s
of such d ep th th at the advan ce slowed almo st to a halt. I nte ns e artillery
fire descended on Rommel's engineers and infantry as they tried to deal
with an estimated 150,000 mines and booby traps which littered the
sector of the attack. Whilst its me n were en gag ed in the op erat ion , th e
Afrika Korps was hit by relays of heavy bombers disrupting progress
th ro ug h the b elt of obstacles. Th e two brigades of 7th Ar mo ur ed Division
fought well in defence and staged a controlled withdrawal as planned.
The result was that none of the attacking formations had reached their
appointed objectives by dawn. This delay in the timetable of the advance
had e nsu red th at the British were able to plot the ro ute of the attack and
be well prepared to receive the expected armoured thrust.
As news began to filter into Rommel's HQ the picture looked bleak.
He acknowledged that the British had defended with extraordinary
stubbornness and achieved a setback in his plan. He had hoped that by
dawn his tanks would be 45 kilom etre s east of th e minefield s, rea dy to
swing north towards the sea. Further bad news reached the army
co mm an de r when he learn ed that GenMaj von Bismarck, co mm an de r of
21st Panzer Division had been killed by a mine and that Gen der Pz
Nehring had been wounded in an air attack on his Afrika Korps. Rommel
now considered abandoning the offensive, but decided to press on whenhe h ear d from O ber st Bayerlein, N ehr ing 's Chief of Staff who ha d take n
over command of the Afrika Korps, that the tanks were through the
mines and driving east.
The delays suffered in the minefields and by air raids caused Rommel
to reconsider his original plan. With the British alerted and ready, a wide
sweep to the east, passing to the south of Alam Haifa Ridge, would expose
his right flanks to the 7th Armoured Division and the 10th Armoured
Division which he knew was in the north. He now decided to turn left
before he got to Alam Haifa, much earlier than previously intended. New
objectives were set: Point 132 on the ridge for the Afrika Korps and Point
102 at Alam Bueit for XX Corps. Then his forces would drive northwards
passing behind the Ruweisat Ridge towards the coast road. But first the 51
GenFM Rommel at 21st Panzer
Division's HQ. He is discussing
the current situation with its
commander, GenMaj Georg yon
Bismarck (left). The Chief of Staff
of the Afrika Korps, Oberst Fritz
Bayerlein, is looking over
Rommel's right shoulder.
(Bundesarchiv 1011-785-0286-
31)
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advance had to halt to refuel and take on ammunition. It was 1300hrs
before it got going again.
Montgomery was pleased with the way things were shaping; the attack
had come in just where it had been anticipated. The minefields were
slowing down the advance as planned and throwing many of the Axis
units into disarray. None of Italian XX Corps' divisions had managed to
break free of the obstacles and 90th Light Division was virtually halted
around Deir el Munassib. Best of all, the Afrika Korps was identified south
of Alam Haifa and its direction of advance was aimed at the western end
of the ridge itself. Montgomery could now confidently bring 23rd
Armoured Brigade southwards to a position between 22nd Armoured
Brigade and the New Zealanders. Rommel was being lured onto the hull-
down tanks and anti-tank guns that were blocking his path.
The battle now took the course that Montgomery had hoped for.
Both 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions ran into the defensive positions of
the two British Armoured Brigades under the guns of division and corpsartillery. Tank and anti-tank fire raked the advancing Germans and did
great damage. Try as they might, the British armour could not be
enticed out of their hull-down positions. It was now the Germans' turn
to suffer the consequences of trying to overwhelm well established anti-
tank guns and armour. When the light began to fade the attack was
called off. The panzers withdrew to replenish their strength from
dwindling stocks of fuel and ammunition.
Throughout the night, just as they had done during the long day, the
Desert Air Force bombed and strafed the enemy. Flares lit up the night sky
and the bright light etched out soft-topped transport, armour and guns
on the bare desert below, exposing them to medium bombers and lowflying fighter-bombers. None of the Axis troops were allowed any rest, for 53
A dead crewman lies beside his
knocked-out Panzer III tank.
(IWM E16494)
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no sooner had one raid finished when another started. They lay all night
in the sand, suffering the strain of waiting for the next bomb to fall.
Early the next day 15th Panzer Division tried to work around the
eastern flank of 22nd Armoured Brigade. The move was frustrated by 8th
Armoured Brigade moving across from Point 87 to jo in up with 22nd
Armoured Brigade. Both sides were forced to a halt by supporting anti-
tank fire. That day 21st Panzer Division did very little, frustrated by lack
of fuel and strafed by artillery fire from the ridge. On the left flank of the
Afrika Korps the Ariete and Littorio Divisions were still struggling to get
clear of the minefields under continuous fire from the New ZealandDivision. The Trieste Division did a little better, but still could not free
itself from the artillery fire. Further north the 90th Light Division crawled
forward past Munassib, never likely to get into the battle proper. By
the end of the day, Rommel issued the order to his formations to go
over to the defensive, dig themselves in and prepare for the next night
of bombing.
Ever cautious, Montgomery now moved more formations to the Alam
Haifa area. Now that all of the enemy's main force was committed, he was
determined that they would get no further. He told XXX Corps to thin
out its line and moved the South African 2nd Brigade further south to a
position just north of the ridge. He also shifted Indian 5th Brigadesouthwards and brought it under command of Freyberg's New Zealand
The aftermath of the Alam Haifa
action. British troops inspect the
wrecked transport left on the
battlefield by the Afrika Korps.
(IWM E16651)
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Division. Sup er cautio us, he t he n gave ord ers for 151st Brig ade of 50th
Division to cease its work as airfield protection back in the Delta and to
com e forward to the eas tern e nd of the Alam Haifa Ridge. Ro mme l was
now well and truly boxed in, for in the south, 7th Armoured Division was
beginning to make sorties against his exposed flanks.
This was now the time for Montgomery to strike back and drive
across Rommel's lines of com mun icat ion to engi neer a res oun din g
defeat. Th e rei nf orc eme nt of the New Zealand Division with Indi an 5thBrigade came with a warning to LtGen Freyberg to get ready to attack
southwards from Alam Nayil towards Himeimat. In the north, on 1
Se pt emb er Austral ian 9th Division carrie d out an op era tio n west of Tel
el Eisa and attacked German 164th Division, capturing 140 prisoners.
This long-prepared move was planned to bring alarm to the Axis camp
and to stress the vulnerability of their forces, strung out as they were
across the desert.
Overhead fighters and bombers continued to plague the Afrika
Korps. Jo in in g with the De sert Air Force were a few sq uad ron s of
Mitchell bombers from the USAAF. They made 111 sorties on 1
Se pt em be r to jo in with the 372 flown by the RAF. Th at nig ht they wer e
active again over the Afrika Korps and included a few 4,0001b bombs in
their loads with devastating effect.
Rommel knew that his offensive had failed. He had been held by a
supe rior force arrayed on gro un d of its own choosing . He h ad also be en
let dow n by his superi ors. Marsh al Cavellero's pro mis e of 5,000 tons of
petrol failed to materialize: 2,600 tons of it had been sunk in the
Me di te rr an ean a nd 1,500 tons were still on the d ocks ide in Italy. Ju st 900
tons were land ed an d mu ch of that was co ns ume d by trans port on its long
journey to the fron t. Kessel ring 's as sura nce of 1,500 to ns of Luftwaffe fuel
to be delivered by air was also a hollow gesture. Only a fraction of it
arrived. On 2 Septem ber, Ro mme l or der ed a gradual withdrawal of all
formations back to the western edge of the British minefields.
Rommel was puzzled by Montgomery's tactics. He knew that the
British had assembled a powerful armoured force between Alam Haifa
and Bab el Qattara, but it had remained stationary in its assembly area.
Th e impre ssio n he gai ned of the ne w British co mm an de r was 'of a very
caut ious m an who was no t pr ep ar ed to take any sort of risk.'
Mo nt gom ery was in de ed acting cautiously. He ju d ge d Eighth Army to be
un re ad y to take on the task of a possible chase an d ord er ed tha t the
enemy was to be harassed vigorously, but the only staged attack was the
on e to be lau nc he d by Lt Ge n Freyb erg' s division. This itself was to belimited to the closi ng of the min efield gaps be hi nd th e Axis forces an d
was no t du e to take place before t he ni ght of 3/ 4 Septemb er, al most two
days after Rommel had begun his withdrawal.
Monty's counterattack finally began with diversionary raids by 6th
New Zealand Division at 2300hrs on 3 September. These roused the
enemy who met the advancing infantry of 132nd Brigade with mortar
and machine-gun fire disrupting its advance, although a similar attack
by New Zealand 5th Brigade did reach its initial objectives. Strong
fighting went on throughout the night as the Italians and Germans
fought to prevent the gaps being closed. Progress was poor and shortly
after midday on 4 September the enemy came back at the New Zealand
Division in a fierce counterattack. This was successfully turned aside, 55
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TANKS AND MOTORIZED INFANTRY FROM 15TH PANZER
DIVISION ATTACK TOWARDS ALAM HALFA RIDGE ON
1 SEPTEMBER (pages 56-57)
GFM Rommel's last attempt to break through Eighth Army's
lines at El Alamein and drive on towards the Nile Delta was
delayed by the strength and depth of British minefields.
When his Afrika Korps finally emerged from the eastern
limit of the obstacles and manoeuvred to get behind the
main British positions, Rommel was forced to try to swing
his armour around the western end of the Alam Haifa Ridge
to make up for lost time. Montgomery tracked this
movement and brought 23rd Armoured Brigade southwards
to a position between 22nd Armoured Brigade and the NewZealanders to block the move. Rommel's panzers had been
lured onto a mass of hull-down tanks and anti-tank guns
blocking his path. The battle then took the course that
Montgomery had hoped for. Both 15th and 21st Panzer
Divisions had to face the defensive positions of the two
British brigades and the 44th Division. They were caught
by a welter of fire from division and corps artillery, which
raked the advancing Afrika Korps with tank and anti-tank
shells. Panzers and Panzergrenadiers suffered
considerably trying to overwhelm these well-established
guns without being able to entice the British armour out
of their hull-down positions. The Battlescene shows tanks
of the 15th Panzer Division attacking towards Alam Haifa
Ridge on 31 August through the barrage of British fire.
At this stage of the campaign, 15th Panzer Division had
perfected its mobility and always attacked with infantry
support. The troops of the motorized 115th
Panzergrenadier Regiment were carried forward in SdKfz
251 half-track armoured personnel carriers (1) and trucks,
which allowed them to immediately exploit any gains made
by the armour. Amongst the division were a few of the
improved Panzer IV tanks (2) with the long 75mm gun
known to the British as a 'MarklV Special'. This up-gunned
tank was master of the battlefield, outperforming all other
tanks. Unfortunately for Rommel, only a few of them were
available to the Afrika Korps for Alam Haifa and the bulk
of his armour consisted of older Panzer Ills and short-
barrelled Panzer IVs. When the new Panzer IVs finally did
appear in North Africa in significant numbers, the Allies
had by then also received a new tank with comparable
performance in the shape of the Sherman. The
15th Panzer Division was formed from the 33rd Infantry
Division which had taken part in the campaign in France
in 1940. It arrived in North Africa in 1941 with one panzer
regiment (the 8th) and two Panzergrenadier regiments
(the 104th and the 115th) and became the founding
division of the Afrika Korps. A short time later it gave up
its 104th Panzergrenadier Regiment to join with 5th Panzer
Regiment to the form the new 21st Panzer Division.
(Howard Gerrard)
8
TANKS AND MOTORIZED INFANTRY FROM 15TH PANZER
DIVISION ATTACK TOWARDS ALAM HALFA RIDGE ON
1 SEPTEMBER (pages 56-57)
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then a second attack took place a few hours later. Artillery fire backed
up by day bombers helped to break up both assaults. The enemy's fierce
reaction convinced Freyberg that a renewed attack by his division would
not succeed and he requested permission for a complete withdrawal.
This was granted by both Horrocks and Montgomery.
The attempt to close the minefields and to show at least some sign of
aggressive action had failed. Even the British official history admits that
'it had caused the enemy no more than passing concern.' It did, however,give the New Zealand Division itself some cause for concern, for it lost 275
me n, in clud ing the cap ture of its 6th Brigade's comm and er, Brig Clifton.
The 132nd Brigade fared even worse, with 697 killed, wounded and
missing, among whom was its commander, Brig Robertson. It was a very
disa ppoi ntin g outc om e for such a high n um be r of casualties. Total British
casualties after almost a week of fighti ng am ou nt ed to 1,750 killed,
wounded and missing. The Italians lost 1,051 men and the Germans
1,859. The Germans had 38 tanks destroyed and the Italians 11, while the
British lost 67. In the air, losses in aircraft from all causes were British 68,
Italian 5 and German 36.
Th e Battle of Alam Haifa en de d with Pa nz era rm ee Afrika with
dra wi ng all of its fo rma tio ns to the west ern side of th e British minefi elds
unmolested, except for some light actions fought by the 7th and 10th
Armoured Divisions following at a safe distance. Montgomery even left
Axis forces in possession of the hi gh gr ou nd at Him eim at, claimi ng that
he rather liked them to overlook his southern front so that they could
see the bogus preparations being made for his coming offensive and
perhaps believe that his main attack would be launched in the south.
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EL ALAMEIN:THE ATTACK
Gen Montgomery was quite satisfied with the outcome of the Alam
Haifa battle. He felt that the application of his tactics had
demonstrated that the revitalized Eighth Army under his
co mm an d was mor e tha n capable of defeating Rommel . As soon as the
battle was over, all of Mon tgo mer y's e nerg y was co nce nt rat ed on his
proposed offensive to break Panzerarmee Afrika. Every man in Eighth
Army, from its commander down to its rank and file, now applied
himself to the pre par ati ons for the co mi ng battle .
The first task was to replace and strengthen the minefields that were
lost in the Germ an break thr oug h. Next, a prog ram me of training rolled
out through the army as each formation rehearsed the techniques that
were required for the task that had been allocated to it in the attack.
Much new equipment was arriving in Egypt and troops were required to
adjust to the new demands placed upon them. Units were reshuffled to
bring them under their appropriate command; Montgomery insisted
that divisions must fight as divisions with all of the support units that were
proper to them. There would be no brigade groups as had been common
in the past, except in the case of the Gr eek and Fren ch con ting ents . The y
would still ope rat e ind epe nde ntl y with their own su ppo rt units.
O ne o f the first thing s tha t Mo nt go me ry did wh en he arrived in Egyptwas to create a mobil e corps of ar mo ur which he t erm ed his corps de chasse.
He envisaged that the formation would be the
British equivalent of the Afrika Korps; an
armoured strike force that could exploit any
breakthrough made in the enemy lines. He
chose X Corps for this task and moved LtGen
Lumsden across from 1st Armoured Division
to take over the reformed corps. Lumsden was
not Monty's first choice for the command; he
would have preferred to have someone he
knew in charge of the corps, but pressure wasapplied by Alexander to employ one of the
existing Eighth Army commanders who had
both desert and armoured experience.
Montgomery brought into X Corps the
1st, 10th and the newly arrived 8th Armoured
Divisions, together with the 2nd New Zealand
Division which had been reorganized by the
addition of British 9th Arm ou re d Brigade.
The 7th Armoured Division remained with
Horrocks' XIII Corps.
Many changes now took place amongst the
senior officers, for there was a great weeding
A British film cameraman takes a
look inside a knocked out Italian
M13/40 Italian tank. The turret isfacing to the rear. (IWM E14556)
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ou t of unsu itab le, over-age an d ineffective com ma nd er s. Th e biggest
cha nge was the removal of LtGen Ram sden as co mm an de r of XXX
Corps. He was replaced by a newcomer from England, LtGen Oliver
Leese, from Guards Armoured Division. MajGen Renton left 7th
Armoured Division to be replaced by MajGen A.F. Harding who moved
over from his post as Deputy Chief of Staff in Cairo. Lower down the
chain of command, more new men with new ideas were promoted to
replace th ose that Montg ome ry dee me d to be out of touc h or tired.Th er e was a grea t deal of pres sure be in g app lied to Ale xan der to
persuade Montgomery to launch his attack sooner rather than later.
Churchill was pushing for a resounding victory over Rommel before the
proposed Anglo-American landings in Morocco and Algeria took place.
These were planned for early November and it was important that the
Vichy French in those countries, and in Tunisia, were influenced in the
Allies' favour before the Americans arrived. An Axis defeat in North
Africa would go some way in persuading the French colonials not to
oppose the landings. It was also important that fresh convoys got
th ro ug h to the besieg ed island of Malta whose po pu lat ion was ne ar to
starvation. These convoys could not sail until the enemy had beencleared from airfields in nearby Cyrenaica. Churchill pressed for the
attack to be made in late September, but Montgomery would not be
swayed from his targ et lau nc h date of mid-O ctobe r. He was de te rm in ed
not to move until he was absolutely ready.
On 3 September the promised shipment of 300 American Sherman
tanks arrived at Suez to be dispersed amongst the armoured brigades,
usually one sq uadr on per armo ur ed regiment. T he build-up of arm ou r
continued with British-built tanks also arriving in greater numbers. By the
start of the offensive Eighth Army's effective tank strength ready for
action was 1,038, comprising 252 Shermans, 170 Grants, 294 Crusaders,
119 Stuarts, 194 Valentines, six Matildas and three Churchills. In addition
ther e were ar ou nd 200 of all types available as repl ace me nts . Also arriving
were large nu mb er s of the ne w 6-pdr anti-tank gu n and mo re of the
smaller 2-pdr gun. At the start of the battle there were 554 2-pdr and
849 6-pdr anti-tank guns in operation. This meant that all of the Royal
Artillery anti-tank regiments were now equipped with the effective 6-pdr
guns, each more than capable of dealing with Axis armour. In support,
the Royal Artillery had 52 medium guns and 832, 25-pdr field pieces. The
fire power of Eigh th Army had mo re t han d ou bl ed dur ing the critical
weeks leading up to Montgomery's offensive. Supplies were plentiful, vast
qua nti ties of fuel an d amm un it io n were available from stocks in the Deltaand were being delivered along short lines of communication well served
by road and rail. These improvements, coupled with the changes in
co mm an d and the reorganiz ation of units and formations, broug ht an air
of ren ewe d confiden ce and vigour amo ngs t the 195,000 men who ma de
up t he fighting str engt h of Eigh th Army.
It only remained for Montgomery to formulate a plan that would
break Rommel's line and force Panzerarmee Afrika into retreat. With no
ro om to man oeu vre a mobile striking force of ar mo ur arou nd the
enemy's flank, Montgomery was constrained to force a passage right
through his main defensive zones. He therefore decided that his main
attack would be made in the north by XXX Corps, with a subsidiary
assault in the south by XIII Corps. Deception plans would be used to 61
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make the enemy believe that the southern
attack was in fact the main effort, for it would
be strong enough to prevent the enemy
moving troops to reinforce the northern
sector. Montgomery's original plan relied on
the ar mo ur of Lum sde n's X Corps help ing to
carve out a passage through the German
defences, but reluctance which verged onmutiny by the armoured commanders swayed
Monty into changing his intentions. He
settled on a plan which would rely on simul-
taneous attacks by four infantry divisions to
help clear routes through which the
armoured divisions could advance. The
armoured divisions would then themselves
clear two corridors through the minefields
passable for tanks. Then the infantry would
widen their breaches to the north and south
by methodically destroying enemy troops,'crumbling' away the Axis defenders by over-
whelming artillery fire and local attacks.
Rommel could not stand idle and watch his
defences disintegrate; he would have to commit his armour to help save
his infantry. The British tank force would then manoeuvre through the
breaches to meet the counterattack by the Panzer divisions.
The overwhelming strength of the land forces that Montgomery was
able to put in the field, was similarly matched by the British effort in the
air. Air Vice-Marshal Coningham had 104 squadrons at his disposal from
the RAF, Dominion and USAAF units. He could put 530 serviceable
aircraft aloft against the 350 serviceable aircraft available to Axis air forces
(150 German and 200 Italian). Coningham planned to attack the enemy's
airfields by day and night and to provide fighter cover over the army's
forward area. He would also provide constant reconnaissance over the
enemy positions before the attack while at the same time interdicting any
Axis attempts to spy on British preparations. Once the battle began,
Coningham intended to provide constant ground support as required.
There was to be complete army and air force co-operation. Even the Royal
Navy was to participate in the action, planning disruptive demonstrations
along the coast to simulate landings in the rear of Rommel's forces.
To the west of Eigh th Army, ens co nce d beh in d thick minefields,Panzerarmee Afrika was not so full of confidence. Visions of capturing
Cairo and the Suez Canal had faded from their memories. The Germans
and Italians waited in their exposed dugouts sure in the knowledge that
the big attack was coming. They had no illusions about what was in store
for them. They knew that their once mobile army had been reduced to
a static rol e, ju st wait ing for th e en em y to strike. M ost of th e Italian s wer e
now lon gi ng for the en d of th e war. Successful British attacks by sea an d
air against shipping had meant that supplies were short, ammunition
was scarce and fuel was rationed. Replacements in manpower had not
kept pace with losses, with the inevitable result that all formations were
below strength. To make matters worse, their inspiring commander wasgone, invalided home to Germany for a rest.
A British sergeant looking out
across the Qattara Depression.
This vast area of soft sand was
thought to be impenetrable
to most vehicles and therefore
anchored the southern end
of the El Alamein defence line.
(IWM E16399)
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Rommel's health had deteriorated during the campaign. He had
pu sh ed himself ha rd for two years and h ad ta ken little rest; by the e nd
of the Alam Haifa battle he was near to collapse. His doctor ordered him
home for at least six weeks' leave to recuperate. Rommel was replaced
by Gen der Kavallerie Georg Stumme who had commanded Rommel's old
7th Panzer Division and then XXXX Panzer Korps on the Russian Front.
Before he left, Rommel spent the first two weeks of September
reorganizing his formations to meet the coming attack which he expectedto take place early in October. He knew that the British had over-
whelming superiority both on land and in the air but would not choose
to fight a mobile battle against his Afrika Korps. He was therefore forced
to base his defence on a static fortified line against which he knew the
British would use their massed artillery. The battle would start with an
infantry attack which would have to carve a way through the defences for
their tanks to follow. As a result Rommel knew that his plan of defence
was simple: the line must be made as strong as possible with the main
positions capable of holding out against the heaviest assault long enough
for the Panzer divisions to come to their aid. He also supposed that the
initial assault would be made at several places, with Montgomery lookingto exploit the most favourable penetration.
The Axis line was to be held by Italian troops interlaced with German
units. Italian and Ger ma n forma tions were supe rim pos ed on top of each
other right down to battalion level to stiffen the Italian resolve and bring
German expertise into the defence. Rommel kept his two main tank
formations to the rear of the defences, with 15th Panzer Division in the
northern sector and 21st Panzer Division in the south. De Stefanis' XX
Corps was split up, with the Littorio Armoured Division in front of 15th
Panzer and the Ariete in the south together with 21st Panzer. In reserve
by the coast, but well to the west of the main line, were 90th Light Division
and the Trieste Motorized Division. From the coast down to the Miteirya
Ridge the main line was held by German 164th Division and Gen Gloria's
Italian XXI Corps, with Trento Division overlapping the positions held by
the 164th. From there to Deir el Shein and Ruweisat Ridge was covered
Italian signal men repairing
a break in the communications
line. All lines had to be laid
across open ground and the
passage of tanks and lorries over
them caused breaks that needed
almost constant attention. Mostcontact between formations in
forward areas had to be by radio.
(Ufficio Storico Esercito Rome)
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by the Bologna Division. To the south of these positions was Gen Frattini's
X Corps, with the Brescia Division around Bab el Qattara. Both the
Bologna and the Brescia Divisions were 'sandwiched' with battalions of
Ramcke 's Par ach ute Brigade. Th e rema in de r of the line southwa rds to
Qaret el Himeimat contained the Folgore Parachute Division and the
Pavia Division.
The Axis defences were designed in depth, beginning with a thin
screen of outposts on the edge of the forward minefields, with somesection posts actually in the minefields themselves. The minefields were
strewn with both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, linked together with
booby traps a nd ot her obstacles. A Germ an re por t jus t before t he battle
suggested that there were 445,000 mines in the Axis minefields, about
14,000 of which were anti per son nel type. The se advanc e positions woul d
contain a company of infantry with a few anti-tank guns and machine guns.
The lightly held zones located well forward enabled the main line of
defence and the heavier anti-tank guns to be placed to the rear, further
away from British artillery. About two kilometres behind these advance
positions was the principal minefield belt with strong defensive locations
along its front edge. Each Axis battalion would hold a sector of the lineab ou t one-and-a-half kilometre s lon g an d five kilom etres de ep . Th e main
position would contain the bulk of the anti-tank and machine guns. The
depth of the line from the forward positions to the rear of the defensive
zone was between four and seven kilometres. Behind this were the heavy
artillery and then the Panzer divisions, waiting to bring their fire onto any
possible penetration. It was important for Rommel to confine the British
within this defended zone. Rommel knew that if the British armour ever
managed to break out into the open, then the battle would be virtually lost.
Rommel relied on his instinct that the British would attack in their
usual manner, saturating the forward positions with devastating artilleryfire and then putting in an infantry assault. This would give ample
warn ing to the ma in defen ce line of the dire ction an d strength of the
attack. By the time the main line was reached, the initial surprise would
have been lost and the impetus of the attack would be starting to wane.
The advancing infantry would then be met with the strongest part of the
defences. Any attempt to push armour through at this point would be
countered by the anti-tank screen which in all probability would have
been missed by the artillery bombardment. As the battle progressed, any
likely penetration could then be countered by shifting into that sector
the whole o r pa rt of on e of the a rm ou re d divisions.
The effective tank strength of the Panzer divisions was well below theirpea k, with 249 Ge rm an an d 278 Italian mai n tanks and ju st 20 light tanks
available for action. In anti-tank guns, the Axis forces contained 68 7.65cm
guns, and 290 5cm Pak 38s. Of the potent dual-role 8.8cm flak guns,
Rommel never had enough and never stopped asking for more. At the
start of the battle 19th Flak Division deployed 86 of these weapons in the
forward area and a further 52 in the rear areas for anti-aircraft defence of
the airfields and ports. The fighting strength of Panzerarmee Afrika was
ar ou nd 104,000, of which 54,000 were Italian an d 50,000 Germa n.
While Montgomery had been switching many of his senior
commanders because of a perceived lack of ability, Rommel was obliged to
cha nge some of his for mo re depr essing reasons. The wo un ded Neh rin g
was replaced by GenLt Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma as head of the Afrika 65
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The Alamein battlefield today;
wide open barren desert, just
as it was over sixty years ago.
(Robin Neillands)
Korps. Von Thoma came from Russia with a growing reputation as an
armoured commander. GenMaj Heinz von Randow replaced the dead von
Bismarck at the h ea d of 21st Pan zer Division an d Ge nLt Graf von S pon eck
succeeded the wounded Kleeman in 90th Light Division. Such an influx of
new senior commanders did little to improve confidence amongst Axis
forces, but it was the loss of their lucky talisman, GFM Rommel, that hit
them most.
Before Rommel left for his rest in Austria, he met with Marshal
Cavellero and de ma nd ed that shipments of supplies to Pan zera rmee
Afrika be increased. He asked for at least 30,000 tons to be delivered in
September and 35,000 tons in October. Cavellero reassured him that
every effort would be made to meet these totals. On his way to Germany
Rommel repeated his demands to Mussolini and then again to Hitler
and Goring when he arrived in Berlin a few days later, but was left witha feeling that little would be done.
The battle was set to begin on the night of 23 October. Lined up that
night along the edge of the British minefields were XXX and XIII Corps.
LtGen Leese's XXX Corps was on the right with, from north to south, 9th
Australian Division, 51st (Highland) Division, 2nd New Zealand Division,
1st South African Division and 4th Indian Division. These were in the line
from the coast to the sout h of the Ruweisat Ridge . Fr om th er e to the
Qattara Depression was Horrocks' XIII Corps containing 50th Division,
44th Division, 7th Armoured Division and 1st French Brigade. Lumsden's
X Corps, with 1st and 10th Arm ou re d Divisions, was in the r ear of XX X
Corps near the coast. The recently arrived 8th Armoured Division wasdestined not to take part in the battle as a division. It had been split, with
its 24th Armoured Brigade under the command of 10th Armoured
Division and the r em ai nd er of the division grou pe d toge ther into a
formation called 'Hammerforce' and placed under the command of
1st Armoured Division.
Montgomery's final orders for the offensive, code named 'Lightfoot',
called for three simultaneous attacks to be made. In the north, XXX
Corps would penetrate the enemy line and form a bridgehead beyond the
main Axis defence zone, advancing to a forward position code named
'Oxalic', then assist X Corps to pass through. In the south, XIII Corps
would penetrate the enemy positions near Munassib and pass the 7th
Ar mo ur ed Division th ro ug h towards Je bel Kalakh. Th e division was told66
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Italian Semovente 75/18 self-
propelled gun. This vehicle
consisted of a turretless medium
M40 tank chassis mounted with
a 75mm gun, which made it a
very potent, but unreliable,
weapon. (Ufficio Storico Esercito
Rome)
not to get itself into a slogging match, but to preserve its strength for later
mobile operations, its main task to threaten the enemy in order to keep
his armour in the south. Finally, XIII Corps would use the 1st French
Brigade to secure the Qaret el Himeimat and the El Taqa plateau. Both
XXX and XIII Corps were then to begin the crumbling operations to
grind down the enemy infantry and draw the Panzers onto the armoured
divisions and the massed anti-tank guns. If the enemy armoured divisions
failed to come forward to meet the challenge, 1st and 10th Armoured
Divisions were to seek positions from which they could prevent the enemy
from interfering with XXX Corps' crumbling operations.
The main weight of Eighth Army's assault was with XXX Corps. Four
of its divisions were to attack Axis minefields and defences then helpcarve out two cleared corridors for the a rmoured divisions. On the right,
9th Australian Division would attack eastwards from Tel El Eisa; on its
left, 51st Division would clear a path towards Kidney Ridge. Both of
these divisions would cover the ground of 1st Armoured Division's
northern corridor through the enemy minefields. South of these
divisions, 2nd New Zealand Division would clear towards the western
end of the Miteiriya Ridge and 1st South African Division would attack
across the main part of the ridge. These would then cover the southern
corridor through the minefields for 10th Armoured Division. On the
extreme left of XXX Corps, the 4th Indian Division would take no major
part in the opening attack, but would make threatening anddiversionary raids from the western end of Ruweisat Ridge.
The battle opened with a tremendous artillery barrage at 2140hrs on
23 October. At first the guns opened up on the known locations of all
enemy gun sites with anti-battery fire. This fire then switched to the
forward edge of the enemy defences. As the infantry attacked, the
artillery laid down a rolling barrage in front of them, lifting by measured
amounts as the infantry moved forward. For the first time in the desert,
there were sufficient anti-tank guns protecting the infantry to allow all of
the 25-pdr weapons to be massed together under centralized command
in their proper role as field guns. Medium and heavy guns of the Royal
Artillery were added to produce the greatest concentrated barrage since
the First World War. Ammunition supplies were unrestricted allowing the 67
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The night-time artillery barrage
fired at the start of Operation
Lightfoot was the largest laid
on by the British since the First
World War. (IWM E18465)
gun s to fire at a prod igi ous r ate. In th e following twelve days of fighting ,
the 834 field guns fired altogether over one million rounds, an average
of 102 rounds per gun per day. The rates for the other guns were even
higher; 133 rounds for the 4.5in guns and 157 for the 5.5in weapons.
The Desert Air Force added its weight to the bombardment by
bombing known enemy gun positions and those German and Italian guns
which returned fire. Specially equipped Wellington bombers also flew
overhea d, ja mm in g the radi o-tele phony chan nels of the Axis forces in an
effort to disrupt enemy communications. These measures effectively
blo cke d off rad io traffic for a per iod , ad di ng to the c onfus ion at
Pan zera rmee 's HQ as to th e size and dire ction of the attack.Th e four divisions of XX X Corps att acked t og eth er on a 16km front,
each with two brigades forward. Each division had one regiment of
Valentine tanks from 23rd Armoured Brigade in support, except
Freyberg's New Zealander s who ha d the whole of 9th Armo ur ed Brigade
under command. The four formations advanced across a kilometre of
no-man's-land and then began their attack through six kilometres of
enemy-held territory towards their objective, phase line 'Oxalic'.
Nearest the sea, the Australians attacked with 26th Brigade on the
right and the 20th Brigade on the left. Its third brigade, 24th Brigade,
ma de noisy feints towards the coast in an effort to draw fire. Th e righ t
brigade reached 'Oxalic' after some fierce encounters with the enemy, but20th Brig ade was sto pp ed ab ou t a kil ome tre s hor t by stiff resist ance. T he
Australian Division endured the same pattern of events that was being
experienced by other attacking divisions. The first minefield and line of
def ence was crossed with no gr eat difficulty, ju st as Ro mm el e xpe cte d
them to be. But, as the two brigades pushed on into the main German
defence line and the second minefield, enemy resistance increased.
On the left of the Australians, the Highlanders of 51st Division
adva nced on a two-brigade fron t with 15 3rd Brigade on th e righ t an d 154th
Brigade on the left. Each brigade moved with one battalion forward and
the o th er two ready to follow up . T hey set ou t to the st irring sou nds o f reg
imental pipers ma rch ing at the he ad of the battalions. In or der to maint ain
the momentum, when each intermediate phase line was reached, the68
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Royal Engineer mine-clearance
teams were amongst the
most valuable troops on the
battlefield. The numbers
of mines laid in front of both
opposing armies was prodigious
and little forward progress could
be made until they had been
lifted to allow tanks and vehicles
to pass through. (IWM E16226)
forward battalion paused while the battalion to its
rear leapfrogged over into the lead. This procedure
was repeated across other phase lines towards
'Oxalic'. The Highland Division had the most dif
ficult task of XXX Corps, for its final objectives
covered a width double the front of its start line.
There was also a larger number of defended
localities to be over come , e ach of which h ad to beeliminated before the advance could continue.
Progress at first was good, but it was gradually
slowed down by the large numbers of casualties that
the division was suffering. By dawn the Highland
Division had not penetrated the enemy's main
defence line. The delays and difficulties met during
the advance meant that the mine clearance teams
hoping to open a corridor for 1st Armoured
Division were delayed.
The 2nd New Zealand Division began its
attac k on th e wes ter n en d of Miteirya Ridge also
on a two-briga de front, with ju st on e batt ali on at a
time in the lead. LtGen Freyberg had decided to use his two infantry
brigades to fight their way to the ridge before introducing the full
streng th of 9th Ar mo ur ed Brigade to pass thr oug h and get beyo nd the
hig h gr ou nd . He wante d to save as muc h of his weight as he could for
this final stage. The plan worked well and the New Zealander infantry,
despite heavy casualties, cleared a way through the minefields to allow
Brig Cur rie t o get his tanks on t he crest of the r idg e ju st bef ore da wn.
Th e com ing of daylight, however, br ou gh t accu rate e nem y fire which
forced the armour back on to the reverse slopes.
MajGen Pienaar's 1st South African Division advanced in much
the same method as the New Zealanders. The infantry penetrated the
minefields and cleared a way for some armoured support and the division
was able, with great effort, to get ont o th e east ern e nd of the r idge.
Difficulty was met in trying to get vehicles and heavy weapons forward
which limited the strength of the division's positions. It had hoped to get
beyond the ridge and allow armoured cars and the tanks of 8th RTR to
exploit th e left ha nd o f XXX C orps attack, b ut ene my resistance forced it
to dig in alo ng the r idge. Jus t a little furth er south, Ind ian 4 th Division
made threatening raids near Ruweisat Ridge to confuse the enemy with
reg ard to th e leng th of the ma in British attack.In th e main , th e first twelve hou rs of XX X Corp s' attack had be en fairly
successful. LtGen Leese had got his divisions through most of the
minefields a nd well int o the en emy' s positions. Best of all, he ha d troop s
on the Miteirya Ridge, something that Rommel would have been horrified
by had he been on the spot. This success was not mirrored during the night
by X Corps. Each of its armoured divisions had the responsibility of
clearing its own minefield gaps. The clearance teams were to work closely
with the infantry to open three gaps for its parent division, each wide
enough for tanks. It was planned that these gaps would be completely
swept an d marke d durin g the hour s of darkness, allowing the armo ur ed
divisions to exploit southwards from XXX Corps final objectives beforedawn. They would then be ready to meet the expected Panzer counter- 6 9
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attacks on ground of their own choosing.
Unfortunately, this did not happen.
The corps had priority on all forward tracks
from 0200hrs. Its clearance teams came forward as
planned but then worked in confusing and haz
ardous conditions to locate and clear mines by
hand and with mine detectors. The northern
corridor for 1st Armoured Division was locatedclose to the ju nc ti on o f the Australian a nd
Highland Divisions. Results that night were mixed
with one marked gap actually completed through
as far as the forward infantry, but the others slowed
down by pock ets of en em y resista nce close to thei r
routes. The other gap for 10th Armoured Division
was located in the New Zealand sector further
south. Here there was a little more success with
four routes marked right up to the Miteirya Ridge,
although only one was actually usable at the
wester n end. Im me ns e traffic ja ms at the ea ster n
en d of all the rou tes pre ven ted man y tanks getting
thr oug h to the forward edge of the pene tra tion . Tho se that did were met
with heavy anti-tank fire from many parts of the enemy main defences that
were still intact. By dawn his fire forced those tanks that had made it onto
the ridge back over the crest to hull-down positions in the rear. In some
cases the armour made a complete withdrawal right back off the ridge.
When daylight came, neither 1st nor 10th Armoured Divisions were in a
position to exploit XXX Corps' penetration.
Down in the south, Horrocks' XIII Corps had put in its attack the
previous nigh t in conc ert with thos e in the nor th . MajGen Hard ing 's 7thArmoured Division met the same resistance and difficulties when trying
to pene tr ate t he minefields as ha d the divisions of XX X and X Corps.
The division's right flank was protected by an attack by 131st Brigade of
44th Division which ran into difficulties soon after the start. Only the
first of two large en emy minefiel ds was actually pe ne tr at ed by XIII Cor ps
before dawn, but the attack helped confuse the enemy in the southern
sector of the line as did BrigGen Koenig's diversionary moves against
Qaret el Himeimat and Naqb Rala with his Free French Brigade.
When details began to filter into Montgomery's HQ early in the
morning, he was rather pleased with the preliminary results. The attacks
had gone reasonably well, although X Corps did not have as many tanksforward through the minefields as hoped. Enemy resistance had been
fierce as had been expected, but progress had been made all along the
line. If the bridg ehea d could be streng then ed as plan ned , crumb ling
attacks could begin to grind down Axis infantry and provoke a showdown
with the Panzer divisions. Th e out co me of the battle would th en de pe nd
on who cou ld best end ur e th e battle o f attritio n that would follow.
Enemy casualties and kit lie
scattered around a fortified
position that had been overrun
during Operation Lightfoot.
These positions were difficult
to see and to locate in the
featureless desert, often
remaining undetected by the
advancing infantry until machine-
gun fire ripped their ranks. (IWM
E18657)
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EL ALAMEIN:THE DOG FIGHT
LtGen Montgomery with two of
his armoured commanders. From
left to right: Brig 'Pip' Roberts
(22nd Armoured Brigade),
Montgomery and MajGen
Gatehouse (10th Armoured
Division). (IWM E16484)
Dawn on 24 October brought with it a fair degree of optimism
regarding the results of the previous night, but daylight also
introduced new problems for Montgomery's forces. During the
morning all formations were trying to get their vehicles into the
bridgehead that had been carved through the enemy minefields.
Smo ke, dust, shell fire an d mines all hel pe d to create a fog of battle tha t
in tr od uc ed an el em en t of chaos into the pro cee din gs. Six divisions from
two corps were all attempting to clear gaps for their own use in an area
that had no fixed boundaries or recognizable features, whilst all the
while being harassed by an enemy who had not yet been fully evicted. Itis no t surpr ising t he n tha t traffic ja ms a nd frayed temp ers be gan t o
influence decisions.
LtGen Montgomery intended to continue with the plan he had laid
ou t befor e the battle. Work was to res ume carving out the cor rido rs on
XXX Corps front. The 51st Division was to push on to its primary
objective and help clear 1st Armoured Division's gaps. New Zealand
Division was to get onto the Miteirya Ridge then exploit southwards.
MajGen Gatehouse's 10th Armoured Division was ordered to advance
with strong artillery support over the ridge to protect the New
Zealanders' flank. Montgomery told LtGen Lumsden that he was
prepared to accept casualties amongst his corps, but he had to get the
tanks forward. On the extreme right flank the Australian Division would
begin its crumbling operations northwards starting that night, the South
Africans would do likewise on the other flank. In the far south, Horrocks
was told that if 7th Armoured Division could not get through the second
minefield, then 44th Division would have to force a gap with a night
attack. Maximum air effort in support of ground forces that day was
requested from AVM. Coningham and his aircraft rose to the occasion
by flying over 1,000 sorties.
On the enemy side there was something approaching dismay. The
attack had achieved complete surprise and for almost an hour after theassault had begun there was little response from the Axis artillery. The
effects of British artillery, an d th e ja mm in g of Ge rm an r adio fr equencies,
had disrupted Axis communications and resulted in most news of the
attacks having to be relayed by messengers to senior commanders. It took
time be fore a n overall appr eci ati on of the offensive could be built up at
Panzerarmee HQ. The simultaneous attacks on the line from the sea to
the Qattara Depression meant that its commander, Gen d.Kav Stumme,
was unable to determine which thrust was the main one. He had
sur mis ed th at the m ain British effort woul d be deliver ed ju st sout h of the
centre, but no reports could confirm that this had in fact happened.
Desperate to assess matters, Stumme set out for the front to see forhimself. It was a mistake, for as he neared the sector of the line opposite 71
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the Australians his staff car was shelled and he died
of a heart attack. The loss of Stumme at this
most critical time in the battle was a huge blow to
the enemy.
For a while no one knew what had happened to
Stumme, or where he was. By midday the awful
realization that Panzerarmee Afrika was leaderless
became apparent and command passed tem-porarily to Gen d.Pz von Thoma. He had no better
idea of the true situation than had Stumme and
decided to contain the British attacks locally rather
than commit any of the armoured formations. In
Berlin the crisis was also viewed with alarm at OKW.
At around 1500hrs a message was sent to Rommel.
He was summoned from his convalescence and
ordered to return to Africa and take over the
battle. He arrived late the following day.
Progress made by Eighth Army on 24 October was disappointing. Few
tanks made it completely through the minefields in either of the armour'scorridors. Only minor gains were made by 51st Division. The Highlanders
put in an attack to clear a passage for MajGen Briggs' 1st Armoured
Division in the afternoon, but although some tanks of 2nd Armoured
Brigade got beyond the German obstacles, they remained well short of
their objective, Kidney Ridge. Montgomery continued to urge his
armoured commanders to get their divisions through the minefields and
out into the open where they could manoeuvre, but little effort was made
to comply with the order. LtGen Freyberg was incensed with MajGen
Gatehouse's unwillingness to exploit the success of his infantry. The
commander of 10th Armoured Division said that his tanks would be shot
to pieces if they ventured over the ridge and he seemed preoccupied withgetting his division into position to repel an enemy attack rather than to
initiate one of his own. Further urging and pleading by Leese not to let
the opportunity slip by, also failed to get the armoured divisions moving.
After a meeting with his commanders, Lumsden signalled Montgomery
that his corps would attack that night. Montgomery signalled back that
they must attack that afternoon. To comply with the army commander's
wishes, Gatehouse's 8th Armoured Brigade sent a reconnaissance attack
across the Miteirya Ridge at 1600hrs that afternoon only to find a new
minefield covered by anti-tank guns. The half-hearted advance stopped
three hours later when Lumsden signalled to his chief that the attack
would resume later that night.
That night's operations by 10th Armoured Division had massive
artillery support from the guns of the division and those of 51st and 2nd
New Zealand Divisions. After a period of counter-battery fire and a heavy
barrage, Gatehouse's two armoured brigades, the 8th and 24th, intended
to advance over the top of the ridge supported by 133rd Lorried Infantry
Brigade. When the attack got underway it immediately got caught up in
the minefield along the crest of the Miteirya Ridge. Enemy shellfire
hampered attempts to clear gaps and then the Luftwaffe put in an air
attack on the waiting armour. The raid caused some disorganization as
the armour dispersed for safety. When the attack tried to resume theartillery barrage had gone too far forward for the tanks to catch up with
Crew of a Crusader tank cook
breakfast beside their tank in theearly October morning sunshine.
(IWM R16266)
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British infantry on a daylight
patrol near enemy lines. The flat
open terrain of the desert made
this a particularly hazardous
task. (IWM E14582)
i t and Brig Custance, commander 24th
Brigade, advised the divisional commander
that it was inadvisable to go on with the
advance. Gatehouse agreed, fearful that
daylight would find the division in some
disarray, with tanks still on the forward slope
or caught in the minefield. Freyberg was
appalled with the decision; he needed
ar mo ur ed pro tec tio n if his division was to
exploit to the south and relayed the news of
the delays to his corps commander.
When Leese reported this news to Eighth
Army's HQ, the sleeping Montgomery was
roused from his bed and became most
annoyed at news of the setback. The army
co mm an de r the n met with his two corps com-
manders at his Tactical HQ at 0330hrs and
told them both that 10th Armoured would break out that night as
ordered. Monty also told Lumsden that he would have no hesitation in
remov ing com man der s if his orders were no t carried out. This blun t
speaking seemed to have some effect, for during the night news began
to filter back that 24th Brigade had broken through into the open and
was in contact with 2nd Armoured Brigade on its right. Ninth Armoured
Brigade had also got through the minefield and was ready to support
the New Zealanders in their crumbling operations the next day. LtGen
Montgomery went back to bed thinking that his armour was at last out
in the open ready to challenge the Panzer divisions and attack them.
Th e nex t mo rn in g it was soon rea lized tha t no ne o f this had in fact
happened and there was no armour whatsoever on the forward slopes of
th e Miteirya Ridg e. Th e 1st Ar mo ur ed Division also did not have 2nd
Armoured Brigade on Kidney Ridge. To make matters worse, Horrocks
ha d called off the att ack by 7th Ar mo ur ed Division in th e south , citing
problems in getting through the minefields.
In view of these failures, LtGen Freyberg reported that his division
could not now start the crumbling attacks as planned. He had completely
lost faith in the British armour and doubted whether Gatehouse would
ever get his division to break out beyond the Miteirya Ridge. Freyberg
even suggested that the New Zealand Division should put in an artillery
supported attack with its own infantry to gain a position 4,000 metres
beyond the ridge for Gatehouse's tanks. Monty refused, knowing that theattack would be costly for the infantry. He required these infantry for the
crumbling operations that were to follow and was well aware of the high
losses alrea dy suffered by the t roo ps o f th re e of th e four divisions of XX X
Corps that had forced their way through the minefields. Only the
Australians were anything like near their full strength.
On th e ot he r side of the battlefield, G en von Arni m ha d bee n puzzled
by British actions since the battle began. The British had taken the
advantage during the first night, but had declined to press this advantage
the next morning or in the afternoon. This allowed the temporary
co mm an de r of Pan zera rmee t o move mor e guns into the critical Miteirya
area and to lay more mines. He predicted that the British would thenattack that night, 24 October, with infantry. What in fact came at his forces 73
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in the dark was a huge artillery barrage
and a half-hearted attack by armour. This
convinced von Thoma that the thrust
from the Miteirya Ridge was the main
British effort and sent some of his tanks
into the area to be ready for it.
Ope ra t ion Lightfoot was no t goin g
according to plan for Montgomery.Although XXX Corps had almost reached
most of its original objectives, the
ar mo ure d divisions were jus t no t per
forming. Casualties amongst the infantry,
although not excessive, were still high and
amounted to over 4,500. There were no
reinforcements available for the New
Zealand or South African Divisions, and
the Hi gh lan d Division's casualties ha d re ach ed 2,100. The se losses ha d
been suffered even though the enemy had not committed the whole Afrika
Korps or 90th Light Division, although some tanks of 15th Panzer Division
had been sent against the Miteirya Ridge area. Monty knew that the failure
of a night attack by the New Zealand infantry or another refusal to
implement his orders by the armoured commanders could result in
stalemate, or worse, especially if the Panzer divisions were moved against
him before his armoured divisions were in a position to receive them.
He decided to change his original plan. He needed to try to surprise
the enemy and retain the initiative. In a bold move he now ordered the
righ t-ha nd sector of the bre ak-in t o carry the m ain weigh t of the attack.
He int en de d tha t the 1st Ar mo ur ed Division wou ld pu sh forward to
form a shield for the Australian Division who would then begin its
crumbling operations northwards towards the sea. He hoped that this
new line of attack woul d catch the en em y unaw ares an d thr ea te n to take
the coast road. If the attack was successful, he could switch the whole
axis of this advance to the n or th an d the ene my wou ld be co mpe lle d to
move his Panzer divisions against it. In the meantime, 10th Armoured
Division would be withdrawn, except for 24th Armoured Brigade which
would jo in 1st Ar mo ur ed Division. T he rem ain der of XXX C orps would
continue to hold the line along the Miteirya Ridge.
On 25 Octobe r, 1st Ar mo ur ed Division atta cked north-westw ards bu t
m a d e little headway against enemy anti-tank defences. During the day it
dealt with an attack by Ge rm an an d Italian armou r, bea tin g the en em yback with th e loss of 34 of its own tank s. T he Australia ns, m ean whi le,
continued with their preparations for the attack northwards. In the
south, 50th Division attempted and failed to penetrate the enemy
minefield on its front and 44th Division took over the ground that 7th
Armoured Division had won. The disappointing results gained by XIII
Corps did, however, have a wider significance in that its attacks had kept
21st Panzer and Ariete Divisions in the southern sector away from the
main effort in the north.
On the ni ght of 25 /2 6 Octo ber the 51st Hig hlan d Division ma de
ground towards its original objective line on 'Oxalic'. At the same time,
a little further north, LtGen Morshead's 9th Australian Division attacked
towards the strategically important ground at Point 29. This slight rise
MajGen Briggs, Commander
1st Armoured Division (left)
with LtGen Lumsden (right).Montgomery was not best
pleased with the performance
of his armoured commanders
during the opening stages of the
Alamein battle. (IWM E16464)
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Soft sand makes all movement
difficult for this artillery quad
towing its 25-Pounder field gun.
When forward movement bogs
down, it is a case of everyone
out and push. (IWM E14037)
gave good observation over the northern section of the battlefield withexceptionally good sight towards the coast. The assault was put in by 26th
Australian Brigade supported by the Valentine tanks of 40th RTR and the
guns of five field and two medium regiments of artillery. In the air 79
sorties were flown by Wellingtons and Albacores which dropped 115 tons
of bombs on targets in the battle area. German fighters were kept at bay
by night-flying Hurricanes. The Australian attack was a complete success
and well before dawn the 26th Brigade had two battalions dug in on the
feature ready to deal with any enemy counterattack.
GFM Rommel had arrived back at Panzerarmee's HQ the previous
evening. He was shocked by what had happened since his departure and
with the reports that were given to him regarding fuel and supplies. Little
of what had been promised had been delivered. The lack of fuel worried
him most, for the shortages restricted the mobility of his army just when
he needed speed and manoeuvrability. When news arrived of the loss of
Point 29, he ordered an immediate counterattack by elements of 15th
Panzer and 164th Divisions, together with infantry and tanks from Italian
XX Corps. He was concerned that this British success would be followed
up by an armoured thrust north-west towards the coast road.
Rommel's counterattack was unsuccessful. His assembled forces were
strafed and bombed the whole day and British and Australian Artillery
broke up his formations as they approached Point 29, forcing the moveto be abandoned. Later that day Rommel decided to move his reserve
forward and brought 90th Light Division eastwards in front of Point 29.
He also contemplated bringing 21st Panzer and Ariete Divisions north
to reinforce the sector, but knew that if he did so he would not have
enough fuel to move them back again.
The enemy reaction to the moves by the Australians had
strengthened Montgomery's hand. Rommel was beginning to engage
more and more of his tanks in countering each of the small gains made
by Eighth Army. The fighting all along the front was grinding down
Rommel's forces and eating away at his strength. Although Montgomery
didn't fully realize it, the sheer size of the British attack was forcing
Rommel to spend his force in penny packets. The field marshal's 75
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stren gth was dimin ish ing to a po in t whe re it was in dan ge r of be co mi ng
critical. Fifte enth Pa nz er Division for ins tan ce was down to ju st 40 tanks .
Montgomery now decided that the Australians should renew theirattack nor thw ard s again on the nig ht of the 28 th /2 9t h. Before that, 1st
Armoured Division would put in another attack against the area around
Kidney Ridge with 7th Motor and 2nd Armoured Brigades, while 51st,
New Zea lan d and So uth African Divisions cle are d any of th e en em y still
holding out in their sectors and advanced to the original Oxalic line
wherev er they were s hor t of it. M onty also deci ded to creat e a reserve
ready to launch against the enemy at a time suitable for exploitation.
XXX Corps was told to withdraw the New Zealand Division and 9th
Arm our ed Brigade on 27 and 28 Octob er to jo in 10th Ar mo ur ed
Division in this reserve and to hold its sector of the line by redistributing
other formations within the corps. The 7th Armoured Division was alsogiven war nin g of a move no rt h to jo in the reserve.
While these moves were being organized, 1st Armoured Division
beg an an advance from the n or th er n corr ido r to draw on to itself som e
of the ene my ar mo ur and to hel p the Australian s on its right. On the
nigh t of 26 Octob er, 7th Mot or Brigade m ad e an attack against two
centr es of resistance e ith er side of Kidney Ridge - 'Woods tock' in the
north and 'Snipe' in the south - both located approximately 1.5 kilo-
metr es from the r idge itself. Woodst ock bec am e th e objective of 2n d
Kings Royal Rifle Corps; S nip e was the goal of 2n d Rifle Bri gad e. T he se
night attacks were required to seize these locations before dawn to allow
2nd Armoured Brigade to pass around to the north and 24th Armoured
Brigade to advance to the south.
The attack got underway as planned at 2300hrs on 26 October behind
a bar rag e fired by all the gu ns of bo th X an d XX X Corps. Bot h battalion s
of 7th Motor Brigade made a successful advance and established
themselves on or near their objectives, although they found that the fea-
tureless terrain made it difficult to pinpoint their locations exactly. At
around 0600hrs the 2nd and 24th Armoured Brigades began their
advance. Their progress was slow in the face of increasing enemy
resistance, but by midday both were close to the battalions of 7th Motor
Brigade. The moves had attracted opposition from the Littorio Divisionand from eleme nts of bo th of the G erm an Pan zer Divisions. Du rin g the
day each side pounded the other continuously as the British tanks
The blast from this 4.5 inch
British gun lights up the night
sky in support of the start of
another infantry attack. (IWM
14775)
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An Italian M13/40 tank on
display outside the Military
Museum at El Alamein. (Robin
Neillands)
attempted to gain a breakthrough. Rommel, in turn, recognized the
growing danger of the British moves and was determined to push back the
British away from his main defence line. He ordered an immediate attack
against the Kidney Ridge area.
In the afte rno on the situat ion facing 1st Ar mo ur ed Division
deteriorated rapidly as all three brigades suddenly found themselves
dealing with a full-scale German armoured counterattack. Rommel's blow
fell most heavily on the Snipe area and was met by the 6-pdr anti-tank guns
of 2nd Rifle Brigade and 239th Anti-tank Battery RA. The defence put upby these units was brave and dogged. The battalion, in the words of the
official history, 'stood its ground and did great execution, particularly
amongst enemy tanks advancing against 24th Armoured Brigade'. More
than once it seemed that the battalion would be wiped out, but it hung on
defiantly. The heroic stand made by the 2nd Rifle Brigade defeated the
enemy counterattack completely; the enemy could not endure the losses
taken by his tanks and withdrew. The 2nd Rifle Brigade's commander,
LtCol V. B. Turner , fully deserved t he Victoria Cross award ed to hi m for the
action. Axis attacks against Point 29 by German 90th Light Division also
failed that day.
That night 133rd Lorried Brigade came forward to help hold on tothe gains and deal with further small counterattacks against the positions.
The next day the pressure on the enemy continued when Montgomery
shifted his weight northwards and launched 9th Australian Division
towards th e coastal roa d. This new pus h ope ne d on the nig ht of 28
October with 20th Australian Brigade making a set-piece attack to enlarge
the ground already taken around Point 29. A simultaneous assault by 26th
Australian Brigade on the right striking northwards towards the railway
line and the coastal road hoped to widen this penetration. Good progress
was initially made in these attacks, but increasing enemy resistance
stopped them both before they could reach their objectives. None the
less, the attacks were deemed to be a success for they caused great
destruction to the units of German 164th and 90th Divisions pitted 7 9
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against them. Armour from 15th Panzer Division was also attracted
northwards to help stem the attack.
The two Australian attacks caused Rommel to switch more and more of
his forces to the north. On 29 October elements of 21st Panzer Division
came up from the south and joined in the struggle against the Australians.
The fighting in this northern sector led Montgomery to
contemplate making his breakthrough here. His divisions were engaged in
a dog fight in which his superior strength and resources must prevail. Henow decided that he would move the New Zealand Division into the area
to maintain the momentum of the infantry attacks, prior to launching his
armoured reserve in a breakout battle along the coast road.
A fresh attack by Australian 26th Brigade on the night of 30 October
clashed again with 90th Light Division and did great execution. The
advance continued across the railway line and coastal road to reach the
sea. It then attempted to turn eastwards to capture a defended locality
called Thompson's Post, encircling the First Battalion of German 125th
Regiment. Although the attacks did not achieve all that was planned, they
did form a salient across the road and railway line through which the
trapped enemy forces found it difficult to withdraw. These moves madeRommel certain that this attack would be followed by Eighth Army's main
breakout attempt through this salient towards Sidi Abd el Rahman and
for a brief moment he considered making a general withdrawal to a new
line at Fuka. He decided to withdraw 21st Panzer Division to an area
north of Point 44 at Tel el Aqqaqir to form a mobile reserve. Rommel
knew that he would need this reserve to counter any possible break-
through in the north. More bad news arrived at his HQ that day when he
heard that the tanker Luisiano had been sunk and little more fuel would
reach his army in the near future.
Rommel had read Montgomery's thoughts correctly when he predicted
that the British might try to break through in the north, but by then Eighth
Army's commander had changed his mind again. The main effort would
now go through south of this sector. Montgomery had formulated a new
plan for his great breakout battle, one which, in his words, 'would hit
Rommel for six'.
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EL ALAMEIN:BREAKOUT ANDPURSUIT
Gen Montgomery in a classic
pose standing in the turret of his
Grant tank. With his black beret
on his head and binoculars in
hand this was the image flashed
around the world during his
moment of victory. (IWM E18980)
LtGen Montgomery's new plan for the breakout was called
Supercharge and was similar in concept to Lightfoot XXX Corps'
infantry would attack in strength at night followed closely by the
armour. Simultaneously, in the south, Horrocks' depleted XIII Corps
would lead the enemy into thinking that an attack was going in there.
The location and direction of Supercharge would be out of a 4,000-metre
front jus t to the south of the Australian-held groun d aro und Point 29.
As before there would be tremendous support from both artillery and
the aircraft of the Desert Air Force. There was one added advantage in
that there would be no deep minefields to contend with during theinitial attack. Mines would be present, but only in scattered patches.
This time, Montgomery insisted, armour would be passed through the
infantry without any loss of momentum.
The New Zealand Division would carry out the initial infantry attack,
strengthened by the addition of several other formations. It would make
the assault with 151st Brigade from 50th Division and 152nd Brigade
from 51st Division under command, both with a battalion of tanks in
support. Following closely behind would be 9th Armoured Brigade, also
under LtGen Freyberg's command. This brigade would carry the attack
from the infantry's objective for another two kilometres behind a rolling
barrage to smash through and capture the enemy defences around the
Rahman track. The momentum would then be taken up by 1st
Armoured Division who would take on the Panzer divisions backed by its
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THE ACTION FOUGHT BY THE 3RD KING'S OWN HUSSARS
NEAR THE RAHMAN TRACK ON 2 NOVEMBER DURING
OPERATION SUPERCHARGE (pages 84-85)
Montgomery's final battle to break through Rommel's
positions at Alamein, Operation Supercharge, began late on
1 November with an attack by the reinforced New Zealand
Division. At 0615 Hours the next day, behind a rolling
barrage, 9th Armoured Brigade took up the advance with
orders to break through the enemy anti-tank and field-gun
positions to 'hold the door open' for the 1st Armoured
Division of X Corps. Montgomery told the commander, Brig
Currie, that he was prepared to take 100 per cent casu-
alties in order for the brigade to reach the Rahman track.When the CO of The 3rd The King's Own Hussars, Lt Col Sir
Peter Farquhar, protested that 'this was just suicide,'
Montgomery remained adamant. The advance by the 3rd
King's Own Hussars is recognized as one of the greatest
armoured regimental actions of the war. The Hussars faced
fierce enemy opposition and shellfire during the whole of
the operation. On the move up to the start line alone, it lost
most of its carriers and soft-skinned vehicles to shell fire.
By the time it had arrived on the infantry objective ready
to begin its own attack, ten of its tanks had been
destroyed. The Hussars battled their way forward and
eventually reached the Rahman Track at first light.
Unfortunately, at this critical time, the tanks becamesilhouetted against the dawn sky and drew heavy anti-tank
fire. The Hussars pressed on relentlessly through this
barrage, driving straight at the German gun positions,
crushing the enemy weapons beneath their tracks. At very
close quarters, the tanks were fought to a standstill, having
to eliminate each anti-tank gun in turn whilst the Germans
returned this fire at point blank range. Soon the battlefield
was a mass of burning armour and broken guns, with the
Hussars left with just seven serviceable tanks out of the
35 that had set off earlier that morning. But the regiment
had gained its objective and broken through the Axis anti-
tank line along the Rahman Track just as they had been
ordered to do, allowing X Corps a route through the
German defences. It was the turning point of Operation
Supercharge. The battlescene shows the 3rd King's Own
Hussars at the height of the action when their tanks had
closed right up to the enemy anti-tank gun positions. By
this time in the Alamein battle the Hussars had received
some of the newly arrived Sherman tanks (1) and were
using them to good effect. The mainstay of the regiment
were the sturdy Grants (2) and their 75mm and 37mm
weapons were particularly useful in this close combat. Also
present in the action were the near-obsolete Crusaders (3),
but their speed counted for little in this type of battle and
most quickly became casualties. The enemy PAK 38 5cm
anti-tank gun (4) was one of the enemy's most useful and
reliable weapons and did sterling service for the German
Army throughout the war. Close by is a burning Panzer II
(5), a tank totally outclassed on the battlefield, but still
useful as a reconnaissance and close-support weapon
for the field guns. (Howard Gerrard)
THE ACTION FOUGHT BY THE 3RD KING'S OWN HUSSARS
NEAR THE RAHMAN TRACK ON 2 NOVEMBER DURING
OPERATION SUPERCHARGE (pages 84-85)
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anti-tank guns. Either side of this main attack, other divisions would
simultaneously whittle away at the Axis defences, probing for an
opening through which to exploit.
At 0105hrs on 2 November, Operation Supercharge got underway
behind an artillery barrage laid down on Axis positions. Prior to this,
starting at 2115hrs the previous evening, AVM Coningham's aircraft had
be gu n seven ho ur s of attacks on enem y locatio ns alon g thei r line. T he
Royal Navy also played a part in the operation by simulating landings
along the coast, dropping rafts and flares from torpedo boats and filling
the air with tracer fire and noise.
The infantry of 151st Brigade, supported by Valentine tanks of 8th
RTR, began its advance on a front of 2,000 metres against German and
Italian defences. Advancing on their right, 152nd Brigade also moved out
be hi nd a rolling barra ge, with the Valenti ne tanks of 50th RTR following
closely behind. On the right of these attacks, New Zealand 28th Maori
Battalion attacked north-eastward s to hol d the nor th er n shoul der of the
assault. To the south, the 133rd Lorried Brigade carried out the same
defensive task around Kidney Ridge.
The ground attack started well, with both brigades advancing
th ro ug h 4,000 met res of ene my defences to reach th eir objectiveswit hou t excessive loss. Taking imm edi ate adv antag e of the ad vance , two
armoured car regiments tried to slip through the breach out into open
country. One, 1st Royal Dragoons, was especially successful and two of
its squadrons got out into the desert to the west and caused great
mischief in th e re ar areas of Rom mel 's forces.
At 0615hrs, behind a rolling barrage, 9th Armoured Brigade split
into three groups and took over the advance towards the Rahman Track,
aiming to prise open the final German defences. Montgomery had told
9th Brigade's commander, Brig Currie, that he was prepared to take 100
per cent casualties, but the brigade had to get onto the Rahman track.
The brigade rose to this challenge and, although almost halted by fierce
opposition and a strong anti-tank screen in front of the track, reached 87
A British Crusader passes a
brewed-up Panzer IV at the end
of the battle. (IWM E6751)
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German and Italian prisoners of
war are escorted into captivity.
When Rommel's forces collapsed
at the end of the battle, most
of those troops who got away
had their own transport. Those
infantry who had no access to
vehicles, and this included the
bulk of the Italian infantrydivisions, had to try to make
their escape on foot. Thousands
of them were captured. (IWM
E18485)
its objectives. Losses were substantial - 70 out of their 94 tanks were
kn oc ked ou t - bu t the das h of Brig Curr ie's brig ade crac ked op en th e
en em y line in what has since bee n reco gni zed as one of the gre atest
cavalry achievements of the war.
With 9th Ar mo ur ed Brigade on the Rah man Track, 1st Ar mo ur ed
Division came forward to be introduced into the battle. The 2nd
Ar mo ur ed Brigade att acked to th e no rt h of Tel El Aqqaqir, bu t was hal ted
by the tanks and anti-tank guns of the Afrika Korps with both sides
suffering considerable losses. The defences on Point 44 at Tel El Aqqaqir
were the n attacked by 8th Ar mo ur ed Brigade which had bee n transferredto the division for the battle from 10th Armoured Division. The combined
strengt h of the en emy tanks an d guns proved to be eno ugh to halt this
advance as well, but the Panzer Korps suffered significant losses.
Elsewhere th e Axis line was be gin ni ng to buckle. Later in the day at 1815
hrs, 51st Highland Division advanced south-westwards to take Snipe and the
adjacent Skinflint feature. Fighting contin ued th rou gh th e night. At 0115
hrs on 3rd November, the 7th Motor Brigade attacked the anti-tank screen
on the Rahman Track, but was repulsed. Further attacks later that day by
2nd and 8th Armoured Brigades to get across the track were likewise turned
back, but the continual pressure applied by Montgomery was whittling away
ene my strengt h to the po int of nea r collapse.To the no rt h, Australia n 9th Division sens ed a slack ening of en em y
resista nce an d started to pus h no rt h and eastwards out of its salient ne ar
Point 29. By mid-afternoon of 3 November, Rommel realized that he
could not hold the British back for much longer and took the heavy
decision to begin to withdraw Italian XX and XXI Corps behind the
Afrika Korps, but still the British attacks came at him. When Hitler
le ar ne d of the withdrawals he was furious and or de re d Ro mm el to stand
firm. No retreat by any formation was permitted. Rommel reversed his
order and prepared for his forces to meet their Valhalla. The pressure
continued when the 152nd Brigade tried a new assault at 17l5hrs
towards the Rahman track, three kilometres below Point 44. Rommel's
forces h al te d it ju st sh or t of its objective. 8 9
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Commonwealth war cemetery
at El Alamein looking toward the
Miteirya Ridge. (Commonwealth
War Graves Commission)
Axis resistance to the British moves two days into the operation was
still dogged, but Montgomery knew that the battle of attrition was
swinging in his favour. The enemy was pulling back, but he still did not
realize that Rommel's army was so close to the point of collapse. Indian
5th Brigade was now brought northwards to join in the battle and
successfully advanced to the Rahman track at 0230hrs on 4 November
against negligible opposition. A little later the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders attacked Point 44 on Tel El Aqqaqir at 0545hrs and an hour
later took the strategically important position against melting opposition.
Rommel knew that he was beaten. Urgings from Hitler had little effect onhis army's resolve, his formations were gradually recoiling westwards;
Panzerarmee Afrika was in retreat. Both 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions
pulled out of the line during the early hours of 4 November and began
to stream back towards Fuka. By daybreak all Axis transport was in full
retreat and all footbound infantry that managed to disengage themselves
from the fighting were marching westwards.
Montgomery decided that it was now time to unleash his mobile
forces. The 1st Armoured Division struggled through the jumble of traffic
around the Rahman track and organized itself for the chase, moving off
in pursuit of the Afrika Korps on the night of 4/5 November. Then
7th Armoured Division joined in the pursuit during the night followed byNew Zealand 2nd Division at first light. Eighth Army Commander then
decided that MajGen Gatehouse's 10th Armoured Division could now
enter the tail end of the battle and he launched it westwards against the
stragglers of Rommel's army now in full flight. In the south XIII Corps was
striking out into the desert against fading opposition. After eleven days of
fighting, and the loss of 13,560 men killed, wounded and missing,
Montgomery had won the Battle of El Alamein.
A great victory had been achieved at El Alamein, but the pursuit of
Rommel's beaten army was not the great triumph for Eighth Army that
it should have been. Disorganized, fragmented, demoralized and short
of fuel, Panzerarmee Afrika was ripe for the coup de grace and the vastly
superior Eighth Army should have delivered it. For many reasons, some0
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complex and real, others fanciful and apologetic, Montgomery allowed
Ro mm el 's forces to slip away al on g the coas t of No rt h Africa. By
13 November Rommel was at Tobruk and a week later in Benghazi. The
further west the Axis forces travelled the shorter their supply lines
became. The withdrawal was not a rout, but it was a full retreat. There
was no longer any hope that Panzerarmee Afrika would ever attain
enough strength to go back on to the offensive. Its fate was finally sealed
on 8 November when Anglo-American forces landed in Algeria andMorocco and then moved swiftly into Tunisia. Rommel now had an
Allied army to his front an d rear. Th e inevitable e nd of the D eser t War
came on 13 May 1943 when all those Axis forces that were still fighting
on the c ont ine nt of Africa surr end ere d to Gen Eisenhower' s forces.
GFM Erwin Rommel was not among them; the Desert Fox had slipped
away to Italy to fight another day.
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THE BATTLEFIELDTODAY
The op en a nd featur eless de ser t sou th of the small railway statio n of
El Alamein has changed little in the sixty years since the battles of
1942; it still remains a most desolate region. The same cannot be
said for the st retch of coast line from Alex and ria to El Ala mein . This has
bec ome an almost con tin uou s strip of dev elop ment . El Alamein itself has
also ch an ge d and is now a small town of ar ou nd 5,000 peo pl e with a po rt
facility for shipping oil nearby. There are also several small hotels and a
beach amenity in the neighbourhood. The tiny railway station beloved of
war pho to gr aph er s in 1942 as the only place bear ing the n am e of El
Alamein has been replaced by a very modern structure a short distance
away, although the old single-story building remains in situ.
El Alamein is quite accessible for tourists and is located just over 100
kilome tres from Alexan dria. To cater for visitors who c om e to see ju st
where one of the most important battles of the Second World War took
place, a museum has been built. Here the battle is explained in
dioramas, photographic displays and contemporary exhibits. Those
visitors more interested in hardware will find relics of the opposing
forces also on show, with examples of the tanks and guns that fought in
the battle on display ar ou nd the out side of the build ing.
There are several difficulties to be encountered for those who wishto leave the roads and get out into the desert to reach the more remote
areas of the battlefield. The area of desert to the south of the coastal
road and railway line is vast and most inhospitable for the unwary. It is
still devoid of people and settlements, empty save for the few locals who
One of the dangers that still mar
the Alamein battlefield today.
Wind and weather has uncovered
this anti-tank mine, but many of
the hundreds of thousands that
were laid in 1942 still remain
buried and make the whole area
very dangerous to the unwary.
(Robin Neillands)
2
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The old railway station building
at El Alamein as it is today. It has
been replaced by a more modern
structure a short distance away.
(Robin Neillands)
criss-cross the area along the ancient tracks that traverse the sands. It is
also a very difficult area to get to. This is not the place for tourists in hire
cars to go for a drive, for soft ground, deep gullies and shifting sands can
trap the uninitiated. There is also considerable danger from the
hu nd re ds of tho us and s of mine s that were laid by bo th sides du ri ng the
conflict, many of which still remain, untouched and unlocated.
The most suitable way to experience the detail of the battlefield is with
on e of the r epu tab le battlefield tour com pan ies who organ ize visits to site.
They will make the arrangements, devise a programme, lay on guest
speakers, organize guides and arrange suitable transport. All you then
have to do is to enjoy the locations and relive the action. These companies
usually have great experience in organizing these trips; they have all done
it before and will be prepared for any eventuality. Dates, itineraries and
costs can be found on their various web pages on the Internet.
As with all battlefields, t he mo st po ig na nt sites of all are the war
cemeteries and mausoleums. There are three in the area, one for British
and Commonwealth dead, one for the German fallen and one for Italian
victims of the fig hting. All are, as you would exp ect, calm peacef ul oases
in the parched desert. The British cemetery, administered by the
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, looks out from Alamein
towards the Miteirya Ridge from a position close by the museum. There
are over 8,000 burials located here, together with a roll of names of thosewho have no known grave. Between the stark headstones there is none of
the soft grass that is found in European cemeteries, only wind-blown
sand . At the t op of the ce met ery is an impressive shri ne m ad e up of a
series of cloisters stretching for almost 90 metres.
The Axis dead are commemorated on two separate sites. The
33-metre high Italian monument was built in 1959 and is situated in an
area of 1,500 squar e metr es of gr ou nd leased out to the Italian gove rn men t
for 99 years. Th e nam es of 4,634 soldiers are inscr ibed on th e maus ole um' s
walls. The German memorial is shaped like a medieval Teutonic castle and
stands on a ridge at Tel el Eisa near the sea. In its inner courtyard a tall
obelisk supported by four falcons is ringed by memorial plates and mosaic
panels listing the names of 4,200 German dead. 9 3
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bierman, John & Smith, Colin, Alamein: War Without Hate, Viking, London (2002)
Blaxland, Gregory, The Plain Cook and the Great Showman, Kimber, London (1977)
Braddock, D. W., The Campaigns in Egypt and Libya, Gale & Polden, Aldershot (1964)
Carver, Michael, Dilemmas of the Desert War, Batsford, London (1986)
Carver, Michael, El Alamein, Batsford, London (1962)
Delaney, John, Fighting The Desert Fox, Arms & Armour, London (1998)
Forty, George, The Armies of Rommel, Arms & Armour, London (1997)
Gilbert, Adrian (ed), The IWM Book of the Desert War, Sidgwick & Jackson, London
(1992)
Hamilton, Nigel, Monty: The Making of a General 1887-1942, Hamish Hamilton, London
(1981)
Horrocks, LtGen Sir Brian, A Full Life, Collins, London (1960)Irving, David, The Trail of the Fox, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London (1977)
Joslen, LtCol H. F., Orders of Battle: Second World War 1939-1945, HMSO London
(1960)
Kippenberger, MajGen Sir Howard, Infantry Brigadier, Oxford University Press, Oxford
(1949)
Liddell Hart, B.H. (ed), The Rommel Papers, Collins, London (1953)
Lucas, James, Panzer Army Africa, Macdonald & Janes, London (1977)
Messenger, Charles, The Unknown Alamein, Ian Allen, Shepperton (1982)
Montgomery, Field Marshal The Viscount, El Alamein to the River Sangro, Hutchinson,
London (1948)
Pimlott, Dr John, Rommel In his Own Words, Greenhill, London (1994)
Playfair, MajGen I.S.O., The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume III, HMSO, London
(1960)Playfair, MajGen I.S.O., The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume IV, HMSO, London
(1966)
Quarrie, Bruce, Afrika Korps, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge (1975)
Quarrie, Bruce, Panzers in the Desert, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge (1978)
Ryder, Rowland, Oliver Leese, Hamish Hamilton, London (1987)
Stewart, Adrian, The Early Battles of Eighth Army, Leo Cooper, Barnsley (2002)
9 4
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INDEX
References to illustrations are shown
in bold.
Alam Haifa, Battle of 11, 3 1, 45 -4 7,
50-51, 53-55, 56-58, 59
aftermath 54
Alam Haifa Rid ge 12, 30, 47, 53
Alamein, First (batt le of) 10 -1 1, 12,
12, 15, 20, 24, 30, 32, 34-35, 36-38,
39-44, 45 see also El Alame in, Battle
of
Alamein Box 34, 35, 41 ,4 2
Alexander, Gen the Hon Sir Harold7,7, 11, 12, 15-16, 26,45, 60, 61
Alexandria 34
Arena, Gen Fra nces co 18
Arnim, Gen von 73- 74
artillery barrage 68
artillery crew, Ge rm an 23
Auchinleck, Gen Sir Cla ude 8,
10-11, 12, 15, 15, 20, 22, 29-30, 35,
45,47
First Alamein 35 ,3 9, 40 ,4 1, 42 ,
43, 44
Axis forces 23 -2 6, 32 see also Germa n
forces; Italian forcescasualties 70
Order of Battle 28
Bab el Qatta ra 32, 34, 35, 41, 65
Bastico, Marsha l Et to re 17, 29
Bayerlein, Ober st Fritz 18, 51, 51
Bismarck, GenM aj Geo rg von 19, 51 ,
51,66
Briggs, MajGen R. 26, 74
British forces 7, 20 -2 3 see also Desert
Air Force
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,
7th 90armoured brigades
2nd 72, 78, 89
4th 40
8th 50, 54, 72, 89
9th 14, 60, 68, 69, 73, 83 , 84-86,
87,89
22nd 47
23rd 45, 47, 50, 53, 58, 68
24th 72, 73, 74, 78
Ar mou red Division, 1st 13, 26, 45,
73, 74, 78, 79, 83, 87, 89, 90
First Alamein 35, 36-38, 39, 40, 42
El Alamein, Battle of: the attack
60, 66, 67, 70
Armoured Division, 7th (Desert
Rats) 20 -2 1, 21, 26, 43, 60, 66,
70, 71, 73, 78,90
Alam Haifa, Battle of 45, 50, 51,
55
Ar mo ur ed Division, 8th 26, 60, 66
Ar mo ur ed Division, 10th 8, 26, 60,
66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74,90
ar mo ur ed divisions 22
Aust rali an 9th Division 12, 12, 13,
2 6 , 4 5 , 5 5 , 7 1 , 7 4 , 7 9 , 8 9
First Alame in 41-4 2, 44
El Alamein, Battle of: the attack
66, 67, 68Australian Brigad e, 20th 79
Australian Brigade, 26th 75, 79, 82
brigades
131st 47
132nd 47, 55, 59
133rd 47, 79, 87
151st 55, 83, 87
152nd 83, 87
Cor ps, X 13, 14, 16, 21, 26, 60, 62,
66, 69-70, 78
Cor ps, XIII 13, 16, 21 , 26, 45, 46,
74, 83, 90
First Ala mei n 34, 35, 36-38, 39,40 ,41 ,42
El Alamein, Battle of: the attack
61,66, 67, 70
Corp s, XXX 12, 15, 21, 26, 73, 74,
78, 83
First Ala mei n 35, 42
Alam Haifa, Battle of 50, 54
El Alamein, Battle of: the attack
61, 66, 67, 68-69
Division, 44t h 26, 47, 66, 71, 74
Division, 50th 26, 66, 74
Eighth Army 8, 10, 11, 12, 14,
20-21, 22, 23, 26, 30First Ala mei n 42, 44
Alam Haifa, Battle of 45, 46, 47
El Alamein, Battle of 60, 61, 72,
90
(H ig hl and ) Division, 51st 26, 66,
67, 68-69, 71, 72, 74, 89
In di an 4th Division 26, 66, 67, 69
Ind ian 5th Brigade 54- 55, 90
Ind ian 5th Division 35, 42, 43, 44, 41
Indi an 18th Brigade 35
infantry 73
infan try divisions 22
King's Own Hussars, 3rd 84-86
King's Royal Rifle Corps, 2n d 78
Light Arm our ed Brigade, 4th 50
Maori Battalion, 28th 87
Mot or Bri gade , 7th 40, 50, 78, 89
New Zea lan d 2nd Division 12, 14,
26, 71, 72, 73, 82, 83, 87, 90
First Alame in 35, 36-38, 39, 40,
42, 43, 44
Alam Haifa, Battle of 45, 47,
54-55
El Alamein, Battle of: the attack
60, 66, 67, 69
New Zeala nd 4th Brigade 42-43
New Zea lan d 6th Division 55, 59
officers 10, 12Or de r of Battle 26
Rifle Bri gade , 2nd 78, 79
Royal Artillery 61 ,6 7- 68
239th Anti-T ank Batte ry 79
Royal Dr ago ons , 1st 87
Royal Engi neer s 69
Royal Tank Regi ment, 40th 75
sergeant 62
Sou th African 1st Division 26, 27,
35,41, 42,45, 66, 67, 69
Sout h African 2nd Brigade 54
Sou th African 2n d Division 12
tan k crew, Cru sad er 72Brook e, Gen Sir Alan 45- 46
Burrow s, Brig 43
Cair o 10, 31, 32, 34, 62
Cavall ero, Mars hal Ug o 17, 18, 29,
50, 55, 66
cemet erie s, war 90, 93
chronology 12-14
Church ill, Winston 7, 15, 30, 44,
45-46, 61
Clifton, Brig 59
com mand ers, Axis 17-19
com mand ers, British 15-17Co nin gha m, AVM 62, 71, 87
Cun nin gham , Gen Alan 8
Curr ie, Brig 69, 86, 87
dis tan ce, Brig 73
Cyre naica 7, 8, 61
Ede n, Sir Ant hon y 17
Egyp t 7, 8, 10, 29, 45
El Agh eil a 7, 8, 14
de Stefanis, Ge n Gi use ppe 19, 19, 28
Deir el She in 35, 39, 40, 44, 45
Des ert Air For ce 23, 34, 35, 43, 46,
53-54, 62, 68, 83
Deser t War 7-8, 15, 91
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El Alam ein 92
railway sta tion 32, 32, 92, 93
El Alam ein, Battle of 1 1, 14 see also
Alamein, First
origins 7-8, 10-11
the attack 60- 63, 65-7 0
the dog fight 71-7 5, 78-79, 82
bre ako ut and purs uit 83, 87, 89-9 1
battlefield today 66, 92, 92-93
El Ala mein line 10, 12, 29, 32, 34, 35,
39
equ ipm ent : 'jerrycans' 27
Farquhar, LtCol Sir Peter 86
Fellers, Col Bo nn er 31
'foxholes' 30
Frattini, Gen Enric o 28
Fre nch , Fre e, 1st Bri gade 22, 66, 67,
70
Fren ch, Free, 2nd Brigade 22
Freyberg, LtGen Sir Bernard, VC
16-17, 17, 26, 59, 69, 72, 73, 83
Gair dner, MajGen C.H. 26
Gateho use, MajGen A.H. 8, 26, 71,
72,73
Gazala, Battle of 17, 20, 32
German forces
Afrika Korps 8, 12, 13, 23, 28, 29,
34, 45 see also German forces:
Panzer Divisions, 15th and 21st
Alam Haifa, Battle of 47, 50, 51, 53
ar mou re d divisions 25
First Alamei n 36-38, 39, 40
officers 29
artillery crew 23Brigade, 152nd 89
Ligh t Division, 90th 10, 12, 23, 25,
28, 63, 75, 79, 82
First Ala mei n 34, 35, 41
Alam Haifa, Battle of 45, 47, 53,
54
Ligh t 'Afrika' Division, 164th 23,
25, 28, 42, 45, 55, 63, 75, 79, 82
officers 29
Or de r of Battle 28
Pan zer Division, 15th 8, 23, 34, 42,
63, 74, 75, 76, 82, 90
Alam Haifa, Battle of 53, 54,56-58
Pan zer Division, 21st 8, 12, 23, 34,
3 9 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 6 3 , 8 2 , 9 0
Alam Haifa, Battle of 5 3, 54, 58
Panzer Regim ent, 5th 19, 44
Panzerwerkstattkompanie 13
Panze r Regim ent, 8th 27, 42, 44
Panze rar mee Afrika 7, 10, 14, 23, 25,
29, 40, 43, 46, 59, 60, 62, 65, 90, 91
Panz ergr enad iers 6, 34, 45, 46
Par achu te Brigade , 288th 45, 65
Regim ent, 125th 82
Regim ent, 382nd 42
soldier 30
Gloria, Gen Ales sandr o 28
Gott, LtG en 'Str afer' 16, 35, 46
Graziani, Gen Marshal 7
Greece 8
Gre ek Bri gade, 1st 21-22
'Hammerforce' 66
Har din g, MajGen A.F 26, 61
Hitler, Adolf 7, 10, 17, 89, 90
Horr ocks, LtGen Brian 16, 26, 46,
71,73
Hu gh es , MajGen I.T.P. 26
infantry, British 73
Infantry Tactics 17
Italia n forces 7-8, 24- 25
air force (Regia Aeron auti ca) 23
Corp s, X 28, 36-38, 39, 45, 65
Corp s, XX 24, 28, 34, 39, 45, 53,
63, 75, 89
Corp s, XXI 28, 34, 45, 63, 89
divisions
Ariete 24, 36-38, 39, 41 , 47, 54,
63arm our ed 24, 25
Bolog na 63, 65
Brescia 36-38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 65
Folgore Par achu te 45, 65
infantry 24
Litt orio 12, 24, 41 , 47, 54, 63, 78
Pavia 42, 65
Sabratha 41
Trento 63
Trieste 24, 41 , 54, 63
generals 19
gu n crew 25
infantry 14Or de r of Battle 28
signalmen 63
tank commander 36-38
troops 43
Kesselring, Generfeldmarschall
Albert 17, 18, 29, 50, 55
Kidney Ridg e 72, 73, 78, 79, 87
Koeni ng, BrigGen 70
Lees e, LtGen Sir Oliver 15, 16, 16,
26, 61, 69, 73
Libya 7, 8Luftwaffe 23
troops 34
Luisiano 82
Lum sde n, LtG en He rb er t 16, 16, 26,
60 ,71 ,72 , 73 ,74
Malta 61
Mellenthin, Obers tleut nant 18
Mersa Mat ru h 10, 12, 34
mine-clearance teams, Royal
Engineer 69
minefields 51, 65
mines , anti-tank 30, 43, 45, 92
Miteirya Ridge 63, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72,
73, 74, 90
Montgom ery, LtGe n Sir Ber nar d 7,
13, 14, 16, 16, 26, 71, 83
arrival 11, 12, 15, 16 ,2 1, 30 -3 1,
45-46, 47
Alam Haifa, Battle of 50, 53, 54,
55, 59, 60
El Alamein, Battle of 60, 62, 70,
71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 83, 90-91
corps de chasse 60
Mor she ad, LtGe n Sir Leslie 15, 17,
26
Nehr ing , GenL t Walt her 18, 18, 35,
51,65
Nichol s, MajGen J.S. 26
O'Co nnor, LtGen 7
officers, Brit ish 10, 12
officers, Ge rm an 29
Operat ion Crusader 8
Opera t ion Lightfoot 8, 12, 66, 68, 70,
74
Operation Supercharge 14, 83, 84-86,87, 89-91
'Ox ali c' positi on 66, 68, 69, 74, 78
Panzergr enadiers 6, 34, 45, 46
Pien aar, MajGen D.H . 15, 17, 26
plans, oppo sin g 29-31
Point 29: 74, 75, 79, 83, 89
Point 44: 82, 89, 90
priso ners of war, G erm an an d Italian
89
Qatt ara Depres sion 32, 62
radio interce pts and signals 31, 31,
41, 42, 47
Ra hma n Track 83, 84-86, 87, 89, 90
Rams den, LtGen W.H. 41, 61
Randow, GenMaj Hein z von 66
Ren ton , MajGen 61
Ritc hie, LtGe n Neil 8, 10, 12, 15
Roberts , Brig 'Pi p' 71
Robe rtso n, Brig 59
Ro mm el , GFM Erwin 12, 13, 14, 17,
17 -18 , 18 ,20 ,24 ,25 ,51 ,91
ori gin s of bat tle 7, 8, 10, 11
advance towards Nile 29-3 0or der s recei ved 32, 34
an d Battle of Alam Haifa 31 , 46,
47, 50, 51,55
First Alamein 3 5, 39 ,4 0, 41 ,4 2,
43,44
ill hea lt h 63, 66
El Alamein, Battle of 62, 63, 65,
72, 75, 78, 79, 82, 89, 90
Royal Navy, Me di te rr an ea n Fleet 34
Ruweisat Ridge 12, 34, 35, 36-38, 39,
40-41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 67
sand sto rm 12
serg eant , British 62
signalmen, Italian 6396
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